Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant

IN TWO VOLUMES.

PREFACE.

“Man proposes and God disposes.” There are but few important
events in the affairs of men brought about by their own choice.

Although frequently urged by friends to write my memoirs I had
determined never to do so, nor to write anything for
publication. At the age of nearly sixty-two I received an
injury from a fall, which confined me closely to the house while
it did not apparently affect my general health. This made study
a pleasant pastime. Shortly after, the rascality of a business
partner developed itself by the announcement of a failure. This
was followed soon after by universal depression of all
securities, which seemed to threaten the extinction of a good
part of the income still retained, and for which I am indebted
to the kindly act of friends. At this juncture the editor of
the Century Magazine asked me to write a few articles for him. I
consented for the money it gave me; for at that moment I was
living upon borrowed money. The work I found congenial, and I
determined to continue it. The event is an important one for
me, for good or evil; I hope for the former.

In preparing these volumes for the public, I have entered upon
the task with the sincere desire to avoid doing injustice to any
one, whether on the National or Confederate side, other than the
unavoidable injustice of not making mention often where special
mention is due. There must be many errors of omission in this
work, because the subject is too large to be treated of in two
volumes in such way as to do justice to all the officers and men
engaged. There were thousands of instances, during the
rebellion, of individual, company, regimental and brigade deeds
of heroism which deserve special mention and are not here
alluded to. The troops engaged in them will have to look to the
detailed reports of their individual commanders for the full
history of those deeds.

The first volume, as well as a portion of the second, was
written before I had reason to suppose I was in a critical
condition of health. Later I was reduced almost to the point of
death, and it became impossible for me to attend to anything for
weeks. I have, however, somewhat regained my strength, and am
able, often, to devote as many hours a day as a person should
devote to such work. I would have more hope of satisfying the
expectation of the public if I could have allowed myself more
time. I have used my best efforts, with the aid of my eldest
son, F. D. Grant, assisted by his brothers, to verify from the
records every statement of fact given. The comments are my own,
and show how I saw the matters treated of whether others saw them
in the same light or not.

With these remarks I present these volumes to the public, asking
no favor but hoping they will meet the approval of the reader.

U. S. GRANT.

MOUNT MACGREGOR, NEW YORK, July 1, 1885.

CONTENTS

VOLUME I.

CHAPTER I.
ANCESTRY–BIRTH–BOYHOOD.

CHAPTER II.
WEST POINT–GRADUATION.

CHAPTER III.
ARMY LIFE–CAUSES OF THE MEXICAN WAR–CAMP SALUBRITY.

CHAPTER IV.
CORPUS CHRISTI–MEXICAN SMUGGLING–SPANISH RULE IN
MEXICO–SUPPLYING TRANSPORTATION.

CHAPTER V.
TRIP TO AUSTIN–PROMOTION TO FULL SECOND-LIEUTENANT–ARMY OF
OCCUPATION.

CHAPTER VI.
ADVANCE OF THE ARMY–CROSSING THE COLORADO–THE RIO GRANDE.

CHAPTER VII.
THE MEXICAN WAR–THE BATTLE OF PALO ALTO–THE BATTLE OF RESACA
DE LA PALMA–ARMY OF INVASION–GENERAL TAYLOR–MOVEMENT ON
CAMARGO.

CHAPTER VIII.
ADVANCE ON MONTEREY–THE BLACK FORT–THE BATTLE OF
MONTEREY–SURRENDER OF THE CITY.

CHAPTER IX.
POLITICAL INTRIGUE–BUENA VISTA–MOVEMENT AGAINST VERA
CRUZ–SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF VERA CRUZ.

CHAPTER X.
MARCH TO JALAPA–BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO–PEROTE–PUEBLA–SCOTT
AND TAYLOR.

CHAPTER XI.
ADVANCE ON THE CITY OF MEXICO–BATTLE OF CONTRERAS–ASSAULT AT
CHURUBUSCO–NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE–BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL
REY–STORMING OF CHAPULTEPEC–SAN COSME–EVACUATION OF THE
CITY–HALLS OF THE MONTEZUMAS.

CHAPTER XII.
PROMOTION TO FIRST LIEUTENANT–CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF
MEXICO–THE ARMY–MEXICAN SOLDIERS–PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

CHAPTER XIII.
TREATY OF PEACE–MEXICAN BULL FIGHTS–REGIMENTAL
QUARTERMASTER–TRIP TO POPOCATAPETL–TRIP TO THE CAVES OF MEXICO.

CHAPTER XIV.
RETURN OF THE ARMY–MARRIAGE–ORDERED TO THE PACIFIC
COAST–CROSSING THE ISTHMUS–ARRIVAL AT SAN FRANCISCO.

CHAPTER XV.
SAN FRANCISCO–EARLY CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCES–LIFE ON THE PACIFIC
COAST–PROMOTED CAPTAIN–FLUSH TIMES IN CALIFORNIA.

CHAPTER XVI.
RESIGNATION–PRIVATE LIFE–LIFE AT GALENA–THE COMING CRISIS.

CHAPTER XVII.
OUTBREAK OF THE REBELLION–PRESIDING AT A UNION
MEETING–MUSTERING OFFICER OF STATE TROOPS–LYON AT CAMP
JACKSON–SERVICES TENDERED TO THE GOVERNMENT.

CHAPTER XVIII.
APPOINTED COLONEL OF THE 21ST ILLINOIS–PERSONNEL OF THE
REGIMENT–GENERAL LOGAN–MARCH TO MISSOURI–MOVEMENT AGAINST
HARRIS AT FLORIDA, MO.–GENERAL POPE IN COMMAND–STATIONED AT
MEXICO, MO.

CHAPTER XIX.
COMMISSIONED BRIGADIER-GENERAL–COMMAND AT IRONTON,
MO.–JEFFERSON CITY–CAPE GIRARDEAU–GENERAL PRENTISS–SEIZURE
OF PADUCAH–HEADQUARTERS AT CAIRO.

CHAPTER XX.
GENERAL FREMONT IN COMMAND–MOVEMENT AGAINST BELMONT–BATTLE OF
BELMONT–A NARROW ESCAPE–AFTER THE BATTLE.

CHAPTER XXI.
GENERAL HALLECK IN COMMAND–COMMANDING THE DISTRICT OF
CAIRO–MOVEMENT ON FORT HENRY–CAPTURE OF FORT HENRY.

CHAPTER XXII.
INVESTMENT OF FORT DONELSON–THE NAVAL OPERATIONS–ATTACK OF THE
ENEMY–ASSAULTING THE WORKS–SURRENDER OF THE FORT.

CHAPTER XXIII.
PROMOTED MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS–UNOCCUPIED
TERRITORY–ADVANCE UPON NASHVILLE–SITUATION OF THE
TROOPS–CONFEDERATE RETREAT–RELIEVED OF THE COMMAND–RESTORED
TO THE COMMAND–GENERAL SMITH.

CHAPTER XXIV.
THE ARMY AT PITTSBURG LANDING–INJURED BY A FALL–THE
CONFEDERATE ATTACK AT SHILOH–THE FIRST DAY’S FIGHT AT
SHILOH–GENERAL SHERMAN–CONDITION OF THE ARMY–CLOSE OF THE
FIRST DAY’S FIGHT–THE SECOND DAY’S FIGHT–RETREAT AND DEFEAT OF
THE CONFEDERATES.

CHAPTER XXV.
STRUCK BY A BULLET–PRECIPITATE RETREAT OF THE
CONFEDERATES–INTRENCHMENTS AT SHILOH–GENERAL BUELL–GENERAL
JOHNSTON–REMARKS ON SHILOH.

CHAPTER XXVI.
HALLECK ASSUMES COMMAND IN THE FIELD–THE ADVANCE UPON
CORINTH–OCCUPATION OF CORINTH–THE ARMY SEPARATED.

CHAPTER XXVII.
HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO MEMPHIS–ON THE ROAD TO MEMPHIS–ESCAPING
JACKSON–COMPLAINTS AND REQUESTS–HALLECK APPOINTED
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF–RETURN TO CORINTH–MOVEMENTS OF
BRAGG–SURRENDER OF CLARKSVILLE–THE ADVANCE UPON
CHATTANOOGA–SHERIDAN COLONEL OF A MICHIGAN REGIMENT.

CHAPTER XXVIII.
ADVANCE OF VAN DORN AND PRICE–PRICE ENTERS IUKA–BATTLE OF IUKA.

CHAPTER XXIX.
VAN DORN’S MOVEMENTS–BATTLE OF CORINTH–COMMAND OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE.

CHAPTER XXX.
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST VICKSBURG–EMPLOYING THE
FREEDMEN–OCCUPATION OF HOLLY SPRINGS–SHERMAN ORDERED TO
MEMPHIS–SHERMAN’S MOVEMENTS DOWN THE MISSISSIPPI–VAN DORN
CAPTURES HOLLY SPRINGS–COLLECTING FORAGE AND FOOD.

CHAPTER XXXI.
HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO HOLLY SPRINGS–GENERAL MCCLERNAND IN
COMMAND–ASSUMING COMMAND AT YOUNG’S POINT–OPERATIONS ABOVE
VICKSBURG–FORTIFICATIONS ABOUT VICKSBURG–THE CANAL–LAKE
PROVIDENCE–OPERATIONS AT YAZOO PASS.

CHAPTER XXXII.
THE BAYOUS WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI–CRITICISMS OF THE NORTHERN
PRESS–RUNNING THE BATTERIES–LOSS OF THE INDIANOLA–DISPOSITION
OF THE TROOPS.

CHAPTER XXXIII.
ATTACK ON GRAND GULF–OPERATIONS BELOW VICKSBURG.

CHAPTER XXXIV.
CAPTURE OF PORT GIBSON–GRIERSON’S RAID–OCCUPATION OF GRAND
GULF–MOVEMENT UP THE BIG BLACK–BATTLE OF RAYMOND.

CHAPTER XXXV.
MOVEMENT AGAINST JACKSON–FALL OF JACKSON–INTERCEPTING THE
ENEMY–BATTLE OF CHAMPION’S HILL.

CHAPTER XXXVI.
BATTLE OF BLACK RIVER BRIDGE–CROSSING THE BIG BLACK–INVESTMENT
OF VICKSBURG–ASSAULTING THE WORKS.

CHAPTER XXXVII.
SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.
JOHNSTON’S MOVEMENTS–FORTIFICATIONS AT HAINES’S
BLUFF–EXPLOSION OF THE MINE–EXPLOSION OF THE SECOND
MINE–PREPARING FOR THE ASSAULT–THE FLAG OF TRUCE–MEETING WITH
PEMBERTON–NEGOTIATIONS FOR SURRENDER–ACCEPTING THE
TERMS–SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG.

CHAPTER XXXIX.
RETROSPECT OF THE CAMPAIGN–SHERMAN’S MOVEMENTS–PROPOSED
MOVEMENT UPON MOBILE–A PAINFUL ACCIDENT–ORDERED TO REPORT AT
CAIRO.

Volume one begins

CHAPTER I.

ANCESTRY–BIRTH–BOYHOOD.

My family is American, and has been for generations, in all its
branches, direct and collateral.

Mathew Grant, the founder of the branch in America, of which I
am a descendant, reached Dorchester, Massachusetts, in May,
1630. In 1635 he moved to what is now Windsor, Connecticut, and
was the surveyor for that colony for more than forty years. He
was also, for many years of the time, town clerk. He was a
married man when he arrived at Dorchester, but his children were
all born in this country. His eldest son, Samuel, took lands on
the east side of the Connecticut River, opposite Windsor, which
have been held and occupied by descendants of his to this day.

I am of the eighth generation from Mathew Grant, and seventh
from Samuel. Mathew Grant’s first wife died a few years after
their settlement in Windsor, and he soon after married the widow
Rockwell, who, with her first husband, had been fellow-
passengers with him and his first wife, on the ship Mary and
John, from Dorchester, England, in 1630. Mrs. Rockwell had
several children by her first marriage, and others by her
second. By intermarriage, two or three generations later, I am
descended from both the wives of Mathew Grant.

In the fifth descending generation my great grandfather, Noah
Grant, and his younger brother, Solomon, held commissions in the
English army, in 1756, in the war against the French and
Indians. Both were killed that year.

My grandfather, also named Noah, was then but nine years old. At
the breaking out of the war of the Revolution, after the battles
of Concord and Lexington, he went with a Connecticut company to
join the Continental army, and was present at the battle of
Bunker Hill. He served until the fall of Yorktown, or through
the entire Revolutionary war. He must, however, have been on
furlough part of the time–as I believe most of the soldiers of
that period were–for he married in Connecticut during the war,
had two children, and was a widower at the close. Soon after
this he emigrated to Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, and
settled near the town of Greensburg in that county. He took
with him the younger of his two children, Peter Grant. The
elder, Solomon, remained with his relatives in Connecticut until
old enough to do for himself, when he emigrated to the British
West Indies.

Not long after his settlement in Pennsylvania, my grandfather,
Captain Noah Grant, married a Miss Kelly, and in 1799 he
emigrated again, this time to Ohio, and settled where the town
of Deerfield now stands. He had now five children, including
Peter, a son by his first marriage. My father, Jesse R. Grant,
was the second child–oldest son, by the second marriage.

Peter Grant went early to Maysville, Kentucky, where he was very
prosperous, married, had a family of nine children, and was
drowned at the mouth of the Kanawha River, Virginia, in 1825,
being at the time one of the wealthy men of the West.

My grandmother Grant died in 1805, leaving seven children. This
broke up the family. Captain Noah Grant was not thrifty in the
way of “laying up stores on earth,” and, after the death of his
second wife, he went, with the two youngest children, to live
with his son Peter, in Maysville. The rest of the family found
homes in the neighborhood of Deerfield, my father in the family
of judge Tod, the father of the late Governor Tod, of Ohio. His
industry and independence of character were such, that I imagine
his labor compensated fully for the expense of his maintenance.

There must have been a cordiality in his welcome into the Tod
family, for to the day of his death he looked upon judge Tod and
his wife, with all the reverence he could have felt if they had
been parents instead of benefactors. I have often heard him
speak of Mrs. Tod as the most admirable woman he had ever
known. He remained with the Tod family only a few years, until
old enough to learn a trade. He went first, I believe, with his
half-brother, Peter Grant, who, though not a tanner himself,
owned a tannery in Maysville, Kentucky. Here he learned his
trade, and in a few years returned to Deerfield and worked for,
and lived in the family of a Mr. Brown, the father of John
Brown–“whose body lies mouldering in the grave, while his soul
goes marching on.” I have often heard my father speak of John
Brown, particularly since the events at Harper’s Ferry. Brown
was a boy when they lived in the same house, but he knew him
afterwards, and regarded him as a man of great purity of
character, of high moral and physical courage, but a fanatic and
extremist in whatever he advocated. It was certainly the act of
an insane man to attempt the invasion of the South, and the
overthrow of slavery, with less than twenty men.

My father set up for himself in business, establishing a tannery
at Ravenna, the county seat of Portage County. In a few years he
removed from Ravenna, and set up the same business at Point
Pleasant, Clermont County, Ohio.

During the minority of my father, the West afforded but poor
facilities for the most opulent of the youth to acquire an
education, and the majority were dependent, almost exclusively,
upon their own exertions for whatever learning they obtained. I
have often heard him say that his time at school was limited to
six months, when he was very young, too young, indeed, to learn
much, or to appreciate the advantages of an education, and to a
“quarter’s schooling” afterwards, probably while living with
judge Tod. But his thirst for education was intense. He
learned rapidly, and was a constant reader up to the day of his
death in his eightieth year. Books were scarce in the Western
Reserve during his youth, but he read every book he could borrow
in the neighborhood where he lived. This scarcity gave him the
early habit of studying everything he read, so that when he got
through with a book, he knew everything in it. The habit
continued through life. Even after reading the daily
papers–which he never neglected–he could give all the
important information they contained. He made himself an
excellent English scholar, and before he was twenty years of age
was a constant contributor to Western newspapers, and was also,
from that time until he was fifty years old, an able debater in
the societies for this purpose, which were common in the West at
that time. He always took an active part in politics, but was
never a candidate for office, except, I believe, that he was the
first Mayor of Georgetown. He supported Jackson for the
Presidency; but he was a Whig, a great admirer of Henry Clay,
and never voted for any other democrat for high office after
Jackson.

My mother’s family lived in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, for
several generations. I have little information about her
ancestors. Her family took no interest in genealogy, so that my
grandfather, who died when I was sixteen years old, knew only
back to his grandfather. On the other side, my father took a
great interest in the subject, and in his researches, he found
that there was an entailed estate in Windsor, Connecticut,
belonging to the family, to which his nephew, Lawson
Grant–still living–was the heir. He was so much interested in
the subject that he got his nephew to empower him to act in the
matter, and in 1832 or 1833, when I was a boy ten or eleven
years old, lie went to Windsor, proved the title beyond dispute,
and perfected the claim of the owners for a consideration–three
thousand dollars, I think. I remember the circumstance well,
and remember, too, hearing him say on his return that he found
some widows living on the property, who had little or nothing
beyond their homes. From these he refused to receive any
recompense.

My mother’s father, John Simpson, moved from Montgomery County,
Pennsylvania, to Clermont County, Ohio, about the year 1819,
taking with him his four children, three daughters and one
son. My mother, Hannah Simpson, was the third of these
children, and was then over twenty years of age. Her oldest
sister was at that time married, and had several children. She
still lives in Clermont County at this writing, October 5th,
1884, and is over ninety ears of age. Until her memory failed
her, a few years ago, she thought the country ruined beyond
recovery when the Democratic party lost control in 1860. Her
family, which was large, inherited her views, with the exception
of one son who settled in Kentucky before the war. He was the
only one of the children who entered the volunteer service to
suppress the rebellion.

Her brother, next of age and now past eighty-eight, is also
still living in Clermont County, within a few miles of the old
homestead, and is as active in mind as ever. He was a supporter
of the Government during the war, and remains a firm believer,
that national success by the Democratic party means
irretrievable ruin.

In June, 1821, my father, Jesse R. Grant, married Hannah
Simpson. I was born on the 27th of April, 1822, at Point
Pleasant, Clermont County, Ohio. In the fall of 1823 we moved
to Georgetown, the county seat of Brown, the adjoining county
cast. This place remained my home, until at the age of
seventeen, in 1839, I went to West Point.

The schools, at the time of which I write, were very
indifferent. There were no free schools, and none in which the
scholars were classified. They were all supported by
subscription, and a single teacher–who was often a man or a
woman incapable of teaching much, even if they imparted all they
knew–would have thirty or forty scholars, male and female, from
the infant learning the A B C’s up to the young lady of eighteen
and the boy of twenty, studying the highest branches taught–the
three R’s, “Reading, ‘Riting, ‘Rithmetic.” I never saw an
algebra, or other mathematical work higher than the arithmetic,
in Georgetown, until after I was appointed to West Point. I
then bought a work on algebra in Cincinnati; but having no
teacher it was Greek to me.

My life in Georgetown was uneventful. From the age of five or
six until seventeen, I attended the subscription schools of the
village, except during the winters of 1836-7 and 1838-9. The
former period was spent in Maysville, Kentucky, attending the
school of Richardson and Rand; the latter in Ripley, Ohio, at a
private school. I was not studious in habit, and probably did
not make progress enough to compensate for the outlay for board
and tuition. At all events both winters were spent in going
over the same old arithmetic which I knew every word of before,
and repeating: “A noun is the name of a thing,” which I had
also heard my Georgetown teachers repeat, until I had come to
believe it–but I cast no reflections upon my old teacher,
Richardson. He turned out bright scholars from his school, many
of whom have filled conspicuous places in the service of their
States. Two of my contemporaries there–who, I believe, never
attended any other institution of learning–have held seats in
Congress, and one, if not both, other high offices; these are
Wadsworth and Brewster.

My father was, from my earliest recollection, in comfortable
circumstances, considering the times, his place of residence,
and the community in which he lived. Mindful of his own lack of
facilities for acquiring an education, his greatest desire in
maturer years was for the education of his children.
Consequently, as stated before, I never missed a quarter from
school from the time I was old enough to attend till the time of
leaving home. This did not exempt me from labor. In my early
days, every one labored more or less, in the region where my
youth was spent, and more in proportion to their private
means. It was only the very poor who were exempt. While my
father carried on the manufacture of leather and worked at the
trade himself, he owned and tilled considerable land. I
detested the trade, preferring almost any other labor; but I was
fond of agriculture, and of all employment in which horses were
used. We had, among other lands, fifty acres of forest within a
mile of the village. In the fall of the year choppers were
employed to cut enough wood to last a twelve-month. When I was
seven or eight years of age, I began hauling all the wood used
in the house and shops. I could not load it on the wagons, of
course, at that time, but I could drive, and the choppers would
load, and some one at the house unload. When about eleven years
old, I was strong enough to hold a plough. From that age until
seventeen I did all the work done with horses, such as breaking
up the land, furrowing, ploughing corn and potatoes, bringing in
the crops when harvested, hauling all the wood, besides tending
two or three horses, a cow or two, and sawing wood for stoves,
etc., while still attending school. For this I was compensated
by the fact that there was never any scolding or punishing by my
parents; no objection to rational enjoyments, such as fishing,
going to the creek a mile away to swim in summer, taking a horse
and visiting my grandparents in the adjoining county, fifteen
miles off, skating on the ice in winter, or taking a horse and
sleigh when there was snow on the ground.

While still quite young I had visited Cincinnati, forty-five
miles away, several times, alone; also Maysville, Kentucky,
often, and once Louisville. The journey to Louisville was a big
one for a boy of that day. I had also gone once with a two-horse
carriage to Chilicothe, about seventy miles, with a neighbor’s
family, who were removing to Toledo, Ohio, and returned alone;
and had gone once, in like manner, to Flat Rock, Kentucky, about
seventy miles away. On this latter occasion I was fifteen years
of age. While at Flat Rock, at the house of a Mr. Payne, whom I
was visiting with his brother, a neighbor of ours in Georgetown,
I saw a very fine saddle horse, which I rather coveted, and
proposed to Mr. Payne, the owner, to trade him for one of the
two I was driving. Payne hesitated to trade with a boy, but
asking his brother about it, the latter told him that it would
be all right, that I was allowed to do as I pleased with the
horses. I was seventy miles from home, with a carriage to take
back, and Mr. Payne said he did not know that his horse had ever
had a collar on. I asked to have him hitched to a farm wagon and
we would soon see whether he would work. It was soon evident
that the horse had never worn harness before; but he showed no
viciousness, and I expressed a confidence that I could manage
him. A trade was at once struck, I receiving ten dollars
difference.

The next day Mr. Payne, of Georgetown, and I started on our
return. We got along very well for a few miles, when we
encountered a ferocious dog that frightened the horses and made
them run. The new animal kicked at every jump he made. I got
the horses stopped, however, before any damage was done, and
without running into anything. After giving them a little rest,
to quiet their fears, we started again. That instant the new
horse kicked, and started to run once more. The road we were
on, struck the turnpike within half a mile of the point where
the second runaway commenced, and there there was an embankment
twenty or more feet deep on the opposite side of the pike. I
got the horses stopped on the very brink of the precipice. My
new horse was terribly frightened and trembled like an aspen;
but he was not half so badly frightened as my companion, Mr.
Payne, who deserted me after this last experience, and took
passage on a freight wagon for Maysville. Every time I
attempted to start, my new horse would commence to kick. I was
in quite a dilemma for a time. Once in Maysville I could borrow
a horse from an uncle who lived there; but I was more than a
day’s travel from that point. Finally I took out my
bandanna–the style of handkerchief in universal use then–and
with this blindfolded my horse. In this way I reached Maysville
safely the next day, no doubt much to the surprise of my
friend. Here I borrowed a horse from my uncle, and the
following day we proceeded on our journey.

About half my school-days in Georgetown were spent at the school
of John D. White, a North Carolinian, and the father of Chilton
White who represented the district in Congress for one term
during the rebellion. Mr. White was always a Democrat in
politics, and Chilton followed his father. He had two older
brothers–all three being school-mates of mine at their father’s
school–who did not go the same way. The second brother died
before the rebellion began; he was a Whig, and afterwards a
Republican. His oldest brother was a Republican and brave
soldier during the rebellion. Chilton is reported as having
told of an earlier horse-trade of mine. As he told the story,
there was a Mr. Ralston living within a few miles of the
village, who owned a colt which I very much wanted. My father
had offered twenty dollars for it, but Ralston wanted
twenty-five. I was so anxious to have the colt, that after the
owner left, I begged to be allowed to take him at the price
demanded. My father yielded, but said twenty dollars was all
the horse was worth, and told me to offer that price; if it was
not accepted I was to offer twenty-two and a half, and if that
would not get him, to give the twenty-five. I at once mounted a
horse and went for the colt. When I got to Mr. Ralston’s house,
I said to him: ” Papa says I may offer you twenty dollars for
the colt, but if you won’t take that, I am to offer twenty-two
and a half, and if you won’t take that, to give you
twenty-five.” It would not require a Connecticut man to guess
the price finally agreed upon. This story is nearly true. I
certainly showed very plainly that I had come for the colt and
meant to have him. I could not have been over eight years old
at the time. This transaction caused me great heart-burning.
The story got out among the boys of the village, and it was a
long time before I heard the last of it. Boys enjoy the misery
of their companions, at least village boys in that day did, and
in later life I have found that all adults are not free from the
peculiarity. I kept the horse until he was four years old, when
he went blind, and I sold him for twenty dollars. When I went
to Maysville to school, in 1836, at the age of fourteen, I
recognized my colt as one of the blind horses working on the
tread-wheel of the ferry-boat.

I have describes enough of my early life to give an impression
of the whole. I did not like to work; but I did as much of it,
while young, as grown men can be hired to do in these days, and
attended school at the same time. I had as many privileges as
any boy in the village, and probably more than most of them. I
have no recollection of ever having been punished at home,
either by scolding or by the rod. But at school the case was
different. The rod was freely used there, and I was not exempt
from its influence. I can see John D. White–the school
teacher–now, with his long beech switch always in his hand. It
was not always the same one, either. Switches were brought in
bundles, from a beech wood near the school house, by the boys
for whose benefit they were intended. Often a whole bundle
would be used up in a single day. I never had any hard feelings
against my teacher, either while attending the school, or in
later years when reflecting upon my experience. Mr. White was a
kindhearted man, and was much respected by the community in which
he lived. He only followed the universal custom of the period,
and that under which he had received his own education.

CHAPTER II.

WEST POINT–GRADUATION.

In the winter of 1838-9 I was attending school at Ripley, only
ten miles distant from Georgetown, but spent the Christmas
holidays at home. During this vacation my father received a
letter from the Honorable Thomas Morris, then United States
Senator from Ohio. When he read it he said to me, Ulysses, I
believe you are going to receive the appointment.” “What
appointment?” I inquired. To West Point; I have applied for
it.” “But I won’t go,” I said. He said he thought I would, AND
I THOUGHT SO TOO, IF HE DID. I really had no objection to going
to West Point, except that I had a very exalted idea of the
acquirements necessary to get through. I did not believe I
possessed them, and could not bear the idea of failing. There
had been four boys from our village, or its immediate
neighborhood, who had been graduated from West Point, and never
a failure of any one appointed from Georgetown, except in the
case of the one whose place I was to take. He was the son of
Dr. Bailey, our nearest and most intimate neighbor. Young
Bailey had been appointed in 1837. Finding before the January
examination following, that he could not pass, he resigned and
went to a private school, and remained there until the following
year, when he was reappointed. Before the next examination he
was dismissed. Dr. Bailey was a proud and sensitive man, and
felt the failure of his son so keenly that he forbade his return
home. There were no telegraphs in those days to disseminate news
rapidly, no railroads west of the Alleghanies, and but few east;
and above ail, there were no reporters prying into other
people’s private affairs. Consequently it did not become
generally known that there was a vacancy at West Point from our
district until I was appointed. I presume Mrs. Bailey confided
to my mother the fact that Bartlett had been dismissed, and that
the doctor had forbidden his son’s return home.

The Honorable Thomas L. Hamer, one of the ablest men Ohio ever
produced, was our member of Congress at the time, and had the
right of nomination. He and my father had been members of the
same debating society (where they were generally pitted on
opposite sides), and intimate personal friends from their early
manhood up to a few years before. In politics they differed.
Hamer was a life-long Democrat, while my father was a Whig. They
had a warm discussion, which finally became angry–over some act
of President Jackson, the removal of the deposit of public
moneys, I think–after which they never spoke until after my
appointment. I know both of them felt badly over this
estrangement, and would have been glad at any time to come to a
reconciliation; but neither would make the advance. Under these
circumstances my father would not write to Hamer for the
appointment, but he wrote to Thomas Morris, United States
Senator from Ohio, informing him that there was a vacancy at
West Point from our district, and that he would be glad if I
could be appointed to fill it. This letter, I presume, was
turned over to Mr. Hamer, and, as there was no other applicant,
he cheerfully appointed me. This healed the breach between the
two, never after reopened.

Besides the argument used by my father in favor of my going to
West Point–that “he thought I would go”–there was another very
strong inducement. I had always a great desire to travel. I was
already the best travelled boy in Georgetown, except the sons of
one man, John Walker, who had emigrated to Texas with his
family, and immigrated back as soon as he could get the means to
do so. In his short stay in Texas he acquired a very different
opinion of the country from what one would form going there now.

I had been east to Wheeling, Virginia, and north to the Western
Reserve, in Ohio, west to Louisville, and south to Bourbon
County, Kentucky, besides having driven or ridden pretty much
over the whole country within fifty miles of home. Going to
West Point would give me the opportunity of visiting the two
great cities of the continent, Philadelphia and New York. This
was enough. When these places were visited I would have been
glad to have had a steamboat or railroad collision, or any other
accident happen, by which I might have received a temporary
injury sufficient to make me ineligible, for a time, to enter
the Academy. Nothing of the kind occurred, and I had to face
the music.

Georgetown has a remarkable record for a western village. It
is, and has been from its earliest existence, a democratic
town. There was probably no time during the rebellion when, if
the opportunity could have been afforded, it would not have
voted for Jefferson Davis for President of the United States,
over Mr. Lincoln, or any other representative of his party;
unless it was immediately after some of John Morgan’s men, in
his celebrated raid through Ohio, spent a few hours in the
village. The rebels helped themselves to whatever they could
find, horses, boots and shoes, especially horses, and many
ordered meals to be prepared for them by the families. This was
no doubt a far pleasanter duty for some families than it would
have been to render a like service for Union soldiers. The line
between the Rebel and Union element in Georgetown was so marked
that it led to divisions even in the churches. There were
churches in that part of Ohio where treason was preached
regularly, and where, to secure membership, hostility to the
government, to the war and to the liberation of the slaves, was
far more essential than a belief in the authenticity or
credibility of the Bible. There were men in Georgetown who
filled all the requirements for membership in these churches.

Yet this far-off western village, with a population, including
old and young, male and female, of about one thousand–about
enough for the organization of a single regiment if all had been
men capable of bearing arms–furnished the Union army four
general officers and one colonel, West Point graduates, and nine
generals and field officers of Volunteers, that I can think of.
Of the graduates from West Point, all had citizenship elsewhere
at the breaking out of the rebellion, except possibly General A.
V. Kautz, who had remained in the army from his graduation. Two
of the colonels also entered the service from other
localities. The other seven, General McGroierty, Colonels
White, Fyffe, Loudon and Marshall, Majors King and Bailey, were
all residents of Georgetown when the war broke out, and all of
them, who were alive at the close, returned there. Major Bailey
was the cadet who had preceded me at West Point. He was killed
in West Virginia, in his first engagement. As far as I know,
every boy who has entered West Point from that village since my
time has been graduated.

I took passage on a steamer at Ripley, Ohio, for Pittsburg,
about the middle of May, 1839. Western boats at that day did
not make regular trips at stated times, but would stop anywhere,
and for any length of time, for passengers or freight. I have
myself been detained two or three days at a place after steam
was up, the gang planks, all but one, drawn in, and after the
time advertised for starting had expired. On this occasion we
had no vexatious delays, and in about three days Pittsburg was
reached. From Pittsburg I chose passage by the canal to
Harrisburg, rather than by the more expeditious stage. This
gave a better opportunity of enjoying the fine scenery of
Western Pennsylvania, and I had rather a dread of reaching my
destination at all. At that time the canal was much patronized
by travellers, and, with the comfortable packets of the period,
no mode of conveyance could be more pleasant, when time was not
an object. From Harrisburg to Philadelphia there was a
railroad, the first I had ever seen, except the one on which I
had just crossed the summit of the Alleghany Mountains, and over
which canal boats were transported. In travelling by the road
from Harrisburg, I thought the perfection of rapid transit had
been reached. We travelled at least eighteen miles an hour,
when at full speed, and made the whole distance averaging
probably as much as twelve miles an hour. This seemed like
annihilating space. I stopped five days in Philadelphia, saw
about every street in the city, attended the theatre, visited
Girard College (which was then in course of construction), and
got reprimanded from home afterwards, for dallying by the way so
long. My sojourn in New York was shorter, but long enough to
enable me to see the city very well. I reported at West Point
on the 30th or 31st of May, and about two weeks later passed my
examination for admission, without difficulty, very much to my
surprise.

A military life had no charms for me, and I had not the faintest
idea of staying in the army even if I should be graduated, which
I did not expect. The encampment which preceded the commence-
ment of academic studies was very wearisome and uninter-
esting. When the 28th of August came–the date for breaking up
camp and going into barracks–I felt as though I had been at
West Point always, and that if I staid to graduation, I would
have to remain always. I did not take hold of my studies with
avidity, in fact I rarely ever read over a lesson the second
time during my entire cadetship. I could not sit in my room
doing nothing. There is a fine library connected with the
Academy from which cadets can get books to read in their
quarters. I devoted more time to these, than to books relating
to the course of studies. Much of the time, I am sorry to say,
was devoted to novels, but not those of a trashy sort. I read
all of Bulwer’s then published, Cooper’s, Marryat’s, Scott’s,
Washington Irving’s works, Lever’s, and many others that I do
not now remember. Mathematics was very easy to me, so that when
January came, I passed the examination, taking a good standing in
that branch. In French, the only other study at that time in the
first year’s course, my standing was very low. In fact, if the
class had been turned the other end foremost I should have been
near head. I never succeeded in getting squarely at either end
of my class, in any one study, during the four years. I came
near it in French, artillery, infantry and cavalry tactics, and
conduct.

Early in the session of the Congress which met in December,
1839, a bill was discussed abolishing the Military Academy. I
saw in this an honorable way to obtain a discharge, and read the
debates with much interest, but with impatience at the delay in
taking action, for I was selfish enough to favor the bill. It
never passed, and a year later, although the time hung drearily
with me, I would have been sorry to have seen it succeed. My
idea then was to get through the course, secure a detail for a
few years as assistant professor of mathematics at the Academy,
and afterwards obtain a permanent position as professor in some
respectable college; but circumstances always did shape my
course different from my plans.

At the end of two years the class received the usual furlough,
extending from the close of the June examination to the 28th of
August. This I enjoyed beyond any other period of my life. My
father had sold out his business in Georgetown–where my youth
had been spent, and to which my day-dreams carried me back as my
future home, if I should ever be able to retire on a
competency. He had moved to Bethel, only twelve miles away, in
the adjoining county of Clermont, and had bought a young horse
that had never been in harness, for my special use under the
saddle during my furlough. Most of my time was spent among my
old school-mates–these ten weeks were shorter than one week at
West Point.

Persons acquainted with the Academy know that the corps of
cadets is divided into four companies for the purpose of
military exercises. These companies are officered from the
cadets, the superintendent and commandant selecting the officers
for their military bearing and qualifications. The adjutant,
quartermaster, four captains and twelve lieutenants are taken
from the first, or Senior class; the sergeants from the second,
or junior class; and the corporals from the third, or Sophomore
class. I had not been “called out” as a corporal, but when I
returned from furlough I found myself the last but one–about my
standing in all the tactics–of eighteen sergeants. The
promotion was too much for me. That year my standing in the
class–as shown by the number of demerits of the year–was about
the same as it was among the sergeants, and I was dropped, and
served the fourth year as a private.

During my first year’s encampment General Scott visited West
Point, and reviewed the cadets. With his commanding figure, his
quite colossal size and showy uniform, I thought him the finest
specimen of manhood my eyes had ever beheld, and the most to be
envied. I could never resemble him in appearance, but I believe
I did have a presentiment for a moment that some day I should
occupy his place on review–although I had no intention then of
remaining in the army. My experience in a horse-trade ten years
before, and the ridicule it caused me, were too fresh in my mind
for me to communicate this presentiment to even my most intimate
chum. The next summer Martin Van Buren, then President of the
United States, visited West Point and reviewed the cadets; he
did not impress me with the awe which Scott had inspired. In
fact I regarded General Scott and Captain C. F. Smith, the
Commandant of Cadets, as the two men most to be envied in the
nation. I retained a high regard for both up to the day of
their death.

The last two years wore away more rapidly than the first two,
but they still seemed about five times as long as Ohio years, to
me. At last all the examinations were passed, and the members of
the class were called upon to record their choice of arms of
service and regiments. I was anxious to enter the cavalry, or
dragoons as they were then called, but there was only one
regiment of dragoons in the Army at that time, and attached to
that, besides the full complement of officers, there were at
least four brevet second lieutenants. I recorded therefore my
first choice, dragoons; second, 4th infantry; and got the
latter. Again there was a furlough–or, more properly speaking,
leave of absence for the class were now commissioned
officers–this time to the end of September. Again I went to
Ohio to spend my vacation among my old school-mates; and again I
found a fine saddle horse purchased for my special use, besides a
horse and buggy that I could drive–but I was not in a physical
condition to enjoy myself quite as well as on the former
occasion. For six months before graduation I had had a
desperate cough (“Tyler’s grip” it was called), and I was very
much reduced, weighing but one hundred and seventeen pounds,
just my weight at entrance, though I had grown six inches in
stature in the mean time. There was consumption in my father’s
family, two of his brothers having died of that disease, which
made my symptoms more alarming. The brother and sister next
younger than myself died, during the rebellion, of the same
disease, and I seemed the most promising subject for it of the
three in 1843.

Having made alternate choice of two different arms of service
with different uniforms, I could not get a uniform suit until
notified of my assignment. I left my measurement with a tailor,
with directions not to make the uniform until I notified him
whether it was to be for infantry or dragoons. Notice did not
reach me for several weeks, and then it took at least a week to
get the letter of instructions to the tailor and two more to
make the clothes and have them sent to me. This was a time of
great suspense. I was impatient to get on my uniform and see
how it looked, and probably wanted my old school-mates,
particularly the girls, to see me in it.

The conceit was knocked out of me by two little circumstances
that happened soon after the arrival of the clothes, which gave
me a distaste for military uniform that I never recovered
from. Soon after the arrival of the suit I donned it, and put
off for Cincinnati on horseback. While I was riding along a
street of that city, imagining that every one was looking at me,
with a feeling akin to mine when I first saw General Scott, a
little urchin, bareheaded, footed, with dirty and ragged pants
held up by bare a single gallows–that’s what suspenders were
called then–and a shirt that had not seen a wash-tub for weeks,
turned to me and cried: “Soldier! will you work? No, sir–ee;
I’ll sell my shirt first!!” The horse trade and its dire
consequences were recalled to mind.

The other circumstance occurred at home. Opposite our house in
Bethel stood the old stage tavern where “man and beast” found
accommodation, The stable-man was rather dissipated, but
possessed of some humor. On my return I found him parading the
streets, and attending in the stable, barefooted, but in a pair
of sky-blue nankeen pantaloons–just the color of my uniform
trousers–with a strip of white cotton sheeting sewed down the
outside seams in imitation of mine. The joke was a huge one in
the mind of many of the people, and was much enjoyed by them;
but I did not appreciate it so highly.

During the remainder of my leave of absence, my time was spent
in visiting friends in Georgetown and Cincinnati, and
occasionally other towns in that part of the State.

CHAPTER III.

ARMY LIFE–CAUSES OF THE MEXICAN WAR–CAMP SALUBRITY.

On the 30th of September I reported for duty at Jefferson
Barracks, St. Louis, with the 4th United States infantry. It
was the largest military post in the country at that time, being
garrisoned by sixteen companies of infantry, eight of the 3d
regiment, the remainder of the 4th. Colonel Steven Kearney, one
of the ablest officers of the day, commanded the post, and under
him discipline was kept at a high standard, but without
vexatious rules or regulations. Every drill and roll-call had
to be attended, but in the intervals officers were permitted to
enjoy themselves, leaving the garrison, and going where they
pleased, without making written application to state where they
were going for how long, etc., so that they were back for their
next duty. It did seem to me, in my early army days, that too
many of the older officers, when they came to command posts,
made it a study to think what orders they could publish to annoy
their subordinates and render them uncomfortable. I noticed,
however, a few years later, when the Mexican war broke out, that
most of this class of officers discovered they were possessed of
disabilities which entirely incapacitated them for active field
service. They had the moral courage to proclaim it, too. They
were right; but they did not always give their disease the right
name.

At West Point I had a class-mate–in the last year of our
studies he was room-mate also–F. T. Dent, whose family resided
some five miles west of Jefferson Barracks. Two of his
unmarried brothers were living at home at that time, and as I
had taken with me from Ohio, my horse, saddle and bridle, I soon
found my way out to White Haven, the name of the Dent estate. As
I found the family congenial my visits became frequent. There
were at home, besides the young men, two daughters, one a school
miss of fifteen, the other a girl of eight or nine. There was
still an older daughter of seventeen, who had been spending
several years at boarding-school in St. Louis, but who, though
through school, had not yet returned home. She was spending the
winter in the city with connections, the family of Colonel John
O’Fallon, well known in St. Louis. In February she returned to
her country home. After that I do not know but my visits became
more frequent; they certainly did become more enjoyable. We
would often take walks, or go on horseback to visit the
neighbors, until I became quite well acquainted in that
vicinity. Sometimes one of the brothers would accompany us,
sometimes one of the younger sisters. If the 4th infantry had
remained at Jefferson Barracks it is possible, even probable,
that this life might have continued for some years without my
finding out that there was anything serious the matter with me;
but in the following May a circumstance occurred which developed
my sentiment so palpably that there was no mistaking it.

The annexation of Texas was at this time the subject of violent
discussion in Congress, in the press, and by individuals. The
administration of President Tyler, then in power, was making the
most strenuous efforts to effect the annexation, which was,
indeed, the great and absorbing question of the day. During
these discussions the greater part of the single rifle regiment
in the army–the 2d dragoons, which had been dismounted a year
or two before, and designated “Dismounted Rifles”–was stationed
at Fort Jessup, Louisiana, some twenty-five miles east of the
Texas line, to observe the frontier. About the 1st of May the
3d infantry was ordered from Jefferson Barracks to Louisiana, to
go into camp in the neighborhood of Fort Jessup, and there await
further orders. The troops were embarked on steamers and were
on their way down the Mississippi within a few days after the
receipt of this order. About the time they started I obtained a
leave of absence for twenty days to go to Ohio to visit my
parents. I was obliged to go to St. Louis to take a steamer for
Louisville or Cincinnati, or the first steamer going up the Ohio
River to any point. Before I left St. Louis orders were
received at Jefferson Barracks for the 4th infantry to follow
the 3d. A messenger was sent after me to stop my leaving; but
before he could reach me I was off, totally ignorant of these
events. A day or two after my arrival at Bethel I received a
letter from a classmate and fellow lieutenant in the 4th,
informing me of the circumstances related above, and advising me
not to open any letter post marked St. Louis or Jefferson
Barracks, until the expiration of my leave, and saying that he
would pack up my things and take them along for me. His advice
was not necessary, for no other letter was sent to me. I now
discovered that I was exceedingly anxious to get back to
Jefferson Barracks, and I understood the reason without
explanation from any one. My leave of absence required me to
report for duty, at Jefferson Barracks, at the end of twenty
days. I knew my regiment had gone up the Red River, but I was
not disposed to break the letter of my leave; besides, if I had
proceeded to Louisiana direct, I could not have reached there
until after the expiration of my leave. Accordingly, at the end
of the twenty days, I reported for duty to Lieutenant Ewell,
commanding at Jefferson Barracks, handing him at the same time
my leave of absence. After noticing the phraseology of the
order–leaves of absence were generally worded, “at the end of
which time he will report for duty with his proper command”–he
said he would give me an order to join my regiment in
Louisiana. I then asked for a few days’ leave before starting,
which he readily granted. This was the same Ewell who acquired
considerable reputation as a Confederate general during the
rebellion. He was a man much esteemed, and deservedly so, in
the old army, and proved himself a gallant and efficient officer
in two wars–both in my estimation unholy.

I immediately procured a horse and started for the country,
taking no baggage with me, of course. There is an insignificant
creek–the Gravois–between Jefferson Barracks and the place to
which I was going, and at that day there was not a bridge over
it from its source to its mouth. There is not water enough in
the creek at ordinary stages to run a coffee mill, and at low
water there is none running whatever. On this occasion it had
been raining heavily, and, when the creek was reached, I found
the banks full to overflowing, and the current rapid. I looked
at it a moment to consider what to do. One of my superstitions
had always been when I started to go any where, or to do
anything, not to turn back, or stop until the thing intended was
accomplished. I have frequently started to go to places where I
had never been and to which I did not know the way, depending
upon making inquiries on the road, and if I got past the place
without knowing it, instead of turning back, I would go on until
a road was found turning in the right direction, take that, and
come in by the other side. So I struck into the stream, and in
an instant the horse was swimming and I being carried down by
the current. I headed the horse towards the other bank and soon
reached it, wet through and without other clothes on that side of
the stream. I went on, however, to my destination and borrowed a
dry suit from my–future–brother-in-law. We were not of the
same size, but the clothes answered every purpose until I got
more of my own.

Before I returned I mustered up courage to make known, in the
most awkward manner imaginable, the discovery I had made on
learning that the 4th infantry had been ordered away from
Jefferson Barracks. The young lady afterwards admitted that she
too, although until then she had never looked upon me other than
as a visitor whose company was agreeable to her, had experienced
a depression of spirits she could not account for when the
regiment left. Before separating it was definitely understood
that at a convenient time we would join our fortunes, and not
let the removal of a regiment trouble us. This was in May,
1844. It was the 22d of August, 1848, before the fulfilment of
this agreement. My duties kept me on the frontier of Louisiana
with the Army of Observation during the pendency of Annexation;
and afterwards I was absent through the war with Mexico,
provoked by the action of the army, if not by the annexation
itself During that time there was a constant correspondence
between Miss Dent and myself, but we only met once in the period
of four years and three months. In May, 1845, I procured a leave
for twenty days, visited St. Louis, and obtained the consent of
the parents for the union, which had not been asked for before.

As already stated, it was never my intention to remain in the
army long, but to prepare myself for a professorship in some
college. Accordingly, soon after I was settled at Jefferson
Barracks, I wrote a letter to Professor Church–Professor of
Mathematics at West Point–requesting him to ask my designation
as his assistant, when next a detail had to be made. Assistant
professors at West Point are all officers of the army, supposed
to be selected for their special fitness for the particular
branch of study they are assigned to teach. The answer from
Professor Church was entirely satisfactory, and no doubt I
should have been detailed a year or two later but for the
Mexican War coming on. Accordingly I laid out for myself a
course of studies to be pursued in garrison, with regularity, if
not persistency. I reviewed my West Point course of mathematics
during the seven months at Jefferson Barracks, and read many
valuable historical works, besides an occasional novel. To help
my memory I kept a book in which I would write up, from time to
time, my recollections of all I had read since last posting
it. When the regiment was ordered away, I being absent at the
time, my effects were packed up by Lieutenant Haslett, of the
4th infantry, and taken along. I never saw my journal after,
nor did I ever keep another, except for a portion of the time
while travelling abroad. Often since a fear has crossed my mind
lest that book might turn up yet, and fall into the hands of some
malicious person who would publish it. I know its appearance
would cause me as much heart-burning as my youthful horse-trade,
or the later rebuke for wearing uniform clothes.

The 3d infantry had selected camping grounds on the reservation
at Fort Jessup, about midway between the Red River and the
Sabine. Our orders required us to go into camp in the same
neighborhood, and await further instructions. Those authorized
to do so selected a place in the pine woods, between the old
town of Natchitoches and Grand Ecore, about three miles from
each, and on high ground back from the river. The place was
given the name of Camp Salubrity, and proved entitled to it. The
camp was on a high, sandy, pine ridge, with spring branches in
the valley, in front and rear. The springs furnished an
abundance of cool, pure water, and the ridge was above the
flight of mosquitoes, which abound in that region in great
multitudes and of great voracity. In the valley they swarmed in
myriads, but never came to the summit of the ridge. The regiment
occupied this camp six months before the first death occurred,
and that was caused by an accident.

There was no intimation given that the removal of the 3d and 4th
regiments of infantry to the western border of Louisiana was
occasioned in any way by the prospective annexation of Texas,
but it was generally understood that such was the case.
Ostensibly we were intended to prevent filibustering into Texas,
but really as a menace to Mexico in case she appeared to
contemplate war. Generally the officers of the army were
indifferent whether the annexation was consummated or not; but
not so all of them. For myself, I was bitterly opposed to the
measure, and to this day regard the war, which resulted, as one
of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker
nation. It was an instance of a republic following the bad
example of European monarchies, in not considering justice in
their desire to acquire additional territory. Texas was
originally a state belonging to the republic of Mexico. It
extended from the Sabine River on the east to the Rio Grande on
the west, and from the Gulf of Mexico on the south and east to
the territory of the United States and New Mexico–another
Mexican state at that time–on the north and west. An empire in
territory, it had but a very sparse population, until settled by
Americans who had received authority from Mexico to colonize.
These colonists paid very little attention to the supreme
government, and introduced slavery into the state almost from
the start, though the constitution of Mexico did not, nor does
it now, sanction that institution. Soon they set up an
independent government of their own, and war existed, between
Texas and Mexico, in name from that time until 1836, when active
hostilities very nearly ceased upon the capture of Santa Anna,
the Mexican President. Before long, however, the same
people–who with permission of Mexico had colonized Texas, and
afterwards set up slavery there, and then seceded as soon as
they felt strong enough to do so–offered themselves and the
State to the United States, and in 1845 their offer was
accepted. The occupation, separation and annexation were, from
the inception of the movement to its final consummation, a
conspiracy to acquire territory out of which slave states might
be formed for the American Union.

Even if the annexation itself could be justified, the manner in
which the subsequent war was forced upon Mexico cannot. The
fact is, annexationists wanted more territory than they could
possibly lay any claim to, as part of the new acquisition.
Texas, as an independent State, never had exercised jurisdiction
over the territory between the Nueces River and the Rio Grande.
Mexico had never recognized the independence of Texas, and
maintained that, even if independent, the State had no claim
south of the Nueces. I am aware that a treaty, made by the
Texans with Santa Anna while he was under duress, ceded all the
territory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande–, but he was a
prisoner of war when the treaty was made, and his life was in
jeopardy. He knew, too, that he deserved execution at the hands
of the Texans, if they should ever capture him. The Texans, if
they had taken his life, would have only followed the example
set by Santa Anna himself a few years before, when he executed
the entire garrison of the Alamo and the villagers of Goliad.

In taking military possession of Texas after annexation, the
army of occupation, under General Taylor, was directed to occupy
the disputed territory. The army did not stop at the Nueces and
offer to negotiate for a settlement of the boundary question,
but went beyond, apparently in order to force Mexico to initiate
war. It is to the credit of the American nation, however, that
after conquering Mexico, and while practically holding the
country in our possession, so that we could have retained the
whole of it, or made any terms we chose, we paid a round sum for
the additional territory taken; more than it was worth, or was
likely to be, to Mexico. To us it was an empire and of
incalculable value; but it might have been obtained by other
means. The Southern rebellion was largely the outgrowth of the
Mexican war. Nations, like individuals, are punished for their
transgressions. We got our punishment in the most sanguinary
and expensive war of modern times.

The 4th infantry went into camp at Salubrity in the month of
May, 1844, with instructions, as I have said, to await further
orders. At first, officers and men occupied ordinary tents. As
the summer heat increased these were covered by sheds to break
the rays of the sun. The summer was whiled away in social
enjoyments among the officers, in visiting those stationed at,
and near, Fort Jessup, twenty-five miles away, visiting the
planters on the Red River, and the citizens of Natchitoches and
Grand Ecore. There was much pleasant intercourse between the
inhabitants and the officers of the army. I retain very
agreeable recollections of my stay at Camp Salubrity, and of the
acquaintances made there, and no doubt my feeling is shared by
the few officers living who were there at the time. I can call
to mind only two officers of the 4th infantry, besides myself,
who were at Camp Salubrity with the regiment, who are now alive.

With a war in prospect, and belonging to a regiment that had an
unusual number of officers detailed on special duty away from
the regiment, my hopes of being ordered to West Point as
instructor vanished. At the time of which I now write, officers
in the quartermaster’s, commissary’s and adjutant–general’s
departments were appointed from the line of the army, and did
not vacate their regimental commissions until their regimental
and staff commissions were for the same grades. Generally
lieutenants were appointed to captaincies to fill vacancies in
the staff corps. If they should reach a captaincy in the line
before they arrived at a majority in the staff, they would elect
which commission they would retain. In the 4th infantry, in
1844, at least six line officers were on duty in the staff, and
therefore permanently detached from the regiment. Under these
circumstances I gave up everything like a special course of
reading, and only read thereafter for my own amusement, and not
very much for that, until the war was over. I kept a horse and
rode, and staid out of doors most of the time by day, and
entirely recovered from the cough which I had carried from West
Point, and from all indications of consumption. I have often
thought that my life was saved, and my health restored, by
exercise and exposure, enforced by an administrative act, and a
war, both of which I disapproved.

As summer wore away, and cool days and colder nights came upon
us, the tents We were occupying ceased to afford comfortable
quarters; and “further orders” not reaching us, we began to look
about to remedy the hardship. Men were put to work getting out
timber to build huts, and in a very short time all were
comfortably housed–privates as well as officers. The outlay by
the government in accomplishing this was nothing, or nearly
nothing. The winter was spent more agreeably than the summer
had been. There were occasional parties given by the planters
along the “coast”–as the bottom lands on the Red River were
called. The climate was delightful.

Near the close of the short session of Congress of 1844-5, the
bill for the annexation of Texas to the United States was
passed. It reached President Tyler on the 1st of March, 1845,
and promptly received his approval. When the news reached us we
began to look again for “further orders.” They did not arrive
promptly, and on the 1st of May following I asked and obtained a
leave of absence for twenty days, for the purpose of visiting–
St. Louis. The object of this visit has been before stated.

Early in July the long expected orders were received, but they
only took the regiment to New Orleans Barracks. We reached
there before the middle of the month, and again waited weeks for
still further orders. The yellow fever was raging in New Orleans
during the time we remained there, and the streets of the city
had the appearance of a continuous well-observed Sunday. I
recollect but one occasion when this observance seemed to be
broken by the inhabitants. One morning about daylight I
happened to be awake, and, hearing the discharge of a rifle not
far off, I looked out to ascertain where the sound came from. I
observed a couple of clusters of men near by, and learned
afterwards that “it was nothing; only a couple of gentlemen
deciding a difference of opinion with rifles, at twenty paces.
“I do not remember if either was killed, or even hurt, but no
doubt the question of difference was settled satisfactorily, and
“honorably,” in the estimation of the parties engaged. I do not
believe I ever would have the courage to fight a duel. If any
man should wrong me to the extent of my being willing to kill
him, I would not be willing to give him the choice of weapons
with which it should be done, and of the time, place and
distance separating us, when I executed him. If I should do
another such a wrong as to justify him in killing me, I would
make any reasonable atonement within my power, if convinced of
the wrong done. I place my opposition to duelling on higher
grounds than here stated. No doubt a majority of the duels
fought have been for want of moral courage on the part of those
engaged to decline.

At Camp Salubrity, and when we went to New Orleans Barracks, the
4th infantry was commanded by Colonel Vose, then an old gentleman
who had not commanded on drill for a number of years. He was not
a man to discover infirmity in the presence of danger. It now
appeared that war was imminent, and he felt that it was his duty
to brush up his tactics. Accordingly, when we got settled down
at our new post, he took command of the regiment at a battalion
drill. Only two or three evolutions had been gone through when
he dismissed the battalion, and, turning to go to his own
quarters, dropped dead. He had not been complaining of ill
health, but no doubt died of heart disease. He was a most
estimable man, of exemplary habits, and by no means the author
of his own disease.

CHAPTER IV.

CORPUS CHRISTI–MEXICAN SMUGGLING–SPANISH RULE IN
MEXICO–SUPPLYING TRANSPORTATION.

Early in September the regiment left New Orleans for Corpus
Christi, now in Texas. Ocean steamers were not then common, and
the passage was made in sailing vessels. At that time there was
not more than three feet of water in the channel at the outlet
of Corpus Christi Bay; the debarkation, therefore, had to take
place by small steamers, and at an island in the channel called
Shell Is land, the ships anchoring some miles out from shore.
This made the work slow, and as the army was only supplied with
one or two steamers, it took a number of days to effect the
landing of a single regiment with its stores, camp and garrison
equipage, etc. There happened to be pleasant weather while this
was going on, but the land-swell was so great that when the ship
and steamer were on opposite sides of the same wave they would
be at considerable distance apart. The men and baggage were let
down to a point higher than the lower deck of the steamer, and
when ship and steamer got into the trough between the waves, and
were close together, the load would be drawn over the steamer and
rapidly run down until it rested on the deck.

After I had gone ashore, and had been on guard several days at
Shell Island, quite six miles from the ship, I had occasion for
some reason or other to return on board. While on the Suviah–I
think that was the name of our vessel–I heard a tremendous
racket at the other end of the ship, and much and excited sailor
language, such as “damn your eyes,” etc. In a moment or two the
captain, who was an excitable little man, dying with
consumption, and not weighing much over a hundred pounds, came
running out, carrying a sabre nearly as large and as heavy as he
was, and cry ing, that his men had mutinied. It was necessary to
sustain the captain without question, and in a few minutes all
the sailors charged with mutiny were in irons. I rather felt
for a time a wish that I had not gone aboard just then. As the
men charged with mutiny submitted to being placed in irons
without resistance, I always doubted if they knew that they had
mutinied until they were told.

By the time I was ready to leave the ship again I thought I had
learned enough of the working of the double and single pulley,
by which passengers were let down from the upper deck of the
ship to the steamer below, and determined to let myself down
without assistance. Without saying anything of my intentions to
any one, I mounted the railing, and taking hold of the centre
rope, just below the upper block, I put one foot on the hook
below the lower block, and stepped off just as I did so some one
called out “hold on.” It was too late. I tried to “hold on”
with all my might, but my heels went up, and my head went down
so rapidly that my hold broke, and I plunged head foremost into
the water, some twenty-five feet below, with such velocity that
it seemed to me I never would stop. When I came to the surface
again, being a fair swimmer, and not having lost my presence of
mind, I swam around until a bucket was let down for me, and I
was drawn up without a scratch or injury. I do not believe there
was a man on board who sympathized with me in the least when they
found me uninjured. I rather enjoyed the joke myself The captain
of the Suviah died of his disease a few months later, and I
believe before the mutineers were tried. I hope they got clear,
because, as before stated, I always thought the mutiny was all in
the brain of a very weak and sick man.

After reaching shore, or Shell Island, the labor of getting to
Corpus Christi was slow and tedious. There was, if my memory
serves me, but one small steamer to transport troops and baggage
when the 4th infantry arrived. Others were procured later. The
distance from Shell Island to Corpus Christi was some sixteen or
eighteen miles. The channel to the bay was so shallow that the
steamer, small as it was, had to be dragged over the bottom when
loaded. Not more than one trip a day could be effected. Later
this was remedied, by deepening the channel and increasing the
number of vessels suitable to its navigation.

Corpus Christi is near the head of the bay of the same name,
formed by the entrance of the Nueces River into tide-water, and
is on the west bank of that bay. At the time of its first
occupancy by United States troops there was a small Mexican
hamlet there, containing probably less than one hundred souls.
There was, in addition, a small American trading post, at which
goods were sold to Mexican smugglers. All goods were put up in
compact packages of about one hundred pounds each, suitable for
loading on pack mules. Two of these packages made a load for an
ordinary Mexican mule, and three for the larger ones. The bulk
of the trade was in leaf tobacco, and domestic cotton-cloths and
calicoes. The Mexicans had, before the arrival of the army, but
little to offer in exchange except silver. The trade in tobacco
was enormous, considering the population to be supplied. Almost
every Mexican above the age of ten years, and many much younger,
smoked the cigarette. Nearly every Mexican carried a pouch of
leaf tobacco, powdered by rolling in the hands, and a roll of
corn husks to make wrappers. The cigarettes were made by the
smokers as they used them.

Up to the time of which I write, and for years afterwards–I
think until the administration of President Juarez–the
cultivation, manufacture and sale of tobacco constituted a
government monopoly, and paid the bulk of the revenue collected
from internal sources. The price was enormously high, and made
successful smuggling very profitable. The difficulty of
obtaining tobacco is probably the reason why everybody, male and
female, used it at that time. I know from my own experience that
when I was at West Point, the fact that tobacco, in every form,
was prohibited, and the mere possession of the weed severely
punished, made the majority of the cadets, myself included, try
to acquire the habit of using it. I failed utterly at the time
and for many years afterward; but the majority accomplished the
object of their youthful ambition.

Under Spanish rule Mexico was prohibited from producing anything
that the mother-country could supply. This rule excluded the
cultivation of the grape, olive and many other articles to which
the soil and climate were well adapted. The country was governed
for “revenue only;” and tobacco, which cannot be raised in Spain,
but is indigenous to Mexico, offered a fine instrumentality for
securing this prime object of government. The native population
had been in the habit of using “the weed” from a period, back of
any recorded history of this continent. Bad habits–if not
restrained by law or public opinion–spread more rapidly and
universally than good ones, and the Spanish colonists adopted
the use of tobacco almost as generally as the natives. Spain,
therefore, in order to secure the largest revenue from this
source, prohibited the cultivation, except in specified
localities–and in these places farmed out the privilege at a
very high price. The tobacco when raised could only be sold to
the government, and the price to the consumer was limited only
by the avarice of the authorities, and the capacity of the
people to pay.

All laws for the government of the country were enacted in
Spain, and the officers for their execution were appointed by
the Crown, and sent out to the New El Dorado. The Mexicans had
been brought up ignorant of how to legislate or how to rule.
When they gained their independence, after many years of war, it
was the most natural thing in the world that they should adopt as
their own the laws then in existence. The only change was, that
Mexico became her own executor of the laws and the recipient of
the revenues. The tobacco tax, yielding so large a revenue
under the law as it stood, was one of the last, if not the very
last, of the obnoxious imposts to be repealed. Now, the
citizens are allowed to cultivate any crops the soil will
yield. Tobacco is cheap, and every quality can be produced. Its
use is by no means so general as when I first visited the
country.

Gradually the “Army of Occupation” assembled at Corpus
Christi. When it was all together it consisted of seven
companies of the 2d regiment of dragoons, four companies of
light artillery, five regiments of infantry–the 3d, 4th, 5th,
7th and 8th–and one regiment of artillery acting as
infantry–not more than three thousand men in all. General
Zachary Taylor commanded the whole. There were troops enough in
one body to establish a drill and discipline sufficient to fit
men and officers for all they were capable of in case of
battle. The rank and file were composed of men who had enlisted
in time of peace, to serve for seven dollars a month, and were
necessarily inferior as material to the average volunteers
enlisted later in the war expressly to fight, and also to the
volunteers in the war for the preservation of the Union. The
men engaged in the Mexican war were brave, and the officers of
the regular army, from highest to lowest, were educated in their
profession. A more efficient army for its number and armament, I
do not believe ever fought a battle than the one commanded by
General Taylor in his first two engagements on Mexican–or Texan
soil.

The presence of United States troops on the edge of the disputed
territory furthest from the Mexican settlements, was not
sufficient to provoke hostilities. We were sent to provoke a
fight, but it was essential that Mexico should commence it. It
was very doubtful whether Congress would declare war; but if
Mexico should attack our troops, the Executive could announce,
“Whereas, war exists by the acts of, etc.,” and prosecute the
contest with vigor. Once initiated there were but few public
men who would have the courage to oppose it. Experience proves
that the man who obstructs a war in which his nation is engaged,
no matter whether right or wrong, occupies no enviable place in
life or history. Better for him, individually, to advocate
“war, pestilence, and famine,” than to act as obstructionist to
a war already begun. The history of the defeated rebel will be
honorable hereafter, compared with that of the Northern man who
aided him by conspiring against his government while protected
by it. The most favorable posthumous history the stay-at-home
traitor can hope for is–oblivion.

Mexico showing no willingness to come to the Nueces to drive the
invaders from her soil, it became necessary for the “invaders” to
approach to within a convenient distance to be struck.
Accordingly, preparations were begun for moving the army to the
Rio Grande, to a point near Matamoras. It was desirable to
occupy a position near the largest centre of population possible
to reach, without absolutely invading territory to which we set
up no claim whatever.

The distance from Corpus Christi to Matamoras is about one
hundred and fifty miles. The country does not abound in fresh
water, and the length of the marches had to be regulated by the
distance between water supplies. Besides the streams, there
were occasional pools, filled during the rainy season, some
probably made by the traders, who travelled constantly between
Corpus Christi and the Rio Grande, and some by the buffalo.
There was not at that time a single habitation, cultivated
field, or herd of do mestic animals, between Corpus Christi and
Matamoras. It was necessary, therefore, to have a wagon train
sufficiently large to transport the camp and garrison equipage,
officers’ baggage, rations for the army, and part rations of
grain for the artillery horses and all the animals taken from
the north, where they had been accustomed to having their forage
furnished them. The army was but indifferently supplied with
transportation. Wagons and harness could easily be supplied
from the north but mules and horses could not so readily be
brought. The American traders and Mexican smugglers came to the
relief. Contracts were made for mules at from eight to eleven
dollars each. The smugglers furnished the animals, and took
their pay in goods of the description before mentioned. I doubt
whether the Mexicans received in value from the traders five
dollars per head for the animals they furnished, and still more,
whether they paid anything but their own time in procuring
them. Such is trade; such is war. The government paid in hard
cash to the contractor the stipulated price.

Between the Rio Grande and the Nueces there was at that time a
large band of wild horses feeding; as numerous, probably, as the
band of buffalo roaming further north was before its rapid
extermination commenced. The Mexicans used to capture these in
large numbers and bring them into the American settlements and
sell them. A picked animal could be purchased at from eight to
twelve dollars, but taken at wholesale, they could be bought for
thirty-six dollars a dozen. Some of these were purchased for the
army, and answered a most useful purpose. The horses were
generally very strong, formed much like the Norman horse, and
with very heavy manes and tails. A number of officers supplied
themselves with these, and they generally rendered as useful
service as the northern animal in fact they were much better
when grazing was the only means of supplying forage.

There was no need for haste, and some months were consumed in
the necessary preparations for a move. In the meantime the army
was engaged in all the duties pertaining to the officer and the
soldier. Twice, that I remember, small trains were sent from
Corpus Christi, with cavalry escorts, to San Antonio and Austin,
with paymasters and funds to pay off small detachments of troops
stationed at those places. General Taylor encouraged officers
to accompany these expeditions. I accompanied one of them in
December, 1845. The distance from Corpus Christi to San Antonio
was then computed at one hundred and fifty miles. Now that roads
exist it is probably less. From San Antonio to Austin we
computed the distance at one hundred and ten miles, and from the
latter place back to Corpus Christi at over two hundred miles. I
know the distance now from San Antonio to Austin is but little
over eighty miles, so that our computation was probably too high.

There was not at the time an individual living between Corpus
Christi and San Antonio until within about thirty miles of the
latter point, where there were a few scattering Mexican
settlements along the San Antonio River. The people in at least
one of these hamlets lived underground for protection against the
Indians. The country abounded in game, such as deer and
antelope, with abundance of wild turkeys along the streams and
where there were nut-bearing woods. On the Nueces, about
twenty-five miles up from Corpus Christi, were a few log cabins,
the remains of a town called San Patricio, but the inhabitants
had all been massacred by the Indians, or driven away.

San Antonio was about equally divided in population between
Americans and Mexicans. From there to Austin there was not a
single residence except at New Braunfels, on the Guadalupe
River. At that point was a settlement of Germans who had only
that year come into the State. At all events they were living
in small huts, about such as soldiers would hastily construct
for temporary occupation. From Austin to Corpus Christi there
was only a small settlement at Bastrop, with a few farms along
the Colorado River; but after leaving that, there were no
settlements except the home of one man, with one female slave,
at the old town of Goliad. Some of the houses were still
standing. Goliad had been quite a village for the period and
region, but some years before there had been a Mexican massacre,
in which every inhabitant had been killed or driven away. This,
with the massacre of the prisoners in the Alamo, San Antonio,
about the same time, more than three hundred men in all,
furnished the strongest justification the Texans had for
carrying on the war with so much cruelty. In fact, from that
time until the Mexican. war, the hostilities between Texans and
Mexicans was so great that neither was safe in the neighborhood
of the other who might be in superior numbers or possessed of
superior arms. The man we found living there seemed like an old
friend; he had come from near Fort Jessup, Louisiana, where the
officers of the 3d and 4th infantry and the 2d dragoons had
known him and his family. He had emigrated in advance of his
family to build up a home for them.

CHAPTER V.

TRIP TO AUSTIN–PROMOTION TO FULL SECOND LIEUTENANT–ARMY OF
OCCUPATION.

When our party left Corpus Christi it was quite large, including
the cavalry escort, Paymaster, Major Dix, his clerk and the
officers who, like myself, were simply on leave; but all the
officers on leave, except Lieutenant Benjamin–afterwards killed
in the valley of Mexico–Lieutenant, now General, Augur, and
myself, concluded to spend their allotted time at San Antonio
and return from there. We were all to be back at Corpus Christi
by the end of the month. The paymaster was detained in Austin so
long that, if we had waited for him, we would have exceeded our
leave. We concluded, therefore, to start back at once with the
animals we had, and having to rely principally on grass for
their food, it was a good six days’ journey. We had to sleep on
the prairie every night, except at Goliad, and possibly one night
on the Colorado, without shelter and with only such food as we
carried with us, and prepared ourselves. The journey was
hazardous on account of Indians, and there were white men in
Texas whom I would not have cared to meet in a secluded place.
Lieutenant Augur was taken seriously sick before we reached
Goliad and at a distance from any habitation. To add to the
complication, his horse–a mustang that had probably been
captured from the band of wild horses before alluded to, and of
undoubted longevity at his capture–gave out. It was absolutely
necessary to get for ward to Goliad to find a shelter for our
sick companion. By dint of patience and exceedingly slow
movements, Goliad was at last reached, and a shelter and bed
secured for our patient. We remained over a day, hoping that
Augur might recover sufficiently to resume his travels. He did
not, however, and knowing that Major Dix would be along in a few
days, with his wagon-train, now empty, and escort, we arranged
with our Louisiana friend to take the best of care of the sick
lieutenant until thus relieved, and went on.

I had never been a sportsman in my life; had scarcely ever gone
in search of game, and rarely seen any when looking for it. On
this trip there was no minute of time while travelling between
San Patricio and the settlements on the San Antonio River, from
San Antonio to Austin, and again from the Colorado River back to
San Patricio, when deer or antelope could not be seen in great
numbers. Each officer carried a shot-gun, and every evening,
after going into camp, some would go out and soon return with
venison and wild turkeys enough for the entire camp. I,
however, never went out, and had no occasion to fire my gun;
except, being detained over a day at Goliad, Benjamin and I
concluded to go down to the creek–which was fringed with
timber, much of it the pecan–and bring back a few turkeys. We
had scarcely reached the edge of the timber when I heard the
flutter of wings overhead, and in an instant I saw two or three
turkeys flying away. These were soon followed by more, then
more, and more, until a flock of twenty or thirty had left from
just over my head. All this time I stood watching the turkeys
to see where they flew–with my gun on my shoulder, and never
once thought of levelling it at the birds. When I had time to
reflect upon the matter, I came to the conclusion that as a
sportsman I was a failure, and went back to the house. Benjamin
remained out, and got as many turkeys as he wanted to carry back.

After the second night at Goliad, Benjamin and I started to make
the remainder of the journey alone. We reached Corpus Christi
just in time to avoid “absence without leave.” We met no one
not even an Indian–during the remainder of our journey, except
at San Patricio. A new settlement had been started there in our
absence of three weeks, induced possibly by the fact that there
were houses already built, while the proximity of troops gave
protection against the Indians. On the evening of the first day
out from Goliad we heard the most unearthly howling of wolves,
directly in our front. The prairie grass was tall and we could
not see the beasts, but the sound indicated that they were
near. To my ear it appeared that there must have been enough of
them to devour our party, horses and all, at a single meal. The
part of Ohio that I hailed from was not thickly settled, but
wolves had been driven out long before I left. Benjamin was
from Indiana, still less populated, where the wolf yet roamed
over the prairies. He understood the nature of the animal and
the capacity of a few to make believe there was an unlimited
number of them. He kept on towards the noise, unmoved. I
followed in his trail, lacking moral courage to turn back and
join our sick companion. I have no doubt that if Benjamin had
proposed returning to Goliad, I would not only have “seconded
the motion” but have sug gested that it was very hard-hearted in
us to leave Augur sick there in the first place; but Benjamin did
not propose turning back. When he did speak it was to ask:
“Grant, how many wolves do you think there are in that pack?”
Knowing where he was from, and suspecting that he thought I
would over-estimate the number, I determined to show my
acquaintance with the animal by putting the estimate below what
possibly could be correct, and answered: “Oh, about twenty,”
very indifferently. He smiled and rode on. In a minute we were
close upon them, and before they saw us. There were just TWO of
them. Seated upon their haunches, with their mouths close
together, they had made all the noise we had been hearing for
the past ten minutes. I have often thought of this incident
since when I have heard the noise of a few disappointed
politicians who had deserted their associates. There are always
more of them before they are counted.

A week or two before leaving Corpus Christi on this trip, I had
been promoted from brevet second-lieutenant, 4th infantry, to
full second-lieutenant, 7th infantry. Frank Gardner,(*1) of the
7th, was promoted to the 4th in the same orders. We immediately
made application to be transferred, so as to get back to our old
regiments. On my return, I found that our application had been
approved at Washington. While in the 7th infantry I was in the
company of Captain Holmes, afterwards a Lieutenant-general in
the Confederate army. I never came in contact with him in the
war of the Rebellion, nor did he render any very conspicuous
service in his high rank. My transfer carried me to the company
of Captain McCall, who resigned from the army after the Mexican
war and settled in Philadelphia. He was prompt, however, to
volunteer when the rebellion broke out, and soon rose to the
rank of major-general in the Union army. I was not fortunate
enough to meet him after he resigned. In the old army he was
esteemed very highly as a soldier and gentleman. Our relations
were always most pleasant.

The preparations at Corpus Christi for an advance progressed as
rapidly in the absence of some twenty or more lieutenants as if
we had been there. The principal business consisted in securing
mules, and getting them broken to harness. The process was slow
but amusing. The animals sold to the government were all young
and unbroken, even to the saddle, and were quite as wild as the
wild horses of the prairie. Usually a number would be brought
in by a company of Mexicans, partners in the delivery. The
mules were first driven into a stockade, called a corral,
inclosing an acre or more of ground. The Mexicans,–who were
all experienced in throwing the lasso,–would go into the corral
on horseback, with their lassos attached to the pommels of their
saddles. Soldiers detailed as teamsters and black smiths would
also enter the corral, the former with ropes to serve as
halters, the latter with branding irons and a fire to keep the
irons heated. A lasso was then thrown over the neck of a mule,
when he would immediately go to the length of his tether, first
one end, then the other in the air. While he was thus plunging
and gyrating, another lasso would be thrown by another Mexican,
catching the animal by a fore-foot. This would bring the mule
to the ground, when he was seized and held by the teamsters
while the blacksmith put upon him, with hot irons, the initials
“U. S.” Ropes were then put about the neck, with a slipnoose
which would tighten around the throat if pulled. With a man on
each side holding these ropes, the mule was released from his
other bindings and allowed to rise. With more or less
difficulty he would be conducted to a picket rope outside and
fastened there. The delivery of that mule was then complete.
This process was gone through with every mule and wild horse
with the army of occupation.

The method of breaking them was less cruel and much more
amusing. It is a well-known fact that where domestic animals
are used for specific purposes from generation to generation,
the descendants are easily, as a rule, subdued to the same
uses. At that time in Northern Mexico the mule, or his
ancestors, the horse and the ass, was seldom used except for the
saddle or pack. At all events the Corpus Christi mule resisted
the new use to which he was being put. The treatment he was
subjected to in order to overcome his prejudices was summary and
effective.

The soldiers were principally foreigners who had enlisted in our
large cities, and, with the exception of a chance drayman among
them, it is not probable that any of the men who reported
themselves as competent teamsters had ever driven a mule-team in
their lives, or indeed that many had had any previous experience
in driving any animal whatever to harness. Numbers together can
accomplish what twice their number acting individually could not
perform. Five mules were allotted to each wagon. A teamster
would select at the picket rope five animals of nearly the same
color and general appearance for his team. With a full corps of
assistants, other teamsters, he would then proceed to get his
mules together. In two’s the men would approach each animal
selected, avoiding as far as possible its heels. Two ropes
would be put about the neck of each animal, with a slip noose,
so that he could be choked if too unruly. They were then led
out, harnessed by force and hitched to the wagon in the position
they had to keep ever after. Two men remained on either side of
the leader, with the lassos about its neck, and one man retained
the same restraining influence over each of the others. All
being ready, the hold would be slackened and the team started.
The first motion was generally five mules in the air at one
time, backs bowed, hind feet extended to the rear. After
repeating this movement a few times the leaders would start to
run. This would bring the breeching tight against the mules at
the wheels, which these last seemed to regard as a most
unwarrantable attempt at coercion and would resist by taking a
seat, sometimes going so far as to lie down. In time all were
broken in to do their duty submissively if not cheerfully, but
there never was a time during the war when it was safe to let a
Mexican mule get entirely loose. Their drivers were all
teamsters by the time they got through.

I recollect one case of a mule that had worked in a team under
the saddle, not only for some time at Corpus Christi, where he
was broken, but all the way to the point opposite Matamoras,
then to Camargo, where he got loose from his fastenings during
the night. He did not run away at first, but staid in the
neighborhood for a day or two, coming up sometimes to the feed
trough even; but on the approach of the teamster he always got
out of the way. At last, growing tired of the constant effort
to catch him, he disappeared altogether. Nothing short of a
Mexican with his lasso could have caught him. Regulations would
not have warranted the expenditure of a dollar in hiring a man
with a lasso to catch that mule; but they did allow the
expenditure “of the mule,” on a certificate that he had run away
without any fault of the quartermaster on whose returns he was
borne, and also the purchase of another to take his place. am a
competent witness, for I was regimental quartermaster at the
time.

While at Corpus Christi all the officers who had a fancy for
riding kept horses. The animals cost but little in the first
instance, and when picketed they would get their living without
any cost. I had three not long before the army moved, but a sad
accident bereft me of them all at one time. A colored boy who
gave them all the attention they got–besides looking after my
tent and that of a class-mate and fellow-lieutenant and cooking
for us, all for about eight dollars per month, was riding one to
water and leading the other two. The led horses pulled him from
his seat and all three ran away. They never were heard of
afterwards. Shortly after that some one told Captain Bliss,
General Taylor’s Adjutant-General, of my misfortune. “Yes; I
heard Grant lost five or six dollars’ worth of horses the other
day,” he replied. That was a slander; they were broken to the
saddle when I got them and cost nearly twenty dollars. I never
suspected the colored boy of malicious intent in letting them
get away, because, if they had not escaped, he could have had
one of them to ride on the long march then in prospect.

CHAPTER VI.

ADVANCE OF THE ARMY–CROSSING THE COLORADO–THE RIO GRANDE.

At last the preparations were complete and orders were issued
for the advance to begin on the 8th of March. General Taylor
had an army of not more than three thousand men. One battery,
the siege guns and all the convalescent troops were sent on by
water to Brazos Santiago, at the mouth of the Rio Grande. A
guard was left back at Corpus Christi to look after public
property and to take care of those who were too sick to be
removed. The remainder of the army, probably not more than
twenty five hundred men, was divided into three brigades, with
the cavalry independent. Colonel Twiggs, with seven companies
of dragoons and a battery of light artillery, moved on the
8th. He was followed by the three infantry brigades, with a
day’s interval between the commands. Thus the rear brigade did
not move from Corpus Christi until the 11th of March. In view
of the immense bodies of men moved on the same day over narrow
roads, through dense forests and across large streams, in our
late war, it seems strange now that a body of less than three
thousand men should have been broken into four columns,
separated by a day’s march.

General Taylor was opposed to anything like plundering by the
troops, and in this instance, I doubt not, he looked upon the
enemy as the aggrieved party and was not willing to injure them
further than his instructions from Washington demanded. His
orders to the troops enjoined scrupulous regard for the rights
of all peaceable persons and the payment of the highest price
for all supplies taken for the use of the army.

All officers of foot regiments who had horses were permitted to
ride them on the march when it did not interfere with their
military duties. As already related, having lost my “five or
six dollars’ worth of horses ” but a short time before I
determined not to get another, but to make the journey on
foot. My company commander, Captain McCall, had two good
American horses, of considerably more value in that country,
where native horses were cheap, than they were in the States. He
used one himself and wanted the other for his servant. He was
quite anxious to know whether I did not intend to get me another
horse before the march began. I told him No; I belonged to a
foot regiment. I did not understand the object of his
solicitude at the time, but, when we were about to start, he
said: “There, Grant, is a horse for you.” I found that he
could not bear the idea of his servant riding on a long march
while his lieutenant went a-foot. He had found a mustang, a
three-year old colt only recently captured, which had been
purchased by one of the colored servants with the regiment for
the sum of three dollars. It was probably the only horse at
Corpus Christi that could have been purchased just then for any
reasonable price. Five dollars, sixty-six and two-thirds per
cent. advance, induced the owner to part with the mustang. I
was sorry to take him, because I really felt that, belonging to
a foot regiment, it was my duty to march with the men. But I
saw the Captain’s earnestness in the matter, and accepted the
horse for the trip. The day we started was the first time the
horse had ever been under saddle. I had, however, but little
difficulty in breaking him, though for the first day there were
frequent disagreements between us as to which way we should go,
and sometimes whether we should go at all. At no time during
the day could I choose exactly the part of the column I would
march with; but after that, I had as tractable a horse as any
with the army, and there was none that stood the trip better. He
never ate a mouthful of food on the journey except the grass he
could pick within the length of his picket rope.

A few days out from Corpus Christi, the immense herd of wild
horses that ranged at that time between the Nueces and the Rio
Grande was seen directly in advance of the head of the column
and but a few miles off. It was the very band from which the
horse I was riding had been captured but a few weeks before. The
column was halted for a rest, and a number of officers, myself
among them, rode out two or three miles to the right to see the
extent of the herd. The country was a rolling prairie, and,
from the higher ground, the vision was obstructed only by the
earth’s curvature. As far as the eye could reach to our right,
the herd extended. To the left, it extended equally. There was
no estimating the number of animals in it; I have no idea that
they could all have been corralled in the State of Rhode Island,
or Delaware, at one time. If they had been, they would have been
so thick that the pasturage would have given out the first day.
People who saw the Southern herd of buffalo, fifteen or twenty
years ago, can appreciate the size of the Texas band of wild
horses in 1846.

At the point where the army struck the Little Colorado River,
the stream was quite wide and of sufficient depth for
navigation. The water was brackish and the banks were fringed
with timber. Here the whole army concentrated before attempting
to cross. The army was not accompanied by a pontoon train, and
at that time the troops were not instructed in bridge
building. To add to the embarrassment of the situation, the
army was here, for the first time, threatened with opposition.
Buglers, concealed from our view by the brush on the opposite
side, sounded the “assembly,” and other military calls. Like
the wolves before spoken of, they gave the impression that there
was a large number of them and that, if the troops were in
proportion to the noise, they were sufficient to devour General
Taylor and his army. There were probably but few troops, and
those engaged principally in watching the movements of the
“invader.” A few of our cavalry dashed in, and forded and swam
the stream, and all opposition was soon dispersed. I do not
remember that a single shot was fired.

The troops waded the stream, which was up to their necks in the
deepest part. Teams were crossed by attaching a long rope to
the end of the wagon tongue passing it between the two swing
mules and by the side of the leader, hitching his bridle as well
as the bridle of the mules in rear to it, and carrying the end to
men on the opposite shore. The bank down to the water was steep
on both sides. A rope long enough to cross the river,
therefore, was attached to the back axle of the wagon, and men
behind would hold the rope to prevent the wagon “beating” the
mules into the water. This latter rope also served the purpose
of bringing the end of the forward one back, to be used over
again. The water was deep enough for a short distance to swim
the little Mexican mules which the army was then using, but
they, and the wagons, were pulled through so fast by the men at
the end of the rope ahead, that no time was left them to show
their obstinacy. In this manner the artillery and
transportation of the “army of occupation” crossed the Colorado
River.

About the middle of the month of March the advance of the army
reached the Rio Grande and went into camp near the banks of the
river, opposite the city of Matamoras and almost under the guns
of a small fort at the lower end of the town. There was not at
that time a single habitation from Corpus Christi until the Rio
Grande was reached.

The work of fortifying was commenced at once. The fort was laid
out by the engineers, but the work was done by the soldiers under
the supervision of their officers, the chief engineer retaining
general directions. The Mexicans now became so incensed at our
near approach that some of their troops crossed the river above
us, and made it unsafe for small bodies of men to go far beyond
the limits of camp. They captured two companies of dragoons,
commanded by Captains Thornton and Hardee. The latter figured
as a general in the late war, on the Confederate side, and was
author of the tactics first used by both armies. Lieutenant
Theodric Porter, of the 4th infantry, was killed while out with
a small detachment; and Major Cross, the assistant
quartermaster-general, had also been killed not far from camp.

There was no base of supplies nearer than Point Isabel, on the
coast, north of the mouth of the Rio Grande and twenty-five
miles away. The enemy, if the Mexicans could be called such at
this time when no war had been declared, hovered about in such
numbers that it was not safe to send a wagon train after
supplies with any escort that could be spared. I have already
said that General Taylor’s whole command on the Rio Grande
numbered less than three thousand men. He had, however, a few
more troops at Point Isabel or Brazos Santiago. The supplies
brought from Corpus Christi in wagons were running short. Work
was therefore pushed with great vigor on the defences, to enable
the minimum number of troops to hold the fort. All the men who
could be employed, were kept at work from early dawn until
darkness closed the labors of the day. With all this the fort
was not completed until the supplies grew so short that further
delay in obtaining more could not be thought of. By the latter
part of April the work was in a partially defensible condition,
and the 7th infantry, Major Jacob Brown commanding, was marched
in to garrison it, with some few pieces of artillery. All the
supplies on hand, with the exception of enough to carry the rest
of the army to Point Isabel, were left with the garrison, and the
march was commenced with the remainder of the command, every
wagon being taken with the army. Early on the second day after
starting the force reached its destination, without opposition
from the Mexicans. There was some delay in getting supplies
ashore from vessels at anchor in the open roadstead.

CHAPTER VII.

THE MEXICAN WAR–THE BATTLE OF PALO ALTO–THE BATTLE OF RESACA
DE LA PALMA–ARMY OF INVASION–GENERAL TAYLOR–MOVEMENT ON
CAMARGO.

While General Taylor was away with the bulk of his army, the
little garrison up the river was besieged. As we lay in our
tents upon the sea-shore, the artillery at the fort on the Rio
Grande could be distinctly heard.

The war had begun.

There were no possible means of obtaining news from the
garrison, and information from outside could not be otherwise
than unfavorable. What General Taylor’s feelings were during
this suspense I do not know; but for myself, a young
second-lieutenant who had never heard a hostile gun before, I
felt sorry that I had enlisted. A great many men, when they
smell battle afar off, chafe to get into the fray. When they
say so themselves they generally fail to convince their hearers
that they are as anxious as they would like to make believe, and
as they approach danger they become more subdued. This rule is
not universal, for I have known a few men who were always aching
for a fight when there was no enemy near, who were as good as
their word when the battle did come. But the number of such men
is small.

On the 7th of May the wagons were all loaded and General Taylor
started on his return, with his army reinforced at Point Isabel,
but still less than three thousand strong, to relieve the
garrison on the Rio Grande. The road from Point Isabel to
Matamoras is over an open, rolling, treeless prairie, until the
timber that borders the bank of the Rio Grande is reached. This
river, like the Mississippi, flows through a rich alluvial valley
in the most meandering manner, running towards all points of the
compass at times within a few miles. Formerly the river ran by
Resaca de la Palma, some four or five miles east of the present
channel. The old bed of the river at Resaca had become filled
at places, leaving a succession of little lakes. The timber
that had formerly grown upon both banks, and for a considerable
distance out, was still standing. This timber was struck six or
eight miles out from the besieged garrison, at a point known as
Palo Alto–“Tall trees” or “woods.”

Early in the forenoon of the 8th of May as Palo Alto was
approached, an army, certainly outnumbering our little force,
was seen, drawn up in line of battle just in front of the
timber. Their bayonets and spearheads glistened in the sunlight
formidably. The force was composed largely of cavalry armed with
lances. Where we were the grass was tall, reaching nearly to the
shoulders of the men, very stiff, and each stock was pointed at
the top, and hard and almost as sharp as a darning-needle.
General Taylor halted his army before the head of column came in
range of the artillery of the Mexicans. He then formed a line of
battle, facing the enemy. His artillery, two batteries and two
eighteen-pounder iron guns, drawn by oxen, were placed in
position at intervals along the line. A battalion was thrown to
the rear, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Childs, of the
artillery, as reserves. These preparations completed, orders
were given for a platoon of each company to stack arms and go to
a stream off to the right of the command, to fill their canteens
and also those of the rest of their respective companies. When
the men were all back in their places in line, the command to
advance was given. As I looked down that long line of about
three thousand armed men, advancing towards a larger force also
armed, I thought what a fearful responsibility General Taylor
must feel, commanding such a host and so far away from
friends. The Mexicans immediately opened fire upon us, first
with artillery and then with infantry. At first their shots did
not reach us, and the advance was continued. As we got nearer,
the cannon balls commenced going through the ranks. They hurt
no one, however, during this advance, because they would strike
the ground long before they reached our line, and ricochetted
through the tall grass so slowly that the men would see them and
open ranks and let them pass. When we got to a point where the
artillery could be used with effect, a halt was called, and the
battle opened on both sides.

The infantry under General Taylor was armed with flint-lock
muskets, and paper cartridges charged with powder, buck-shot and
ball. At the distance of a few hundred yards a man might fire at
you all day without your finding it out. The artillery was
generally six-pounder brass guns throwing only solid shot; but
General Taylor had with him three or four twelve-pounder
howitzers throwing shell, besides his eighteen-pounders before
spoken of, that had a long range. This made a powerful
armament. The Mexicans were armed about as we were so far as
their infantry was concerned, but their artillery only fired
solid shot. We had greatly the advantage in this arm.

The artillery was advanced a rod or two in front of the line,
and opened fire. The infantry stood at order arms as
spectators, watching the effect of our shots upon the enemy, and
watching his shots so as to step out of their way. It could be
seen that the eighteen-pounders and the howitzers did a great
deal of execution. On our side there was little or no loss
while we occupied this position. During the battle Major
Ringgold, an accomplished and brave artillery officer, was
mortally wounded, and Lieutenant Luther, also of the artillery,
was struck. During the day several advances were made, and just
at dusk it became evident that the Mexicans were falling back. We
again advanced, and occupied at the close of the battle
substantially the ground held by the enemy at the beginning. In
this last move there was a brisk fire upon our troops, and some
execution was done. One cannon-ball passed through our ranks,
not far from me. It took off the head of an enlisted man, and
the under jaw of Captain Page of my regiment, while the
splinters from the musket of the killed soldier, and his brains
and bones, knocked down two or three others, including one
officer, Lieutenant Wallen,–hurting them more or less. Our
casualties for the day were nine killed and forty-seven wounded.

At the break of day on the 9th, the army under Taylor was ready
to renew the battle ; but an advance showed that the enemy had
entirely left our front during the night. The chaparral before
us was impenetrable except where there were roads or trails,
with occasionally clear or bare spots of small dimensions. A
body of men penetrating it might easily be ambushed. It was
better to have a few men caught in this way than the whole army,
yet it was necessary that the garrison at the river should be
relieved. To get to them the chaparral had to be passed. Thus
I assume General Taylor reasoned. He halted the army not far in
advance of the ground occupied by the Mexicans the day before,
and selected Captain C. F. Smith, of the artillery, and Captain
McCall, of my company, to take one hundred and fifty picked men
each and find where the enemy had gone. This left me in command
of the company, an honor and responsibility I thought very great.

Smith and McCall found no obstruction in the way of their
advance until they came up to the succession of ponds, before
describes, at Resaca. The Mexicans had passed them and formed
their lines on the opposite bank. This position they had
strengthened a little by throwing up dead trees and brush in
their front, and by placing artillery to cover the approaches
and open places. Smith and McCall deployed on each side of the
road as well as they could, and engaged the enemy at long
range. Word was sent back, and the advance of the whole army
was at once commenced. As we came up we were deployed in like
manner. I was with the right wing, and led my company through
the thicket wherever a penetrable place could be found, taking
advantage of any clear spot that would carry me towards the
enemy. At last I got pretty close up without knowing it. The
balls commenced to whistle very thick overhead, cutting the
limbs of the chaparral right and left. We could not see the
enemy, so I ordered my men to lie down, an order that did not
have to be enforced. We kept our position until it became
evident that the enemy were not firing at us, and then withdrew
to find better ground to advance upon.

By this time some progress had been made on our left. A section
of artillery had been captured by the cavalry, and some prisoners
had been taken. The Mexicans were giving way all along the line,
and many of them had, no doubt, left early. I at last found a
clear space separating two ponds. There seemed to be a few men
in front and I charged upon them with my company.

There was no resistance, and we captured a Mexican colonel, who
had been wounded, and a few men. Just as I was sending them to
the rear with a guard of two or three men, a private came from
the front bringing back one of our officers, who had been badly
wounded in advance of where I was. The ground had been charged
over before. My exploit was equal to that of the soldier who
boasted that he had cut off the leg of one of the enemy. When
asked why he did not cut off his head, he replied: “Some one
had done that before.” This left no doubt in my mind but that
the battle of Resaca de la Palma would have been won, just as it
was, if I had not been there. There was no further resistance.
The evening of the 9th the army was encamped on its old ground
near the Fort, and the garrison was relieved. The siege had
lasted a number of days, but the casualties were few in
number. Major Jacob Brown, of the 7th infantry, the commanding
officer, had been killed, and in his honor the fort was named.
Since then a town of considerable importance has sprung up on
the ground occupied by the fort and troops, which has also taken
his name.

The battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma seemed to us
engaged, as pretty important affairs; but we had only a faint
conception of their magnitude until they were fought over in the
North by the Press and the reports came back to us. At the same
time, or about the same time, we learned that war existed
between the United States and Mexico, by the acts of the latter
country. On learning this fact General Taylor transferred our
camps to the south or west bank of the river, and Matamoras was
occupied. We then became the “Army of Invasion.”

Up to this time Taylor had none but regular troops in his
command; but now that invasion had already taken place,
volunteers for one year commenced arriving. The army remained
at Matamoras until sufficiently reinforced to warrant a movement
into the interior. General Taylor was not an officer to trouble
the administration much with his demands, but was inclined to do
the best he could with the means given him. He felt his
responsibility as going no further. If he had thought that he
was sent to perform an impossibility with the means given him,
he would probably have informed the authorities of his opinion
and left them to determine what should be done. If the judgment
was against him he would have gone on and done the best he could
with the means at hand without parading his grievance before the
public. No soldier could face either danger or responsibility
more calmly than he. These are qualities more rarely found than
genius or physical courage.

General Taylor never made any great show or parade, either of
uniform or retinue. In dress he was possibly too plain, rarely
wearing anything in the field to indicate his rank, or even that
he was an officer; but he was known to every soldier in his army,
and was respected by all. I can call to mind only one instance
when I saw him in uniform, and one other when I heard of his
wearing it, On both occasions he was unfortunate. The first was
at Corpus Christi. He had concluded to review his army before
starting on the march and gave orders accordingly. Colonel
Twiggs was then second in rank with the army, and to him was
given the command of the review. Colonel and Brevet
Brigadier-General Worth, a far different soldier from Taylor in
the use of the uniform, was next to Twiggs in rank, and claimed
superiority by virtue of his brevet rank when the accidents of
service threw them where one or the other had to command. Worth
declined to attend the review as subordinate to Twiggs until the
question was settled by the highest authority. This broke up
the review, and the question was referred to Washington for
final decision.

General Taylor was himself only a colonel, in real rank, at that
time, and a brigadier-general by brevet. He was assigned to
duty, however, by the President, with the rank which his brevet
gave him. Worth was not so assigned, but by virtue of
commanding a division he must, under the army regulations of
that day, have drawn the pay of his brevet rank. The question
was submitted to Washington, and no response was received until
after the army had reached the Rio Grande. It was decided
against General Worth, who at once tendered his resignation and
left the army, going north, no doubt, by the same vessel that
carried it. This kept him out of the battles of Palo Alto and
Resaca de la Palma. Either the resignation was not accepted, or
General Worth withdrew it before action had been taken. At all
events he returned to the army in time to command his division
in the battle of Monterey, and served with it to the end of the
war.

The second occasion on which General Taylor was said to have
donned his uniform, was in order to receive a visit from the
Flag Officer of the naval squadron off the mouth of the Rio
Grande. While the army was on that river the Flag Officer sent
word that he would call on the General to pay his respects on a
certain day. General Taylor, knowing that naval officers
habitually wore all the uniform the “law allowed” on all
occasions of ceremony, thought it would be only civil to receive
his guest in the same style. His uniform was therefore got out,
brushed up, and put on, in advance of the visit. The Flag
Officer, knowing General Taylor’s aversion to the wearing of the
uniform, and feeling that it would be regarded as a compliment
should he meet him in civilian’s dress, left off his uniform for
this occasion. The meeting was said to have been embarrassing to
both, and the conversation was principally apologetic.

The time was whiled away pleasantly enough at Matamoras, while
we were waiting for volunteers. It is probable that all the
most important people of the territory occupied by our army left
their homes before we got there, but with those remaining the
best of relations apparently existed. It was the policy of the
Commanding General to allow no pillaging, no taking of private
property for public or individual use without satisfactory
compensation, so that a better market was afforded than the
people had ever known before.

Among the troops that joined us at Matamoras was an Ohio
regiment, of which Thomas L. Hamer, the Member of Congress who
had given me my appointment to West Point, was major. He told
me then that he could have had the colonelcy, but that as he
knew he was to be appointed a brigadier-general, he preferred at
first to take the lower grade. I have said before that Hamer was
one of the ablest men Ohio ever produced. At that time he was in
the prime of life, being less than fifty years of age, and
possessed an admirable physique, promising long life. But he
was taken sick before Monterey, and died within a few days. I
have always believed that had his life been spared, he would
have been President of the United States during the term filled
by President Pierce. Had Hamer filled that office his
partiality for me was such, there is but little doubt I should
have been appointed to one of the staff corps of the army–the
Pay Department probably–and would therefore now be preparing to
retire. Neither of these speculations is unreasonable, and they
are mentioned to show how little men control their own destiny.

Reinforcements having arrived, in the month of August the
movement commenced from Matamoras to Camargo, the head of
navigation on the Rio Grande. The line of the Rio Grande was
all that was necessary to hold, unless it was intended to invade
Mexico from the North. In that case the most natural route to
take was the one which General Taylor selected. It entered a
pass in the Sierra Madre Mountains, at Monterey, through which
the main road runs to the City of Mexico. Monterey itself was a
good point to hold, even if the line of the Rio Grande covered
all the territory we desired to occupy at that time. It is
built on a plain two thousand feet above tide water, where the
air is bracing and the situation healthy.

On the 19th of August the army started for Monterey, leaving a
small garrison at Matamoras. The troops, with the exception of
the artillery, cavalry, and the brigade to which I belonged,
were moved up the river to Camargo on steamers. As there were
but two or three of these, the boats had to make a number of
trips before the last of the troops were up. Those who marched
did so by the south side of the river. Lieutenant-Colonel
Garland, of the 4th infantry, was the brigade commander, and on
this occasion commanded the entire marching force. One day out
convinced him that marching by day in that latitude, in the
month of August, was not a beneficial sanitary measure,
particularly for Northern men. The order of marching was
changed and night marches were substituted with the best results.

When Camargo was reached, we found a city of tents outside the
Mexican hamlet. I was detailed to act as quartermaster and
commissary to the regiment. The teams that had proven
abundantly sufficient to transport all supplies from Corpus
Christi to the Rio Grande over the level prairies of Texas, were
entirely inadequate to the needs of the reinforced army in a
mountainous country. To obviate the deficiency, pack mules were
hired, with Mexicans to pack and drive them. I had charge of the
few wagons allotted to the 4th infantry and of the pack train to
supplement them. There were not men enough in the army to
manage that train without the help of Mexicans who had learned
how. As it was the difficulty was great enough. The troops
would take up their march at an early hour each day. After they
had started, the tents and cooking utensils had to be made into
packages, so that they could be lashed to the backs of the
mules. Sheet-iron kettles, tent-poles and mess chests were
inconvenient articles to transport in that way. It took several
hours to get ready to start each morning, and by the time we were
ready some of the mules first loaded would be tired of standing
so long with their loads on their backs. Sometimes one would
start to run, bowing his back and kicking up until he scattered
his load; others would lie down and try to disarrange their
loads by attempting to get on the top of them by rolling on
them; others with tent-poles for part of their loads would
manage to run a tent-pole on one side of a sapling while they
would take the other. I am not aware of ever having used a
profane expletive in my life; but I would have the charity to
excuse those who may have done so, if they were in charge of a
train of Mexican pack mules at the time.

CHAPTER VIII.

ADVANCE ON MONTEREY–THE BLACK FORT–THE BATTLE OF
MONTEREY–SURRENDER OF THE CITY.

The advance from Camargo was commenced on the 5th of September.
The army was divided into four columns, separated from each
other by one day’s march. The advance reached Cerralvo in four
days and halted for the remainder of the troops to come up. By
the 13th the rear-guard had arrived, and the same day the
advance resumed its march, followed as before, a day separating
the divisions. The forward division halted again at Marin,
twenty-four miles from Monterey. Both this place and Cerralvo
were nearly deserted, and men, women and children were seen
running and scattered over the hills as we approached; but when
the people returned they found all their abandoned property
safe, which must have given them a favorable opinion of Los
Grengos–“the Yankees.” From Marin the movement was in mass.
On the 19th General Taylor, with is army, was encamped at Walnut
Springs, within three miles of Monterey.

The town is on a small stream coming out of the mountain-pass,
and is backed by a range of hills of moderate elevation. To the
north, between the city and Walnut Springs, stretches an
extensive plain. On this plain, and entirely outside of the
last houses of the city, stood a strong fort, enclosed on all
sides, to which our army gave the name of “Black Fort.” Its
guns commanded the approaches to the city to the full extent of
their range. There were two detached spurs of hills or
mountains to the north and northwest of the city, which were
also fortified. On one of these stood the Bishop’s Palace. The
road to Saltillo leaves the upper or western end of the city
under the fire of the guns from these heights. The lower or
eastern end was defended by two or three small detached works,
armed with artillery and infantry. To the south was the
mountain stream before mentioned, and back of that the range of
foot-hills. The plaza in the centre of the city was the
citadel, properly speaking. All the streets leading from it
were swept by artillery, cannon being intrenched behind
temporary parapets. The house-tops near the plaza were converted
into infantry fortifications by the use of sand-bags for
parapets. Such were the defences of Monterey in September,
1847. General Ampudia, with a force of certainly ten thousand
men, was in command.

General Taylor’s force was about six thousand five hundred
strong, in three divisions, under Generals Butler, Twiggs and
Worth. The troops went into camp at Walnut Springs, while the
engineer officers, under Major Mansfield–a General in the late
war–commenced their reconnoissance. Major Mansfield found that
it would be practicable to get troops around, out of range of the
Black Fort and the works on the detached hills to the north-west
of the city, to the Saltillo road. With this road in our
possession, the enemy would be cut off from receiving further
supplies, if not from all communication with the interior.
General Worth, with his division somewhat reinforced, was given
the task of gaining possession of the Saltillo road, and of
carrying the detached works outside the city, in that quarter.
He started on his march early in the afternoon of the 20th. The
divisions under Generals Butler and Twiggs were drawn up to
threaten the east and north sides of the city and the works on
those fronts, in support of the movement under General Worth.
Worth’s was regarded as the main attack on Monterey, and all
other operations were in support of it. His march this day was
uninterrupted; but the enemy was seen to reinforce heavily about
the Bishop’s Palace and the other outside fortifications on their
left. General Worth reached a defensible position just out of
range of the enemy’s guns on the heights north-west of the city,
and bivouacked for the night. The engineer officers with
him–Captain Sanders and Lieutenant George G. Meade, afterwards
the commander of the victorious National army at the battle of
Gettysburg–made a reconnoissance to the Saltillo road under
cover of night.

During the night of the 20th General Taylor had established a
battery, consisting of two twenty-four-pounder howitzers and a
ten inch mortar, at a point from which they could play upon
Black Fort. A natural depression in the plain, sufficiently
deep to protect men standing in it from the fire from the fort,
was selected and the battery established on the crest nearest
the enemy. The 4th infantry, then consisting of but six reduced
companies, was ordered to support the artillerists while they
were intrenching themselves and their guns. I was regimental
quartermaster at the time and was ordered to remain in charge of
camp and the public property at Walnut Springs. It was supposed
that the regiment would return to its camp in the morning.

The point for establishing the siege battery was reached and the
work performed without attracting the attention of the enemy. At
daylight the next morning fire was opened on both sides and
continued with, what seemed to me at that day, great fury. My
curiosity got the better of my judgment, and I mounted a horse
and rode to the front to see what was going on. I had been
there but a short time when an order to charge was given, and
lacking the moral courage to return to camp–where I had been
ordered to stay–I charged with the regiment As soon as the
troops were out of the depression they came under the fire of
Black Fort. As they advanced they got under fire from batteries
guarding the cast, or lower, end of the city, and of musketry.
About one-third of the men engaged in the charge were killed or
wounded in the space of a few minutes. We retreated to get out
of fire, not backward, but eastward and perpendicular to the
direct road running into the city from Walnut Springs. I was, I
believe, the only person in the 4th infantry in the charge who
was on horseback. When we got to a lace of safety the regiment
halted and drew itself together–what was left of it. The
adjutant of the regiment, Lieutenant Hoskins, who was not in
robust health, found himself very much fatigued from running on
foot in the charge and retreat, and, seeing me on horseback,
expressed a wish that he could be mounted also. I offered him
my horse and he accepted the offer. A few minutes later I saw a
soldier, a quartermaster’s man, mounted, not far away. I ran to
him, took his horse and was back with the regiment in a few
minutes. In a short time we were off again; and the next place
of safety from the shots of the enemy that I recollect of being
in, was a field of cane or corn to the north-east of the lower
batteries. The adjutant to whom I had loaned my horse was
killed, and I was designated to act in his place.

This charge was ill-conceived, or badly executed. We belonged
to the brigade commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Garland, and he
had received orders to charge the lower batteries of the city,
and carry them if he could without too much loss, for the
purpose of creating a diversion in favor of Worth, who was
conducting the movement which it was intended should be
decisive. By a movement by the left flank Garland could have
led his men beyond the range of the fire from Black Fort and
advanced towards the northeast angle of the city, as well
covered from fire as could be expected. There was no undue loss
of life in reaching the lower end of Monterey, except that
sustained by Garland’s command.

Meanwhile Quitman’s brigade, conducted by an officer of
engineers, had reached the eastern end of the city, and was
placed under cover of the houses without much loss. Colonel
Garland’s brigade also arrived at the suburbs, and, by the
assistance of some of our troops that had reached house-tops
from which they could fire into a little battery covering the
approaches to the lower end of the city, the battery was
speedily captured and its guns were turned upon another work of
the enemy. An entrance into the cast end of the city was now
secured, and the houses protected our troops so long as they
were inactive. On the west General Worth had reached the
Saltillo road after some fighting but without heavy loss. He
turned from his new position and captured the forts on both
heights in that quarter. This gave him possession of the upper
or west end of Monterey. Troops from both Twiggs’s and Butler’s
divisions were in possession of the east end of the town, but the
Black Fort to the north of the town and the plaza in the centre
were still in the possession of the enemy. Our camps at Walnut
Springs, three miles away, were guarded by a company from each
regiment. A regiment of Kentucky volunteers guarded the mortars
and howitzers engaged against Black Fort. Practically Monterey
was invested.

There was nothing done on the 22d by the United States troops;
but the enemy kept up a harmless fire upon us from Black Fort
and the batteries still in their possession at the east end of
the city. During the night they evacuated these; so that on the
morning of the 23d we held undisputed possession of the east end
of Monterey.

Twiggs’s division was at the lower end of the city, and well
covered from the fire of the enemy. But the streets leading to
the plaza–all Spanish or Spanish-American towns have near their
centres a square called a plaza–were commanded from all
directions by artillery. The houses were flat-roofed and but
one or two stories high, and about the plaza the roofs were
manned with infantry, the troops being protected from our fire
by parapets made of sand-bags. All advances into the city were
thus attended with much danger. While moving along streets
which did not lead to the plaza, our men were protected from the
fire, and from the view, of the enemy except at the crossings;
but at these a volley of musketry and a discharge of grape-shot
were invariably encountered. The 3d and 4th regiments of
infantry made an advance nearly to the plaza in this way and
with heavy loss. The loss of the 3d infantry in commissioned
officers was especially severe. There were only five companies
of the regiment and not over twelve officers present, and five
of these officers were killed. When within a square of the
plaza this small command, ten companies in all, was brought to a
halt. Placing themselves under cover from the shots of the
enemy, the men would watch to detect a head above the sand-bags
on the neighboring houses. The exposure of a single head would
bring a volley from our soldiers.

We had not occupied this position long when it was discovered
that our ammunition was growing low. I volunteered to go back
(*2) to the point we had started from, report our position to
General Twiggs, and ask for ammunition to be forwarded. We were
at this time occupying ground off from the street, in rear of the
houses. My ride back was an exposed one. Before starting I
adjusted myself on the side of my horse furthest from the enemy,
and with only one foot holding to the cantle of the saddle, and
an arm over the neck of the horse exposed, I started at full
run. It was only at street crossings that my horse was under
fire, but these I crossed at such a flying rate that generally I
was past and under cover of the next block of houses before the
enemy fired. I got out safely without a scratch.

At one place on my ride, I saw a sentry walking in front of a
house, and stopped to inquire what he was doing there. Finding
that the house was full of wounded American officers and
soldiers, I dismounted and went in. I found there Captain
Williams, of the Engineer Corps, wounded in the head, probably
fatally, and Lieutenant Territt, also badly wounded his bowels
protruding from his wound. There were quite a number of
soldiers also. Promising them to report their situation, I
left, readjusted myself to my horse, recommenced the run, and
was soon with the troops at the east end. Before ammunition
could be collected, the two regiments I had been with were seen
returning, running the same gauntlet in getting out that they
had passed in going in, but with comparatively little loss. The
movement was countermanded and the troops were withdrawn. The
poor wounded officers and men I had found, fell into the hands
of the enemy during the night, and died.

While this was going on at the east, General Worth, with a small
division of troops, was advancing towards the plaza from the
opposite end of the city. He resorted to a better expedient for
getting to the plaza–the citadel–than we did on the east.
Instead of moving by the open streets, he advanced through the
houses, cutting passageways from one to another. Without much
loss of life, he got so near the plaza during the night that
before morning, Ampudia, the Mexican commander, made overtures
for the surrender of the city and garrison. This stopped all
further hostilities. The terms of surrender were soon agreed
upon. The prisoners were paroled and permitted to take their
horses and personal property with them.

My pity was aroused by the sight of the Mexican garrison of
Monterey marching out of town as prisoners, and no doubt the
same feeling was experienced by most of our army who witnessed
it. Many of the prisoners were cavalry, armed with lances, and
mounted on miserable little half-starved horses that did not
look as if they could carry their riders out of town. The men
looked in but little better condition. I thought how little
interest the men before me had in the results of the war, and
how little knowledge they had of “what it was all about.”

After the surrender of the garrison of Monterey a quiet camp
life was led until midwinter. As had been the case on the Rio
Grande, the people who remained at their homes fraternized with
the “Yankees” in the pleasantest manner. In fact, under the
humane policy of our commander, I question whether the great
majority of the Mexican people did not regret our departure as
much as they had regretted our coming. Property and person were
thoroughly protected, and a market was afforded for all the
products of the country such as the people had never enjoyed
before. The educated and wealthy portion of the population
here, as elsewhere, abandoned their homes and remained away from
them as long as they were in the possession of the invaders; but
this class formed a very small percentage of the whole
population.

CHAPTER IX.

POLITICAL INTRIGUE–BUENA VISTA–MOVEMENT AGAINST VERA
CRUZ–SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF VERA CRUZ.

The Mexican war was a political war, and the administration
conducting it desired to make party capital out of it. General
Scott was at the head of the army, and, being a soldier of
acknowledged professional capacity, his claim to the command of
the forces in the field was almost indisputable and does not
seem to have been denied by President Polk, or Marcy, his
Secretary of War. Scott was a Whig and the administration was
democratic. General Scott was also known to have political
aspirations, and nothing so popularizes a candidate for high
civil positions as military victories. It would not do
therefore to give him command of the “army of conquest.” The
plans submitted by Scott for a campaign in Mexico were
disapproved by the administration, and he replied, in a tone
possibly a little disrespectful, to the effect that, if a
soldier’s plans were not to be supported by the administration,
success could not be expected. This was on the 27th of May,
1846. Four days later General Scott was notified that he need
not go to Mexico. General Gaines was next in rank, but he was
too old and feeble to take the field. Colonel Zachary Taylor–a
brigadier-general by brevet–was therefore left in command. He,
too, was a Whig, but was not supposed to entertain any political
ambitions; nor did he; but after the fall of Monterey, his third
battle and third complete victory, the Whig papers at home began
to speak of him as the candidate of their party for the
Presidency. Something had to be done to neutralize his growing
popularity. He could not be relieved from duty in the field
where all his battles had been victories: the design would have
been too transparent. It was finally decided to send General
Scott to Mexico in chief command, and to authorize him to carry
out his own original plan: that is, capture Vera Cruz and march
upon the capital of the country. It was no doubt supposed that
Scott’s ambition would lead him to slaughter Taylor or destroy
his chances for the Presidency, and yet it was hoped that he
would not make sufficient capital himself to secure the prize.

The administration had indeed a most embarrassing problem to
solve. It was engaged in a war of conquest which must be
carried to a successful issue, or the political object would be
unattained. Yet all the capable officers of the requisite rank
belonged to the opposition, and the man selected for his lack of
political ambition had himself become a prominent candidate for
the Presidency. It was necessary to destroy his chances
promptly. The problem was to do this without the loss of
conquest and without permitting another general of the same
political party to acquire like popularity. The fact is, the
administration of Mr. Polk made every preparation to disgrace
Scott, or, to speak more correctly, to drive him to such
desperation that he would disgrace himself.

General Scott had opposed conquest by the way of the Rio Grande,
Matamoras and Saltillo from the first. Now that he was in
command of all the forces in Mexico, he withdrew from Taylor
most of his regular troops and left him only enough volunteers,
as he thought, to hold the line then in possession of the
invading army. Indeed Scott did not deem it important to hold
anything beyond the Rio Grande, and authorized Taylor to fall
back to that line if he chose. General Taylor protested against
the depletion of his army, and his subsequent movement upon Buena
Vista would indicate that he did not share the views of his chief
in regard to the unimportance of conquest beyond the Rio Grande.

Scott had estimated the men and material that would be required
to capture Vera Cruz and to march on the capital of the country,
two hundred and sixty miles in the interior. He was promised all
he asked and seemed to have not only the confidence of the
President, but his sincere good wishes. The promises were all
broken. Only about half the troops were furnished that had been
pledged, other war material was withheld and Scott had scarcely
started for Mexico before the President undertook to supersede
him by the appointment of Senator Thomas H. Benton as
lieutenant-general. This being refused by Congress, the
President asked legislative authority to place a junior over a
senior of the same grade, with the view of appointing Benton to
the rank of major-general and then placing him in command of the
army, but Congress failed to accede to this proposition as well,
and Scott remained in command: but every general appointed to
serve under him was politically opposed to the chief, and
several were personally hostile.

General Scott reached Brazos Santiago or Point Isabel, at the
mouth of the Rio Grande, late in December, 1846, and proceeded
at once up the river to Camargo, where he had written General
Taylor to meet him. Taylor, however, had gone to, or towards
Tampico, for the purpose of establishing a post there. He had
started on this march before he was aware of General Scott being
in the country. Under these circumstances Scott had to issue his
orders designating the troops to be withdrawn from Taylor,
without the personal consultation he had expected to hold with
his subordinate.

General Taylor’s victory at Buena Vista, February 22d, 23d, and
24th, 1847, with an army composed almost entirely of volunteers
who had not been in battle before, and over a vastly superior
force numerically, made his nomination for the Presidency by the
Whigs a foregone conclusion. He was nominated and elected in
1848. I believe that he sincerely regretted this turn in his
fortunes, preferring the peace afforded by a quiet life free
from abuse to the honor of filling the highest office in the
gift of any people, the Presidency of the United States.

When General Scott assumed command of the army of invasion, I
was in the division of General David Twiggs, in Taylor’s
command; but under the new orders my regiment was transferred to
the division of General William Worth, in which I served to the
close of the war. The troops withdrawn from Taylor to form part
of the forces to operate against Vera Cruz, were assembled at the
mouth of the Rio Grande preparatory to embarkation for their
destination. I found General Worth a different man from any I
had before served directly under. He was nervous, impatient and
restless on the march, or when important or responsible duty
confronted him. There was not the least reason for haste on the
march, for it was known that it would take weeks to assemble
shipping enough at the point of our embarkation to carry the
army, but General Worth moved his division with a rapidity that
would have been commendable had he been going to the relief of a
beleaguered garrison. The length of the marches was regulated by
the distances between places affording a supply of water for the
troops, and these distances were sometimes long and sometimes
short. General Worth on one occasion at least, after having
made the full distance intended for the day, and after the
troops were in camp and preparing their food, ordered tents
struck and made the march that night which had been intended for
the next day. Some commanders can move troops so as to get the
maximum distance out of them without fatigue, while others can
wear them out in a few days without accomplishing so much.
General Worth belonged to this latter class. He enjoyed,
however, a fine reputation for his fighting qualities, and thus
attached his officers and men to him.

The army lay in camp upon the sand-beach in the neighborhood of
the mouth of the Rio Grande for several weeks, awaiting the
arrival of transports to carry it to its new field of
operations. The transports were all sailing vessels. The
passage was a tedious one, and many of the troops were on
shipboard over thirty days from the embarkation at the mouth of
the Rio Grande to the time of debarkation south of Vera Cruz.
The trip was a comfortless one for officers and men. The
transports used were built for carrying freight and possessed
but limited accommodations for passengers, and the climate added
to the discomfort of all.

The transports with troops were assembled in the harbor of Anton
Lizardo, some sixteen miles south of Vera Cruz, as they arrived,
and there awaited the remainder of the fleet, bringing
artillery, ammunition and supplies of all kinds from the
North. With the fleet there was a little steam propeller
dispatch-boat–the first vessel of the kind I had ever seen, and
probably the first of its kind ever seen by any one then with the
army. At that day ocean steamers were rare, and what there were
were sidewheelers. This little vessel, going through the fleet
so fast, so noiselessly and with its propeller under water out
of view, attracted a great deal of attention. I recollect that
Lieutenant Sidney Smith, of the 4th infantry, by whom I happened
to be standing on the deck of a vessel when this propeller was
passing, exclaimed, “Why, the thing looks as if it was propelled
by the force of circumstances.”

Finally on the 7th of March, 1847, the little army of ten or
twelve thousand men, given Scott to invade a country with a
population of seven or eight millions, a mountainous country
affording the greatest possible natural advantages for defence,
was all assembled and ready to commence the perilous task of
landing from vessels lying in the open sea.

The debarkation took place inside of the little island of
Sacrificios, some three miles south of Vera Cruz. The vessels
could not get anywhere near shore, so that everything had to be
landed in lighters or surf-boats; General Scott had provided
these before leaving the North. The breakers were sometimes
high, so that the landing was tedious. The men were got ashore
rapidly, because they could wade when they came to shallow
water; but the camp and garrison equipage, provisions,
ammunition and all stores had to be protected from the salt
water, and therefore their landing took several days. The
Mexicans were very kind to us, however, and threw no obstacles
in the way of our landing except an occasional shot from their
nearest fort. During the debarkation one shot took off the head
of Major Albertis. No other, I believe, reached anywhere near
the same distance. On the 9th of March the troops were landed
and the investment of Vera Cruz, from the Gulf of Mexico south
of the city to the Gulf again on the north, was soon and easily
effected. The landing of stores was continued until everything
was got ashore.

Vera Cruz, at the time of which I write and up to 1880, was a
walled city. The wall extended from the water’s edge south of
the town to the water again on the north. There were
fortifications at intervals along the line and at the angles. In
front of the city, and on an island half a mile out in the Gulf,
stands San Juan de Ulloa, an enclosed fortification of large
dimensions and great strength for that period. Against
artillery of the present day the land forts and walls would
prove elements of weakness rather than strength. After the
invading army had established their camps out of range of the
fire from the city, batteries were established, under cover of
night, far to the front of the line where the troops lay. These
batteries were intrenched and the approaches sufficiently
protected. If a sortie had been made at any time by the
Mexicans, the men serving the batteries could have been quickly
reinforced without great exposure to the fire from the enemy’s
main line. No serious attempt was made to capture the batteries
or to drive our troops away.

The siege continued with brisk firing on our side till the 27th
of March, by which time a considerable breach had been made in
the wall surrounding the city. Upon this General Morales, who
was Governor of both the city and of San Juan de Ulloa,
commenced a correspondence with General Scott looking to the
surrender of the town, forts and garrison. On the 29th Vera
Cruz and San Juan de Ulloa were occupied by Scott’s army. About
five thousand prisoners and four hundred pieces of artillery,
besides large amounts of small arms and ammunition, fell into
the hands of the victorious force. The casualties on our side
during the siege amounted to sixty-four officers and men, killed
and wounded.

CHAPTER X.

MARCH TO JALAPA–BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO–PEROTE–PUEBLA –SCOTT
AND TAYLOR.

General Scott had less than twelve thousand men at Vera Cruz. He
had been promised by the administration a very much larger force,
or claimed that he had, and he was a man of veracity. Twelve
thousand was a very small army with which to penetrate two
hundred and sixty miles into an enemy’s country, and to besiege
the capital; a city, at that time, of largely over one hundred
thousand inhabitants. Then, too, any line of march that could
be selected led through mountain passes easily defended. In
fact, there were at that time but two roads from Vera Cruz to
the City of Mexico that could be taken by an army; one by Jalapa
and Perote, the other by Cordova and Orizaba, the two coming
together on the great plain which extends to the City of Mexico
after the range of mountains is passed.

It was very important to get the army away from Vera Cruz as
soon as possible, in order to avoid the yellow fever, or vomito,
which usually visits that city early in the year, and is very
fatal to persons not acclimated; but transportation, which was
expected from the North, was arriving very slowly. It was
absolutely necessary to have enough to supply the army to
Jalapa, sixty-five miles in the interior and above the fevers of
the coast. At that point the country is fertile, and an army of
the size of General Scott’s could subsist there for an
indefinite period. Not counting the sick, the weak and the
garrisons for the captured city and fort, the moving column was
now less than ten thousand strong. This force was composed of
three divisions, under Generals Twiggs, Patterson, and Worth.
The importance of escaping the vomito was so great that as soon
as transportation enough could be got together to move a
division the advance was commenced. On the 8th of April,
Twiggs’s division started for Jalapa. He was followed very soon
by Patterson, with his division. General Worth was to bring up
the rear with his command as soon as transportation enough was
assembled to carry six days’ rations for his troops with the
necessary ammunition and camp and garrison equipage. It was the
13th of April before this division left Vera Cruz.

The leading division ran against the enemy at Cerro Gordo, some
fifty miles west, on the road to Jalapa, and went into camp at
Plan del Rio, about three miles from the fortifications. General
Patterson reached Plan del Rio with his division soon after
Twiggs arrived. The two were then secure against an attack from
Santa Anna, who commanded the Mexican forces. At all events they
confronted the enemy without reinforcements and without
molestation, until the 18th of April. General Scott had
remained at Vera Cruz to hasten preparations for the field; but
on the 12th, learning the situation at the front, he hastened on
to take personal supervision. He at once commenced his
preparations for the capture of the position held by Santa Anna
and of the troops holding it.

Cerro Gordo is one of the higher spurs of the mountains some
twelve to fifteen miles east of Jalapa, and Santa Anna had
selected this point as the easiest to defend against an invading
army. The road, said to have been built by Cortez, zigzags
around the mountain-side and was defended at every turn by
artillery. On either side were deep chasms or mountain walls. A
direct attack along the road was an impossibility. A flank
movement seemed equally impossible. After the arrival of the
commanding-general upon the scene, reconnoissances were sent out
to find, or to make, a road by which the rear of the enemy’s
works might be reached without a front attack. These
reconnoissances were made under the supervision of Captain
Robert E. Lee, assisted by Lieutenants P. G. T. Beauregard,
Isaac I. Stevens, Z. B. Tower, G. W. Smith, George B. McClellan,
and J. G. Foster, of the corps of engineers, all officers who
attained rank and fame, on one side or the other, in the great
conflict for the preservation of the unity of the nation. The
reconnoissance was completed, and the labor of cutting out and
making roads by the flank of the enemy was effected by the 17th
of the month. This was accomplished without the knowledge of
Santa Anna or his army, and over ground where he supposed it
impossible. On the same day General Scott issued his order for
the attack on the 18th.

The attack was made as ordered, and perhaps there was not a
battle of the Mexican war, or of any other, where orders issued
before an engagement were nearer being a correct report of what
afterwards took place. Under the supervision of the engineers,
roadways had been opened over chasms to the right where the
walls were so steep that men could barely climb them. Animals
could not. These had been opened under cover of night, without
attracting the notice of the enemy. The engineers, who had
directed the opening, led the way and the troops followed.
Artillery was let down the steep slopes by hand, the men engaged
attaching a strong rope to the rear axle and letting the guns
down, a piece at a time, while the men at the ropes kept their
ground on top, paying out gradually, while a few at the front
directed the course of the piece. In like manner the guns were
drawn by hand up the opposite slopes. In this way Scott’s
troops reached their assigned position in rear of most of the
intrenchments of the enemy, unobserved. The attack was made,
the Mexican reserves behind the works beat a hasty retreat, and
those occupying them surrendered. On the left General Pillow’s
command made a formidable demonstration, which doubtless held a
part of the enemy in his front and contributed to the victory. I
am not pretending to give full details of all the battles fought,
but of the portion that I saw. There were troops engaged on both
sides at other points in which both sustained losses; but the
battle was won as here narrated.

The surprise of the enemy was complete, the victory
overwhelming; some three thousand prisoners fell into Scott’s
hands, also a large amount of ordnance and ordnance stores. The
prisoners were paroled, the artillery parked and the small arms
and ammunition destroyed. The battle of Buena Vista was
probably very important to the success of General Scott at Cerro
Gordo and in his entire campaign from Vera Cruz to the great
plains reaching to the City of Mexico. The only army Santa Anna
had to protect his capital and the mountain passes west of Vera
Cruz, was the one he had with him confronting General Taylor. It
is not likely that he would have gone as far north as Monterey to
attack the United States troops when he knew his country was
threatened with invasion further south. When Taylor moved to
Saltillo and then advanced on to Buena Vista, Santa Anna crossed
the desert confronting the invading army, hoping no doubt to
crush it and get back in time to meet General Scott in the
mountain passes west of Vera Cruz. His attack on Taylor was
disastrous to the Mexican army, but, notwithstanding this, he
marched his army to Cerro Gordo, a distance not much short of
one thousand miles by the line he had to travel, in time to
intrench himself well before Scott got there. If he had been
successful at Buena Vista his troops would no doubt have made a
more stubborn resistance at Cerro Gordo. Had the battle of
Buena Vista not been fought Santa Anna would have had time to
move leisurely to meet the invader further south and with an
army not demoralized nor depleted by defeat.

After the battle the victorious army moved on to Jalapa, where
it was in a beautiful, productive and healthy country, far above
the fevers of the coast. Jalapa, however, is still in the
mountains, and between there and the great plain the whole line
of the road is easy of defence. It was important, therefore, to
get possession of the great highway between the sea-coast and the
capital up to the point where it leaves the mountains, before the
enemy could have time to re-organize and fortify in our front.
Worth’s division was selected to go forward to secure this
result. The division marched to Perote on the great plain, not
far from where the road debouches from the mountains. There is
a low, strong fort on the plain in front of the town, known as
the Castle of Perote. This, however, offered no resistance and
fell into our hands, with its armament.

General Scott having now only nine or ten thousand men west of
Vera Cruz, and the time of some four thousand of them being
about to expire, a long delay was the consequence. The troops
were in a healthy climate, and where they could subsist for an
indefinite period even if their line back to Vera Cruz should be
cut off. It being ascertained that the men whose time would
expire before the City of Mexico could possibly fall into the
hands of the American army, would not remain beyond the term for
which they had volunteered, the commanding-general determined to
discharge them at once, for a delay until the expiration of
their time would have compelled them to pass through Vera Cruz
during the season of the vomito. This reduced Scott’s force in
the field to about five thousand men.

Early in May, Worth, with his division, left Perote and marched
on to Puebla. The roads were wide and the country open except
through one pass in a spur of mountains coming up from the
south, through which the road runs. Notwithstanding this the
small column was divided into two bodies, moving a day apart.
Nothing occurred on the march of special note, except that while
lying at the town of Amozoque–an easy day’s march east of
Puebla–a body of the enemy’s cavalry, two or three thousand
strong, was seen to our right, not more than a mile away. A
battery or two, with two or three infantry regiments, was sent
against them and they soon disappeared. On the 15th of May we
entered the city of Puebla.

General Worth was in command at Puebla until the latter end of
May, when General Scott arrived. Here, as well as on the march
up, his restlessness, particularly under responsibilities,
showed itself. During his brief command he had the enemy
hovering around near the city, in vastly superior numbers to his
own. The brigade to which I was attached changed quarters three
different times in about a week, occupying at first quarters
near the plaza, in the heart of the city; then at the western
entrance; then at the extreme east. On one occasion General
Worth had the troops in line, under arms, all day, with three
days’ cooked rations in their haversacks. He galloped from one
command to another proclaiming the near proximity of Santa Anna
with an army vastly superior to his own. General Scott arrived
upon the scene the latter part of the month, and nothing more
was heard of Santa Anna and his myriads. There were, of course,
bodies of mounted Mexicans hovering around to watch our movements
and to pick up stragglers, or small bodies of troops, if they
ventured too far out. These always withdrew on the approach of
any considerable number of our soldiers. After the arrival of
General Scott I was sent, as quartermaster, with a large train
of wagons, back two days’ march at least, to procure forage. We
had less than a thousand men as escort, and never thought of
danger. We procured full loads for our entire train at two
plantations, which could easily have furnished as much more.

There had been great delay in obtaining the authority of
Congress for the raising of the troops asked for by the
administration. A bill was before the National Legislature from
early in the session of 1846-7, authorizing the creation of ten
additional regiments for the war to be attached to the regular
army, but it was the middle of February before it became a
law. Appointments of commissioned officers had then to be made;
men had to be enlisted, the regiments equipped and the whole
transported to Mexico. It was August before General Scott
received reinforcement sufficient to warrant an advance. His
moving column, not even now more than ten thousand strong, was
in four divisions, commanded by Generals Twiggs, Worth, Pillow
and Quitman. There was also a cavalry corps under General
Harney, composed of detachments of the 1st, 2d, and 3d
dragoons. The advance commenced on the 7th of August with
Twiggs’s division in front. The remaining three divisions
followed, with an interval of a day between. The marches were
short, to make concentration easier in case of attack.

I had now been in battle with the two leading commanders
conducting armies in a foreign land. The contrast between the
two was very marked. General Taylor never wore uniform, but
dressed himself entirely for comfort. He moved about the field
in which he was operating to see through his own eyes the
situation. Often he would be without staff officers, and when
he was accompanied by them there was no prescribed order in
which they followed. He was very much given to sit his horse
side-ways–with both feet on one side–particularly on the
battlefield. General Scott was the reverse in all these
particulars. He always wore all the uniform prescribed or
allowed by law when he inspected his lines; word would be sent
to all division and brigade commanders in advance, notifying
them of the hour when the commanding general might be
expected. This was done so that all the army might be under
arms to salute their chief as he passed. On these occasions he
wore his dress uniform, cocked hat, aiguillettes, sabre and
spurs. His staff proper, besides all officers constructively on
his staff–engineers, inspectors, quartermasters, etc., that
could be spared–followed, also in uniform and in prescribed
order. Orders were prepared with great care and evidently with
the view that they should be a history of what followed.

In their modes of expressing thought, these two generals
contrasted quite as strongly as in their other
characteristics. General Scott was precise in language,
cultivated a style peculiarly his own; was proud of his
rhetoric; not averse to speaking of himself, often in the third
person, and he could bestow praise upon the person he was
talking about without the least embarrassment. Taylor was not a
conversationalist, but on paper he could put his meaning so
plainly that there could be no mistaking it. He knew how to
express what he wanted to say in the fewest well-chosen words,
but would not sacrifice meaning to the construction of
high-sounding sentences. But with their opposite
characteristics both were great and successful soldiers; both
were true, patriotic and upright in all their dealings. Both
were pleasant to serve under–Taylor was pleasant to serve
with. Scott saw more through the eyes of his staff officers
than through his own. His plans were deliberately prepared, and
fully expressed in orders. Taylor saw for himself, and gave
orders to meet the emergency without reference to how they would
read in history.

CHAPTER XI.

ADVANCE ON THE CITY OF MEXICO–BATTLE OF CONTRERAS–ASSAULT AT
CHURUBUSCO–NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE–BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL
REY–STORMING OF CHAPULTEPEC–SAN COSME–EVACUATION OF THE
CITY–HALLS OF THE MONTEZUMAS.

The route followed by the army from Puebla to the City of Mexico
was over Rio Frio mountain, the road leading over which, at the
highest point, is about eleven thousand feet above tide water.
The pass through this mountain might have been easily defended,
but it was not; and the advanced division reached the summit in
three days after leaving Puebla. The City of Mexico lies west
of Rio Frio mountain, on a plain backed by another mountain six
miles farther west, with others still nearer on the north and
south. Between the western base of Rio Frio and the City of
Mexico there are three lakes, Chalco and Xochimilco on the left
and Texcoco on the right, extending to the east end of the City
of Mexico. Chalco and Texcoco are divided by a narrow strip of
land over which the direct road to the city runs. Xochimilco is
also to the left of the road, but at a considerable distance
south of it, and is connected with Lake Chalco by a narrow
channel. There is a high rocky mound, called El Penon, on the
right of the road, springing up from the low flat ground
dividing the lakes. This mound was strengthened by
intrenchments at its base and summit, and rendered a direct
attack impracticable.

Scott’s army was rapidly concentrated about Ayotla and other
points near the eastern end of Lake Chalco. Reconnoissances
were made up to within gun-shot of El Penon, while engineers
were seeking a route by the south side of Lake Chalco to flank
the city, and come upon it from the south and south-west. A way
was found around the lake, and by the 18th of August troops were
in St. Augustin Tlalpam, a town about eleven miles due south
from the plaza of the capital. Between St. Augustin Tlalpam and
the city lie the hacienda of San Antonio and the village of
Churubusco, and south-west of them is Contreras. All these
points, except St. Augustin Tlalpam, were intrenched and
strongly garrisoned. Contreras is situated on the side of a
mountain, near its base, where volcanic rocks are piled in great
confusion, reaching nearly to San Antonio. This made the
approach to the city from the south very difficult.

The brigade to which I was attached–Garland’s, of Worth’s
division–was sent to confront San Antonio, two or three miles
from St. Augustin Tlalpam, on the road to Churubusco and the
City of Mexico. The ground on which San Antonio stands is
completely in the valley, and the surface of the land is only a
little above the level of the lakes, and, except to the
south-west, it was cut up by deep ditches filled with water. To
the south-west is the Pedregal–the volcanic rock before spoken
of–over which cavalry or artillery could not be passed, and
infantry would make but poor progress if confronted by an
enemy. From the position occupied by Garland’s brigade,
therefore, no movement could be made against the defences of San
Antonio except to the front, and by a narrow causeway, over
perfectly level ground, every inch of which was commanded by the
enemy’s artillery and infantry. If Contreras, some three miles
west and south, should fall into our hands, troops from there
could move to the right flank of all the positions held by the
enemy between us and the city. Under these circumstances
General Scott directed the holding of the front of the enemy
without making an attack until further orders.

On the 18th of August, the day of reaching San Augustin Tlalpam,
Garland’s brigade secured a position within easy range of the
advanced intrenchments of San Antonio, but where his troops were
protected by an artificial embankment that had been thrown up for
some other purpose than defense. General Scott at once set his
engineers reconnoitring the works about Contreras, and on the
19th movements were commenced to get troops into positions from
which an assault could be made upon the force occupying that
place. The Pedregal on the north and north-east, and the
mountain on the south, made the passage by either flank of the
enemy’s defences difficult, for their work stood exactly between
those natural bulwarks; but a road was completed during the day
and night of the 19th, and troops were got to the north and west
of the enemy.

This affair, like that of Cerro Gordo, was an engagement in
which the officers of the engineer corps won special
distinction. In fact, in both cases, tasks which seemed
difficult at first sight were made easier for the troops that
had to execute them than they would have been on an ordinary
field. The very strength of each of these positions was, by the
skill of the engineers, converted into a defence for the
assaulting parties while securing their positions for final
attack. All the troops with General Scott in the valley of
Mexico, except a part of the division of General Quitman at San
Augustin Tlalpam and the brigade of Garland (Worth’s division)
at San Antonio, were engaged at the battle of Contreras, or were
on their way, in obedience to the orders of their chief, to
reinforce those who were engaged. The assault was made on the
morning of the 20th, and in less than half an hour from the
sound of the advance the position was in our hands, with many
prisoners and large quantities of ordnance and other stores. The
brigade commanded by General Riley was from its position the most
conspicuous in the final assault, but all did well, volunteers
and regulars.

From the point occupied by Garland’s brigade we could see the
progress made at Contreras and the movement of troops toward the
flank and rear of the enemy opposing us. The Mexicans all the
way back to the city could see the same thing, and their conduct
showed plainly that they did not enjoy the sight. We moved out
at once, and found them gone from our immediate front. Clarke’s
brigade of Worth’s division now moved west over the point of the
Pedregal, and after having passed to the north sufficiently to
clear San Antonio, turned east and got on the causeway leading
to Churubusco and the City of Mexico. When he approached
Churubusco his left, under Colonel Hoffman, attacked a
tete-de-pont at that place and brought on an engagement. About
an hour after, Garland was ordered to advance directly along the
causeway, and got up in time to take part in the engagement. San
Antonio was found evacuated, the evacuation having probably taken
place immediately upon the enemy seeing the stars and stripes
waving over Contreras.

The troops that had been engaged at Contreras, and even then on
their way to that battle-field, were moved by a causeway west
of, and parallel to the one by way of San Antonio and
Churubusco. It was expected by the commanding general that
these troops would move north sufficiently far to flank the
enemy out of his position at Churubusco, before turning east to
reach the San Antonio road, but they did not succeed in this,
and Churubusco proved to be about the severest battle fought in
the valley of Mexico. General Scott coming upon the
battle-field about this juncture, ordered two brigades, under
Shields, to move north and turn the right of the enemy. This
Shields did, but not without hard fighting and heavy loss. The
enemy finally gave way, leaving in our hands prisoners,
artillery and small arms. The balance of the causeway held by
the enemy, up to the very gates of the city, fell in like
manner. I recollect at this place that some of the gunners who
had stood their ground, were deserters from General Taylor’s
army on the Rio Grande.

Both the strategy and tactics displayed by General Scott in
these various engagements of the 20th of August, 1847, were
faultless as I look upon them now, after the lapse of so many
years. As before stated, the work of the engineer officers who
made the reconnoissances and led the different commands to their
destinations, was so perfect that the chief was able to give his
orders to his various subordinates with all the precision he
could use on an ordinary march. I mean, up to the points from
which the attack was to commence. After that point is reached
the enemy often induces a change of orders not before
contemplated. The enemy outside the city outnumbered our
soldiery quite three to one, but they had become so demoralized
by the succession of defeats this day, that the City of Mexico
could have been entered without much further bloodshed. In
fact, Captain Philip Kearney–afterwards a general in the war of
the rebellion–rode with a squadron of cavalry to the very gates
of the city, and would no doubt have entered with his little
force, only at that point he was badly wounded, as were several
of his officers. He had not heard the call for a halt.

General Franklin Pierce had joined the army in Mexico, at
Puebla, a short time before the advance upon the capital
commenced. He had consequently not been in any of the
engagements of the war up to the battle of Contreras. By an
unfortunate fall of his horse on the afternoon of the 19th he
was painfully injured. The next day, when his brigade, with the
other troops engaged on the same field, was ordered against the
flank and rear of the enemy guarding the different points of the
road from San Augustin Tlalpam to the city, General Pierce
attempted to accompany them. He was not sufficiently recovered
to do so, and fainted. This circumstance gave rise to
exceedingly unfair and unjust criticisms of him when he became a
candidate for the Presidency. Whatever General Pierce’s
qualifications may have been for the Presidency, he was a
gentleman and a man of courage. I was not a supporter of him
politically, but I knew him more intimately than I did any other
of the volunteer generals.

General Scott abstained from entering the city at this time,
because Mr. Nicholas P. Trist, the commissioner on the part of
the United States to negotiate a treaty of peace with Mexico,
was with the army, and either he or General Scott
thought–probably both of them–that a treaty would be more
possible while the Mexican government was in possession of the
capital than if it was scattered and the capital in the hands of
an invader. Be this as it may, we did not enter at that time.
The army took up positions along the slopes of the mountains
south of the city, as far west as Tacubaya. Negotiations were
at once entered into with Santa Anna, who was then practically
THE GOVERNMENT and the immediate commander of all the troops
engaged in defence of the country. A truce was signed which
denied to either party the right to strengthen its position, or
to receive reinforcements during the continuance of the
armistices, but authorized General Scott to draw supplies for
his army from the city in the meantime.

Negotiations were commenced at once and were kept up vigorously
between Mr. Trist and the commissioners appointed on the part of
Mexico, until the 2d of September. At that time Mr. Trist handed
in his ultimatum. Texas was to be given up absolutely by Mexico,
and New Mexico and California ceded to the United States for a
stipulated sum to be afterwards determined. I do not suppose
Mr. Trist had any discretion whatever in regard to boundaries.
The war was one of conquest, in the interest of an institution,
and the probabilities are that private instructions were for the
acquisition of territory out of which new States might be
carved. At all events the Mexicans felt so outraged at the
terms proposed that they commenced preparations for defence,
without giving notice of the termination of the armistice. The
terms of the truce had been violated before, when teams had been
sent into the city to bring out supplies for the army. The first
train entering the city was very severely threatened by a mob.
This, however, was apologized for by the authorities and all
responsibility for it denied; and thereafter, to avoid exciting
the Mexican people and soldiery, our teams with their escorts
were sent in at night, when the troops were in barracks and the
citizens in bed. The circumstance was overlooked and
negotiations continued. As soon as the news reached General
Scott of the second violation of the armistice, about the 4th of
September, he wrote a vigorous note to President Santa Anna,
calling his attention to it, and, receiving an unsatisfactory
reply, declared the armistice at an end.

General Scott, with Worth’s division, was now occupying
Tacubaya, a village some four miles south-west of the City of
Mexico, and extending from the base up the mountain-side for the
distance of half a mile. More than a mile west, and also a
little above the plain, stands Molino del Rey. The mill is a
long stone structure, one story high and several hundred feet in
length. At the period of which I speak General Scott supposed a
portion of the mill to be used as a foundry for the casting of
guns. This, however, proved to be a mistake. It was valuable
to the Mexicans because of the quantity of grain it contained.
The building is flat roofed, and a line of sand-bags over the
outer walls rendered the top quite a formidable defence for
infantry. Chapultepec is a mound springing up from the plain to
the height of probably three hundred feet, and almost in a direct
line between Molino del Rey and the western part of the city. It
was fortified both on the top and on the rocky and precipitous
sides.

The City of Mexico is supplied with water by two aqueducts,
resting on strong stone arches. One of these aqueducts draws
its supply of water from a mountain stream coming into it at or
near Molino del Rey, and runs north close to the west base of
Chapultepec; thence along the centre of a wide road, until it
reaches the road running east into the city by the Garita San
Cosme; from which point the aqueduct and road both run east to
the city. The second aqueduct starts from the east base of
Chapultepec, where it is fed by a spring, and runs north-east to
the city. This aqueduct, like the other, runs in the middle of a
broad road-way, thus leaving a space on each side. The arches
supporting the aqueduct afforded protection for advancing troops
as well as to those engaged defensively. At points on the San
Cosme road parapets were thrown across, with an embrasure for a
single piece of artillery in each. At the point where both road
and aqueduct turn at right angles from north to east, there was
not only one of these parapets supplied by one gun and infantry
supports, but the houses to the north of the San Cosme road,
facing south and commanding a view of the road back to
Chapultepec, were covered with infantry, protected by parapets
made of sandbags. The roads leading to garitas (the gates) San
Cosme and Belen, by which these aqueducts enter the city, were
strongly intrenched. Deep, wide ditches, filled with water,
lined the sides of both roads. Such were the defences of the
City of Mexico in September, 1847, on the routes over which
General Scott entered.

Prior to the Mexican war General Scott had been very partial to
General Worth–indeed he continued so up to the close of
hostilities–but, for some reason, Worth had become estranged
from his chief. Scott evidently took this coldness somewhat to
heart. He did not retaliate, however, but on the contrary
showed every disposition to appease his subordinate. It was
understood at the time that he gave Worth authority to plan and
execute the battle of Molino del Rey without dictation or
interference from any one, for the very purpose of restoring
their former relations. The effort failed, and the two generals
remained ever after cold and indifferent towards each other, if
not actually hostile.

The battle of Molino del Rey was fought on the 8th of
September. The night of the 7th, Worth sent for his brigade and
regimental commanders, with their staffs, to come to his quarters
to receive instructions for the morrow. These orders
contemplated a movement up to within striking distance of the
Mills before daylight. The engineers had reconnoitred the
ground as well as possible, and had acquired all the information
necessary to base proper orders both for approach and attack.

By daylight on the morning of the 8th, the troops to be engaged
at Molino were all at the places designated. The ground in
front of the Mills, to the south, was commanded by the artillery
from the summit of Chapultepec as well as by the lighter
batteries at hand; but a charge was made, and soon all was
over. Worth’s troops entered the Mills by every door, and the
enemy beat a hasty retreat back to Chapultepec. Had this
victory been followed up promptly, no doubt Americans and
Mexicans would have gone over the defences of Chapultepec so
near together that the place would have fallen into our hands
without further loss. The defenders of the works could not have
fired upon us without endangering their own men. This was not
done, and five days later more valuable lives were sacrificed to
carry works which had been so nearly in our possession on the
8th. I do not criticise the failure to capture Chapultepec at
this time. The result that followed the first assault could not
possibly have been foreseen, and to profit by the unexpected
advantage, the commanding general must have been on the spot and
given the necessary instructions at the moment, or the troops
must have kept on without orders. It is always, however, in
order to follow a retreating foe, unless stopped or otherwise
directed. The loss on our side at Molino del Rey was severe for
the numbers engaged. It was especially so among commissioned
officers.

I was with the earliest of the troops to enter the Mills. In
passing through to the north side, looking towards Chapultepec,
I happened to notice that there were armed Mexicans still on top
of the building, only a few feet from many of our men. Not
seeing any stairway or ladder reaching to the top of the
building, I took a few soldiers, and had a cart that happened to
be standing near brought up, and, placing the shafts against the
wall and chocking the wheels so that the cart could not back,
used the shafts as a sort of ladder extending to within three or
four feet of the top. By this I climbed to the roof of the
building, followed by a few men, but found a private soldier had
preceded me by some other way. There were still quite a number
of Mexicans on the roof, among them a major and five or six
officers of lower grades, who had not succeeded in getting away
before our troops occupied the building. They still had their
arms, while the soldier before mentioned was walking as sentry,
guarding the prisoners he had SURROUNDED, all by himself. I
halted the sentinel, received the swords from the commissioned
officers, and proceeded, with the assistance of the soldiers now
with me, to disable the muskets by striking them against the edge
of the wall, and throw them to the ground below.

Molino del Rey was now captured, and the troops engaged, with
the exception of an appropriate guard over the captured position
and property, were marched back to their quarters in Tacubaya.
The engagement did not last many minutes, but the killed and
wounded were numerous for the number of troops engaged.

During the night of the 11th batteries were established which
could play upon the fortifications of Chapultepec. The
bombardment commenced early on the morning of the 12th, but
there was no further engagement during this day than that of the
artillery. General Scott assigned the capture of Chapultepec to
General Pillow, but did not leave the details to his judgment.
Two assaulting columns, two hundred and fifty men each, composed
of volunteers for the occasion, were formed. They were commanded
by Captains McKinzie and Casey respectively. The assault was
successful, but bloody.

In later years, if not at the time, the battles of Molino del
Rey and Chapultepec have seemed to me to have been wholly
unnecessary. When the assaults upon the garitas of San Cosme
and Belen were determined upon, the road running east to the
former gate could have been reached easily, without an
engagement, by moving along south of the Mills until west of
them sufficiently far to be out of range, thence north to the
road above mentioned; or, if desirable to keep the two attacking
columns nearer together, the troops could have been turned east
so as to come on the aqueduct road out of range of the guns from
Chapultepec. In like manner, the troops designated to act
against Belen could have kept east of Chapultepec, out of range,
and come on to the aqueduct, also out of range of Chapultepec.
Molino del Rey and Chapultepec would both have been necessarily
evacuated if this course had been pursued, for they would have
been turned.

General Quitman, a volunteer from the State of Mississippi, who
stood well with the army both as a soldier and as a man,
commanded the column acting against Belen. General Worth
commanded the column against San Cosme. When Chapultepec fell
the advance commenced along the two aqueduct roads. I was on
the road to San Cosme, and witnessed most that took place on
that route. When opposition was encountered our troops
sheltered themselves by keeping under the arches supporting the
aqueduct, advancing an arch at a time. We encountered no
serious obstruction until within gun-shot of the point where the
road we were on intersects that running east to the city, the
point where the aqueduct turns at a right angle. I have
described the defences of this position before. There were but
three commissioned officers besides myself, that I can now call
to mind, with the advance when the above position was reached.
One of these officers was a Lieutenant Semmes, of the Marine
Corps. I think Captain Gore, and Lieutenant Judah, of the 4th
infantry, were the others. Our progress was stopped for the
time by the single piece of artillery at the angle of the roads
and the infantry occupying the house-tops back from it.

West of the road from where we were, stood a house occupying the
south-west angle made by the San Cosme road and the road we were
moving upon. A stone wall ran from the house along each of
these roads for a considerable distance and thence back until it
joined, enclosing quite a yard about the house. I watched my
opportunity and skipped across the road and behind the south
wall. Proceeding cautiously to the west corner of the
enclosure, I peeped around and seeing nobody, continued, still
cautiously, until the road running east and west was reached. I
then returned to the troops, and called for volunteers. All that
were close to me, or that heard me, about a dozen, offered their
services. Commanding them to carry their arms at a trail, I
watched our opportunity and got them across the road and under
cover of the wall beyond, before the enemy had a shot at us. Our
men under cover of the arches kept a close watch on the
intrenchments that crossed our path and the house-tops beyond,
and whenever a head showed itself above the parapets they would
fire at it. Our crossing was thus made practicable without loss.

When we reached a safe position I instructed my little command
again to carry their arms at a trail, not to fire at the enemy
until they were ordered, and to move very cautiously following
me until the San Cosme road was reached; we would then be on the
flank of the men serving the gun on the road, and with no
obstruction between us and them. When we reached the south-west
corner of the enclosure before described, I saw some United
States troops pushing north through a shallow ditch near by, who
had come up since my reconnaissance. This was the company of
Captain Horace Brooks, of the artillery, acting as infantry. I
explained to Brooks briefly what I had discovered and what I was
about to do. He said, as I knew the ground and he did not, I
might go on and he would follow. As soon as we got on the road
leading to the city the troops serving the gun on the parapet
retreated, and those on the house-tops near by followed; our men
went after them in such close pursuit–the troops we had left
under the arches joining–that a second line across the road,
about half-way between the first and the garita, was carried. No
reinforcements had yet come up except Brooks’s company, and the
position we had taken was too advanced to be held by so small a
force. It was given up, but retaken later in the day, with some
loss.

Worth’s command gradually advanced to the front now open to
it. Later in the day in reconnoitring I found a church off to
the south of the road, which looked to me as if the belfry would
command the ground back of the garita San Cosme. I got an
officer of the voltigeurs, with a mountain howitzer and men to
work it, to go with me. The road being in possession of the
enemy, we had to take the field to the south to reach the
church. This took us over several ditches breast deep in water
and grown up with water plants. These ditches, however, were
not over eight or ten feet in width. The howitzer was taken to
pieces and carried by the men to its destination. When I
knocked for admission a priest came to the door who, while
extremely polite, declined to admit us. With the little Spanish
then at my command, I explained to him that he might save
property by opening the door, and he certainly would save
himself from becoming a prisoner, for a time at least; and
besides, I intended to go in whether he consented or not. He
began to see his duty in the same light that I did, and opened
the door, though he did not look as if it gave him special
pleasure to do so. The gun was carried to the belfry and put
together. We were not more than two or three hundred yards from
San Cosme. The shots from our little gun dropped in upon the
enemy and created great confusion. Why they did not send out a
small party and capture us, I do not know. We had no infantry
or other defences besides our one gun.

The effect of this gun upon the troops about the gate of the
city was so marked that General Worth saw it from his position.
(*3) He was so pleased that he sent a staff officer, Lieutenant
Pemberton–later Lieutenant-General commanding the defences of
Vicksburg–to bring me to him. He expressed his gratification
at the services the howitzer in the church steeple was doing,
saying that every shot was effective, and ordered a captain of
voltigeurs to report to me with another howitzer to be placed
along with the one already rendering so much service. I could
not tell the General that there was not room enough in the
steeple for another gun, because he probably would have looked
upon such a statement as a contradiction from a second
lieutenant. I took the captain with me, but did not use his gun.

The night of the 13th of September was spent by the troops under
General Worth in the houses near San Cosme, and in line
confronting the general line of the enemy across to Belen. The
troops that I was with were in the houses north of the road
leading into the city, and were engaged during the night in
cutting passage-ways from one house to another towards the
town. During the night Santa Anna, with his army–except the
deserters–left the city. He liberated all the convicts
confined in the town, hoping, no doubt, that they would inflict
upon us some injury before daylight; but several hours after
Santa Anna was out of the way, the city authorities sent a
delegation to General Scott to ask–if not demand–an armistice,
respecting church property, the rights of citizens and the
supremacy of the city government in the management of municipal
affairs. General Scott declined to trammel himself with
conditions, but gave assurances that those who chose to remain
within our lines would be protected so long as they behaved
themselves properly.

General Quitman had advanced along his line very successfully on
the 13th, so that at night his command occupied nearly the same
position at Belen that Worth’s troops did about San Cosme. After
the interview above related between General Scott and the city
council, orders were issued for the cautious entry of both
columns in the morning. The troops under Worth were to stop at
the Alameda, a park near the west end of the city. Quitman was
to go directly to the Plaza, and take possession of the
Palace–a mass of buildings on the east side in which Congress
has its sessions, the national courts are held, the public
offices are all located, the President resides, and much room is
left for museums, receptions, etc. This is the building
generally designated as the “Halls of the Montezumas.”

CHAPTER XII.

PROMOTION TO FIRST LIEUTENANT–CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF
MEXICO–THE ARMY–MEXICAN SOLDIERS–PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

On entering the city the troops were fired upon by the released
convicts, and possibly by deserters and hostile citizens. The
streets were deserted, and the place presented the appearance of
a “city of the dead,” except for this firing by unseen persons
from house-tops, windows, and around corners. In this firing
the lieutenant-colonel of my regiment, Garland, was badly
wounded, Lieutenant Sidney Smith, of the 4th infantry, was also
wounded mortally. He died a few days after, and by his death I
was promoted to the grade of first lieutenant.(*4) I had gone
into the battle of Palo Alto in May, 1846, a second lieutenant,
and I entered the city of Mexico sixteen months later with the
same rank, after having been in all the engagements possible for
any one man and in a regiment that lost more officers during the
war than it ever had present at any one engagement. My regiment
lost four commissioned officers, all senior to me, by steamboat
explosions during the Mexican war. The Mexicans were not so
discriminating. They sometimes picked off my juniors.

General Scott soon followed the troops into the city, in
state. I wonder that he was not fired upon, but I believe he
was not; at all events he was not hurt. He took quarters at
first in the “Halls of the Montezumas,” and from there issued
his wise and discreet orders for the government of a conquered
city, and for suppressing the hostile acts of liberated convicts
already spoken of–orders which challenge the respect of all who
study them. Lawlessness was soon suppressed, and the City of
Mexico settled down into a quiet, law-abiding place. The people
began to make their appearance upon the streets without fear of
the invaders. Shortly afterwards the bulk of the troops were
sent from the city to the villages at the foot of the mountains,
four or five miles to the south and south-west.

Whether General Scott approved of the Mexican war and the manner
in which it was brought about, I have no means of knowing. His
orders to troops indicate only a soldierly spirit, with probably
a little regard for the perpetuation of his own fame. On the
other hand, General Taylor’s, I think, indicate that he
considered the administration accountable for the war, and felt
no responsibility resting on himself further than for the
faithful performance of his duties. Both generals deserve the
commendations of their countrymen and to live in the grateful
memory of this people to the latest generation.

Earlier in this narrative I have stated that the plain, reached
after passing the mountains east of Perote, extends to the
cities of Puebla and Mexico. The route travelled by the army
before reaching Puebla, goes over a pass in a spur of mountain
coming up from the south. This pass is very susceptible of
defence by a smaller against a larger force. Again, the highest
point of the road-bed between Vera Cruz and the City of Mexico is
over Rio Frio mountain, which also might have been successfully
defended by an inferior against a superior force. But by moving
north of the mountains, and about thirty miles north of Puebla,
both of these passes would have been avoided. The road from
Perote to the City of Mexico, by this latter route, is as level
as the prairies in our West. Arriving due north from Puebla,
troops could have been detached to take possession of that
place, and then proceeding west with the rest of the army no
mountain would have been encountered before reaching the City of
Mexico. It is true this road would have brought troops in by
Guadalupe–a town, church and detached spur of mountain about
two miles north of the capital, all bearing the same general
name–and at this point Lake Texcoco comes near to the mountain,
which was fortified both at the base and on the sides: but
troops could have passed north of the mountain and come in only
a few miles to the north-west, and so flanked the position, as
they actually did on the south.

It has always seemed to me that this northern route to the City
of Mexico, would have been the better one to have taken. But my
later experience has taught me two lessons: first, that things
are seen plainer after the events have occurred; second, that
the most confident critics are generally those who know the
least about the matter criticised. I know just enough about the
Mexican war to approve heartily of most of the generalship, but
to differ with a little of it. It is natural that an important
city like Puebla should not have been passed with contempt; it
may be natural that the direct road to it should have been
taken; but it could have been passed, its evacuation insured and
possession acquired without danger of encountering the enemy in
intricate mountain defiles. In this same way the City of Mexico
could have been approached without any danger of opposition,
except in the open field.

But General Scott’s successes are an answer to all criticism. He
invaded a populous country, penetrating two hundred and sixty
miles into the interior, with a force at no time equal to
one-half of that opposed to him; he was without a base; the
enemy was always intrenched, always on the defensive; yet he won
every battle, he captured the capital, and conquered the
government. Credit is due to the troops engaged, it is true,
but the plans and the strategy were the general’s.

I had now made marches and been in battle under both General
Scott and General Taylor. The former divided his force of
10,500 men into four columns, starting a day apart, in moving
from Puebla to the capital of the nation, when it was known that
an army more than twice as large as his own stood ready to resist
his coming. The road was broad and the country open except in
crossing the Rio Frio mountain. General Taylor pursued the same
course in marching toward an enemy. He moved even in smaller
bodies. I never thought at the time to doubt the infallibility
of these two generals in all matters pertaining to their
profession. I supposed they moved in small bodies because more
men could not be passed over a single road on the same day with
their artillery and necessary trains. Later I found the fallacy
of this belief. The rebellion, which followed as a sequence to
the Mexican war, never could have been suppressed if larger
bodies of men could not have been moved at the same time than
was the custom under Scott and Taylor.

The victories in Mexico were, in every instance, over vastly
superior numbers. There were two reasons for this. Both
General Scott and General Taylor had such armies as are not
often got together. At the battles of Palo Alto and
Resaca-de-la-Palma, General Taylor had a small army, but it was
composed exclusively of regular troops, under the best of drill
and discipline. Every officer, from the highest to the lowest,
was educated in his profession, not at West Point necessarily,
but in the camp, in garrison, and many of them in Indian wars.
The rank and file were probably inferior, as material out of
which to make an army, to the volunteers that participated in
all the later battles of the war; but they were brave men, and
then drill and discipline brought out all there was in them. A
better army, man for man, probably never faced an enemy than the
one commanded by General Taylor in the earliest two engagements
of the Mexican war. The volunteers who followed were of better
material, but without drill or discipline at the start. They
were associated with so many disciplined men and professionally
educated officers, that when they went into engagements it was
with a confidence they would not have felt otherwise. They
became soldiers themselves almost at once. All these conditions
we would enjoy again in case of war.

The Mexican army of that day was hardly an organization. The
private soldier was picked up from the lower class of the
inhabitants when wanted; his consent was not asked; he was
poorly clothed, worse fed, and seldom paid. He was turned
adrift when no longer wanted. The officers of the lower grades
were but little superior to the men. With all this I have seen
as brave stands made by some of these men as I have ever seen
made by soldiers. Now Mexico has a standing army larger than
that of the United States. They have a military school modelled
after West Point. Their officers are educated and, no doubt,
generally brave. The Mexican war of 1846-8 would be an
impossibility in this generation.

The Mexicans have shown a patriotism which it would be well if
we would imitate in part, but with more regard to truth. They
celebrate the anniversaries of Chapultepec and Molino del Rey as
of very great victories. The anniversaries are recognized as
national holidays. At these two battles, while the United
States troops were victorious, it was at very great sacrifice of
life compared with what the Mexicans suffered. The Mexicans, as
on many other occasions, stood up as well as any troops ever
did. The trouble seemed to be the lack of experience among the
officers, which led them after a certain time to simply quit,
without being particularly whipped, but because they had fought
enough. Their authorities of the present day grow enthusiastic
over their theme when telling of these victories, and speak with
pride of the large sum of money they forced us to pay in the
end. With us, now twenty years after the close of the most
stupendous war ever known, we have writers–who profess devotion
to the nation–engaged in trying to prove that the Union forces
were not victorious; practically, they say, we were slashed
around from Donelson to Vicksburg and to Chattanooga; and in the
East from Gettysburg to Appomattox, when the physical rebellion
gave out from sheer exhaustion. There is no difference in the
amount of romance in the two stories.

I would not have the anniversaries of our victories celebrated,
nor those of our defeats made fast days and spent in humiliation
and prayer; but I would like to see truthful history written.
Such history will do full credit to the courage, endurance and
soldierly ability of the American citizen, no matter what
section of the country he hailed from, or in what ranks he
fought. The justice of the cause which in the end prevailed,
will, I doubt not, come to be acknowledged by every citizen of
the land, in time. For the present, and so long as there are
living witnesses of the great war of sections, there will be
people who will not be consoled for the loss of a cause which
they believed to be holy. As time passes, people, even of the
South, will begin to wonder how it was possible that their
ancestors ever fought for or justified institutions which
acknowledged the right of property in man.

After the fall of the capital and the dispersal of the
government of Mexico, it looked very much as if military
occupation of the country for a long time might be necessary.
General Scott at once began the preparation of orders,
regulations and laws in view of this contingency. He
contemplated making the country pay all the expenses of the
occupation, without the army becoming a perceptible burden upon
the people. His plan was to levy a direct tax upon the separate
states, and collect, at the ports left open to trade, a duty on
all imports. From the beginning of the war private property had
not been taken, either for the use of the army or of individuals,
without full compensation. This policy was to be pursued. There
were not troops enough in the valley of Mexico to occupy many
points, but now that there was no organized army of the enemy of
any size, reinforcements could be got from the Rio Grande, and
there were also new volunteers arriving from time to time, all
by way of Vera Cruz. Military possession was taken of
Cuernavaca, fifty miles south of the City of Mexico; of Toluca,
nearly as far west, and of Pachuca, a mining town of great
importance, some sixty miles to the north-east. Vera Cruz,
Jalapa, Orizaba, and Puebla were already in our possession.

Meanwhile the Mexican government had departed in the person of
Santa Anna, and it looked doubtful for a time whether the United
States commissioner, Mr. Trist, would find anybody to negotiate
with. A temporary government, however, was soon established at
Queretaro, and Trist began negotiations for a conclusion of the
war. Before terms were finally agreed upon he was ordered back
to Washington, but General Scott prevailed upon him to remain,
as an arrangement had been so nearly reached, and the
administration must approve his acts if he succeeded in making
such a treaty as had been contemplated in his instructions. The
treaty was finally signed the 2d of February, 1848, and accepted
by the government at Washington. It is that known as the
“Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,” and secured to the United States
the Rio Grande as the boundary of Texas, and the whole territory
then included in New Mexico and Upper California, for the sum of
$15,000,000.

Soon after entering the city of Mexico, the opposition of
Generals Pillow, Worth and Colonel Duncan to General Scott
became very marked. Scott claimed that they had demanded of the
President his removal. I do not know whether this is so or not,
but I do know of their unconcealed hostility to their chief. At
last he placed them in arrest, and preferred charges against them
of insubordination and disrespect. This act brought on a crisis
in the career of the general commanding. He had asserted from
the beginning that the administration was hostile to him; that
it had failed in its promises of men and war material; that the
President himself had shown duplicity if not treachery in the
endeavor to procure the appointment of Benton: and the
administration now gave open evidence of its enmity. About the
middle of February orders came convening a court of inquiry,
composed of Brevet Brigadier-General Towson, the
paymaster-general of the army, Brigadier-General Cushing and
Colonel Belknap, to inquire into the conduct of the accused and
the accuser, and shortly afterwards orders were received from
Washington, relieving Scott of the command of the army in the
field and assigning Major-General William O. Butler of Kentucky
to the place. This order also released Pillow, Worth and Duncan
from arrest.

If a change was to be made the selection of General Butler was
agreeable to every one concerned, so far as I remember to have
heard expressions on the subject. There were many who regarded
the treatment of General Scott as harsh and unjust. It is quite
possible that the vanity of the General had led him to say and do
things that afforded a plausible pretext to the administration
for doing just what it did and what it had wanted to do from the
start. The court tried the accuser quite as much as the
accused. It was adjourned before completing its labors, to meet
in Frederick, Maryland. General Scott left the country, and
never after had more than the nominal command of the army until
early in 1861. He certainly was not sustained in his efforts to
maintain discipline in high places.

The efforts to kill off politically the two successful generals,
made them both candidates for the Presidency. General Taylor was
nominated in 1848, and was elected. Four years later General
Scott received the nomination but was badly beaten, and the
party nominating him died with his defeat.(*5)

CHAPTER XIII.

TREATY OF PEACE–MEXICAN BULL FIGHTS–REGIMENTAL
QUARTERMASTER–TRIP TO POPOCATAPETL–TRIP TO THE CAVES OF MEXICO.

The treaty of peace between the two countries was signed by the
commissioners of each side early in February, 1848. It took a
considerable time for it to reach Washington, receive the
approval of the administration, and be finally ratified by the
Senate. It was naturally supposed by the army that there would
be no more fighting, and officers and men were of course anxious
to get home, but knowing there must be delay they contented
themselves as best they could. Every Sunday there was a bull
fight for the amusement of those who would pay their fifty
cents. I attended one of them–just one–not wishing to leave
the country without having witnessed the national sport. The
sight to me was sickening. I could not see how human beings
could enjoy the sufferings of beasts, and often of men, as they
seemed to do on these occasions.

At these sports there are usually from four to six bulls
sacrificed. The audience occupies seats around the ring in
which the exhibition is given, each seat but the foremost rising
higher than the one in front, so that every one can get a full
view of the sport. When all is ready a bull is turned into the
ring. Three or four men come in, mounted on the merest
skeletons of horses blind or blind-folded and so weak that they
could not make a sudden turn with their riders without danger of
falling down. The men are armed with spears having a point as
sharp as a needle. Other men enter the arena on foot, armed
with red flags and explosives about the size of a musket
cartridge. To each of these explosives is fastened a barbed
needle which serves the purpose of attaching them to the bull by
running the needle into the skin. Before the animal is turned
loose a lot of these explosives are attached to him. The pain
from the pricking of the skin by the needles is exasperating;
but when the explosions of the cartridges commence the animal
becomes frantic. As he makes a lunge towards one horseman,
another runs a spear into him. He turns towards his last
tormentor when a man on foot holds out a red flag; the bull
rushes for this and is allowed to take it on his horns. The
flag drops and covers the eyes of the animal so that he is at a
loss what to do; it is jerked from him and the torment is
renewed. When the animal is worked into an uncontrollable
frenzy, the horsemen withdraw, and the matadores–literally
murderers–enter, armed with knives having blades twelve or
eighteen inches long, and sharp. The trick is to dodge an
attack from the animal and stab him to the heart as he passes.
If these efforts fail the bull is finally lassoed, held fast and
killed by driving a knife blade into the spinal column just back
of the horns. He is then dragged out by horses or mules,
another is let into the ring, and the same performance is
renewed.

On the occasion when I was present one of the bulls was not
turned aside by the attacks in the rear, the presentations of
the red flag, etc., etc., but kept right on, and placing his
horns under the flanks of a horse threw him and his rider to the
ground with great force. The horse was killed and the rider lay
prostrate as if dead. The bull was then lassoed and killed in
the manner above described. Men came in and carried the dead
man off in a litter. When the slaughtered bull and horse were
dragged out, a fresh bull was turned into the ring. Conspicuous
among the spectators was the man who had been carried out on a
litter but a few minutes before. He was only dead so far as
that performance went; but the corpse was so lively that it
could not forego the chance of witnessing the discomfiture of
some of his brethren who might not be so fortunate. There was a
feeling of disgust manifested by the audience to find that he had
come to life again. I confess that I felt sorry to see the
cruelty to the bull and the horse. I did not stay for the
conclusion of the performance; but while I did stay, there was
not a bull killed in the prescribed way.

Bull fights are now prohibited in the Federal District–
embracing a territory around the City of Mexico, somewhat larger
than the District of Columbia–and they are not an institution in
any part of the country. During one of my recent visits to
Mexico, bull fights were got up in my honor at Puebla and at
Pachuca. I was not notified in advance so as to be able to
decline and thus prevent the performance; but in both cases I
civilly declined to attend.

Another amusement of the people of Mexico of that day, and one
which nearly all indulged in, male and female, old and young,
priest and layman, was Monte playing. Regular feast weeks were
held every year at what was then known as St. Augustin Tlalpam,
eleven miles out of town. There were dealers to suit every
class and condition of people. In many of the booths
tlackos–the copper coin of the country, four of them making six
and a quarter cents of our money–were piled up in great
quantities, with some silver, to accommodate the people who
could not bet more than a few pennies at a time. In other
booths silver formed the bulk of the capital of the bank, with a
few doubloons to be changed if there should be a run of luck
against the bank. In some there was no coin except gold. Here
the rich were said to bet away their entire estates in a single
day. All this is stopped now.

For myself, I was kept somewhat busy during the winter of
1847-8. My regiment was stationed in Tacubaya. I was
regimental quartermaster and commissary. General Scott had been
unable to get clothing for the troops from the North. The men
were becoming–well, they needed clothing. Material had to be
purchased, such as could be obtained, and people employed to
make it up into “Yankee uniforms.” A quartermaster in the city
was designated to attend to this special duty; but clothing was
so much needed that it was seized as fast as made up. A
regiment was glad to get a dozen suits at a time. I had to look
after this matter for the 4th infantry. Then our regimental fund
had run down and some of the musicians in the band had been
without their extra pay for a number of months.

The regimental bands at that day were kept up partly by pay from
the government, and partly by pay from the regimental fund. There
was authority of law for enlisting a certain number of men as
musicians. So many could receive the pay of non-commissioned
officers of the various grades, and the remainder the pay of
privates. This would not secure a band leader, nor good players
on certain instruments. In garrison there are various ways of
keeping up a regimental fund sufficient to give extra pay to
musicians, establish libraries and ten-pin alleys, subscribe to
magazines and furnish many extra comforts to the men. The best
device for supplying the fund is to issue bread to the soldiers
instead of flour. The ration used to be eighteen ounces per day
of either flour or bread; and one hundred pounds of flour will
make one hundred and forty pounds of bread. This saving was
purchased by the commissary for the benefit of the fund. In the
emergency the 4th infantry was laboring under, I rented a bakery
in the city, hired bakers–Mexicans–bought fuel and whatever
was necessary, and I also got a contract from the chief
commissary of the army for baking a large amount of hard
bread. In two months I made more money for the fund than my pay
amounted to during the entire war. While stationed at Monterey I
had relieved the post fund in the same way. There, however, was
no profit except in the saving of flour by converting it into
bread.

In the spring of 1848 a party of officers obtained leave to
visit Popocatapetl, the highest volcano in America, and to take
an escort. I went with the party, many of whom afterwards
occupied conspicuous positions before the country. Of those who
“went south,” and attained high rank, there was Lieutenant
Richard Anderson, who commanded a corps at Spottsylvania;
Captain Sibley, a major-general, and, after the war, for a
number of years in the employ of the Khedive of Egypt; Captain
George Crittenden, a rebel general; S. B. Buckner, who
surrendered Fort Donelson; and Mansfield Lovell, who commanded
at New Orleans before that city fell into the hands of the
National troops. Of those who remained on our side there were
Captain Andrew Porter, Lieutenant C. P. Stone and Lieutenant Z.
B. Tower. There were quite a number of other officers, whose
names I cannot recollect.

At a little village (Ozumba) near the base of Popocatapetl,
where we purposed to commence the ascent, we procured guides and
two pack mules with forage for our horses. High up on the
mountain there was a deserted house of one room, called the
Vaqueria, which had been occupied years before by men in charge
of cattle ranging on the mountain. The pasturage up there was
very fine when we saw it, and there were still some cattle,
descendants of the former domestic herd, which had now become
wild. It was possible to go on horseback as far as the
Vaqueria, though the road was somewhat hazardous in places.
Sometimes it was very narrow with a yawning precipice on one
side, hundreds of feet down to a roaring mountain torrent below,
and almost perpendicular walls on the other side. At one of
these places one of our mules loaded with two sacks of barley,
one on each side, the two about as big as he was, struck his
load against the mountain-side and was precipitated to the
bottom. The descent was steep but not perpendicular. The mule
rolled over and over until the bottom was reached, and we
supposed of course the poor animal was dashed to pieces. What
was our surprise, not long after we had gone into bivouac, to
see the lost mule, cargo and owner coming up the ascent. The
load had protected the animal from serious injury; and his owner
had gone after him and found a way back to the path leading up to
the hut where we were to stay.

The night at the Vaqueria was one of the most unpleasant I ever
knew. It was very cold and the rain fell in torrents. A little
higher up the rain ceased and snow began. The wind blew with
great velocity. The log-cabin we were in had lost the roof
entirely on one side, and on the other it was hardly better then
a sieve. There was little or no sleep that night. As soon as it
was light the next morning, we started to make the ascent to the
summit. The wind continued to blow with violence and the
weather was still cloudy, but there was neither rain nor snow.
The clouds, however, concealed from our view the country below
us, except at times a momentary glimpse could be got through a
clear space between them. The wind carried the loose snow
around the mountain-sides in such volumes as to make it almost
impossible to stand up against it. We labored on and on, until
it became evident that the top could not be reached before
night, if at all in such a storm, and we concluded to return.
The descent was easy and rapid, though dangerous, until we got
below the snow line. At the cabin we mounted our horses, and by
night were at Ozumba.

The fatigues of the day and the loss of sleep the night before
drove us to bed early. Our beds consisted of a place on the
dirt-floor with a blanket under us. Soon all were asleep; but
long before morning first one and then another of our party
began to cry out with excruciating pain in the eyes. Not one
escaped it. By morning the eyes of half the party were so
swollen that they were entirely closed. The others suffered
pain equally. The feeling was about what might be expected from
the prick of a sharp needle at a white heat. We remained in
quarters until the afternoon bathing our eyes in cold water.
This relieved us very much, and before night the pain had
entirely left. The swelling, however, continued, and about half
the party still had their eyes entirely closed; but we concluded
to make a start back, those who could see a little leading the
horses of those who could not see at all. We moved back to the
village of Ameca Ameca, some six miles, and stopped again for
the night. The next morning all were entirely well and free
from pain. The weather was clear and Popocatapetl stood out in
all its beauty, the top looking as if not a mile away, and
inviting us to return. About half the party were anxious to try
the ascent again, and concluded to do so. The remainder–I was
with the remainder–concluded that we had got all the pleasure
there was to be had out of mountain climbing, and that we would
visit the great caves of Mexico, some ninety miles from where we
then were, on the road to Acapulco.

The party that ascended the mountain the second time succeeded
in reaching the crater at the top, with but little of the labor
they encountered in their first attempt. Three of them–
Anderson, Stone and Buckner–wrote accounts of their journey,
which were published at the time. I made no notes of this
excursion, and have read nothing about it since, but it seems to
me that I can see the whole of it as vividly as if it were but
yesterday. I have been back at Ameca Ameca, and the village
beyond, twice in the last five years. The scene had not changed
materially from my recollection of it.

The party which I was with moved south down the valley to the
town of Cuantla, some forty miles from Ameca Ameca. The latter
stands on the plain at the foot of Popocatapetl, at an elevation
of about eight thousand feet above tide water. The slope down is
gradual as the traveller moves south, but one would not judge
that, in going to Cuantla, descent enough had been made to
occasion a material change in the climate and productions of the
soil; but such is the case. In the morning we left a temperate
climate where the cereals and fruits are those common to the
United States, we halted in the evening in a tropical climate
where the orange and banana, the coffee and the sugar-cane were
flourishing. We had been travelling, apparently, on a plain all
day, but in the direction of the flow of water.

Soon after the capture of the City of Mexico an armistice had
been agreed to, designating the limits beyond which troops of
the respective armies were not to go during its continuance. Our
party knew nothing about these limits. As we approached Cuantla
bugles sounded the assembly, and soldiers rushed from the
guard-house in the edge of the town towards us. Our party
halted, and I tied a white pocket handkerchief to a stick and,
using it as a flag of truce, proceeded on to the town. Captains
Sibley and Porter followed a few hundred yards behind. I was
detained at the guard-house until a messenger could be
dispatched to the quarters of the commanding general, who
authorized that I should be conducted to him. I had been with
the general but a few minutes when the two officers following
announced themselves. The Mexican general reminded us that it
was a violation of the truce for us to be there. However, as we
had no special authority from our own commanding general, and as
we knew nothing about the terms of the truce, we were permitted
to occupy a vacant house outside the guard for the night, with
the promise of a guide to put us on the road to Cuernavaca the
next morning.

Cuernavaca is a town west of Guantla. The country through which
we passed, between these two towns, is tropical in climate and
productions and rich in scenery. At one point, about half-way
between the two places, the road goes over a low pass in the
mountains in which there is a very quaint old town, the
inhabitants of which at that day were nearly all full-blooded
Indians. Very few of them even spoke Spanish. The houses were
built of stone and generally only one story high. The streets
were narrow, and had probably been paved before Cortez visited
the country. They had not been graded, but the paving had been
done on the natural surface. We had with us one vehicle, a
cart, which was probably the first wheeled vehicle that had ever
passed through that town.

On a hill overlooking this town stands the tomb of an ancient
king; and it was understood that the inhabitants venerated this
tomb very highly, as well as the memory of the ruler who was
supposed to be buried in it. We ascended the mountain and
surveyed the tomb; but it showed no particular marks of
architectural taste, mechanical skill or advanced
civilization. The next day we went into Cuernavaca.

After a day’s rest at Cuernavaca our party set out again on the
journey to the great caves of Mexico. We had proceeded but a
few miles when we were stopped, as before, by a guard and
notified that the terms of the existing armistice did not permit
us to go further in that direction. Upon convincing the guard
that we were a mere party of pleasure seekers desirous of
visiting the great natural curiosities of the country which we
expected soon to leave, we were conducted to a large hacienda
near by, and directed to remain there until the commanding
general of that department could be communicated with and his
decision obtained as to whether we should be permitted to pursue
our journey. The guard promised to send a messenger at once, and
expected a reply by night. At night there was no response from
the commanding general, but the captain of the guard was sure he
would have a reply by morning. Again in the morning there was no
reply. The second evening the same thing happened, and finally
we learned that the guard had sent no message or messenger to
the department commander. We determined therefore to go on
unless stopped by a force sufficient to compel obedience.

After a few hours’ travel we came to a town where a scene
similar to the one at Cuantia occurred. The commanding officer
sent a guide to conduct our party around the village and to put
us upon our road again. This was the last interruption: that
night we rested at a large coffee plantation, some eight miles
from the cave we were on the way to visit. It must have been a
Saturday night; the peons had been paid off, and spent part of
the night in gambling away their scanty week’s earnings. Their
coin was principally copper, and I do not believe there was a
man among them who had received as much as twenty-five cents in
money. They were as much excited, however, as if they had been
staking thousands. I recollect one poor fellow, who had lost
his last tlacko, pulled off his shirt and, in the most excited
manner, put that up on the turn of a card. Monte was the game
played, the place out of doors, near the window of the room
occupied by the officers of our party.

The next morning we were at the mouth of the cave at an early
hour, provided with guides, candles and rockets. We explored to
a distance of about three miles from the entrance, and found a
succession of chambers of great dimensions and of great beauty
when lit up with our rockets. Stalactites and stalagmites of
all sizes were discovered. Some of the former were many feet in
diameter and extended from ceiling to floor; some of the latter
were but a few feet high from the floor; but the formation is
going on constantly, and many centuries hence these stalagmites
will extend to the ceiling and become complete columns. The
stalagmites were all a little concave, and the cavities were
filled with water. The water percolates through the roof, a
drop at a time–often the drops several minutes apart–and more
or less charged with mineral matter. Evaporation goes on
slowly, leaving the mineral behind. This in time makes the
immense columns, many of them thousands of tons in weight, which
serve to support the roofs over the vast chambers. I recollect
that at one point in the cave one of these columns is of such
huge proportions that there is only a narrow passage left on
either side of it. Some of our party became satisfied with
their explorations before we had reached the point to which the
guides were accustomed to take explorers, and started back
without guides. Coming to the large column spoken of, they
followed it entirely around, and commenced retracing their steps
into the bowels of the mountain, without being aware of the
fact. When the rest of us had completed our explorations, we
started out with our guides, but had not gone far before we saw
the torches of an approaching party. We could not conceive who
these could be, for all of us had come in together, and there
were none but ourselves at the entrance when we started in. Very
soon we found it was our friends. It took them some time to
conceive how they had got where they were. They were sure they
had kept straight on for the mouth of the cave, and had gone
about far enough to have reached it.

CHAPTER XIV.

RETURN OF THE ARMY–MARRIAGE–ORDERED TO THE PACIFIC
COAST–CROSSING THE ISTHMUS–ARRIVAL AT SAN FRANCISCO.

My experience in the Mexican war was of great advantage to me
afterwards. Besides the many practical lessons it taught, the
war brought nearly all the officers of the regular army together
so as to make them personally acquainted. It also brought them
in contact with volunteers, many of whom served in the war of
the rebellion afterwards. Then, in my particular case, I had
been at West Point at about the right time to meet most of the
graduates who were of a suitable age at the breaking out of the
rebellion to be trusted with large commands. Graduating in
1843, I was at the military academy from one to four years with
all cadets who graduated between 1840 and 1846–seven classes.
These classes embraced more than fifty officers who afterwards
became generals on one side or the other in the rebellion, many
of them holding high commands. All the older officers, who
became conspicuous in the rebellion, I had also served with and
known in Mexico: Lee, J. E. Johnston, A. S. Johnston, Holmes,
Hebert and a number of others on the Confederate side; McCall,
Mansfield, Phil. Kearney and others on the National side. The
acquaintance thus formed was of immense service to me in the war
of the rebellion–I mean what I learned of the characters of
those to whom I was afterwards opposed. I do not pretend to say
that all movements, or even many of them, were made with special
reference to the characteristics of the commander against whom
they were directed. But my appreciation of my enemies was
certainly affected by this knowledge. The natural disposition
of most people is to clothe a commander of a large army whom
they do not know, with almost superhuman abilities. A large
part of the National army, for instance, and most of the press
of the country, clothed General Lee with just such qualities,
but I had known him personally, and knew that he was mortal; and
it was just as well that I felt this.

The treaty of peace was at last ratified, and the evacuation of
Mexico by United States troops was ordered. Early in June the
troops in the City of Mexico began to move out. Many of them,
including the brigade to which I belonged, were assembled at
Jalapa, above the vomito, to await the arrival of transports at
Vera Cruz: but with all this precaution my regiment and others
were in camp on the sand beach in a July sun, for about a week
before embarking, while the fever raged with great virulence in
Vera Cruz, not two miles away. I can call to mind only one
person, an officer, who died of the disease. My regiment was
sent to Pascagoula, Mississippi, to spend the summer. As soon
as it was settled in camp I obtained a leave of absence for four
months and proceeded to St. Louis. On the 22d of August, 1848, I
was married to Miss Julia Dent, the lady of whom I have before
spoken. We visited my parents and relations in Ohio, and, at
the end of my leave, proceeded to my post at Sackett’s Harbor,
New York. In April following I was ordered to Detroit,
Michigan, where two years were spent with but few important
incidents.

The present constitution of the State of Michigan was ratified
during this time. By the terms of one of its provisions, all
citizens of the United States residing within the State at the
time of the ratification became citizens of Michigan also.
During my stay in Detroit there was an election for city
officers. Mr. Zachariah Chandler was the candidate of the Whigs
for the office of Mayor, and was elected, although the city was
then reckoned democratic. All the officers stationed there at
the time who offered their votes were permitted to cast them. I
did not offer mine, however, as I did not wish to consider myself
a citizen of Michigan. This was Mr. Chandler’s first entry into
politics, a career he followed ever after with great success,
and in which he died enjoying the friendship, esteem and love of
his countrymen.

In the spring of 1851 the garrison at Detroit was transferred to
Sackett’s Harbor, and in the following spring the entire 4th
infantry was ordered to the Pacific Coast. It was decided that
Mrs. Grant should visit my parents at first for a few months,
and then remain with her own family at their St. Louis home
until an opportunity offered of sending for her. In the month
of April the regiment was assembled at Governor’s Island, New
York Harbor, and on the 5th of July eight companies sailed for
Aspinwall. We numbered a little over seven hundred persons,
including the families of officers and soldiers. Passage was
secured for us on the old steamer Ohio, commanded at the time by
Captain Schenck, of the navy. It had not been determined, until
a day or two before starting, that the 4th infantry should go by
the Ohio; consequently, a complement of passengers had already
been secured. The addition of over seven hundred to this list
crowded the steamer most uncomfortably, especially for the
tropics in July.

In eight days Aspinwall was reached. At that time the streets
of the town were eight or ten inches under water, and foot
passengers passed from place to place on raised foot-walks. July
is at the height of the wet season, on the Isthmus. At intervals
the rain would pour down in streams, followed in not many minutes
by a blazing, tropical summer’s sun. These alternate changes,
from rain to sunshine, were continuous in the afternoons. I
wondered how any person could live many months in Aspinwall, and
wondered still more why any one tried.

In the summer of 1852 the Panama railroad was completed only to
the point where it now crosses the Chagres River. From there
passengers were carried by boats to Gorgona, at which place they
took mules for Panama, some twenty-five miles further. Those who
travelled over the Isthmus in those days will remember that boats
on the Chagres River were propelled by natives not inconveniently
burdened with clothing. These boats carried thirty to forty
passengers each. The crews consisted of six men to a boat,
armed with long poles. There were planks wide enough for a man
to walk on conveniently, running along the sides of each boat
from end to end. The men would start from the bow, place one
end of their poles against the river bottom, brace their
shoulders against the other end, and then walk to the stern as
rapidly as they could. In this way from a mile to a mile and a
half an hour could be made, against the current of the river.

I, as regimental quartermaster, had charge of the public
property and had also to look after the transportation. A
contract had been entered into with the steamship company in New
York for the transportation of the regiment to California,
including the Isthmus transit. A certain amount of baggage was
allowed per man, and saddle animals were to be furnished to
commissioned officers and to all disabled persons. The
regiment, with the exception of one company left as guards to
the public property–camp and garrison equipage principally–and
the soldiers with families, took boats, propelled as above
described, for Gorgona. From this place they marched to Panama,
and were soon comfortably on the steamer anchored in the bay,
some three or four miles from the town. I, with one company of
troops and all the soldiers with families, all the tents, mess
chests and camp kettles, was sent to Cruces, a town a few miles
higher up the Chagres River than Gorgona. There I found an
impecunious American who had taken the contract to furnish
transportation for the regiment at a stipulated price per
hundred pounds for the freight and so much for each saddle
animal. But when we reached Cruces there was not a mule, either
for pack or saddle, in the place. The contractor promised that
the animals should be on hand in the morning. In the morning he
said that they were on the way from some imaginary place, and
would arrive in the course of the day. This went on until I saw
that he could not procure the animals at all at the price he had
promised to furnish them for. The unusual number of passengers
that had come over on the steamer, and the large amount of
freight to pack, had created an unprecedented demand for
mules. Some of the passengers paid as high as forty dollars for
the use of a mule to ride twenty-five miles, when the mule would
not have sold for ten dollars in that market at other times.
Meanwhile the cholera had broken out, and men were dying every
hour. To diminish the food for the disease, I permitted the
company detailed with me to proceed to Panama. The captain and
the doctors accompanied the men, and I was left alone with the
sick and the soldiers who had families. The regiment at Panama
was also affected with the disease; but there were better
accommodations for the well on the steamer, and a hospital, for
those taken with the disease, on an old hulk anchored a mile
off. There were also hospital tents on shore on the island of
Flamingo, which stands in the bay.

I was about a week at Cruces before transportation began to come
in. About one-third of the people with me died, either at Cruces
or on the way to Panama. There was no agent of the
transportation company at Cruces to consult, or to take the
responsibility of procuring transportation at a price which
would secure it. I therefore myself dismissed the contractor
and made a new contract with a native, at more than double the
original price. Thus we finally reached Panama. The steamer,
however, could not proceed until the cholera abated, and the
regiment was detained still longer. Altogether, on the Isthmus
and on the Pacific side, we were delayed six weeks. About
one-seventh of those who left New York harbor with the 4th
infantry on the 5th of July, now lie buried on the Isthmus of
Panama or on Flamingo island in Panama Bay.

One amusing circumstance occurred while we were Iying at anchor
in Panama Bay. In the regiment there was a Lieutenant Slaughter
who was very liable to sea-sickness. It almost made him sick to
see the wave of a table-cloth when the servants were spreading
it. Soon after his graduation, Slaughter was ordered to
California and took passage by a sailing vessel going around
Cape Horn. The vessel was seven months making the voyage, and
Slaughter was sick every moment of the time, never more so than
while Iying at anchor after reaching his place of destination.
On landing in California he found orders which had come by the
Isthmus, notifying him of a mistake in his assignment; he should
have been ordered to the northern lakes. He started back by the
Isthmus route and was sick all the way. But when he arrived at
the East he was again ordered to California, this time
definitely, and at this date was making his third trip. He was
as sick as ever, and had been so for more than a month while
lying at anchor in the bay. I remember him well, seated with
his elbows on the table in front of him, his chin between his
hands, and looking the picture of despair. At last he broke
out, “I wish I had taken my father’s advice; he wanted me to go
into the navy; if I had done so, I should not have had to go to
sea so much.” Poor Slaughter! it was his last sea voyage. He
was killed by Indians in Oregon.

By the last of August the cholera had so abated that it was
deemed safe to start. The disease did not break out again on
the way to California, and we reached San Francisco early in
September.

CHAPTER XV.

SAN FRANCISCO–EARLY CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCES–LIFE ON THE PACIFIC
COAST–PROMOTED CAPTAIN–FLUSH TIMES IN CALIFORNIA.

San Francisco at that day was a lively place. Gold, or placer
digging as it was called, was at its height. Steamers plied
daily between San Francisco and both Stockton and Sacramento.
Passengers and gold from the southern mines came by the Stockton
boat; from the northern mines by Sacramento. In the evening when
these boats arrived, Long Wharf–there was but one wharf in San
Francisco in 1852–was alive with people crowding to meet the
miners as they came down to sell their “dust” and to “have a
time.” Of these some were runners for hotels, boarding houses
or restaurants; others belonged to a class of impecunious
adventurers, of good manners and good presence, who were ever on
the alert to make the acquaintance of people with some ready
means, in the hope of being asked to take a meal at a
restaurant. Many were young men of good family, good education
and gentlemanly instincts. Their parents had been able to
support them during their minority, and to give them good
educations, but not to maintain them afterwards. From 1849 to
1853 there was a rush of people to the Pacific coast, of the
class described. All thought that fortunes were to be picked
up, without effort, in the gold fields on the Pacific. Some
realized more than their most sanguine expectations; but for one
such there were hundreds disappointed, many of whom now fill
unknown graves; others died wrecks of their former selves, and
many, without a vicious instinct, became criminals and
outcasts. Many of the real scenes in early California life
exceed in strangeness and interest any of the mere products of
the brain of the novelist.

Those early days in California brought out character. It was a
long way off then, and the journey was expensive. The fortunate
could go by Cape Horn or by the Isthmus of Panama; but the mass
of pioneers crossed the plains with their ox-teams. This took
an entire summer. They were very lucky when they got through
with a yoke of worn-out cattle. All other means were exhausted
in procuring the outfit on the Missouri River. The immigrant,
on arriving, found himself a stranger, in a strange land, far
from friends. Time pressed, for the little means that could be
realized from the sale of what was left of the outfit would not
support a man long at California prices. Many became
discouraged. Others would take off their coats and look for a
job, no matter what it might be. These succeeded as a rule.
There were many young men who had studied professions before
they went to California, and who had never done a day’s manual
labor in their lives, who took in the situation at once and went
to work to make a start at anything they could get to do. Some
supplied carpenters and masons with material–carrying plank,
brick, or mortar, as the case might be; others drove stages,
drays, or baggage wagons, until they could do better. More
became discouraged early and spent their time looking up people
who would “treat,” or lounging about restaurants and gambling
houses where free lunches were furnished daily. They were
welcomed at these places because they often brought in miners
who proved good customers.

My regiment spent a few weeks at Benicia barracks, and then was
ordered to Fort Vancouver, on the Columbia River, then in Oregon
Territory. During the winter of 1852-3 the territory was
divided, all north of the Columbia River being taken from Oregon
to make Washington Territory.

Prices for all kinds of supplies were so high on the Pacific
coast from 1849 until at least 1853–that it would have been
impossible for officers of the army to exist upon their pay, if
it had not been that authority was given them to purchase from
the commissary such supplies as he kept, at New Orleans
wholesale prices. A cook could not be hired for the pay of a
captain. The cook could do better. At Benicia, in 1852, flour
was 25 cents per pound; potatoes were 16 cents; beets, turnips
and cabbage, 6 cents; onions, 37 – 1/2 cents; meat and other
articles in proportion. In 1853 at Vancouver vegetables were a
little lower. I with three other officers concluded that we
would raise a crop for ourselves, and by selling the surplus
realize something handsome. I bought a pair of horses that had
crossed the plains that summer and were very poor. They
recuperated rapidly, however, and proved a good team to break up
the ground with. I performed all the labor of breaking up the
ground while the other officers planted the potatoes. Our crop
was enormous. Luckily for us the Columbia River rose to a great
height from the melting of the snow in the mountains in June, and
overflowed and killed most of our crop. This saved digging it
up, for everybody on the Pacific coast seemed to have come to
the conclusion at the same time that agriculture would be
profitable. In 1853 more than three-quarters of the potatoes
raised were permitted to rot in the ground, or had to be thrown
away. The only potatoes we sold were to our own mess.

While I was stationed on the Pacific coast we were free from
Indian wars. There were quite a number of remnants of tribes in
the vicinity of Portland in Oregon, and of Fort Vancouver in
Washington Territory. They had generally acquired some of the
vices of civilization, but none of the virtues, except in
individual cases. The Hudson’s Bay Company had held the
North-west with their trading posts for many years before the
United States was represented on the Pacific coast. They still
retained posts along the Columbia River and one at Fort
Vancouver, when I was there. Their treatment of the Indians had
brought out the better qualities of the savages. Farming had
been undertaken by the company to supply the Indians with bread
and vegetables; they raised some cattle and horses; and they had
now taught the Indians to do the labor of the farm and herd. They
always compensated them for their labor, and always gave them
goods of uniform quality and at uniform price.

Before the advent of the American, the medium of exchange
between the Indian and the white man was pelts. Afterward it
was silver coin. If an Indian received in the sale of a horse a
fifty dollar gold piece, not an infrequent occurrence, the first
thing he did was to exchange it for American half dollars. These
he could count. He would then commence his purchases, paying for
each article separately, as he got it. He would not trust any
one to add up the bill and pay it all at once. At that day
fifty dollar gold pieces, not the issue of the government, were
common on the Pacific coast. They were called slugs.

The Indians, along the lower Columbia as far as the Cascades and
on the lower Willamette, died off very fast during the year I
spent in that section; for besides acquiring the vices of the
white people they had acquired also their diseases. The measles
and the small-pox were both amazingly fatal. In their wild
state, before the appearance of the white man among them, the
principal complaints they were subject to were those produced by
long involuntary fasting, violent exercise in pursuit of game,
and over-eating. Instinct more than reason had taught them a
remedy for these ills. It was the steam bath. Something like a
bake-oven was built, large enough to admit a man lying down.
Bushes were stuck in the ground in two rows, about six feet long
and some two or three feet apart; other bushes connected the rows
at one end. The tops of the bushes were drawn together to
interlace, and confined in that position; the whole was then
plastered over with wet clay until every opening was filled.
Just inside the open end of the oven the floor was scooped out
so as to make a hole that would hold a bucket or two of water.
These ovens were always built on the banks of a stream, a big
spring, or pool of water. When a patient required a bath, a
fire was built near the oven and a pile of stones put upon it.
The cavity at the front was then filled with water. When the
stones were sufficiently heated, the patient would draw himself
into the oven; a blanket would be thrown over the open end, and
hot stones put into the water until the patient could stand it
no longer. He was then withdrawn from his steam bath and doused
into the cold stream near by. This treatment may have answered
with the early ailments of the Indians. With the measles or
small-pox it would kill every time.

During my year on the Columbia River, the small-pox exterminated
one small remnant of a band of Indians entirely, and reduced
others materially. I do not think there was a case of recovery
among them, until the doctor with the Hudson Bay Company took
the matter in hand and established a hospital. Nearly every
case he treated recovered. I never, myself, saw the treatment
described in the preceding paragraph, but have heard it
described by persons who have witnessed it. The decimation
among the Indians I knew of personally, and the hospital,
established for their benefit, was a Hudson’s Bay building not a
stone’s throw from my own quarters.

The death of Colonel Bliss, of the Adjutant General’s
department, which occurred July 5th, 1853, promoted me to the
captaincy of a company then stationed at Humboldt Bay,
California. The notice reached me in September of the same
year, and I very soon started to join my new command. There was
no way of reaching Humboldt at that time except to take passage
on a San Francisco sailing vessel going after lumber. Red wood,
a species of cedar, which on the Pacific coast takes the place
filled by white pine in the East, then abounded on the banks of
Humboldt Bay. There were extensive saw-mills engaged in
preparing this lumber for the San Francisco market, and sailing
vessels, used in getting it to market, furnished the only means
of communication between Humboldt and the balance of the world.

I was obliged to remain in San Francisco for several days before
I found a vessel. This gave me a good opportunity of comparing
the San Francisco of 1852 with that of 1853. As before stated,
there had been but one wharf in front of the city in 1852–Long
Wharf. In 1853 the town had grown out into the bay beyond what
was the end of this wharf when I first saw it. Streets and
houses had been built out on piles where the year before the
largest vessels visiting the port lay at anchor or tied to the
wharf. There was no filling under the streets or houses. San
Francisco presented the same general appearance as the year
before; that is, eating, drinking and gambling houses were
conspicuous for their number and publicity. They were on the
first floor, with doors wide open. At all hours of the day and
night in walking the streets, the eye was regaled, on every
block near the water front, by the sight of players at faro.
Often broken places were found in the street, large enough to
let a man down into the water below. I have but little doubt
that many of the people who went to the Pacific coast in the
early days of the gold excitement, and have never been heard
from since, or who were heard from for a time and then ceased to
write, found watery graves beneath the houses or streets built
over San Francisco Bay.

Besides the gambling in cards there was gambling on a larger
scale in city lots. These were sold “On Change,” much as stocks
are now sold on Wall Street. Cash, at time of purchase, was
always paid by the broker; but the purchaser had only to put up
his margin. He was charged at the rate of two or three per
cent. a month on the difference, besides commissions. The sand
hills, some of them almost inaccessible to foot-passengers, were
surveyed off and mapped into fifty vara lots–a vara being a
Spanish yard. These were sold at first at very low prices, but
were sold and resold for higher prices until they went up to
many thousands of dollars. The brokers did a fine business, and
so did many such purchasers as were sharp enough to quit
purchasing before the final crash came. As the city grew, the
sand hills back of the town furnished material for filling up
the bay under the houses and streets, and still further out. The
temporary houses, first built over the water in the harbor, soon
gave way to more solid structures. The main business part of
the city now is on solid ground, made where vessels of the
largest class lay at anchor in the early days. I was in San
Francisco again in 1854. Gambling houses had disappeared from
public view. The city had become staid and orderly.

CHAPTER XVI.

RESIGNATION–PRIVATE LIFE–LIFE AT GALENA–THE COMING CRISIS.

My family, all this while, was at the East. It consisted now of
a wife and two children. I saw no chance of supporting them on
the Pacific coast out of my pay as an army officer. I
concluded, therefore, to resign, and in March applied for a
leave of absence until the end of the July following, tendering
my resignation to take effect at the end of that time. I left
the Pacific coast very much attached to it, and with the full
expectation of making it my future home. That expectation and
that hope remained uppermost in my mind until the Lieutenant-
Generalcy bill was introduced into Congress in the winter of
1863-4. The passage of that bill, and my promotion, blasted my
last hope of ever becoming a citizen of the further West.

In the late summer of 1854 I rejoined my family, to find in it a
son whom I had never seen, born while I was on the Isthmus of
Panama. I was now to commence, at the age of thirty-two, a new
struggle for our support. My wife had a farm near St. Louis, to
which we went, but I had no means to stock it. A house had to be
built also. I worked very hard, never losing a day because of
bad weather, and accomplished the object in a moderate way. If
nothing else could be done I would load a cord of wood on a
wagon and take it to the city for sale. I managed to keep along
very well until 1858, when I was attacked by fever and ague. I
had suffered very severely and for a long time from this
disease, while a boy in Ohio. It lasted now over a year, and,
while it did not keep me in the house, it did interfere greatly
with the amount of work I was able to perform. In the fall of
1858 I sold out my stock, crops and farming utensils at auction,
and gave up farming.

In the winter I established a partnership with Harry Boggs, a
cousin of Mrs. Grant, in the real estate agency business. I
spent that winter at St. Louis myself, but did not take my
family into town until the spring. Our business might have
become prosperous if I had been able to wait for it to grow. As
it was, there was no more than one person could attend to, and
not enough to support two families. While a citizen of St.
Louis and engaged in the real estate agency business, I was a
candidate for the office of county engineer, an office of
respectability and emolument which would have been very
acceptable to me at that time. The incumbent was appointed by
the county court, which consisted of five members. My opponent
had the advantage of birth over me (he was a citizen by
adoption) and carried off the prize. I now withdrew from the
co-partnership with Boggs, and, in May, 1860, removed to Galena,
Illinois, and took a clerkship in my father’s store.

While a citizen of Missouri, my first opportunity for casting a
vote at a Presidential election occurred. I had been in the
army from before attaining my majority and had thought but
little about politics, although I was a Whig by education and a
great admirer of Mr. Clay. But the Whig party had ceased to
exist before I had an opportunity of exercising the privilege of
casting a ballot; the Know-Nothing party had taken its place, but
was on the wane; and the Republican party was in a chaotic state
and had not yet received a name. It had no existence in the
Slave States except at points on the borders next to Free
States. In St. Louis City and County, what afterwards became
the Republican party was known as the Free-Soil Democracy, led
by the Honorable Frank P. Blair. Most of my neighbors had known
me as an officer of the army with Whig proclivities. They had
been on the same side, and, on the death of their party, many
had become Know-Nothings, or members of the American party.
There was a lodge near my new home, and I was invited to join
it. I accepted the invitation; was initiated; attended a
meeting just one week later, and never went to another
afterwards.

I have no apologies to make for having been one week a member of
the American party; for I still think native-born citizens of the
United States should have as much protection, as many privileges
in their native country, as those who voluntarily select it for
a home. But all secret, oath-bound political parties are
dangerous to any nation, no matter how pure or how patriotic the
motives and principles which first bring them together. No
political party can or ought to exist when one of its
corner-stones is opposition to freedom of thought and to the
right to worship God “according to the dictate of one’s own
conscience,” or according to the creed of any religious
denomination whatever. Nevertheless, if a sect sets up its laws
as binding above the State laws, wherever the two come in
conflict this claim must be resisted and suppressed at whatever
cost.

Up to the Mexican war there were a few out and out
abolitionists, men who carried their hostility to slavery into
all elections, from those for a justice of the peace up to the
Presidency of the United States. They were noisy but not
numerous. But the great majority of people at the North, where
slavery did not exist, were opposed to the institution, and
looked upon its existence in any part of the country as
unfortunate. They did not hold the States where slavery existed
responsible for it; and believed that protection should be given
to the right of property in slaves until some satisfactory way
could be reached to be rid of the institution. Opposition to
slavery was not a creed of either political party. In some
sections more anti-slavery men belonged to the Democratic party,
and in others to the Whigs. But with the inauguration of the
Mexican war, in fact with the annexation of Texas, “the
inevitable conflict” commenced.

As the time for the Presidential election of 1856–the first at
which I had the opportunity of voting–approached, party feeling
began to run high. The Republican party was regarded in the
South and the border States not only as opposed to the extension
of slavery, but as favoring the compulsory abolition of the
institution without compensation to the owners. The most
horrible visions seemed to present themselves to the minds of
people who, one would suppose, ought to have known better. Many
educated and, otherwise, sensible persons appeared to believe
that emancipation meant social equality. Treason to the
Government was openly advocated and was not rebuked. It was
evident to my mind that the election of a Republican President
in 1856 meant the secession of all the Slave States, and
rebellion. Under these circumstances I preferred the success of
a candidate whose election would prevent or postpone secession,
to seeing the country plunged into a war the end of which no man
could foretell. With a Democrat elected by the unanimous vote of
the Slave States, there could be no pretext for secession for
four years. I very much hoped that the passions of the people
would subside in that time, and the catastrophe be averted
altogether; if it was not, I believed the country would be
better prepared to receive the shock and to resist it. I
therefore voted for James Buchanan for President. Four years
later the Republican party was successful in electing its
candidate to the Presidency. The civilized world has learned
the consequence. Four millions of human beings held as chattels
have been liberated; the ballot has been given to them; the free
schools of the country have been opened to their children. The
nation still lives, and the people are just as free to avoid
social intimacy with the blacks as ever they were, or as they
are with white people.

While living in Galena I was nominally only a clerk supporting
myself and family on a stipulated salary. In reality my
position was different. My father had never lived in Galena
himself, but had established my two brothers there, the one next
younger than myself in charge of the business, assisted by the
youngest. When I went there it was my father’s intention to
give up all connection with the business himself, and to
establish his three sons in it: but the brother who had really
built up the business was sinking with consumption, and it was
not thought best to make any change while he was in this
condition. He lived until September, 1861, when he succumbed to
that insidious disease which always flatters its victims into the
belief that they are growing better up to the close of life. A
more honorable man never transacted business. In September,
1861, I was engaged in an employment which required all my
attention elsewhere.

During the eleven months that I lived in Galena prior to the
first call for volunteers, I had been strictly attentive to my
business, and had made but few acquaintances other than
customers and people engaged in the same line with myself. When
the election took place in November, 1860, I had not been a
resident of Illinois long enough to gain citizenship and could
not, therefore, vote. I was really glad of this at the time,
for my pledges would have compelled me to vote for Stephen A.
Douglas, who had no possible chance of election. The contest
was really between Mr. Breckinridge and Mr. Lincoln; between
minority rule and rule by the majority. I wanted, as between
these candidates, to see Mr. Lincoln elected. Excitement ran
high during the canvass, and torch-light processions enlivened
the scene in the generally quiet streets of Galena many nights
during the campaign. I did not parade with either party, but
occasionally met with the “wide awakes”–Republicans–in their
rooms, and superintended their drill. It was evident, from the
time of the Chicago nomination to the close of the canvass, that
the election of the Republican candidate would be the signal for
some of the Southern States to secede. I still had hopes that
the four years which had elapsed since the first nomination of a
Presidential candidate by a party distinctly opposed to slavery
extension, had given time for the extreme pro-slavery sentiment
to cool down; for the Southerners to think well before they took
the awful leap which they had so vehemently threatened. But I
was mistaken.

The Republican candidate was elected, and solid substantial
people of the North-west, and I presume the same order of people
throughout the entire North, felt very serious, but determined,
after this event. It was very much discussed whether the South
would carry out its threat to secede and set up a separate
government, the corner-stone of which should be, protection to
the “Divine” institution of slavery. For there were people who
believed in the “divinity” of human slavery, as there are now
people who believe Mormonism and Polygamy to be ordained by the
Most High. We forgive them for entertaining such notions, but
forbid their practice. It was generally believed that there
would be a flurry; that some of the extreme Southern States
would go so far as to pass ordinances of secession. But the
common impression was that this step was so plainly suicidal for
the South, that the movement would not spread over much of the
territory and would not last long.

Doubtless the founders of our government, the majority of them
at least, regarded the confederation of the colonies as an
experiment. Each colony considered itself a separate
government; that the confederation was for mutual protection
against a foreign foe, and the prevention of strife and war
among themselves. If there had been a desire on the part of any
single State to withdraw from the compact at any time while the
number of States was limited to the original thirteen, I do not
suppose there would have been any to contest the right, no
matter how much the determination might have been regretted. The
problem changed on the ratification of the Constitution by all
the colonies; it changed still more when amendments were added;
and if the right of any one State to withdraw continued to exist
at all after the ratification of the Constitution, it certainly
ceased on the formation of new States, at least so far as the
new States themselves were concerned. It was never possessed at
all by Florida or the States west of the Mississippi, all of
which were purchased by the treasury of the entire nation.
Texas and the territory brought into the Union in consequence of
annexation, were purchased with both blood and treasure; and
Texas, with a domain greater than that of any European state
except Russia, was permitted to retain as state property all the
public lands within its borders. It would have been ingratitude
and injustice of the most flagrant sort for this State to
withdraw from the Union after all that had been spent and done
to introduce her; yet, if separation had actually occurred,
Texas must necessarily have gone with the South, both on account
of her institutions and her geographical position. Secession was
illogical as well as impracticable; it was revolution.

Now, the right of revolution is an inherent one. When people
are oppressed by their government, it is a natural right they
enjoy to relieve themselves of the oppression, if they are
strong enough, either by withdrawal from it, or by overthrowing
it and substituting a government more acceptable. But any
people or part of a people who resort to this remedy, stake
their lives, their property, and every claim for protection
given by citizenship–on the issue. Victory, or the conditions
imposed by the conqueror–must be the result.

In the case of the war between the States it would have been the
exact truth if the South had said,–“We do not want to live with
you Northern people any longer; we know our institution of
slavery is obnoxious to you, and, as you are growing numerically
stronger than we, it may at some time in the future be
endangered. So long as you permitted us to control the
government, and with the aid of a few friends at the North to
enact laws constituting your section a guard against the escape
of our property, we were willing to live with you. You have
been submissive to our rule heretofore; but it looks now as if
you did not intend to continue so, and we will remain in the
Union no longer.” Instead of this the seceding States cried
lustily,–“Let us alone; you have no constitutional power to
interfere with us.” Newspapers and people at the North
reiterated the cry. Individuals might ignore the constitution;
but the Nation itself must not only obey it, but must enforce
the strictest construction of that instrument; the construction
put upon it by the Southerners themselves. The fact is the
constitution did not apply to any such contingency as the one
existing from 1861 to 1865. Its framers never dreamed of such a
contingency occurring. If they had foreseen it, the
probabilities are they would have sanctioned the right of a
State or States to withdraw rather than that there should be war
between brothers.

The framers were wise in their generation and wanted to do the
very best possible to secure their own liberty and independence,
and that also of their descendants to the latest days. It is
preposterous to suppose that the people of one generation can
lay down the best and only rules of government for all who are
to come after them, and under unforeseen contingencies. At the
time of the framing of our constitution the only physical forces
that had been subdued and made to serve man and do his labor,
were the currents in the streams and in the air we breathe. Rude
machinery, propelled by water power, had been invented; sails to
propel ships upon the waters had been set to catch the passing
breeze–but the application of stream to propel vessels against
both wind and current, and machinery to do all manner of work
had not been thought of. The instantaneous transmission of
messages around the world by means of electricity would probably
at that day have been attributed to witchcraft or a league with
the Devil. Immaterial circumstances had changed as greatly as
material ones. We could not and ought not to be rigidly bound
by the rules laid down under circumstances so different for
emergencies so utterly unanticipated. The fathers themselves
would have been the first to declare that their prerogatives
were not irrevocable. They would surely have resisted secession
could they have lived to see the shape it assumed.

I travelled through the Northwest considerably during the winter
of 1860-1. We had customers in all the little towns in
south-west Wisconsin, south-east Minnesota and north-east
Iowa. These generally knew I had been a captain in the regular
army and had served through the Mexican war. Consequently
wherever I stopped at night, some of the people would come to
the public-house where I was, and sit till a late hour
discussing the probabilities of the future. My own views at
that time were like those officially expressed by Mr. Seward at
a later day, that “the war would be over in ninety days.” I
continued to entertain these views until after the battle of
Shiloh. I believe now that there would have been no more
battles at the West after the capture of Fort Donelson if all
the troops in that region had been under a single commander who
would have followed up that victory.

There is little doubt in my mind now that the prevailing
sentiment of the South would have been opposed to secession in
1860 and 1861, if there had been a fair and calm expression of
opinion, unbiased by threats, and if the ballot of one legal
voter had counted for as much as that of any other. But there
was no calm discussion of the question. Demagogues who were too
old to enter the army if there should be a war, others who
entertained so high an opinion of their own ability that they
did not believe they could be spared from the direction of the
affairs of state in such an event, declaimed vehemently and
unceasingly against the North; against its aggressions upon the
South; its interference with Southern rights, etc., etc. They
denounced the Northerners as cowards, poltroons, negro-
worshippers; claimed that one Southern man was equal to five
Northern men in battle; that if the South would stand up for its
rights the North would back down. Mr. Jefferson Davis said in a
speech, delivered at La Grange, Mississippi, before the
secession of that State, that he would agree to drink all the
blood spilled south of Mason and Dixon’s line if there should be
a war. The young men who would have the fighting to do in case
of war, believed all these statements, both in regard to the
aggressiveness of the North and its cowardice. They, too, cried
out for a separation from such people. The great bulk of the
legal voters of the South were men who owned no slaves; their
homes were generally in the hills and poor country; their
facilities for educating their children, even up to the point of
reading and writing, were very limited; their interest in the
contest was very meagre–what there was, if they had been
capable of seeing it, was with the North; they too needed
emancipation. Under the old regime they were looked down upon
by those who controlled all the affairs in the interest of
slave-owners, as poor white trash who were allowed the ballot so
long as they cast it according to direction.

I am aware that this last statement may be disputed and
individual testimony perhaps adduced to show that in ante-bellum
days the ballot was as untrammelled in the south as in any
section of the country; but in the face of any such
contradiction I reassert the statement. The shot-gun was not
resorted to. Masked men did not ride over the country at night
intimidating voters; but there was a firm feeling that a class
existed in every State with a sort of divine right to control
public affairs. If they could not get this control by one means
they must by another. The end justified the means. The
coercion, if mild, was complete.

There were two political parties, it is true, in all the States,
both strong in numbers and respectability, but both equally loyal
to the institution which stood paramount in Southern eyes to all
other institutions in state or nation. The slave-owners were
the minority, but governed both parties. Had politics ever
divided the slave-holders and the non-slave-holders, the
majority would have been obliged to yield, or internecine war
would have been the consequence. I do not know that the
Southern people were to blame for this condition of affairs.
There was a time when slavery was not profitable, and the
discussion of the merits of the institution was confined almost
exclusively to the territory where it existed. The States of
Virginia and Kentucky came near abolishing slavery by their own
acts, one State defeating the measure by a tie vote and the
other only lacking one. But when the institution became
profitable, all talk of its abolition ceased where it existed;
and naturally, as human nature is constituted, arguments were
adduced in its support. The cotton-gin probably had much to do
with the justification of slavery.

The winter of 1860-1 will be remembered by middle-aged people of
to-day as one of great excitement. South Carolina promptly
seceded after the result of the Presidential election was
known. Other Southern States proposed to follow. In some of
them the Union sentiment was so strong that it had to be
suppressed by force. Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky and Missouri,
all Slave States, failed to pass ordinances of secession; but
they were all represented in the so-called congress of the
so-called Confederate States. The Governor and Lieutenant-
Governor of Missouri, in 1861, Jackson and Reynolds, were both
supporters of the rebellion and took refuge with the enemy. The
governor soon died, and the lieutenant-governor assumed his
office; issued proclamations as governor of the State; was
recognized as such by the Confederate Government, and continued
his pretensions until the collapse of the rebellion. The South
claimed the sovereignty of States, but claimed the right to
coerce into their confederation such States as they wanted, that
is, all the States where slavery existed. They did not seem to
think this course inconsistent. The fact is, the Southern
slave-owners believed that, in some way, the ownership of slaves
conferred a sort of patent of nobility–a right to govern
independent of the interest or wishes of those who did not hold
such property. They convinced themselves, first, of the divine
origin of the institution and, next, that that particular
institution was not safe in the hands of any body of legislators
but themselves.

Meanwhile the Administration of President Buchanan looked
helplessly on and proclaimed that the general government had no
power to interfere; that the Nation had no power to save its own
life. Mr. Buchanan had in his cabinet two members at least, who
were as earnest–to use a mild term–in the cause of secession
as Mr. Davis or any Southern statesman. One of them, Floyd, the
Secretary of War, scattered the army so that much of it could be
captured when hostilities should commence, and distributed the
cannon and small arms from Northern arsenals throughout the
South so as to be on hand when treason wanted them. The navy
was scattered in like manner. The President did not prevent his
cabinet preparing for war upon their government, either by
destroying its resources or storing them in the South until a de
facto government was established with Jefferson Davis as its
President, and Montgomery, Alabama, as the Capital. The
secessionists had then to leave the cabinet. In their own
estimation they were aliens in the country which had given them
birth. Loyal men were put into their places. Treason in the
executive branch of the government was estopped. But the harm
had already been done. The stable door was locked after the
horse had been stolen.

During all of the trying winter of 1860-1, when the Southerners
were so defiant that they would not allow within their borders
the expression of a sentiment hostile to their views, it was a
brave man indeed who could stand up and proclaim his loyalty to
the Union. On the other hand men at the North–prominent
men–proclaimed that the government had no power to coerce the
South into submission to the laws of the land; that if the North
undertook to raise armies to go south, these armies would have to
march over the dead bodies of the speakers. A portion of the
press of the North was constantly proclaiming similar views.
When the time arrived for the President-elect to go to the
capital of the Nation to be sworn into office, it was deemed
unsafe for him to travel, not only as a President-elect, but as
any private citizen should be allowed to do. Instead of going
in a special car, receiving the good wishes of his constituents
at all the stations along the road, he was obliged to stop on
the way and to be smuggled into the capital. He disappeared
from public view on his journey, and the next the country knew,
his arrival was announced at the capital. There is little doubt
that he would have been assassinated if he had attempted to
travel openly throughout his journey.

CHAPTER XVII.

OUTBREAK OF THE REBELLION–PRESIDING AT A UNION
MEETING–MUSTERING OFFICER OF STATE TROOPS–LYON AT CAMP
JACKSON–SERVICES TENDERED TO THE GOVERNMENT.

The 4th of March, 1861, came, and Abraham Lincoln was sworn to
maintain the Union against all its enemies. The secession of
one State after another followed, until eleven had gone out. On
the 11th of April Fort Sumter, a National fort in the harbor of
Charleston, South Carolina, was fired upon by the Southerners
and a few days after was captured. The Confederates proclaimed
themselves aliens, and thereby debarred themselves of all right
to claim protection under the Constitution of the United
States. We did not admit the fact that they were aliens, but
all the same, they debarred themselves of the right to expect
better treatment than people of any other foreign state who make
war upon an independent nation. Upon the firing on Sumter
President Lincoln issued his first call for troops and soon
after a proclamation convening Congress in extra session. The
call was for 75,000 volunteers for ninety days’ service. If the
shot fired at Fort Sumter “was heard around the world,” the call
of the President for 75,000 men was heard throughout the
Northern States. There was not a state in the North of a
million of inhabitants that would not have furnished the entire
number faster than arms could have been supplied to them, if it
had been necessary.

As soon as the news of the call for volunteers reached Galena,
posters were stuck up calling for a meeting of the citizens at
the court-house in the evening. Business ceased entirely; all
was excitement; for a time there were no party distinctions; all
were Union men, determined to avenge the insult to the national
flag. In the evening the court-house was packed. Although a
comparative stranger I was called upon to preside; the sole
reason, possibly, was that I had been in the army and had seen
service. With much embarrassment and some prompting I made out
to announce the object of the meeting. Speeches were in order,
but it is doubtful whether it would have been safe just then to
make other than patriotic ones. There was probably no one in
the house, however, who felt like making any other. The two
principal speeches were by B. B. Howard, the post-master and a
Breckinridge Democrat at the November election the fall before,
and John A. Rawlins, an elector on the Douglas ticket. E. B.
Washburne, with whom I was not acquainted at that time, came in
after the meeting had been organized, and expressed, I
understood afterwards, a little surprise that Galena could not
furnish a presiding officer for such an occasion without taking
a stranger. He came forward and was introduced, and made a
speech appealing to the patriotism of the meeting.

After the speaking was over volunteers were called for to form a
company. The quota of Illinois had been fixed at six regiments;
and it was supposed that one company would be as much as would
be accepted from Galena. The company was raised and the
officers and non-commissioned officers elected before the
meeting adjourned. I declined the captaincy before the
balloting, but announced that I would aid the company in every
way I could and would be found in the service in some position
if there should be a war. I never went into our leather store
after that meeting, to put up a package or do other business.

The ladies of Galena were quite as patriotic as the men. They
could not enlist, but they conceived the idea of sending their
first company to the field uniformed. They came to me to get a
description of the United States uniform for infantry;
subscribed and bought the material; procured tailors to cut out
the garments, and the ladies made them up. In a few days the
company was in uniform and ready to report at the State capital
for assignment. The men all turned out the morning after their
enlistment, and I took charge, divided them into squads and
superintended their drill. When they were ready to go to
Springfield I went with them and remained there until they were
assigned to a regiment.

There were so many more volunteers than had been called for that
the question whom to accept was quite embarrassing to the
governor, Richard Yates. The legislature was in session at the
time, however, and came to his relief. A law was enacted
authorizing the governor to accept the services of ten
additional regiments, one from each congressional district, for
one month, to be paid by the State, but pledged to go into the
service of the United States if there should be a further call
during their term. Even with this relief the governor was still
very much embarrassed. Before the war was over he was like the
President when he was taken with the varioloid: “at last he had
something he could give to all who wanted it.”

In time the Galena company was mustered into the United States
service, forming a part of the 11th Illinois volunteer
infantry. My duties, I thought, had ended at Springfield, and I
was prepared to start home by the evening train, leaving at nine
o’clock. Up to that time I do not think I had been introduced
to Governor Yates, or had ever spoken to him. I knew him by
sight, however, because he was living at the same hotel and I
often saw him at table. The evening I was to quit the capital I
left the supper room before the governor and was standing at the
front door when he came out. He spoke to me, calling me by my
old army title “Captain,” and said he understood that I was
about leaving the city. I answered that I was. He said he
would be glad if I would remain over-night and call at the
Executive office the next morning. I complied with his request,
and was asked to go into the Adjutant-General’s office and render
such assistance as I could, the governor saying that my army
experience would be of great service there. I accepted the
proposition.

My old army experience I found indeed of very great service. I
was no clerk, nor had I any capacity to become one. The only
place I ever found in my life to put a paper so as to find it
again was either a side coat-pocket or the hands of a clerk or
secretary more careful than myself. But I had been
quartermaster, commissary and adjutant in the field. The army
forms were familiar to me and I could direct how they should be
made out. There was a clerk in the office of the Adjutant-
General who supplied my deficiencies. The ease with which the
State of Illinois settled its accounts with the government at
the close of the war is evidence of the efficiency of Mr. Loomis
as an accountant on a large scale. He remained in the office
until that time.

As I have stated, the legislature authorized the governor to
accept the services of ten additional regiments. I had charge
of mustering these regiments into the State service. They were
assembled at the most convenient railroad centres in their
respective congressional districts. I detailed officers to
muster in a portion of them, but mustered three in the southern
part of the State myself. One of these was to assemble at
Belleville, some eighteen miles south-east of St. Louis. When I
got there I found that only one or two companies had arrived.
There was no probability of the regiment coming together under
five days. This gave me a few idle days which I concluded to
spend in St. Louis.

There was a considerable force of State militia at Camp Jackson,
on the outskirts of St. Louis, at the time. There is but little
doubt that it was the design of Governor Claiborn Jackson to
have these troops ready to seize the United States arsenal and
the city of St. Louis. Why they did not do so I do not know.
There was but a small garrison, two companies I think, under
Captain N. Lyon at the arsenal, and but for the timely services
of the Hon. F. P. Blair, I have little doubt that St. Louis
would have gone into rebel hands, and with it the arsenal with
all its arms and ammunition.

Blair was a leader among the Union men of St. Louis in 1861.
There was no State government in Missouri at the time that would
sanction the raising of troops or commissioned officers to
protect United States property, but Blair had probably procured
some form of authority from the President to raise troops in
Missouri and to muster them into the service of the United
States. At all events, he did raise a regiment and took command
himself as Colonel. With this force he reported to Captain Lyon
and placed himself and regiment under his orders. It was
whispered that Lyon thus reinforced intended to break up Camp
Jackson and capture the militia. I went down to the arsenal in
the morning to see the troops start out. I had known Lyon for
two years at West Point and in the old army afterwards. Blair I
knew very well by sight. I had heard him speak in the canvass of
1858, possibly several times, but I had never spoken to him. As
the troops marched out of the enclosure around the arsenal,
Blair was on his horse outside forming them into line
preparatory to their march. I introduced myself to him and had
a few moments’ conversation and expressed my sympathy with his
purpose. This was my first personal acquaintance with the
Honorable–afterwards Major-General F. P. Blair. Camp Jackson
surrendered without a fight and the garrison was marched down to
the arsenal as prisoners of war.

Up to this time the enemies of the government in St. Louis had
been bold and defiant, while Union men were quiet but
determined. The enemies had their head-quarters in a central
and public position on Pine Street, near Fifth–from which the
rebel flag was flaunted boldly. The Union men had a place of
meeting somewhere in the city, I did not know where, and I doubt
whether they dared to enrage the enemies of the government by
placing the national flag outside their head-quarters. As soon
as the news of the capture of Camp Jackson reached the city the
condition of affairs was changed. Union men became rampant,
aggressive, and, if you will, intolerant. They proclaimed their
sentiments boldly, and were impatient at anything like disrespect
for the Union. The secessionists became quiet but were filled
with suppressed rage. They had been playing the bully. The
Union men ordered the rebel flag taken down from the building on
Pine Street. The command was given in tones of authority and it
was taken down, never to be raised again in St. Louis.

I witnessed the scene. I had heard of the surrender of the camp
and that the garrison was on its way to the arsenal. I had seen
the troops start out in the morning and had wished them
success. I now determined to go to the arsenal and await their
arrival and congratulate them. I stepped on a car standing at
the corner of 4th and Pine streets, and saw a crowd of people
standing quietly in front of the head-quarters, who were there
for the purpose of hauling down the flag. There were squads of
other people at intervals down the street. They too were quiet
but filled with suppressed rage, and muttered their resentment
at the insult to, what they called, “their” flag. Before the
car I was in had started, a dapper little fellow–he would be
called a dude at this day–stepped in. He was in a great state
of excitement and used adjectives freely to express his contempt
for the Union and for those who had just perpetrated such an
outrage upon the rights of a free people. There was only one
other passenger in the car besides myself when this young man
entered. He evidently expected to find nothing but sympathy
when he got away from the “mud sills” engaged in compelling a
“free people” to pull down a flag they adored. He turned to me
saying: “Things have come to a —- pretty pass when a free
people can’t choose their own flag. Where I came from if a man
dares to say a word in favor of the Union we hang him to a limb
of the first tree we come to.” I replied that “after all we
were not so intolerant in St. Louis as we might be; I had not
seen a single rebel hung yet, nor heard of one; there were
plenty of them who ought to be, however.” The young man
subsided. He was so crestfallen that I believe if I had ordered
him to leave the car he would have gone quietly out, saying to
himself: “More Yankee oppression.”

By nightfall the late defenders of Camp Jackson were all within
the walls of the St. Louis arsenal, prisoners of war. The next
day I left St. Louis for Mattoon, Illinois, where I was to
muster in the regiment from that congressional district. This
was the 21st Illinois infantry, the regiment of which I
subsequently became colonel. I mustered one regiment
afterwards, when my services for the State were about closed.

Brigadier-General John Pope was stationed at Springfield, as
United States mustering officer, all the time I was in the State
service. He was a native of Illinois and well acquainted with
most of the prominent men in the State. I was a carpet-bagger
and knew but few of them. While I was on duty at Springfield
the senators, representatives in Congress, ax-governors and the
State legislators were nearly all at the State capital. The
only acquaintance I made among them was with the governor, whom
I was serving, and, by chance, with Senator S. A. Douglas. The
only members of Congress I knew were Washburne and Philip
Foulk. With the former, though he represented my district and
we were citizens of the same town, I only became acquainted at
the meeting when the first company of Galena volunteers was
raised. Foulk I had known in St. Louis when I was a citizen of
that city. I had been three years at West Point with Pope and
had served with him a short time during the Mexican war, under
General Taylor. I saw a good deal of him during my service with
the State. On one occasion he said to me that I ought to go into
the United States service. I told him I intended to do so if
there was a war. He spoke of his acquaintance with the public
men of the State, and said he could get them to recommend me for
a position and that he would do all he could for me. I declined
to receive endorsement for permission to fight for my country.

Going home for a day or two soon after this conversation with
General Pope, I wrote from Galena the following letter to the
Adjutant-General of the Army.

GALENA, ILLINOIS,
May 24, 1861.

COL. L. THOMAS
Adjt. Gen. U. S. A.,
Washington, D. C.

SIR:–Having served for fifteen years in the regular army,
including four years at West Point, and feeling it the duty of
every one who has been educated at the Government expense to
offer their services for the support of that Government, I have
the honor, very respectfully, to tender my services, until the
close of the war, in such capacity as may be offered. I would
say, in view of my present age and length of service, I feel
myself competent to command a regiment, if the President, in his
judgment, should see fit to intrust one to me.

Since the first call of the President I have been serving on the
staff of the Governor of this State, rendering such aid as I
could in the organization of our State militia, and am still
engaged in that capacity. A letter addressed to me at
Springfield, Illinois, will reach me.

I am very respectfully,
Your obt. svt.,
U. S. GRANT.

This letter failed to elicit an answer from the Adjutant-General
of the Army. I presume it was hardly read by him, and certainly
it could not have been submitted to higher authority. Subsequent
to the war General Badeau having heard of this letter applied to
the War Department for a copy of it. The letter could not be
found and no one recollected ever having seen it. I took no
copy when it was written. Long after the application of General
Badeau, General Townsend, who had become Adjutant-General of the
Army, while packing up papers preparatory to the removal of his
office, found this letter in some out-of-the-way place. It had
not been destroyed, but it had not been regularly filed away.

I felt some hesitation in suggesting rank as high as the
colonelcy of a regiment, feeling somewhat doubtful whether I
would be equal to the position. But I had seen nearly every
colonel who had been mustered in from the State of Illinois, and
some from Indiana, and felt that if they could command a regiment
properly, and with credit, I could also.

Having but little to do after the muster of the last of the
regiments authorized by the State legislature, I asked and
obtained of the governor leave of absence for a week to visit my
parents in Covington, Kentucky, immediately opposite
Cincinnati. General McClellan had been made a major-general and
had his headquarters at Cincinnati. In reality I wanted to see
him. I had known him slightly at West Point, where we served
one year together, and in the Mexican war. I was in hopes that
when he saw me he would offer me a position on his staff. I
called on two successive days at his office but failed to see
him on either occasion, and returned to Springfield.

CHAPTER XVIII.

APPOINTED COLONEL OF THE 21ST ILLINOIS–PERSONNEL OF THE
REGIMENT–GENERAL LOGAN–MARCH TO MISSOURI–MOVEMENT AGAINST
HARRIS AT FLORIDA, MO.–GENERAL POPE IN COMMAND–STATIONED AT
MEXICO, MO.

While I was absent from the State capital on this occasion the
President’s second call for troops was issued. This time it was
for 300,000 men, for three years or the war. This brought into
the United States service all the regiments then in the State
service. These had elected their officers from highest to
lowest and were accepted with their organizations as they were,
except in two instances. A Chicago regiment, the 19th infantry,
had elected a very young man to the colonelcy. When it came to
taking the field the regiment asked to have another appointed
colonel and the one they had previously chosen made
lieutenant-colonel. The 21st regiment of infantry, mustered in
by me at Mattoon, refused to go into the service with the
colonel of their selection in any position. While I was still
absent Governor Yates appointed me colonel of this latter
regiment. A few days after I was in charge of it and in camp on
the fair grounds near Springfield.

My regiment was composed in large part of young men of as good
social position as any in their section of the State. It
embraced the sons of farmers, lawyers, physicians, politicians,
merchants, bankers and ministers, and some men of maturer years
who had filled such positions themselves. There were also men
in it who could be led astray; and the colonel, elected by the
votes of the regiment, had proved to be fully capable of
developing all there was in his men of recklessness. It was
said that he even went so far at times as to take the guard from
their posts and go with them to the village near by and make a
night of it. When there came a prospect of battle the regiment
wanted to have some one else to lead them. I found it very hard
work for a few days to bring all the men into anything like
subordination; but the great majority favored discipline, and by
the application of a little regular army punishment all were
reduced to as good discipline as one could ask.

The ten regiments which had volunteered in the State service for
thirty days, it will be remembered, had done so with a pledge to
go into the National service if called upon within that time.
When they volunteered the government had only called for ninety
days’ enlistments. Men were called now for three years or the
war. They felt that this change of period released them from
the obligation of re-volunteering. When I was appointed
colonel, the 21st regiment was still in the State service. About
the time they were to be mustered into the United States service,
such of them as would go, two members of Congress from the State,
McClernand and Logan, appeared at the capital and I was
introduced to them. I had never seen either of them before, but
I had read a great deal about them, and particularly about Logan,
in the newspapers. Both were democratic members of Congress, and
Logan had been elected from the southern district of the State,
where he had a majority of eighteen thousand over his Republican
competitor. His district had been settled originally by people
from the Southern States, and at the breaking out of secession
they sympathized with the South. At the first outbreak of war
some of them joined the Southern army; many others were
preparing to do so; others rode over the country at night
denouncing the Union, and made it as necessary to guard railroad
bridges over which National troops had to pass in southern
Illinois, as it was in Kentucky or any of the border slave
states. Logan’s popularity in this district was unbounded. He
knew almost enough of the people in it by their Christian names,
to form an ordinary congressional district. As he went in
politics, so his district was sure to go. The Republican papers
had been demanding that he should announce where he stood on the
questions which at that time engrossed the whole of public
thought. Some were very bitter in their denunciations of his
silence. Logan was not a man to be coerced into an utterance by
threats. He did, however, come out in a speech before the
adjournment of the special session of Congress which was
convened by the President soon after his inauguration, and
announced his undying loyalty and devotion to the Union. But I
had not happened to see that speech, so that when I first met
Logan my impressions were those formed from reading
denunciations of him. McClernand, on the other hand, had early
taken strong grounds for the maintenance of the Union and had
been praised accordingly by the Republican papers. The
gentlemen who presented these two members of Congress asked me
if I would have any objections to their addressing my
regiment. I hesitated a little before answering. It was but a
few days before the time set for mustering into the United
States service such of the men as were willing to volunteer for
three years or the war. I had some doubt as to the effect a
speech from Logan might have; but as he was with McClernand,
whose sentiments on the all-absorbing questions of the day were
well known, I gave my consent. McClernand spoke first; and
Logan followed in a speech which he has hardly equalled since
for force and eloquence. It breathed a loyalty and devotion to
the Union which inspired my men to such a point that they would
have volunteered to remain in the army as long as an enemy of
the country continued to bear arms against it. They entered the
United States service almost to a man.

General Logan went to his part of the State and gave his
attention to raising troops. The very men who at first made it
necessary to guard the roads in southern Illinois became the
defenders of the Union. Logan entered the service himself as
colonel of a regiment and rapidly rose to the rank of
major-general. His district, which had promised at first to
give much trouble to the government, filled every call made upon
it for troops, without resorting to the draft. There was no call
made when there were not more volunteers than were asked for.
That congressional district stands credited at the War
Department to-day with furnishing more men for the army than it
was called on to supply.

I remained in Springfield with my regiment until the 3d of July,
when I was ordered to Quincy, Illinois. By that time the
regiment was in a good state of discipline and the officers and
men were well up in the company drill. There was direct
railroad communication between Springfield and Quincy, but I
thought it would be good preparation for the troops to march
there. We had no transportation for our camp and garrison
equipage, so wagons were hired for the occasion and on the 3d of
July we started. There was no hurry, but fair marches were made
every day until the Illinois River was crossed. There I was
overtaken by a dispatch saying that the destination of the
regiment had been changed to Ironton, Missouri, and ordering me
to halt where I was and await the arrival of a steamer which had
been dispatched up the Illinois River to take the regiment to St.
Louis. The boat, when it did come, grounded on a sand-bar a few
miles below where we were in camp. We remained there several
days waiting to have the boat get off the bar, but before this
occurred news came that an Illinois regiment was surrounded by
rebels at a point on the Hannibal and St. Joe Railroad some
miles west of Palmyra, in Missouri, and I was ordered to proceed
with all dispatch to their relief. We took the cars and reached
Quincy in a few hours.

When I left Galena for the last time to take command of the 21st
regiment I took with me my oldest son, Frederick D. Grant, then a
lad of eleven years of age. On receiving the order to take rail
for Quincy I wrote to Mrs. Grant, to relieve what I supposed
would be her great anxiety for one so young going into danger,
that I would send Fred home from Quincy by river. I received a
prompt letter in reply decidedly disapproving my proposition,
and urging that the lad should be allowed to accompany me. It
came too late. Fred was already on his way up the Mississippi
bound for Dubuque, Iowa, from which place there was a railroad
to Galena.

My sensations as we approached what I supposed might be “a field
of battle” were anything but agreeable. I had been in all the
engagements in Mexico that it was possible for one person to be
in; but not in command. If some one else had been colonel and I
had been lieutenant-colonel I do not think I would have felt any
trepidation. Before we were prepared to cross the Mississippi
River at Quincy my anxiety was relieved; for the men of the
besieged regiment came straggling into town. I am inclined to
think both sides got frightened and ran away.

I took my regiment to Palmyra and remained there for a few days,
until relieved by the 19th Illinois infantry. From Palmyra I
proceeded to Salt River, the railroad bridge over which had been
destroyed by the enemy. Colonel John M. Palmer at that time
commanded the 13th Illinois, which was acting as a guard to
workmen who were engaged in rebuilding this bridge. Palmer was
my senior and commanded the two regiments as long as we remained
together. The bridge was finished in about two weeks, and I
received orders to move against Colonel Thomas Harris, who was
said to be encamped at the little town of Florida, some
twenty-five miles south of where we then were.

At the time of which I now write we had no transportation and
the country about Salt River was sparsely settled, so that it
took some days to collect teams and drivers enough to move the
camp and garrison equipage of a regiment nearly a thousand
strong, together with a week’s supply of provision and some
ammunition. While preparations for the move were going on I
felt quite comfortable; but when we got on the road and found
every house deserted I was anything but easy. In the twenty-
five miles we had to march we did not see a person, old or
young, male or female, except two horsemen who were on a road
that crossed ours. As soon as they saw us they decamped as fast
as their horses could carry them. I kept my men in the ranks and
forbade their entering any of the deserted houses or taking
anything from them. We halted at night on the road and
proceeded the next morning at an early hour. Harris had been
encamped in a creek bottom for the sake of being near water. The
hills on either side of the creek extend to a considerable
height, possibly more than a hundred feet. As we approached the
brow of the hill from which it was expected we could see Harris’
camp, and possibly find his men ready formed to meet us, my
heart kept getting higher and higher until it felt to me as
though it was in my throat. I would have given anything then to
have been back in Illinois, but I had not the moral courage to
halt and consider what to do; I kept right on. When we reached
a point from which the valley below was in full view I halted.
The place where Harris had been encamped a few days before was
still there and the marks of a recent encampment were plainly
visible, but the troops were gone. My heart resumed its
place. It occurred to me at once that Harris had been as much
afraid of me as I had been of him. This was a view of the
question I had never taken before; but it was one I never forgot
afterwards. From that event to the close of the war, I never
experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, though I
always felt more or less anxiety. I never forgot that he had as
much reason to fear my forces as I had his. The lesson was
valuable.

Inquiries at the village of Florida divulged the fact that
Colonel Harris, learning of my intended movement, while my
transportation was being collected took time by the forelock and
left Florida before I had started from Salt River. He had
increased the distance between us by forty miles. The next day
I started back to my old camp at Salt River bridge. The
citizens living on the line of our march had returned to their
houses after we passed, and finding everything in good order,
nothing carried away, they were at their front doors ready to
greet us now. They had evidently been led to believe that the
National troops carried death and devastation with them wherever
they went.

In a short time after our return to Salt River bridge I was
ordered with my regiment to the town of Mexico. General Pope
was then commanding the district embracing all of the State of
Missouri between the Mississippi and Missouri rivers, with his
headquarters in the village of Mexico. I was assigned to the
command of a sub-district embracing the troops in the immediate
neighborhood, some three regiments of infantry and a section of
artillery. There was one regiment encamped by the side of
mine. I assumed command of the whole and the first night sent
the commander of the other regiment the parole and
countersign. Not wishing to be outdone in courtesy, he
immediately sent me the countersign for his regiment for the
night. When he was informed that the countersign sent to him
was for use with his regiment as well as mine, it was difficult
to make him understand that this was not an unwarranted
interference of one colonel over another. No doubt he
attributed it for the time to the presumption of a graduate of
West Point over a volunteer pure and simple. But the question
was soon settled and we had no further trouble.

My arrival in Mexico had been preceded by that of two or three
regiments in which proper discipline had not been maintained,
and the men had been in the habit of visiting houses without
invitation and helping themselves to food and drink, or
demanding them from the occupants. They carried their muskets
while out of camp and made every man they found take the oath of
allegiance to the government. I at once published orders
prohibiting the soldiers from going into private houses unless
invited by the inhabitants, and from appropriating private
property to their own or to government uses. The people were no
longer molested or made afraid. I received the most marked
courtesy from the citizens of Mexico as long as I remained there.

Up to this time my regiment had not been carried in the school
of the soldier beyond the company drill, except that it had
received some training on the march from Springfield to the
Illinois River. There was now a good opportunity of exercising
it in the battalion drill. While I was at West Point the
tactics used in the army had been Scott’s and the musket the
flint lock. I had never looked at a copy of tactics from the
time of my graduation. My standing in that branch of studies
had been near the foot of the class. In the Mexican war in the
summer of 1846, I had been appointed regimental quartermaster
and commissary and had not been at a battalion drill since. The
arms had been changed since then and Hardee’s tactics had been
adopted. I got a copy of tactics and studied one lesson,
intending to confine the exercise of the first day to the
commands I had thus learned. By pursuing this course from day
to day I thought I would soon get through the volume.

We were encamped just outside of town on the common, among
scattering suburban houses with enclosed gardens, and when I got
my regiment in line and rode to the front I soon saw that if I
attempted to follow the lesson I had studied I would have to
clear away some of the houses and garden fences to make room. I
perceived at once, however, that Hardee’s tactics–a mere
translation from the French with Hardee’s name attached–was
nothing more than common sense and the progress of the age
applied to Scott’s system. The commands were abbreviated and
the movement expedited. Under the old tactics almost every
change in the order of march was preceded by a “halt,” then came
the change, and then the “forward march.” With the new tactics
all these changes could be made while in motion. I found no
trouble in giving commands that would take my regiment where I
wanted it to go and carry it around all obstacles. I do not
believe that the officers of the regiment ever discovered that I
had never studied the tactics that I used.

CHAPTER XIX.

COMMISSIONED BRIGADIER-GENERAL–COMMAND AT IRONTON,
MO.–JEFFERSON CITY–CAPE GIRARDEAU–GENERAL PRENTISS –SEIZURE
OF PADUCAH–HEADQUARTERS AT CAIRO.

I had not been in Mexico many weeks when, reading a St. Louis
paper, I found the President had asked the Illinois delegation
in Congress to recommend some citizens of the State for the
position of brigadier-general, and that they had unanimously
recommended me as first on a list of seven. I was very much
surprised because, as I have said, my acquaintance with the
Congressmen was very limited and I did not know of anything I
had done to inspire such confidence. The papers of the next day
announced that my name, with three others, had been sent to the
Senate, and a few days after our confirmation was announced.

When appointed brigadier-general I at once thought it proper
that one of my aides should come from the regiment I had been
commanding, and so selected Lieutenant C. B. Lagow. While
living in St. Louis, I had had a desk in the law office of
McClellan, Moody and Hillyer. Difference in views between the
members of the firm on the questions of the day, and general
hard times in the border cities, had broken up this firm.
Hillyer was quite a young man, then in his twenties, and very
brilliant. I asked him to accept a place on my staff. I also
wanted to take one man from my new home, Galena. The canvass in
the Presidential campaign the fall before had brought out a young
lawyer by the name of John A. Rawlins, who proved himself one of
the ablest speakers in the State. He was also a candidate for
elector on the Douglas ticket. When Sumter was fired upon and
the integrity of the Union threatened, there was no man more
ready to serve his country than he. I wrote at once asking him
to accept the position of assistant adjutant-general with the
rank of captain, on my staff. He was about entering the service
as major of a new regiment then organizing in the north-western
part of the State; but he threw this up and accepted my offer.

Neither Hillyer nor Lagow proved to have any particular taste or
special qualifications for the duties of the soldier, and the
former resigned during the Vicksburg campaign; the latter I
relieved after the battle of Chattanooga. Rawlins remained with
me as long as he lived, and rose to the rank of brigadier general
and chief-of-staff to the General of the Army–an office created
for him–before the war closed. He was an able man, possessed
of great firmness, and could say “no” so emphatically to a
request which he thought should not be granted that the person
he was addressing would understand at once that there was no use
of pressing the matter. General Rawlins was a very useful
officer in other ways than this. I became very much attached to
him.

Shortly after my promotion I was ordered to Ironton, Missouri,
to command a district in that part of the State, and took the
21st Illinois, my old regiment, with me. Several other
regiments were ordered to the same destination about the same
time. Ironton is on the Iron Mountain railroad, about seventy
miles south of St. Louis, and situated among hills rising almost
to the dignity of mountains. When I reached there, about the 8th
of August, Colonel B. Gratz Brown–afterwards Governor of
Missouri and in 1872 Vice-Presidential candidate–was in
command. Some of his troops were ninety days’ men and their
time had expired some time before. The men had no clothing but
what they had volunteered in, and much of this was so worn that
it would hardly stay on. General Hardee–the author of the
tactics I did not study–was at Greenville some twenty-five
miles further south, it was said, with five thousand Confederate
troops. Under these circumstances Colonel Brown’s command was
very much demoralized. A squadron of cavalry could have ridden
into the valley and captured the entire force. Brown himself
was gladder to see me on that occasion than he ever has been
since. I relieved him and sent all his men home within a day or
two, to be mustered out of service.

Within ten days after reading Ironton I was prepared to take the
offensive against the enemy at Greenville. I sent a column east
out of the valley we were in, with orders to swing around to the
south and west and come into the Greenville road ten miles south
of Ironton. Another column marched on the direct road and went
into camp at the point designated for the two columns to meet. I
was to ride out the next morning and take personal command of the
movement. My experience against Harris, in northern Missouri,
had inspired me with confidence. But when the evening train
came in, it brought General B. M. Prentiss with orders to take
command of the district. His orders did not relieve me, but I
knew that by law I was senior, and at that time even the
President did not have the authority to assign a junior to
command a senior of the same grade. I therefore gave General
Prentiss the situation of the troops and the general condition
of affairs, and started for St. Louis the same day. The
movement against the rebels at Greenville went no further.

From St. Louis I was ordered to Jefferson City, the capital of
the State, to take command. General Sterling Price, of the
Confederate army, was thought to be threatening the capital,
Lexington, Chillicothe and other comparatively large towns in
the central part of Missouri. I found a good many troops in
Jefferson City, but in the greatest confusion, and no one person
knew where they all were. Colonel Mulligan, a gallant man, was
in command, but he had not been educated as yet to his new
profession and did not know how to maintain discipline. I found
that volunteers had obtained permission from the department
commander, or claimed they had, to raise, some of them,
regiments; some battalions; some companies–the officers to be
commissioned according to the number of men they brought into
the service. There were recruiting stations all over town, with
notices, rudely lettered on boards over the doors, announcing the
arm of service and length of time for which recruits at that
station would be received. The law required all volunteers to
serve for three years or the war. But in Jefferson City in
August, 1861, they were recruited for different periods and on
different conditions; some were enlisted for six months, some
for a year, some without any condition as to where they were to
serve, others were not to be sent out of the State. The
recruits were principally men from regiments stationed there and
already in the service, bound for three years if the war lasted
that long.

The city was filled with Union fugitives who had been driven by
guerilla bands to take refuge with the National troops. They
were in a deplorable condition and must have starved but for the
support the government gave them. They had generally made their
escape with a team or two, sometimes a yoke of oxen with a mule
or a horse in the lead. A little bedding besides their clothing
and some food had been thrown into the wagon. All else of their
worldly goods were abandoned and appropriated by their former
neighbors; for the Union man in Missouri who staid at home
during the rebellion, if he was not immediately under the
protection of the National troops, was at perpetual war with his
neighbors. I stopped the recruiting service, and disposed the
troops about the outskirts of the city so as to guard all
approaches. Order was soon restored.

I had been at Jefferson City but a few days when I was directed
from department headquarters to fit out an expedition to
Lexington, Booneville and Chillicothe, in order to take from the
banks in those cities all the funds they had and send them to St.
Louis. The western army had not yet been supplied with
transportation. It became necessary therefore to press into the
service teams belonging to sympathizers with the rebellion or to
hire those of Union men. This afforded an opportunity of giving
employment to such of the refugees within our lines as had teams
suitable for our purposes. They accepted the service with
alacrity. As fast as troops could be got off they were moved
west some twenty miles or more. In seven or eight days from my
assuming command at Jefferson City, I had all the troops, except
a small garrison, at an advanced position and expected to join
them myself the next day.

But my campaigns had not yet begun, for while seated at my
office door, with nothing further to do until it was time to
start for the front, I saw an officer of rank approaching, who
proved to be Colonel Jefferson C. Davis. I had never met him
before, but he introduced himself by handing me an order for him
to proceed to Jefferson City and relieve me of the command. The
orders directed that I should report at department headquarters
at St. Louis without delay, to receive important special
instructions. It was about an hour before the only regular
train of the day would start. I therefore turned over to
Colonel Davis my orders, and hurriedly stated to him the
progress that had been made to carry out the department
instructions already described. I had at that time but one
staff officer, doing myself all the detail work usually
performed by an adjutant-general. In an hour after being
relieved from the command I was on my way to St. Louis, leaving
my single staff officer(*6) to follow the next day with our
horses and baggage.

The “important special instructions” which I received the next
day, assigned me to the command of the district of south-east
Missouri, embracing all the territory south of St. Louis, in
Missouri, as well as all southern Illinois. At first I was to
take personal command of a combined expedition that had been
ordered for the capture of Colonel Jeff. Thompson, a sort of
independent or partisan commander who was disputing with us the
possession of south-east Missouri. Troops had been ordered to
move from Ironton to Cape Girardeau, sixty or seventy miles to
the south-east, on the Mississippi River; while the forces at
Cape Girardeau had been ordered to move to Jacksonville, ten
miles out towards Ironton; and troops at Cairo and Bird’s Point,
at the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, were to hold
themselves in readiness to go down the Mississippi to Belmont,
eighteen miles below, to be moved west from there when an
officer should come to command them. I was the officer who had
been selected for this purpose. Cairo was to become my
headquarters when the expedition terminated.

In pursuance of my orders I established my temporary
headquarters at Cape Girardeau and sent instructions to the
commanding officer at Jackson, to inform me of the approach of
General Prentiss from Ironton. Hired wagons were kept moving
night and day to take additional rations to Jackson, to supply
the troops when they started from there. Neither General
Prentiss nor Colonel Marsh, who commanded at Jackson, knew their
destination. I drew up all the instructions for the contemplated
move, and kept them in my pocket until I should hear of the
junction of our troops at Jackson. Two or three days after my
arrival at Cape Girardeau, word came that General Prentiss was
approaching that place (Jackson). I started at once to meet him
there and to give him his orders. As I turned the first corner
of a street after starting, I saw a column of cavalry passing
the next street in front of me. I turned and rode around the
block the other way, so as to meet the head of the column. I
found there General Prentiss himself, with a large escort. He
had halted his troops at Jackson for the night, and had come on
himself to Cape Girardeau, leaving orders for his command to
follow him in the morning. I gave the General his orders–which
stopped him at Jackson–but he was very much aggrieved at being
placed under another brigadier-general, particularly as he
believed himself to be the senior. He had been a brigadier, in
command at Cairo, while I was mustering officer at Springfield
without any rank. But we were nominated at the same time for
the United States service, and both our commissions bore date
May 17th, 1861. By virtue of my former army rank I was, by law,
the senior. General Prentiss failed to get orders to his troops
to remain at Jackson, and the next morning early they were
reported as approaching Cape Girardeau. I then ordered the
General very peremptorily to countermarch his command and take
it back to Jackson. He obeyed the order, but bade his command
adieu when he got them to Jackson, and went to St. Louis and
reported himself. This broke up the expedition. But little
harm was done, as Jeff. Thompson moved light and had no fixed
place for even nominal headquarters. He was as much at home in
Arkansas as he was in Missouri and would keep out of the way of
a superior force. Prentiss was sent to another part of the
State.

General Prentiss made a great mistake on the above occasion, one
that he would not have committed later in the war. When I came
to know him better, I regretted it much. In consequence of this
occurrence he was off duty in the field when the principal
campaign at the West was going on, and his juniors received
promotion while he was where none could be obtained. He would
have been next to myself in rank in the district of south-east
Missouri, by virtue of his services in the Mexican war. He was
a brave and very earnest soldier. No man in the service was
more sincere in his devotion to the cause for which we were
battling; none more ready to make sacrifices or risk life in it.

On the 4th of September I removed my headquarters to Cairo and
found Colonel Richard Oglesby in command of the post. We had
never met, at least not to my knowledge. After my promotion I
had ordered my brigadier-general’s uniform from New York, but it
had not yet arrived, so that I was in citizen’s dress. The
Colonel had his office full of people, mostly from the
neighboring States of Missouri and Kentucky, making complaints
or asking favors. He evidently did not catch my name when I was
presented, for on my taking a piece of paper from the table where
he was seated and writing the order assuming command of the
district of south-east Missouri, Colonel Richard J. Oglesby to
command the post at Bird’s Point, and handing it to him, he put
on an expression of surprise that looked a little as if he would
like to have some one identify me. But he surrendered the office
without question.

The day after I assumed command at Cairo a man came to me who
said he was a scout of General Fremont. He reported that he had
just come from Columbus, a point on the Mississippi twenty miles
below on the Kentucky side, and that troops had started from
there, or were about to start, to seize Paducah, at the mouth of
the Tennessee. There was no time for delay; I reported by
telegraph to the department commander the information I had
received, and added that I was taking steps to get off that
night to be in advance of the enemy in securing that important
point. There was a large number of steamers Iying at Cairo and
a good many boatmen were staying in the town. It was the work
of only a few hours to get the boats manned, with coal aboard
and steam up. Troops were also designated to go aboard. The
distance from Cairo to Paducah is about forty-five miles. I did
not wish to get there before daylight of the 6th, and directed
therefore that the boats should lie at anchor out in the stream
until the time to start. Not having received an answer to my
first dispatch, I again telegraphed to department headquarters
that I should start for Paducah that night unless I received
further orders. Hearing nothing, we started before midnight and
arrived early the following morning, anticipating the enemy by
probably not over six or eight hours. It proved very fortunate
that the expedition against Jeff. Thompson had been broken up.
Had it not been, the enemy would have seized Paducah and
fortified it, to our very great annoyance.

When the National troops entered the town the citizens were
taken by surprise. I never after saw such consternation
depicted on the faces of the people. Men, women and children
came out of their doors looking pale and frightened at the
presence of the invader. They were expecting rebel troops that
day. In fact, nearly four thousand men from Columbus were at
that time within ten or fifteen miles of Paducah on their way to
occupy the place. I had but two regiments and one battery with
me, but the enemy did not know this and returned to Columbus. I
stationed my troops at the best points to guard the roads leading
into the city, left gunboats to guard the river fronts and by
noon was ready to start on my return to Cairo. Before leaving,
however, I addressed a short printed proclamation to the
citizens of Paducah assuring them of our peaceful intentions,
that we had come among them to protect them against the enemies
of our country, and that all who chose could continue their
usual avocations with assurance of the protection of the
government. This was evidently a relief to them; but the
majority would have much preferred the presence of the other
army. I reinforced Paducah rapidly from the troops at Cape
Girardeau; and a day or two later General C. F. Smith, a most
accomplished soldier, reported at Cairo and was assigned to the
command of the post at the mouth of the Tennessee. In a short
time it was well fortified and a detachment was sent to occupy
Smithland, at the mouth of the Cumberland.

The State government of Kentucky at that time was rebel in
sentiment, but wanted to preserve an armed neutrality between
the North and the South, and the governor really seemed to think
the State had a perfect right to maintain a neutral position. The
rebels already occupied two towns in the State, Columbus and
Hickman, on the Mississippi; and at the very moment the National
troops were entering Paducah from the Ohio front, General Lloyd
Tilghman–a Confederate–with his staff and a small detachment
of men, were getting out in the other direction, while, as I
have already said, nearly four thousand Confederate troops were
on Kentucky soil on their way to take possession of the town.
But, in the estimation of the governor and of those who thought
with him, this did not justify the National authorities in
invading the soil of Kentucky. I informed the legislature of
the State of what I was doing, and my action was approved by the
majority of that body. On my return to Cairo I found authority
from department headquarters for me to take Paducah “if I felt
strong enough,” but very soon after I was reprimanded from the
same quarters for my correspondence with the legislature and
warned against a repetition of the offence.

Soon after I took command at Cairo, General Fremont entered into
arrangements for the exchange of the prisoners captured at Camp
Jackson in the month of May. I received orders to pass them
through my lines to Columbus as they presented themselves with
proper credentials. Quite a number of these prisoners I had
been personally acquainted with before the war. Such of them as
I had so known were received at my headquarters as old
acquaintances, and ordinary routine business was not disturbed
by their presence. On one occasion when several were present in
my office my intention to visit Cape Girardeau the next day, to
inspect the troops at that point, was mentioned. Something
transpired which postponed my trip; but a steamer employed by
the government was passing a point some twenty or more miles
above Cairo, the next day, when a section of rebel artillery
with proper escort brought her to. A major, one of those who
had been at my headquarters the day before, came at once aboard
and after some search made a direct demand for my delivery. It
was hard to persuade him that I was not there. This officer was
Major Barrett, of St. Louis. I had been acquainted with his
family before the war.

CHAPTER XX.

GENERAL FREMONT IN COMMAND–MOVEMENT AGAINST BELMONT– BATTLE OF
BELMONT–A NARROW ESCAPE–AFTER THE BATTLE.

From the occupation of Paducah up to the early part of November
nothing important occurred with the troops under my command. I
was reinforced from time to time and the men were drilled and
disciplined preparatory for the service which was sure to
come. By the 1st of November I had not fewer than 20,000 men,
most of them under good drill and ready to meet any equal body
of men who, like themselves, had not yet been in an
engagement. They were growing impatient at lying idle so long,
almost in hearing of the guns of the enemy they had volunteered
to fight against. I asked on one or two occasions to be allowed
to move against Columbus. It could have been taken soon after
the occupation of Paducah; but before November it was so
strongly fortified that it would have required a large force and
a long siege to capture it.

In the latter part of October General Fremont took the field in
person and moved from Jefferson City against General Sterling
Price, who was then in the State of Missouri with a considerable
command. About the first of November I was directed from
department headquarters to make a demonstration on both sides of
the Mississippi River with the view of detaining the rebels at
Columbus within their lines. Before my troops could be got off,
I was notified from the same quarter that there were some 3,000
of the enemy on the St. Francis River about fifty miles west, or
south-west, from Cairo, and was ordered to send another force
against them. I dispatched Colonel Oglesby at once with troops
sufficient to compete with the reported number of the enemy. On
the 5th word came from the same source that the rebels were about
to detach a large force from Columbus to be moved by boats down
the Mississippi and up the White River, in Arkansas, in order to
reinforce Price, and I was directed to prevent this movement if
possible. I accordingly sent a regiment from Bird’s Point under
Colonel W. H. L. Wallace to overtake and reinforce Oglesby, with
orders to march to New Madrid, a point some distance below
Columbus, on the Missouri side. At the same time I directed
General C. F. Smith to move all the troops he could spare from
Paducah directly against Columbus, halting them, however, a few
miles from the town to await further orders from me. Then I
gathered up all the troops at Cairo and Fort Holt, except
suitable guards, and moved them down the river on steamers
convoyed by two gunboats, accompanying them myself. My force
consisted of a little over 3,000 men and embraced five regiments
of infantry, two guns and two companies of cavalry. We dropped
down the river on the 6th to within about six miles of Columbus,
debarked a few men on the Kentucky side and established pickets
to connect with the troops from Paducah.

I had no orders which contemplated an attack by the National
troops, nor did I intend anything of the kind when I started out
from Cairo; but after we started I saw that the officers and men
were elated at the prospect of at last having the opportunity of
doing what they had volunteered to do–fight the enemies of their
country. I did not see how I could maintain discipline, or
retain the confidence of my command, if we should return to
Cairo without an effort to do something. Columbus, besides
being strongly fortified, contained a garrison much more
numerous than the force I had with me. It would not do,
therefore, to attack that point. About two o’clock on the
morning of the 7th, I learned that the enemy was crossing troops
from Columbus to the west bank to be dispatched, presumably,
after Oglesby. I knew there was a small camp of Confederates at
Belmont, immediately opposite Columbus, and I speedily resolved
to push down the river, land on the Missouri side, capture
Belmont, break up the camp and return. Accordingly, the pickets
above Columbus were drawn in at once, and about daylight the
boats moved out from shore. In an hour we were debarking on the
west bank of the Mississippi, just out of range of the batteries
at Columbus.

The ground on the west shore of the river, opposite Columbus, is
low and in places marshy and cut up with sloughs. The soil is
rich and the timber large and heavy. There were some small
clearings between Belmont and the point where we landed, but
most of the country was covered with the native forests. We
landed in front of a cornfield. When the debarkation commenced,
I took a regiment down the river to post it as a guard against
surprise. At that time I had no staff officer who could be
trusted with that duty. In the woods, at a short distance below
the clearing, I found a depression, dry at the time, but which at
high water became a slough or bayou. I placed the men in the
hollow, gave them their instructions and ordered them to remain
there until they were properly relieved. These troops, with the
gunboats, were to protect our transports.

Up to this time the enemy had evidently failed to divine our
intentions. From Columbus they could, of course, see our
gunboats and transports loaded with troops. But the force from
Paducah was threatening them from the land side, and it was
hardly to be expected that if Columbus was our object we would
separate our troops by a wide river. They doubtless thought we
meant to draw a large force from the east bank, then embark
ourselves, land on the east bank and make a sudden assault on
Columbus before their divided command could be united.

About eight o’clock we started from the point of debarkation,
marching by the flank. After moving in this way for a mile or a
mile and a half, I halted where there was marshy ground covered
with a heavy growth of timber in our front, and deployed a large
part of my force as skirmishers. By this time the enemy
discovered that we were moving upon Belmont and sent out troops
to meet us. Soon after we had started in line, his skirmishers
were encountered and fighting commenced. This continued,
growing fiercer and fiercer, for about four hours, the enemy
being forced back gradually until he was driven into his camp.
Early in this engagement my horse was shot under me, but I got
another from one of my staff and kept well up with the advance
until the river was reached.

The officers and men engaged at Belmont were then under fire for
the first time. Veterans could not have behaved better than they
did up to the moment of reaching the rebel camp. At this point
they became demoralized from their victory and failed to reap
its full reward. The enemy had been followed so closely that
when he reached the clear ground on which his camp was pitched
he beat a hasty retreat over the river bank, which protected him
from our shots and from view. This precipitate retreat at the
last moment enabled the National forces to pick their way
without hinderance through the abatis–the only artificial
defence the enemy had. The moment the camp was reached our men
laid down their arms and commenced rummaging the tents to pick
up trophies. Some of the higher officers were little better
than the privates. They galloped about from one cluster of men
to another and at every halt delivered a short eulogy upon the
Union cause and the achievements of the command.

All this time the troops we had been engaged with for four
hours, lay crouched under cover of the river bank, ready to come
up and surrender if summoned to do so; but finding that they were
not pursued, they worked their way up the river and came up on
the bank between us and our transports. I saw at the same time
two steamers coming from the Columbus side towards the west
shore, above us, black–or gray–with soldiers from boiler-deck
to roof. Some of my men were engaged in firing from captured
guns at empty steamers down the river, out of range, cheering at
every shot. I tried to get them to turn their guns upon the
loaded steamers above and not so far away. My efforts were in
vain. At last I directed my staff officers to set fire to the
camps. This drew the fire of the enemy’s guns located on the
heights of Columbus. They had abstained from firing before,
probably because they were afraid of hitting their own men; or
they may have supposed, until the camp was on fire, that it was
still in the possession of their friends. About this time, too,
the men we had driven over the bank were seen in line up the
river between us and our transports. The alarm “surrounded” was
given. The guns of the enemy and the report of being surrounded,
brought officers and men completely under control. At first some
of the officers seemed to think that to be surrounded was to be
placed in a hopeless position, where there was nothing to do but
surrender. But when I announced that we had cut our way in and
could cut our way out just as well, it seemed a new revelation
to officers and soldiers. They formed line rapidly and we
started back to our boats, with the men deployed as skirmishers
as they had been on entering camp. The enemy was soon
encountered, but his resistance this time was feeble. Again the
Confederates sought shelter under the river banks. We could not
stop, however, to pick them up, because the troops we had seen
crossing the river had debarked by this time and were nearer our
transports than we were. It would be prudent to get them behind
us; but we were not again molested on our way to the boats.

From the beginning of the fighting our wounded had been carried
to the houses at the rear, near the place of debarkation. I now
set the troops to bringing their wounded to the boats. After
this had gone on for some little time I rode down the road,
without even a staff officer, to visit the guard I had stationed
over the approach to our transports. I knew the enemy had
crossed over from Columbus in considerable numbers and might be
expected to attack us as we were embarking. This guard would be
encountered first and, as they were in a natural intrenchment,
would be able to hold the enemy for a considerable time. My
surprise was great to find there was not a single man in the
trench. Riding back to the boat I found the officer who had
commanded the guard and learned that he had withdrawn his force
when the main body fell back. At first I ordered the guard to
return, but finding that it would take some time to get the men
together and march them back to their position, I countermanded
the order. Then fearing that the enemy we had seen crossing the
river below might be coming upon us unawares, I rode out in the
field to our front, still entirely alone, to observe whether the
enemy was passing. The field was grown up with corn so tall and
thick as to cut off the view of even a person on horseback,
except directly along the rows. Even in that direction, owing
to the overhanging blades of corn, the view was not extensive. I
had not gone more than a few hundred yards when I saw a body of
troops marching past me not fifty yards away. I looked at them
for a moment and then turned my horse towards the river and
started back, first in a walk, and when I thought myself
concealed from the view of the enemy, as fast as my horse could
carry me. When at the river bank I still had to ride a few
hundred yards to the point where the nearest transport lay.

The cornfield in front of our transports terminated at the edge
of a dense forest. Before I got back the enemy had entered this
forest and had opened a brisk fire upon the boats. Our men, with
the exception of details that had gone to the front after the
wounded, were now either aboard the transports or very near
them. Those who were not aboard soon got there, and the boats
pushed off. I was the only man of the National army between the
rebels and our transports. The captain of a boat that had just
pushed out but had not started, recognized me and ordered the
engineer not to start the engine; he then had a plank run out
for me. My horse seemed to take in the situation. There was no
path down the bank and every one acquainted with the Mississippi
River knows that its banks, in a natural state, do not vary at
any great angle from the perpendicular. My horse put his fore
feet over the bank without hesitation or urging, and with his
hind feet well under him, slid down the bank and trotted aboard
the boat, twelve or fifteen feet away, over a single gang
plank. I dismounted and went at once to the upper deck.

The Mississippi River was low on the 7th of November, 1861, so
that the banks were higher than the heads of men standing on the
upper decks of the steamers. The rebels were some distance back
from the river, so that their fire was high and did us but
little harm. Our smoke-stack was riddled with bullets, but
there were only three men wounded on the boats, two of whom were
soldiers. When I first went on deck I entered the captain’s room
adjoining the pilot-house, and threw myself on a sofa. I did not
keep that position a moment, but rose to go out on the deck to
observe what was going on. I had scarcely left when a musket
ball entered the room, struck the head of the sofa, passed
through it and lodged in the foot.

When the enemy opened fire on the transports our gunboats
returned it with vigor. They were well out in the stream and
some distance down, so that they had to give but very little
elevation to their guns to clear the banks of the river. Their
position very nearly enfiladed the line of the enemy while he
was marching through the cornfield. The execution was very
great, as we could see at the time and as I afterwards learned
more positively. We were very soon out of range and went
peacefully on our way to Cairo, every man feeling that Belmont
was a great victory and that he had contributed his share to it.

Our loss at Belmont was 485 in killed, wounded and missing.
About 125 of our wounded fell into the hands of the enemy. We
returned with 175 prisoners and two guns, and spiked four other
pieces. The loss of the enemy, as officially reported, was 642
men, killed, wounded and missing. We had engaged about 2,500
men, exclusive of the guard left with the transports. The enemy
had about 7,000; but this includes the troops brought over from
Columbus who were not engaged in the first defence of Belmont.

The two objects for which the battle of Belmont was fought were
fully accomplished. The enemy gave up all idea of detaching
troops from Columbus. His losses were very heavy for that
period of the war. Columbus was beset by people looking for
their wounded or dead kin, to take them home for medical
treatment or burial. I learned later, when I had moved further
south, that Belmont had caused more mourning than almost any
other battle up to that time. The National troops acquired a
confidence in themselves at Belmont that did not desert them
through the war.

The day after the battle I met some officers from General Polk’s
command, arranged for permission to bury our dead at Belmont and
also commenced negotiations for the exchange of prisoners. When
our men went to bury their dead, before they were allowed to land
they were conducted below the point where the enemy had engaged
our transports. Some of the officers expressed a desire to see
the field; but the request was refused with the statement that
we had no dead there.

While on the truce-boat I mentioned to an officer, whom I had
known both at West Point and in the Mexican war, that I was in
the cornfield near their troops when they passed; that I had
been on horseback and had worn a soldier’s overcoat at the
time. This officer was on General Polk’s staff. He said both
he and the general had seen me and that Polk had said to his
men, “There is a Yankee; you may try your marksmanship on him if
you wish,” but nobody fired at me.

Belmont was severely criticised in the North as a wholly
unnecessary battle, barren of results, or the possibility of
them from the beginning. If it had not been fought, Colonel
Oglesby would probably have been captured or destroyed with his
three thousand men. Then I should have been culpable indeed.

CHAPTER XXI.

GENERAL HALLECK IN COMMAND–COMMANDING THE DISTRICT OF
CAIRO–MOVEMENT ON FORT HENRY–CAPTURE OF FORT HENRY.

While at Cairo I had frequent opportunities of meeting the rebel
officers of the Columbus garrison. They seemed to be very fond
of coming up on steamers under flags of truce. On two or three
occasions I went down in like manner. When one of their boats
was seen coming up carrying a white flag, a gun would be fired
from the lower battery at Fort Holt, throwing a shot across the
bow as a signal to come no farther. I would then take a steamer
and, with my staff and occasionally a few other officers, go down
to receive the party. There were several officers among them
whom I had known before, both at West Point and in Mexico.
Seeing these officers who had been educated for the profession
of arms, both at school and in actual war, which is a far more
efficient training, impressed me with the great advantage the
South possessed over the North at the beginning of the
rebellion. They had from thirty to forty per cent. of the
educated soldiers of the Nation. They had no standing army and,
consequently, these trained soldiers had to find employment with
the troops from their own States. In this way what there was of
military education and training was distributed throughout their
whole army. The whole loaf was leavened.

The North had a great number of educated and trained soldiers,
but the bulk of them were still in the army and were retained,
generally with their old commands and rank, until the war had
lasted many months. In the Army of the Potomac there was what
was known as the “regular brigade,” in which, from the
commanding officer down to the youngest second lieutenant, every
one was educated to his profession. So, too, with many of the
batteries; all the officers, generally four in number to each,
were men educated for their profession. Some of these went into
battle at the beginning under division commanders who were
entirely without military training. This state of affairs gave
me an idea which I expressed while at Cairo; that the government
ought to disband the regular army, with the exception of the
staff corps, and notify the disbanded officers that they would
receive no compensation while the war lasted except as
volunteers. The register should be kept up, but the names of
all officers who were not in the volunteer service at the close,
should be stricken from it.

On the 9th of November, two days after the battle of Belmont,
Major-General H. W. Halleck superseded General Fremont in
command of the Department of the Missouri. The limits of his
command took in Arkansas and west Kentucky east to the
Cumberland River. From the battle of Belmont until early in
February, 1862, the troops under my command did little except
prepare for the long struggle which proved to be before them.

The enemy at this time occupied a line running from the
Mississippi River at Columbus to Bowling Green and Mill Springs,
Kentucky. Each of these positions was strongly fortified, as
were also points on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers near the
Tennessee state line. The works on the Tennessee were called
Fort Heiman and Fort Henry, and that on the Cumberland was Fort
Donelson. At these points the two rivers approached within
eleven miles of each other. The lines of rifle pits at each
place extended back from the water at least two miles, so that
the garrisons were in reality only seven miles apart. These
positions were of immense importance to the enemy; and of course
correspondingly important for us to possess ourselves of. With
Fort Henry in our hands we had a navigable stream open to us up
to Muscle Shoals, in Alabama. The Memphis and Charleston
Railroad strikes the Tennessee at Eastport, Mississippi, and
follows close to the banks of the river up to the shoals. This
road, of vast importance to the enemy, would cease to be of use
to them for through traffic the moment Fort Henry became ours.
Fort Donelson was the gate to Nashville–a place of great
military and political importance–and to a rich country
extending far east in Kentucky. These two points in our
possession the enemy would necessarily be thrown back to the
Memphis and Charleston road, or to the boundary of the cotton
states, and, as before stated, that road would be lost to them
for through communication.

The designation of my command had been changed after Halleck’s
arrival, from the District of South-east Missouri to the
District of Cairo, and the small district commanded by General
C. F. Smith, embracing the mouths of the Tennessee and
Cumberland rivers, had been added to my jurisdiction. Early in
January, 1862, I was directed by General McClellan, through my
department commander, to make a reconnoissance in favor of
Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell, who commanded the Department
of the Ohio, with headquarters at Louisville, and who was
confronting General S. B. Buckner with a larger Confederate
force at Bowling Green. It was supposed that Buell was about to
make some move against the enemy, and my demonstration was
intended to prevent the sending of troops from Columbus, Fort
Henry or Donelson to Buckner. I at once ordered General Smith
to send a force up the west bank of the Tennessee to threaten
forts Heiman and Henry; McClernand at the same time with a force
of 6,000 men was sent out into west Kentucky, threatening
Columbus with one column and the Tennessee River with another. I
went with McClernand’s command. The weather was very bad; snow
and rain fell; the roads, never good in that section, were
intolerable. We were out more than a week splashing through the
mud, snow and rain, the men suffering very much. The object of
the expedition was accomplished. The enemy did not send
reinforcements to Bowling Green, and General George H. Thomas
fought and won the battle of Mill Springs before we returned.

As a result of this expedition General Smith reported that he
thought it practicable to capture Fort Heiman. This fort stood
on high ground, completely commanding Fort Henry on the opposite
side of the river, and its possession by us, with the aid of our
gunboats, would insure the capture of Fort Henry. This report
of Smith’s confirmed views I had previously held, that the true
line of operations for us was up the Tennessee and Cumberland
rivers. With us there, the enemy would be compelled to fall
back on the east and west entirely out of the State of
Kentucky. On the 6th of January, before receiving orders for
this expedition, I had asked permission of the general
commanding the department to go to see him at St. Louis. My
object was to lay this plan of campaign before him. Now that my
views had been confirmed by so able a general as Smith, I renewed
my request to go to St. Louis on what I deemed important military
business. The leave was granted, but not graciously. I had
known General Halleck but very slightly in the old army, not
having met him either at West Point or during the Mexican war. I
was received with so little cordiality that I perhaps stated the
object of my visit with less clearness than I might have done,
and I had not uttered many sentences before I was cut short as
if my plan was preposterous. I returned to Cairo very much
crestfallen.

Flag-officer Foote commanded the little fleet of gunboats then
in the neighborhood of Cairo and, though in another branch of
the service, was subject to the command of General Halleck. He
and I consulted freely upon military matters and he agreed with
me perfectly as to the feasibility of the campaign up the
Tennessee. Notwithstanding the rebuff I had received from my
immediate chief, I therefore, on the 28th of January, renewed
the suggestion by telegraph that “if permitted, I could take and
hold Fort Henry on the Tennessee.” This time I was backed by
Flag-officer Foote, who sent a similar dispatch. On the 29th I
wrote fully in support of the proposition. On the 1st of
February I received full instructions from department
headquarters to move upon Fort Henry. On the 2d the expedition
started.

In February, 1862, there were quite a good many steamers laid up
at Cairo for want of employment, the Mississippi River being
closed against navigation below that point. There were also
many men in the town whose occupation had been following the
river in various capacities, from captain down to deck hand But
there were not enough of either boats or men to move at one time
the 17,000 men I proposed to take with me up the Tennessee. I
loaded the boats with more than half the force, however, and
sent General McClernand in command. I followed with one of the
later boats and found McClernand had stopped, very properly,
nine miles below Fort Henry. Seven gunboats under Flag-officer
Foote had accompanied the advance. The transports we had with
us had to return to Paducah to bring up a division from there,
with General C. F. Smith in command.

Before sending the boats back I wanted to get the troops as near
to the enemy as I could without coming within range of their
guns. There was a stream emptying into the Tennessee on the
east side, apparently at about long range distance below the
fort. On account of the narrow water-shed separating the
Tennessee and Cumberland rivers at that point, the stream must
be insignificant at ordinary stages, but when we were there, in
February, it was a torrent. It would facilitate the investment
of Fort Henry materially if the troops could be landed south of
that stream. To test whether this could be done I boarded the
gunboat Essex and requested Captain Wm. Porter commanding it, to
approach the fort to draw its fire. After we had gone some
distance past the mouth of the stream we drew the fire of the
fort, which fell much short of us. In consequence I had made up
my mind to return and bring the troops to the upper side of the
creek, when the enemy opened upon us with a rifled gun that sent
shot far beyond us and beyond the stream. One shot passed very
near where Captain Porter and I were standing, struck the deck
near the stern, penetrated and passed through the cabin and so
out into the river. We immediately turned back, and the troops
were debarked below the mouth of the creek.

When the landing was completed I returned with the transports to
Paducah to hasten up the balance of the troops. I got back on
the 5th with the advance the remainder following as rapidly as
the steamers could carry them. At ten o’clock at night, on the
5th, the whole command was not yet up. Being anxious to
commence operations as soon as possible before the enemy could
reinforce heavily, I issued my orders for an advance at 11 A.M.
on the 6th. I felt sure that all the troops would be up by that
time.

Fort Henry occupies a bend in the river which gave the guns in
the water battery a direct fire down the stream. The camp
outside the fort was intrenched, with rifle pits and outworks
two miles back on the road to Donelson and Dover. The garrison
of the fort and camp was about 2,800, with strong reinforcements
from Donelson halted some miles out. There were seventeen heavy
guns in the fort. The river was very high, the banks being
overflowed except where the bluffs come to the water’s edge. A
portion of the ground on which Fort Henry stood was two feet
deep in water. Below, the water extended into the woods several
hundred yards back from the bank on the east side. On the west
bank Fort Heiman stood on high ground, completely commanding
Fort Henry. The distance from Fort Henry to Donelson is but
eleven miles. The two positions were so important to the enemy,
AS HE SAW HIS INTEREST, that it was natural to suppose that
reinforcements would come from every quarter from which they
could be got. Prompt action on our part was imperative.

The plan was for the troops and gunboats to start at the same
moment. The troops were to invest the garrison and the gunboats
to attack the fort at close quarters. General Smith was to land
a brigade of his division on the west bank during the night of
the 5th and get it in rear of Heiman.

At the hour designated the troops and gunboats started. General
Smith found Fort Heiman had been evacuated before his men
arrived. The gunboats soon engaged the water batteries at very
close quarters, but the troops which were to invest Fort Henry
were delayed for want of roads, as well as by the dense forest
and the high water in what would in dry weather have been
unimportant beds of streams. This delay made no difference in
the result. On our first appearance Tilghman had sent his
entire command, with the exception of about one hundred men left
to man the guns in the fort, to the outworks on the road to Dover
and Donelson, so as to have them out of range of the guns of our
navy; and before any attack on the 6th he had ordered them to
retreat on Donelson. He stated in his subsequent report that
the defence was intended solely to give his troops time to make
their escape.

Tilghman was captured with his staff and ninety men, as well as
the armament of the fort, the ammunition and whatever stores
were there. Our cavalry pursued the retreating column towards
Donelson and picked up two guns and a few stragglers; but the
enemy had so much the start, that the pursuing force did not get
in sight of any except the stragglers.

All the gunboats engaged were hit many times. The damage,
however, beyond what could be repaired by a small expenditure of
money, was slight, except to the Essex. A shell penetrated the
boiler of that vessel and exploded it, killing and wounding
forty-eight men, nineteen of whom were soldiers who had been
detailed to act with the navy. On several occasions during the
war such details were made when the complement of men with the
navy was insufficient for the duty before them. After the fall
of Fort Henry Captain Phelps, commanding the iron-clad
Carondelet, at my request ascended the Tennessee River and
thoroughly destroyed the bridge of the Memphis and Ohio Railroad.

CHAPTER XXII.

INVESTMENT OF FORT DONELSON–THE NAVAL OPERATIONS–ATTACK OF THE
ENEMY–ASSAULTING THE WORKS–SURRENDER OF THE FORT.

I informed the department commander of our success at Fort Henry
and that on the 8th I would take Fort Donelson. But the rain
continued to fall so heavily that the roads became impassable
for artillery and wagon trains. Then, too, it would not have
been prudent to proceed without the gunboats. At least it would
have been leaving behind a valuable part of our available force.

On the 7th, the day after the fall of Fort Henry, I took my
staff and the cavalry–a part of one regiment–and made a
reconnoissance to within about a mile of the outer line of works
at Donelson. I had known General Pillow in Mexico, and judged
that with any force, no matter how small, I could march up to
within gunshot of any intrenchments he was given to hold. I
said this to the officers of my staff at the time. I knew that
Floyd was in command, but he was no soldier, and I judged that
he would yield to Pillow’s pretensions. I met, as I expected,
no opposition in making the reconnoissance and, besides learning
the topography of the country on the way and around Fort
Donelson, found that there were two roads available for
marching; one leading to the village of Dover, the other to
Donelson.

Fort Donelson is two miles north, or down the river, from
Dover. The fort, as it stood in 1861, embraced about one
hundred acres of land. On the east it fronted the Cumberland;
to the north it faced Hickman’s creek, a small stream which at
that time was deep and wide because of the back-water from the
river; on the south was another small stream, or rather a
ravine, opening into the Cumberland. This also was filled with
back-water from the river. The fort stood on high ground, some
of it as much as a hundred feet above the Cumberland. Strong
protection to the heavy guns in the water batteries had been
obtained by cutting away places for them in the bluff. To the
west there was a line of rifle pits some two miles back from the
river at the farthest point. This line ran generally along the
crest of high ground, but in one place crossed a ravine which
opens into the river between the village and the fort. The
ground inside and outside of this intrenched line was very
broken and generally wooded. The trees outside of the
rifle-pits had been cut down for a considerable way out, and had
been felled so that their tops lay outwards from the
intrenchments. The limbs had been trimmed and pointed, and thus
formed an abatis in front of the greater part of the line.
Outside of this intrenched line, and extending about half the
entire length of it, is a ravine running north and south and
opening into Hickman creek at a point north of the fort. The
entire side of this ravine next to the works was one long abatis.

General Halleck commenced his efforts in all quarters to get
reinforcements to forward to me immediately on my departure from
Cairo. General Hunter sent men freely from Kansas, and a large
division under General Nelson, from Buell’s army, was also
dispatched. Orders went out from the War Department to
consolidate fragments of companies that were being recruited in
the Western States so as to make full companies, and to
consolidate companies into regiments. General Halleck did not
approve or disapprove of my going to Fort Donelson. He said
nothing whatever to me on the subject. He informed Buell on the
7th that I would march against Fort Donelson the next day; but on
the 10th he directed me to fortify Fort Henry strongly,
particularly to the land side, saying that he forwarded me
intrenching tools for that purpose. I received this dispatch in
front of Fort Donelson.

I was very impatient to get to Fort Donelson because I knew the
importance of the place to the enemy and supposed he would
reinforce it rapidly. I felt that 15,000 men on the 8th would
be more effective than 50,000 a month later. I asked
Flag-officer Foote, therefore, to order his gunboats still about
Cairo to proceed up the Cumberland River and not to wait for
those gone to Eastport and Florence; but the others got back in
time and we started on the 12th. I had moved McClernand out a
few miles the night before so as to leave the road as free as
possible.

Just as we were about to start the first reinforcement reached
me on transports. It was a brigade composed of six full
regiments commanded by Colonel Thayer, of Nebraska. As the
gunboats were going around to Donelson by the Tennessee, Ohio
and Cumberland rivers, I directed Thayer to turn about and go
under their convoy.

I started from Fort Henry with 15,000 men, including eight
batteries and part of a regiment of cavalry, and, meeting with
no obstruction to detain us, the advance arrived in front of the
enemy by noon. That afternoon and the next day were spent in
taking up ground to make the investment as complete as
possible. General Smith had been directed to leave a portion of
his division behind to guard forts Henry and Heiman. He left
General Lew. Wallace with 2,500 men. With the remainder of his
division he occupied our left, extending to Hickman creek.
McClernand was on the right and covered the roads running south
and south-west from Dover. His right extended to the back-water
up the ravine opening into the Cumberland south of the village.
The troops were not intrenched, but the nature of the ground was
such that they were just as well protected from the fire of the
enemy as if rifle-pits had been thrown up. Our line was
generally along the crest of ridges. The artillery was
protected by being sunk in the ground. The men who were not
serving the guns were perfectly covered from fire on taking
position a little back from the crest. The greatest suffering
was from want of shelter. It was midwinter and during the siege
we had rain and snow, thawing and freezing alternately. It would
not do to allow camp-fires except far down the hill out of sight
of the enemy, and it would not do to allow many of the troops to
remain there at the same time. In the march over from Fort Henry
numbers of the men had thrown away their blankets and
overcoats. There was therefore much discomfort and absolute
suffering.

During the 12th and 13th, and until the arrival of Wallace and
Thayer on the 14th, the National forces, composed of but 15,000
men, without intrenchments, confronted an intrenched army of
21,000, without conflict further than what was brought on by
ourselves. Only one gunboat had arrived. There was a little
skirmishing each day, brought on by the movement of our troops
in securing commanding positions; but there was no actual
fighting during this time except once, on the 13th, in front of
McClernand’s command. That general had undertaken to capture a
battery of the enemy which was annoying his men. Without orders
or authority he sent three regiments to make the assault. The
battery was in the main line of the enemy, which was defended by
his whole army present. Of course the assault was a failure, and
of course the loss on our side was great for the number of men
engaged. In this assault Colonel William Morrison fell badly
wounded. Up to this time the surgeons with the army had no
difficulty in finding room in the houses near our line for all
the sick and wounded; but now hospitals were overcrowded. Owing,
however, to the energy and skill of the surgeons the suffering
was not so great as it might have been. The hospital
arrangements at Fort Donelson were as complete as it was
possible to make them, considering the inclemency of the weather
and the lack of tents, in a sparsely settled country where the
houses were generally of but one or two rooms.

On the return of Captain Walke to Fort Henry on the 10th, I had
requested him to take the vessels that had accompanied him on
his expedition up the Tennessee, and get possession of the
Cumberland as far up towards Donelson as possible. He started
without delay, taking, however, only his own gunboat, the
Carondelet, towed by the steamer Alps. Captain Walke arrived a
few miles below Donelson on the 12th, a little after noon. About
the time the advance of troops reached a point within gunshot of
the fort on the land side, he engaged the water batteries at
long range. On the 13th I informed him of my arrival the day
before and of the establishment of most of our batteries,
requesting him at the same time to attack again that day so that
I might take advantage of any diversion. The attack was made and
many shots fell within the fort, creating some consternation, as
we now know. The investment on the land side was made as
complete as the number of troops engaged would admit of.

During the night of the 13th Flag-officer Foote arrived with the
iron-clads St. Louis, Louisville and Pittsburg and the wooden
gunboats Tyler and Conestoga, convoying Thayer’s brigade. On
the morning of the 14th Thayer was landed. Wallace, whom I had
ordered over from Fort Henry, also arrived about the same
time. Up to this time he had been commanding a brigade
belonging to the division of General C. F. Smith. These troops
were now restored to the division they belonged to, and General
Lew. Wallace was assigned to the command of a division composed
of the brigade of Colonel Thayer and other reinforcements that
arrived the same day. This new division was assigned to the
centre, giving the two flanking divisions an opportunity to
close up and form a stronger line.

The plan was for the troops to hold the enemy within his lines,
while the gunboats should attack the water batteries at close
quarters and silence his guns if possible. Some of the gunboats
were to run the batteries, get above the fort and above the
village of Dover. I had ordered a reconnoissance made with the
view of getting troops to the river above Dover in case they
should be needed there. That position attained by the gunboats
it would have been but a question of time–and a very short
time, too–when the garrison would have been compelled to
surrender.

By three in the afternoon of the 14th Flag-officer Foote was
ready, and advanced upon the water batteries with his entire
fleet. After coming in range of the batteries of the enemy the
advance was slow, but a constant fire was delivered from every
gun that could be brought to bear upon the fort. I occupied a
position on shore from which I could see the advancing navy. The
leading boat got within a very short distance of the water
battery, not further off I think than two hundred yards, and I
soon saw one and then another of them dropping down the river,
visibly disabled. Then the whole fleet followed and the
engagement closed for the day. The gunboat which Flag-officer
Foote was on, besides having been hit about sixty times, several
of the shots passing through near the waterline, had a shot enter
the pilot-house which killed the pilot, carried away the wheel
and wounded the flag-officer himself. The tiller-ropes of
another vessel were carried away and she, too, dropped
helplessly back. Two others had their pilot-houses so injured
that they scarcely formed a protection to the men at the wheel.

The enemy had evidently been much demoralized by the assault,
but they were jubilant when they saw the disabled vessels
dropping down the river entirely out of the control of the men
on board. Of course I only witnessed the falling back of our
gunboats and felt sad enough at the time over the repulse.
Subsequent reports, now published, show that the enemy
telegraphed a great victory to Richmond. The sun went down on
the night of the 14th of February, 1862, leaving the army
confronting Fort Donelson anything but comforted over the
prospects. The weather had turned intensely cold; the men were
without tents and could not keep up fires where most of them had
to stay, and, as previously stated, many had thrown away their
overcoats and blankets. Two of the strongest of our gunboats
had been disabled, presumably beyond the possibility of
rendering any present assistance. I retired this night not
knowing but that I would have to intrench my position, and bring
up tents for the men or build huts under the cover of the hills.

On the morning of the 15th, before it was yet broad day, a
messenger from Flag-officer Foote handed me a note, expressing a
desire to see me on the flag-ship and saying that he had been
injured the day before so much that he could not come himself to
me. I at once made my preparations for starting. I directed my
adjutant-general to notify each of the division commanders of my
absence and instruct them to do nothing to bring on an engagement
until they received further orders, but to hold their
positions. From the heavy rains that had fallen for days and
weeks preceding and from the constant use of the roads between
the troops and the landing four to seven miles below, these
roads had become cut up so as to be hardly passable. The
intense cold of the night of the 14th-15th had frozen the ground
solid. This made travel on horseback even slower than through
the mud; but I went as fast as the roads would allow.

When I reached the fleet I found the flag-ship was anchored out
in the stream. A small boat, however, awaited my arrival and I
was soon on board with the flag-officer. He explained to me in
short the condition in which he was left by the engagement of
the evening before, and suggested that I should intrench while
he returned to Mound City with his disabled boats, expressing at
the time the belief that he could have the necessary repairs made
and be back in ten days. I saw the absolute necessity of his
gunboats going into hospital and did not know but I should be
forced to the alternative of going through a siege. But the
enemy relieved me from this necessity.

When I left the National line to visit Flag-officer Foote I had
no idea that there would be any engagement on land unless I
brought it on myself. The conditions for battle were much more
favorable to us than they had been for the first two days of the
investment. From the 12th to the 14th we had but 15,000 men of
all arms and no gunboats. Now we had been reinforced by a fleet
of six naval vessels, a large division of troops under General L.
Wallace and 2,500 men brought over from Fort Henry belonging to
the division of C. F. Smith. The enemy, however, had taken the
initiative. Just as I landed I met Captain Hillyer of my staff,
white with fear, not for his personal safety, but for the safety
of the National troops. He said the enemy had come out of his
lines in full force and attacked and scattered McClernand’s
division, which was in full retreat. The roads, as I have said,
were unfit for making fast time, but I got to my command as soon
as possible. The attack had been made on the National right. I
was some four or five miles north of our left. The line was
about three miles long. In reaching the point where the
disaster had occurred I had to pass the divisions of Smith and
Wallace. I saw no sign of excitement on the portion of the line
held by Smith; Wallace was nearer the scene of conflict and had
taken part in it. He had, at an opportune time, sent Thayer’s
brigade to the support of McClernand and thereby contributed to
hold the enemy within his lines.

I saw everything favorable for us along the line of our left and
centre. When I came to the right appearances were different. The
enemy had come out in full force to cut his way out and make his
escape. McClernand’s division had to bear the brunt of the
attack from this combined force. His men had stood up gallantly
until the ammunition in their cartridge-boxes gave out. There
was abundance of ammunition near by lying on the ground in
boxes, but at that stage of the war it was not all of our
commanders of regiments, brigades, or even divisions, who had
been educated up to the point of seeing that their men were
constantly supplied with ammunition during an engagement. When
the men found themselves without ammunition they could not stand
up against troops who seemed to have plenty of it. The division
broke and a portion fled, but most of the men, as they were not
pursued, only fell back out of range of the fire of the enemy.
It must have been about this time that Thayer pushed his brigade
in between the enemy and those of our troops that were without
ammunition. At all events the enemy fell back within his
intrenchments and was there when I got on the field.

I saw the men standing in knots talking in the most excited
manner. No officer seemed to be giving any directions. The
soldiers had their muskets, but no ammunition, while there were
tons of it close at hand. I heard some of the men say that the
enemy had come out with knapsacks, and haversacks filled with
rations. They seemed to think this indicated a determination on
his part to stay out and fight just as long as the provisions
held out. I turned to Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff, who
was with me, and said: “Some of our men are pretty badly
demoralized, but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted
to force his way out, but has fallen back: the one who attacks
first now will be victorious and the enemy will have to be in a
hurry if he gets ahead of me.” I determined to make the assault
at once on our left. It was clear to my mind that the enemy had
started to march out with his entire force, except a few
pickets, and if our attack could be made on the left before the
enemy could redistribute his forces along the line, we would
find but little opposition except from the intervening abatis.
I directed Colonel Webster to ride with me and call out to the
men as we passed: “Fill your cartridge-boxes, quick, and get
into line; the enemy is trying to escape and he must not be
permitted to do so.” This acted like a charm. The men only
wanted some one to give them a command. We rode rapidly to
Smith’s quarters, when I explained the situation to him and
directed him to charge the enemy’s works in his front with his
whole division, saying at the same time that he would find
nothing but a very thin line to contend with. The general was
off in an incredibly short time, going in advance himself to
keep his men from firing while they were working their way
through the abatis intervening between them and the enemy. The
outer line of rifle-pits was passed, and the night of the 15th
General Smith, with much of his division, bivouacked within the
lines of the enemy. There was now no doubt but that the
Confederates must surrender or be captured the next day.

There seems from subsequent accounts to have been much
consternation, particularly among the officers of high rank, in
Dover during the night of the 15th. General Floyd, the
commanding officer, who was a man of talent enough for any civil
position, was no soldier and, possibly, did not possess the
elements of one. He was further unfitted for command, for the
reason that his conscience must have troubled him and made him
afraid. As Secretary of War he had taken a solemn oath to
maintain the Constitution of the United States and to uphold the
same against all its enemies. He had betrayed that trust. As
Secretary of War he was reported through the northern press to
have scattered the little army the country had so that the most
of it could be picked up in detail when secession occurred.
About a year before leaving the Cabinet he had removed arms from
northern to southern arsenals. He continued in the Cabinet of
President Buchanan until about the 1st of January, 1861, while
he was working vigilantly for the establishment of a confederacy
made out of United States territory. Well may he have been
afraid to fall into the hands of National troops. He would no
doubt have been tried for misappropriating public property, if
not for treason, had he been captured. General Pillow, next in
command, was conceited, and prided himself much on his services
in the Mexican war. He telegraphed to General Johnston, at
Nashville, after our men were within the rebel rifle-pits, and
almost on the eve of his making his escape, that the Southern
troops had had great success all day. Johnston forwarded the
dispatch to Richmond. While the authorities at the capital were
reading it Floyd and Pillow were fugitives.

A council of war was held by the enemy at which all agreed that
it would be impossible to hold out longer. General Buckner, who
was third in rank in the garrison but much the most capable
soldier, seems to have regarded it a duty to hold the fort until
the general commanding the department, A. S. Johnston, should get
back to his headquarters at Nashville. Buckner’s report shows,
however, that he considered Donelson lost and that any attempt
to hold the place longer would be at the sacrifice of the
command. Being assured that Johnston was already in Nashville,
Buckner too agreed that surrender was the proper thing. Floyd
turned over the command to Pillow, who declined it. It then
devolved upon Buckner, who accepted the responsibility of the
position. Floyd and Pillow took possession of all the river
transports at Dover and before morning both were on their way to
Nashville, with the brigade formerly commanded by Floyd and some
other troops, in all about 3,000. Some marched up the east bank
of the Cumberland; others went on the steamers. During the night
Forrest also, with his cavalry and some other troops about a
thousand in all, made their way out, passing between our right
and the river. They had to ford or swim over the back-water in
the little creek just south of Dover.

Before daylight General Smith brought to me the following letter
from General Buckner:

HEADQUARTERS, FORT DONELSON,
February 16, 1862.

SIR:–In consideration of all the circumstances governing the
present situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the
Commanding Officer of the Federal forces the appointment of
Commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces
and fort under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice
until 12 o’clock to-day.

I am, sir, very respectfully,
Your ob’t se’v’t,
S. B. BUCKNER,
Brig. Gen. C. S. A.

To Brigadier-General U. S. Grant,
Com’ding U. S. Forces,
Near Fort Donelson.

To this I responded as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY IN THE FIELD,
Camp near Donelson,
February 16, 1862.

General S. B. BUCKNER,
Confederate Army.

SIR:–Yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of
Commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just
received. No terms except an unconditional and immediate
surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon
your works.

I am, sir, very respectfully,
Your ob’t se’v’t,
U. S. GRANT,
Brig. Gen.

To this I received the following reply:

HEADQUARTERS, DOVER, TENNESSEE,
February 16, 1862.

To Brig. Gen’I U. S. GRANT,
U. S. Army.

SIR:–The distribution of the forces under my command, incident
to an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming
force under your command, compel me, notwithstanding the
brilliant success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to accept
the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose.

I am, sir,
Your very ob’t se’v’t,
S. B. BUCKNER,
Brig. Gen. C. S. A.

General Buckner, as soon as he had dispatched the first of the
above letters, sent word to his different commanders on the line
of rifle-pits, notifying them that he had made a proposition
looking to the surrender of the garrison, and directing them to
notify National troops in their front so that all fighting might
be prevented. White flags were stuck at intervals along the line
of rifle-pits, but none over the fort. As soon as the last
letter from Buckner was received I mounted my horse and rode to
Dover. General Wallace, I found, had preceded me an hour or
more. I presume that, seeing white flags exposed in his front,
he rode up to see what they meant and, not being fired upon or
halted, he kept on until he found himself at the headquarters of
General Buckner.

I had been at West Point three years with Buckner and afterwards
served with him in the army, so that we were quite well
acquainted. In the course of our conversation, which was very
friendly, he said to me that if he had been in command I would
not have got up to Donelson as easily as I did. I told him that
if he had been in command I should not have tried in the way I
did: I had invested their lines with a smaller force than they
had to defend them, and at the same time had sent a brigade full
5,000 strong, around by water; I had relied very much upon their
commander to allow me to come safely up to the outside of their
works. I asked General Buckner about what force he had to
surrender. He replied that he could not tell with any degree of
accuracy; that all the sick and weak had been sent to Nashville
while we were about Fort Henry; that Floyd and Pillow had left
during the night, taking many men with them; and that Forrest,
and probably others, had also escaped during the preceding
night: the number of casualties he could not tell; but he said
I would not find fewer than 12,000, nor more than 15,000.

He asked permission to send parties outside of the lines to bury
his dead, who had fallen on the 15th when they tried to get
out. I gave directions that his permit to pass our limits
should be recognized. I have no reason to believe that this
privilege was abused, but it familiarized our guards so much
with the sight of Confederates passing to and fro that I have no
doubt many got beyond our pickets unobserved and went on. The
most of the men who went in that way no doubt thought they had
had war enough, and left with the intention of remaining out of
the army. Some came to me and asked permission to go, saying
that they were tired of the war and would not be caught in the
ranks again, and I bade them go.

The actual number of Confederates at Fort Donelson can never be
given with entire accuracy. The largest number admitted by any
writer on the Southern side, is by Colonel Preston Johnston. He
gives the number at 17,000. But this must be an underestimate.
The commissary general of prisoners reported having issued
rations to 14,623 Fort Donelson prisoners at Cairo, as they
passed that point. General Pillow reported the killed and
wounded at 2,000; but he had less opportunity of knowing the
actual numbers than the officers of McClernand’s division, for
most of the killed and wounded fell outside their works, in
front of that division, and were buried or cared for by Buckner
after the surrender and when Pillow was a fugitive. It is known
that Floyd and Pillow escaped during the night of the 15th,
taking with them not less than 3,000 men. Forrest escaped with
about 1,000 and others were leaving singly and in squads all
night. It is probable that the Confederate force at Donelson,
on the 15th of February, 1862, was 21,000 in round numbers.

On the day Fort Donelson fell I had 27,000 men to confront the
Confederate lines and guard the road four or five miles to the
left, over which all our supplies had to be drawn on wagons.
During the 16th, after the surrender, additional reinforcements
arrived.

During the siege General Sherman had been sent to Smithland, at
the mouth of the Cumberland River, to forward reinforcements and
supplies to me. At that time he was my senior in rank and there
was no authority of law to assign a junior to command a senior
of the same grade. But every boat that came up with supplies or
reinforcements brought a note of encouragement from Sherman,
asking me to call upon him for any assistance he could render
and saying that if he could be of service at the front I might
send for him and he would waive rank.

CHAPTER XXIII.

PROMOTED MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS–UNOCCUPIED
TERRITORY–ADVANCE UPON NASHVILLE–SITUATION OF THE
TROOPS–CONFEDERATE RETREAT–RELIEVED OF THE COMMAND –RESTORED
TO THE COMMAND–GENERAL SMITH.

The news of the fall of Fort Donelson caused great delight all
over the North. At the South, particularly in Richmond, the
effect was correspondingly depressing. I was promptly promoted
to the grade of Major-General of Volunteers, and confirmed by
the Senate. All three of my division commanders were promoted
to the same grade and the colonels who commanded brigades were
made brigadier-generals in the volunteer service. My chief, who
was in St. Louis, telegraphed his congratulations to General
Hunter in Kansas for the services he had rendered in securing
the fall of Fort Donelson by sending reinforcements so
rapidly. To Washington he telegraphed that the victory was due
to General C. F. Smith; “promote him,” he said, “and the whole
country will applaud.” On the 19th there was published at St.
Louis a formal order thanking Flag-officer Foote and myself, and
the forces under our command, for the victories on the Tennessee
and the Cumberland. I received no other recognition whatever
from General Halleck. But General Cullum, his chief of staff,
who was at Cairo, wrote me a warm congratulatory letter on his
own behalf. I approved of General Smith’s promotion highly, as
I did all the promotions that were made.

My opinion was and still is that immediately after the fall of
Fort Donelson the way was opened to the National forces all over
the South-west without much resistance. If one general who would
have taken the responsibility had been in command of all the
troops west of the Alleghanies, he could have marched to
Chattanooga, Corinth, Memphis and Vicksburg with the troops we
then had, and as volunteering was going on rapidly over the
North there would soon have been force enough at all these
centres to operate offensively against any body of the enemy
that might be found near them. Rapid movements and the
acquisition of rebellious territory would have promoted
volunteering, so that reinforcements could have been had as fast
as transportation could have been obtained to carry them to their
destination. On the other hand there were tens of thousands of
strong able-bodied young men still at their homes in the
South-western States, who had not gone into the Confederate army
in February, 1862, and who had no particular desire to go. If
our lines had been extended to protect their homes, many of them
never would have gone. Providence ruled differently. Time was
given the enemy to collect armies and fortify his new positions;
and twice afterwards he came near forcing his north-western front
up to the Ohio River.

I promptly informed the department commander of our success at
Fort Donelson and that the way was open now to Clarksville and
Nashville; and that unless I received orders to the contrary I
should take Clarksville on the 21st and Nashville about the 1st
of March. Both these places are on the Cumberland River above
Fort Donelson. As I heard nothing from headquarters on the
subject, General C. F. Smith was sent to Clarksville at the time
designated and found the place evacuated. The capture of forts
Henry and Donelson had broken the line the enemy had taken from
Columbus to Bowling Green, and it was known that he was falling
back from the eastern point of this line and that Buell was
following, or at least advancing. I should have sent troops to
Nashville at the time I sent to Clarksville, but my
transportation was limited and there were many prisoners to be
forwarded north.

None of the reinforcements from Buell’s army arrived until the
24th of February. Then General Nelson came up, with orders to
report to me with two brigades, he having sent one brigade to
Cairo. I knew General Buell was advancing on Nashville from the
north, and I was advised by scouts that the rebels were leaving
that place, and trying to get out all the supplies they could.
Nashville was, at that time, one of the best provisioned posts
in the South. I had no use for reinforcements now, and thinking
Buell would like to have his troops again, I ordered Nelson to
proceed to Nashville without debarking at Fort Donelson. I sent
a gunboat also as a convoy. The Cumberland River was very high
at the time; the railroad bridge at Nashville had been burned,
and all river craft had been destroyed, or would be before the
enemy left. Nashville is on the west bank of the Cumberland,
and Buell was approaching from the east. I thought the steamers
carrying Nelson’s division would be useful in ferrying the
balance of Buell’s forces across. I ordered Nelson to put
himself in communication with Buell as soon as possible, and if
he found him more than two days off from Nashville to return
below the city and await orders. Buell, however, had already
arrived in person at Edgefield, opposite Nashville, and
Mitchell’s division of his command reached there the same day.
Nelson immediately took possession of the city.

After Nelson had gone and before I had learned of Buell’s
arrival, I sent word to department headquarters that I should go
to Nashville myself on the 28th if I received no orders to the
contrary. Hearing nothing, I went as I had informed my superior
officer I would do. On arriving at Clarksville I saw a fleet of
steamers at the shore–the same that had taken Nelson’s
division–and troops going aboard. I landed and called on the
commanding officer, General C. F. Smith. As soon as he saw me
he showed an order he had just received from Buell in these
words:

NASHVILLE, February 25, 1862.

GENERAL C. F. SMITH,
Commanding U. S. Forces, Clarksville.

GENERAL:–The landing of a portion of our troops, contrary to my
intentions, on the south side of the river has compelled me to
hold this side at every hazard. If the enemy should assume the
offensive, and I am assured by reliable persons that in view of
my position such is his intention, my force present is
altogether inadequate, consisting of only 15,000 men. I have to
request you, therefore, to come forward with all the available
force under your command. So important do I consider the
occasion that I think it necessary to give this communication
all the force of orders, and I send four boats, the Diana,
Woodford, John Rain, and Autocrat, to bring you up. In five or
six days my force will probably be sufficient to relieve you.

Very respectfully, your ob’t srv’t,
D. C. BUELL,
Brigadier-General Comd’g.

P. S.–The steamers will leave here at 12 o’clock to-night.

General Smith said this order was nonsense. But I told him it
was better to obey it. The General replied, “of course I must
obey,” and said his men were embarking as fast as they could. I
went on up to Nashville and inspected the position taken by
Nelson’s troops. I did not see Buell during the day, and wrote
him a note saying that I had been in Nashville since early
morning and had hoped to meet him. On my return to the boat we
met. His troops were still east of the river, and the steamers
that had carried Nelson’s division up were mostly at Clarksville
to bring Smith’s division. I said to General Buell my
information was that the enemy was retreating as fast as
possible. General Buell said there was fighting going on then
only ten or twelve miles away. I said: “Quite probably;
Nashville contained valuable stores of arms, ammunition and
provisions, and the enemy is probably trying to carry away all
he can. The fighting is doubtless with the rear-guard who are
trying to protect the trains they are getting away with.” Buell
spoke very positively of the danger Nashville was in of an attack
from the enemy. I said, in the absence of positive information,
I believed my information was correct. He responded that he
“knew.” “Well,” I said, “I do not know; but as I came by
Clarksville General Smith’s troops were embarking to join you.”

Smith’s troops were returned the same day. The enemy were
trying to get away from Nashville and not to return to it.

At this time General Albert Sidney Johnston commanded all the
Confederate troops west of the Alleghany Mountains, with the
exception of those in the extreme south. On the National side
the forces confronting him were divided into, at first three,
then four separate departments. Johnston had greatly the
advantage in having supreme command over all troops that could
possibly be brought to bear upon one point, while the forces
similarly situated on the National side, divided into
independent commands, could not be brought into harmonious
action except by orders from Washington.

At the beginning of 1862 Johnston’s troops east of the
Mississippi occupied a line extending from Columbus, on his
left, to Mill Springs, on his right. As we have seen, Columbus,
both banks of the Tennessee River, the west bank of the
Cumberland and Bowling Green, all were strongly fortified. Mill
Springs was intrenched. The National troops occupied no
territory south of the Ohio, except three small garrisons along
its bank and a force thrown out from Louisville to confront that
at Bowling Green. Johnston’s strength was no doubt numerically
inferior to that of the National troops; but this was
compensated for by the advantage of being sole commander of all
the Confederate forces at the West, and of operating in a
country where his friends would take care of his rear without
any detail of soldiers. But when General George H. Thomas moved
upon the enemy at Mill Springs and totally routed him, inflicting
a loss of some 300 killed and wounded, and forts Henry and Heiman
fell into the hands of the National forces, with their armaments
and about 100 prisoners, those losses seemed to dishearten the
Confederate commander so much that he immediately commenced a
retreat from Bowling Green on Nashville. He reached this latter
place on the 14th of February, while Donelson was still
besieged. Buell followed with a portion of the Army of the
Ohio, but he had to march and did not reach the east bank of the
Cumberland opposite Nashville until the 24th of the month, and
then with only one division of his army.

The bridge at Nashville had been destroyed and all boats removed
or disabled, so that a small garrison could have held the place
against any National troops that could have been brought against
it within ten days after the arrival of the force from Bowling
Green. Johnston seemed to lie quietly at Nashville to await the
result at Fort Donelson, on which he had staked the possession of
most of the territory embraced in the States of Kentucky and
Tennessee. It is true, the two generals senior in rank at Fort
Donelson were sending him encouraging dispatches, even claiming
great Confederate victories up to the night of the 16th when
they must have been preparing for their individual escape.
Johnston made a fatal mistake in intrusting so important a
command to Floyd, who he must have known was no soldier even if
he possessed the elements of one. Pillow’s presence as second
was also a mistake. If these officers had been forced upon him
and designated for that particular command, then he should have
left Nashville with a small garrison under a trusty officer, and
with the remainder of his force gone to Donelson himself. If he
had been captured the result could not have been worse than it
was.

Johnston’s heart failed him upon the first advance of National
troops. He wrote to Richmond on the 8th of February, “I think
the gunboats of the enemy will probably take Fort Donelson
without the necessity of employing their land force in
cooperation.” After the fall of that place he abandoned
Nashville and Chattanooga without an effort to save either, and
fell back into northern Mississippi, where, six weeks later, he
was destined to end his career.

From the time of leaving Cairo I was singularly unfortunate in
not receiving dispatches from General Halleck. The order of the
10th of February directing me to fortify Fort Henry strongly,
particularly to the land side, and saying that intrenching tools
had been sent for that purpose, reached me after Donelson was
invested. I received nothing direct which indicated that the
department commander knew we were in possession of Donelson. I
was reporting regularly to the chief of staff, who had been sent
to Cairo, soon after the troops left there, to receive all
reports from the front and to telegraph the substance to the St.
Louis headquarters. Cairo was at the southern end of the
telegraph wire. Another line was started at once from Cairo to
Paducah and Smithland, at the mouths of the Tennessee and
Cumberland respectively. My dispatches were all sent to Cairo
by boat, but many of those addressed to me were sent to the
operator at the end of the advancing wire and he failed to
forward them. This operator afterwards proved to be a rebel; he
deserted his post after a short time and went south taking his
dispatches with him. A telegram from General McClellan to me of
February 16th, the day of the surrender, directing me to report
in full the situation, was not received at my headquarters until
the 3d of March.

On the 2d of March I received orders dated March 1st to move my
command back to Fort Henry, leaving only a small garrison at
Donelson. From Fort Henry expeditions were to be sent against
Eastport, Mississippi, and Paris, Tennessee. We started from
Donelson on the 4th, and the same day I was back on the
Tennessee River. On March 4th I also received the following
dispatch from General Halleck:

MAJ.-GEN. U. S. GRANT,
Fort Henry:

You will place Maj.-Gen. C. F. Smith in command of expedition,
and remain yourself at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey my
orders to report strength and positions of your command?

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.

I was surprised. This was the first intimation I had received
that General Halleck had called for information as to the
strength of my command. On the 6th he wrote to me again. “Your
going to Nashville without authority, and when your presence with
your troops was of the utmost importance, was a matter of very
serious complaint at Washington, so much so that I was advised
to arrest you on your return.” This was the first I knew of his
objecting to my going to Nashville. That place was not beyond
the limits of my command, which, it had been expressly declared
in orders, were “not defined.” Nashville is west of the
Cumberland River, and I had sent troops that had reported to me
for duty to occupy the place. I turned over the command as
directed and then replied to General Halleck courteously, but
asked to be relieved from further duty under him.

Later I learned that General Halleck had been calling lustily
for more troops, promising that he would do something important
if he could only be sufficiently reinforced. McClellan asked
him what force he then had. Halleck telegraphed me to supply
the information so far as my command was concerned, but I
received none of his dispatches. At last Halleck reported to
Washington that he had repeatedly ordered me to give the
strength of my force, but could get nothing out of me; that I
had gone to Nashville, beyond the limits of my command, without
his authority, and that my army was more demoralized by victory
than the army at Bull Run had been by defeat. General
McClellan, on this information, ordered that I should be
relieved from duty and that an investigation should be made into
any charges against me. He even authorized my arrest. Thus in
less than two weeks after the victory at Donelson, the two
leading generals in the army were in correspondence as to what
disposition should be made of me, and in less than three weeks I
was virtually in arrest and without a command.

On the 13th of March I was restored to command, and on the 17th
Halleck sent me a copy of an order from the War Department which
stated that accounts of my misbehavior had reached Washington and
directed him to investigate and report the facts. He forwarded
also a copy of a detailed dispatch from himself to Washington
entirely exonerating me; but he did not inform me that it was
his own reports that had created all the trouble. On the
contrary, he wrote to me, “Instead of relieving you, I wish you,
as soon as your new army is in the field, to assume immediate
command, and lead it to new victories.” In consequence I felt
very grateful to him, and supposed it was his interposition that
had set me right with the government. I never knew the truth
until General Badeau unearthed the facts in his researches for
his history of my campaigns.

General Halleck unquestionably deemed General C. F. Smith a much
fitter officer for the command of all the forces in the military
district than I was, and, to render him available for such
command, desired his promotion to antedate mine and those of the
other division commanders. It is probable that the general
opinion was that Smith’s long services in the army and
distinguished deeds rendered him the more proper person for such
command. Indeed I was rather inclined to this opinion myself at
that time, and would have served as faithfully under Smith as he
had done under me. But this did not justify the dispatches which
General Halleck sent to Washington, or his subsequent concealment
of them from me when pretending to explain the action of my
superiors.

On receipt of the order restoring me to command I proceeded to
Savannah on the Tennessee, to which point my troops had
advanced. General Smith was delighted to see me and was
unhesitating in his denunciation of the treatment I had
received. He was on a sick bed at the time, from which he never
came away alive. His death was a severe loss to our western
army. His personal courage was unquestioned, his judgment and
professional acquirements were unsurpassed, and he had the
confidence of those he commanded as well as of those over him.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE ARMY AT PITTSBURG LANDING–INJURED BY A FALL–THE
CONFEDERATE ATTACK AT SHILOH–THE FIRST DAY’S FIGHT AT
SHILOH–GENERAL SHERMAN–CONDITION OF THE ARMY–CLOSE
OF THE FIRST DAY’S FIGHT–THE SECOND DAY’S FIGHT–RETREAT AND
DEFEAT OF THE CONFEDERATES.

When I reassumed command on the 17th of March I found the army
divided, about half being on the east bank of the Tennessee at
Savannah, while one division was at Crump’s landing on the west
bank about four miles higher up, and the remainder at Pittsburg
landing, five miles above Crump’s. The enemy was in force at
Corinth, the junction of the two most important railroads in the
Mississippi valley–one connecting Memphis and the Mississippi
River with the East, and the other leading south to all the
cotton states. Still another railroad connects Corinth with
Jackson, in west Tennessee. If we obtained possession of
Corinth the enemy would have no railroad for the transportation
of armies or supplies until that running east from Vicksburg was
reached. It was the great strategic position at the West between
the Tennessee and the Mississippi rivers and between Nashville
and Vicksburg.

I at once put all the troops at Savannah in motion for Pittsburg
landing, knowing that the enemy was fortifying at Corinth and
collecting an army there under Johnston. It was my expectation
to march against that army as soon as Buell, who had been
ordered to reinforce me with the Army of the Ohio, should
arrive; and the west bank of the river was the place to start
from. Pittsburg is only about twenty miles from Corinth, and
Hamburg landing, four miles further up the river, is a mile or
two nearer. I had not been in command long before I selected
Hamburg as the place to put the Army of the Ohio when it
arrived. The roads from Pittsburg and Hamburg to Corinth
converge some eight miles out. This disposition of the troops
would have given additional roads to march over when the advance
commenced, within supporting distance of each other.

Before I arrived at Savannah, Sherman, who had joined the Army
of the Tennessee and been placed in command of a division, had
made an expedition on steamers convoyed by gunboats to the
neighborhood of Eastport, thirty miles south, for the purpose of
destroying the railroad east of Corinth. The rains had been so
heavy for some time before that the low-lands had become
impassable swamps. Sherman debarked his troops and started out
to accomplish the object of the expedition; but the river was
rising so rapidly that the back-water up the small tributaries
threatened to cut off the possibility of getting back to the
boats, and the expedition had to return without reaching the
railroad. The guns had to be hauled by hand through the water
to get back to the boats.

On the 17th of March the army on the Tennessee River consisted
of five divisions, commanded respectively by Generals C. F.
Smith, McClernand, L. Wallace, Hurlbut and Sherman. General W.
H. L. Wallace was temporarily in command of Smith’s division,
General Smith, as I have said, being confined to his bed.
Reinforcements were arriving daily and as they came up they were
organized, first into brigades, then into a division, and the
command given to General Prentiss, who had been ordered to
report to me. General Buell was on his way from Nashville with
40,000 veterans. On the 19th of March he was at Columbia,
Tennessee, eighty-five miles from Pittsburg. When all
reinforcements should have arrived I expected to take the
initiative by marching on Corinth, and had no expectation of
needing fortifications, though this subject was taken into
consideration. McPherson, my only military engineer, was
directed to lay out a line to intrench. He did so, but reported
that it would have to be made in rear of the line of encampment
as it then ran. The new line, while it would be nearer the
river, was yet too far away from the Tennessee, or even from the
creeks, to be easily supplied with water, and in case of attack
these creeks would be in the hands of the enemy. The fact is, I
regarded the campaign we were engaged in as an offensive one and
had no idea that the enemy would leave strong intrenchments to
take the initiative when he knew he would be attacked where he
was if he remained. This view, however, did not prevent every
precaution being taken and every effort made to keep advised of
all movements of the enemy.

Johnston’s cavalry meanwhile had been well out towards our
front, and occasional encounters occurred between it and our
outposts. On the 1st of April this cavalry became bold and
approached our lines, showing that an advance of some kind was
contemplated. On the 2d Johnston left Corinth in force to
attack my army. On the 4th his cavalry dashed down and captured
a small picket guard of six or seven men, stationed some five
miles out from Pittsburg on the Corinth road. Colonel Buckland
sent relief to the guard at once and soon followed in person
with an entire regiment, and General Sherman followed Buckland
taking the remainder of a brigade. The pursuit was kept up for
some three miles beyond the point where the picket guard had
been captured, and after nightfall Sherman returned to camp and
reported to me by letter what had occurred.

At this time a large body of the enemy was hovering to the west
of us, along the line of the Mobile and Ohio railroad. My
apprehension was much greater for the safety of Crump’s landing
than it was for Pittsburg. I had no apprehension that the enemy
could really capture either place. But I feared it was possible
that he might make a rapid dash upon Crump’s and destroy our
transports and stores, most of which were kept at that point,
and then retreat before Wallace could be reinforced. Lew.
Wallace’s position I regarded as so well chosen that he was not
removed.

At this time I generally spent the day at Pittsburg and returned
to Savannah in the evening. I was intending to remove my
headquarters to Pittsburg, but Buell was expected daily and
would come in at Savannah. I remained at this point, therefore,
a few days longer than I otherwise should have done, in order to
meet him on his arrival. The skirmishing in our front, however,
had been so continuous from about the 3d of April that I did not
leave Pittsburg each night until an hour when I felt there would
be no further danger before the morning.

On Friday the 4th, the day of Buckland’s advance, I was very
much injured by my horse falling with me, and on me, while I was
trying to get to the front where firing had been heard. The
night was one of impenetrable darkness, with rain pouring down
in torrents; nothing was visible to the eye except as revealed
by the frequent flashes of lightning. Under these circumstances
I had to trust to the horse, without guidance, to keep the
road. I had not gone far, however, when I met General W. H. L.
Wallace and Colonel (afterwards General) McPherson coming from
the direction of the front. They said all was quiet so far as
the enemy was concerned. On the way back to the boat my horse’s
feet slipped from under him, and he fell with my leg under his
body. The extreme softness of the ground, from the excessive
rains of the few preceding days, no doubt saved me from a severe
injury and protracted lameness. As it was, my ankle was very
much injured, so much so that my boot had to be cut off. For
two or three days after I was unable to walk except with
crutches.

On the 5th General Nelson, with a division of Buell’s army,
arrived at Savannah and I ordered him to move up the east bank
of the river, to be in a position where he could be ferried over
to Crump’s landing or Pittsburg as occasion required. I had
learned that General Buell himself would be at Savannah the next
day, and desired to meet me on his arrival. Affairs at Pittsburg
landing had been such for several days that I did not want to be
away during the day. I determined, therefore, to take a very
early breakfast and ride out to meet Buell, and thus save
time. He had arrived on the evening of the 5th, but had not
advised me of the fact and I was not aware of it until some time
after. While I was at breakfast, however, heavy firing was heard
in the direction of Pittsburg landing, and I hastened there,
sending a hurried note to Buell informing him of the reason why
I could not meet him at Savannah. On the way up the river I
directed the dispatch-boat to run in close to Crump’s landing,
so that I could communicate with General Lew. Wallace. I found
him waiting on a boat apparently expecting to see me, and I
directed him to get his troops in line ready to execute any
orders he might receive. He replied that his troops were
already under arms and prepared to move.

Up to that time I had felt by no means certain that Crump’s
landing might not be the point of attack. On reaching the
front, however, about eight A.M., I found that the attack on
Pittsburg was unmistakable, and that nothing more than a small
guard, to protect our transports and stores, was needed at
Crump’s. Captain Baxter, a quartermaster on my staff, was
accordingly directed to go back and order General Wallace to
march immediately to Pittsburg by the road nearest the river.
Captain Baxter made a memorandum of this order. About one P.M.,
not hearing from Wallace and being much in need of
reinforcements, I sent two more of my staff, Colonel McPherson
and Captain Rowley, to bring him up with his division. They
reported finding him marching towards Purdy, Bethel, or some
point west from the river, and farther from Pittsburg by several
miles than when he started. The road from his first position to
Pittsburg landing was direct and near the river. Between the
two points a bridge had been built across Snake Creek by our
troops, at which Wallace’s command had assisted, expressly to
enable the troops at the two places to support each other in
case of need. Wallace did not arrive in time to take part in
the first day’s fight. General Wallace has since claimed that
the order delivered to him by Captain Baxter was simply to join
the right of the army, and that the road over which he marched
would have taken him to the road from Pittsburg to Purdy where
it crosses Owl Creek on the right of Sherman; but this is not
where I had ordered him nor where I wanted him to go.

I never could see and do not now see why any order was necessary
further than to direct him to come to Pittsburg landing, without
specifying by what route. His was one of three veteran
divisions that had been in battle, and its absence was severely
felt. Later in the war General Wallace would not have made the
mistake that he committed on the 6th of April, 1862. I presume
his idea was that by taking the route he did he would be able to
come around on the flank or rear of the enemy, and thus perform
an act of heroism that would redound to the credit of his
command, as well as to the benefit of his country.

Some two or three miles from Pittsburg landing was a log
meeting-house called Shiloh. It stood on the ridge which
divides the waters of Snake and Lick creeks, the former emptying
into the Tennessee just north of Pittsburg landing, and the
latter south. This point was the key to our position and was
held by Sherman. His division was at that time wholly raw, no
part of it ever having been in an engagement; but I thought this
deficiency was more than made up by the superiority of the
commander. McClernand was on Sherman’s left, with troops that
had been engaged at forts Henry and Donelson and were therefore
veterans so far as western troops had become such at that stage
of the war. Next to McClernand came Prentiss with a raw
division, and on the extreme left, Stuart with one brigade of
Sherman’s division. Hurlbut was in rear of Prentiss, massed,
and in reserve at the time of the onset. The division of
General C. F. Smith was on the right, also in reserve. General
Smith was still sick in bed at Savannah, but within hearing of
our guns. His services would no doubt have been of inestimable
value had his health permitted his presence. The command of his
division devolved upon Brigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace, a most
estimable and able officer; a veteran too, for he had served a
year in the Mexican war and had been with his command at Henry
and Donelson. Wallace was mortally wounded in the first day’s
engagement, and with the change of commanders thus necessarily
effected in the heat of battle the efficiency of his division
was much weakened.

The position of our troops made a continuous line from Lick
Creek on the left to Owl Creek, a branch of Snake Creek, on the
right, facing nearly south and possibly a little west. The
water in all these streams was very high at the time and
contributed to protect our flanks. The enemy was compelled,
therefore, to attack directly in front. This he did with great
vigor, inflicting heavy losses on the National side, but
suffering much heavier on his own.

The Confederate assaults were made with such a disregard of
losses on their own side that our line of tents soon fell into
their hands. The ground on which the battle was fought was
undulating, heavily timbered with scattered clearings, the woods
giving some protection to the troops on both sides. There was
also considerable underbrush. A number of attempts were made by
the enemy to turn our right flank, where Sherman was posted, but
every effort was repulsed with heavy loss. But the front attack
was kept up so vigorously that, to prevent the success of these
attempts to get on our flanks, the National troops were
compelled, several times, to take positions to the rear nearer
Pittsburg landing. When the firing ceased at night the National
line was all of a mile in rear of the position it had occupied in
the morning.

In one of the backward moves, on the 6th, the division commanded
by General Prentiss did not fall back with the others. This left
his flanks exposed and enabled the enemy to capture him with
about 2,200 of his officers and men. General Badeau gives four
o’clock of the 6th as about the time this capture took place. He
may be right as to the time, but my recollection is that the hour
was later. General Prentiss himself gave the hour as half-past
five. I was with him, as I was with each of the division
commanders that day, several times, and my recollection is that
the last time I was with him was about half-past four, when his
division was standing up firmly and the General was as cool as
if expecting victory. But no matter whether it was four or
later, the story that he and his command were surprised and
captured in their camps is without any foundation whatever. If
it had been true, as currently reported at the time and yet
believed by thousands of people, that Prentiss and his division
had been captured in their beds, there would not have been an
all-day struggle, with the loss of thousands killed and wounded
on the Confederate side.

With the single exception of a few minutes after the capture of
Prentiss, a continuous and unbroken line was maintained all day
from Snake Creek or its tributaries on the right to Lick Creek
or the Tennessee on the left above Pittsburg.

There was no hour during the day when there was not heavy firing
and generally hard fighting at some point on the line, but seldom
at all points at the same time. It was a case of Southern dash
against Northern pluck and endurance. Three of the five
divisions engaged on Sunday were entirely raw, and many of the
men had only received their arms on the way from their States to
the field. Many of them had arrived but a day or two before and
were hardly able to load their muskets according to the
manual. Their officers were equally ignorant of their duties.
Under these circumstances it is not astonishing that many of the
regiments broke at the first fire. In two cases, as I now
remember, colonels led their regiments from the field on first
hearing the whistle of the enemy’s bullets. In these cases the
colonels were constitutional cowards, unfit for any military
position; but not so the officers and men led out of danger by
them. Better troops never went upon a battle-field than many of
these, officers and men, afterwards proved themselves to be, who
fled panic stricken at the first whistle of bullets and shell at
Shiloh.

During the whole of Sunday I was continuously engaged in passing
from one part of the field to another, giving directions to
division commanders. In thus moving along the line, however, I
never deemed it important to stay long with Sherman. Although
his troops were then under fire for the first time, their
commander, by his constant presence with them, inspired a
confidence in officers and men that enabled them to render
services on that bloody battle-field worthy of the best of
veterans. McClernand was next to Sherman, and the hardest
fighting was in front of these two divisions. McClernand told
me on that day, the 6th, that he profited much by having so able
a commander supporting him. A casualty to Sherman that would
have taken him from the field that day would have been a sad one
for the troops engaged at Shiloh. And how near we came to this!
On the 6th Sherman was shot twice, once in the hand, once in the
shoulder, the ball cutting his coat and making a slight wound,
and a third ball passed through his hat. In addition to this he
had several horses shot during the day.

The nature of this battle was such that cavalry could not be
used in front; I therefore formed ours into line in rear, to
stop stragglers–of whom there were many. When there would be
enough of them to make a show, and after they had recovered from
their fright, they would be sent to reinforce some part of the
line which needed support, without regard to their companies,
regiments or brigades.

On one occasion during the day I rode back as far as the river
and met General Buell, who had just arrived; I do not remember
the hour, but at that time there probably were as many as four
or five thousand stragglers lying under cover of the river
bluff, panic-stricken, most of whom would have been shot where
they lay, without resistance, before they would have taken
muskets and marched to the front to protect themselves. This
meeting between General Buell and myself was on the
dispatch-boat used to run between the landing and Savannah. It
was brief, and related specially to his getting his troops over
the river. As we left the boat together, Buell’s attention was
attracted by the men lying under cover of the river bank. I saw
him berating them and trying to shame them into joining their
regiments. He even threatened them with shells from the
gunboats near by. But it was all to no effect. Most of these
men afterward proved themselves as gallant as any of those who
saved the battle from which they had deserted. I have no doubt
that this sight impressed General Buell with the idea that a
line of retreat would be a good thing just then. If he had come
in by the front instead of through the stragglers in the rear, he
would have thought and felt differently. Could he have come
through the Confederate rear, he would have witnessed there a
scene similar to that at our own. The distant rear of an army
engaged in battle is not the best place from which to judge
correctly what is going on in front. Later in the war, while
occupying the country between the Tennessee and the Mississippi,
I learned that the panic in the Confederate lines had not
differed much from that within our own. Some of the country
people estimated the stragglers from Johnston’s army as high as
20,000. Of course this was an exaggeration.

The situation at the close of Sunday was as follows: along the
top of the bluff just south of the log-house which stood at
Pittsburg landing, Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff, had
arranged twenty or more pieces of artillery facing south or up
the river. This line of artillery was on the crest of a hill
overlooking a deep ravine opening into the Tennessee. Hurlbut
with his division intact was on the right of this artillery,
extending west and possibly a little north. McClernand came
next in the general line, looking more to the west. His
division was complete in its organization and ready for any
duty. Sherman came next, his right extending to Snake Creek.
His command, like the other two, was complete in its
organization and ready, like its chief, for any service it might
be called upon to render. All three divisions were, as a matter
of course, more or less shattered and depleted in numbers from
the terrible battle of the day. The division of W. H. L.
Wallace, as much from the disorder arising from changes of
division and brigade commanders, under heavy fire, as from any
other cause, had lost its organization and did not occupy a
place in the line as a division. Prentiss’ command was gone as
a division, many of its members having been killed, wounded or
captured, but it had rendered valiant services before its final
dispersal, and had contributed a good share to the defence of
Shiloh.

The right of my line rested near the bank of Snake Creek, a
short distance above the bridge which had been built by the
troops for the purpose of connecting Crump’s landing and
Pittsburg landing. Sherman had posted some troops in a
log-house and out-buildings which overlooked both the bridge
over which Wallace was expected and the creek above that
point. In this last position Sherman was frequently attacked
before night, but held the point until he voluntarily abandoned
it to advance in order to make room for Lew. Wallace, who came
up after dark.

There was, as I have said, a deep ravine in front of our left.
The Tennessee River was very high and there was water to a
considerable depth in the ravine. Here the enemy made a last
desperate effort to turn our flank, but was repelled. The
gunboats Tyler and Lexington, Gwin and Shirk commanding, with
the artillery under Webster, aided the army and effectually
checked their further progress. Before any of Buell’s troops
had reached the west bank of the Tennessee, firing had almost
entirely ceased; anything like an attempt on the part of the
enemy to advance had absolutely ceased. There was some
artillery firing from an unseen enemy, some of his shells
passing beyond us; but I do not remember that there was the
whistle of a single musket-ball heard. As his troops arrived in
the dusk General Buell marched several of his regiments part way
down the face of the hill where they fired briskly for some
minutes, but I do not think a single man engaged in this firing
received an injury. The attack had spent its force.

General Lew. Wallace, with 5,000 effective men, arrived after
firing had ceased for the day, and was placed on the right. Thus
night came, Wallace came, and the advance of Nelson’s division
came; but none–unless night–in time to be of material service
to the gallant men who saved Shiloh on that first day against
large odds. Buell’s loss on the 6th of April was two men killed
and one wounded, all members of the 36th Indiana infantry. The
Army of the Tennessee lost on that day at least 7,000 men. The
presence of two or three regiments of Buell’s army on the west
bank before firing ceased had not the slightest effect in
preventing the capture of Pittsburg landing.

So confident was I before firing had ceased on the 6th that the
next day would bring victory to our arms if we could only take
the initiative, that I visited each division commander in person
before any reinforcements had reached the field. I directed them
to throw out heavy lines of skirmishers in the morning as soon as
they could see, and push them forward until they found the enemy,
following with their entire divisions in supporting distance, and
to engage the enemy as soon as found. To Sherman I told the
story of the assault at Fort Donelson, and said that the same
tactics would win at Shiloh. Victory was assured when Wallace
arrived, even if there had been no other support. I was glad,
however, to see the reinforcements of Buell and credit them with
doing all there was for them to do.

During the night of the 6th the remainder of Nelson’s division,
Buell’s army crossed the river and were ready to advance in the
morning, forming the left wing. Two other divisions,
Crittenden’s and McCook’s, came up the river from Savannah in
the transports and were on the west bank early on the 7th. Buell
commanded them in person. My command was thus nearly doubled in
numbers and efficiency.

During the night rain fell in torrents and our troops were
exposed to the storm without shelter. I made my headquarters
under a tree a few hundred yards back from the river bank. My
ankle was so much swollen from the fall of my horse the Friday
night preceding, and the bruise was so painful, that I could get
no rest.

The drenching rain would have precluded the possibility of sleep
without this additional cause. Some time after midnight, growing
restive under the storm and the continuous pain, I moved back to
the log-house under the bank. This had been taken as a
hospital, and all night wounded men were being brought in, their
wounds dressed, a leg or an arm amputated as the case might
require, and everything being done to save life or alleviate
suffering. The sight was more unendurable than encountering the
enemy’s fire, and I returned to my tree in the rain.

The advance on the morning of the 7th developed the enemy in the
camps occupied by our troops before the battle began, more than a
mile back from the most advanced position of the Confederates on
the day before. It is known now that they had not yet learned
of the arrival of Buell’s command. Possibly they fell back so
far to get the shelter of our tents during the rain, and also to
get away from the shells that were dropped upon them by the
gunboats every fifteen minutes during the night.

The position of the Union troops on the morning of the 7th was
as follows: General Lew. Wallace on the right; Sherman on his
left; then McClernand and then Hurlbut. Nelson, of Buell’s
army, was on our extreme left, next to the river.

Crittenden was next in line after Nelson and on his right,
McCook followed and formed the extreme right of Buell’s
command. My old command thus formed the right wing, while the
troops directly under Buell constituted the left wing of the
army. These relative positions were retained during the entire
day, or until the enemy was driven from the field.

In a very short time the battle became general all along the
line. This day everything was favorable to the Union side. We
had now become the attacking party. The enemy was driven back
all day, as we had been the day before, until finally he beat a
precipitate retreat. The last point held by him was near the
road leading from the landing to Corinth, on the left of Sherman
and right of McClernand. About three o’clock, being near that
point and seeing that the enemy was giving way everywhere else,
I gathered up a couple of regiments, or parts of regiments, from
troops near by, formed them in line of battle and marched them
forward, going in front myself to prevent premature or
long-range firing. At this point there was a clearing between
us and the enemy favorable for charging, although exposed. I
knew the enemy were ready to break and only wanted a little
encouragement from us to go quickly and join their friends who
had started earlier. After marching to within musket-range I
stopped and let the troops pass. The command, CHARGE, was
given, and was executed with loud cheers and with a run; when
the last of the enemy broke. (*7)

CHAPTER XXV.

STRUCK BY A BULLET–PRECIPITATE RETREAT OF THE
CONFEDERATES–INTRENCHMENTS AT SHILOH–GENERAL BUELL–GENERAL
JOHNSTON–REMARKS ON SHILOH.

During this second day of the battle I had been moving from
right to left and back, to see for myself the progress made. In
the early part of the afternoon, while riding with Colonel
McPherson and Major Hawkins, then my chief commissary, we got
beyond the left of our troops. We were moving along the
northern edge of a clearing, very leisurely, toward the river
above the landing. There did not appear to be an enemy to our
right, until suddenly a battery with musketry opened upon us
from the edge of the woods on the other side of the clearing.
The shells and balls whistled about our ears very fast for about
a minute. I do not think it took us longer than that to get out
of range and out of sight. In the sudden start we made, Major
Hawkins lost his hat. He did not stop to pick it up. When we
arrived at a perfectly safe position we halted to take an
account of damages. McPherson’s horse was panting as if ready
to drop. On examination it was found that a ball had struck him
forward of the flank just back of the saddle, and had gone
entirely through. In a few minutes the poor beast dropped dead;
he had given no sign of injury until we came to a stop. A ball
had struck the metal scabbard of my sword, just below the hilt,
and broken it nearly off; before the battle was over it had
broken off entirely. There were three of us: one had lost a
horse, killed; one a hat and one a sword-scabbard. All were
thankful that it was no worse.

After the rain of the night before and the frequent and heavy
rains for some days previous, the roads were almost
impassable. The enemy carrying his artillery and supply trains
over them in his retreat, made them still worse for troops
following. I wanted to pursue, but had not the heart to order
the men who had fought desperately for two days, lying in the
mud and rain whenever not fighting, and I did (*8) not feel
disposed to positively order Buell, or any part of his command,
to pursue. Although the senior in rank at the time I had been
so only a few weeks. Buell was, and had been for some time
past, a department commander, while I commanded only a
district. I did not meet Buell in person until too late to get
troops ready and pursue with effect; but had I seen him at the
moment of the last charge I should have at least requested him
to follow.

I rode forward several miles the day after the battle, and found
that the enemy had dropped much, if not all, of their provisions,
some ammunition and the extra wheels of their caissons,
lightening their loads to enable them to get off their guns.
About five miles out we found their field hospital abandoned. An
immediate pursuit must have resulted in the capture of a
considerable number of prisoners and probably some guns.

Shiloh was the severest battle fought at the West during the
war, and but few in the East equalled it for hard, determined
fighting. I saw an open field, in our possession on the second
day, over which the Confederates had made repeated charges the
day before, so covered with dead that it would have been
possible to walk across the clearing, in any direction, stepping
on dead bodies, without a foot touching the ground. On our side
National and Confederate troops were mingled together in about
equal proportions; but on the remainder of the field nearly all
were Confederates. On one part, which had evidently not been
ploughed for several years, probably because the land was poor,
bushes had grown up, some to the height of eight or ten feet.
There was not one of these left standing unpierced by bullets.
The smaller ones were all cut down.

Contrary to all my experience up to that time, and to the
experience of the army I was then commanding, we were on the
defensive. We were without intrenchments or defensive
advantages of any sort, and more than half the army engaged the
first day was without experience or even drill as soldiers. The
officers with them, except the division commanders and possibly
two or three of the brigade commanders, were equally
inexperienced in war. The result was a Union victory that gave
the men who achieved it great confidence in themselves ever
after.

The enemy fought bravely, but they had started out to defeat and
destroy an army and capture a position. They failed in both,
with very heavy loss in killed and wounded, and must have gone
back discouraged and convinced that the “Yankee” was not an
enemy to be despised.

After the battle I gave verbal instructions to division
commanders to let the regiments send out parties to bury their
own dead, and to detail parties, under commissioned officers
from each division, to bury the Confederate dead in their
respective fronts and to report the numbers so buried. The
latter part of these instructions was not carried out by all;
but they were by those sent from Sherman’s division, and by some
of the parties sent out by McClernand. The heaviest loss
sustained by the enemy was in front of these two divisions.

The criticism has often been made that the Union troops should
have been intrenched at Shiloh. Up to that time the pick and
spade had been but little resorted to at the West. I had,
however, taken this subject under consideration soon after
re-assuming command in the field, and, as already stated, my
only military engineer reported unfavorably. Besides this, the
troops with me, officers and men, needed discipline and drill
more than they did experience with the pick, shovel and axe.
Reinforcements were arriving almost daily, composed of troops
that had been hastily thrown together into companies and
regiments–fragments of incomplete organizations, the men and
officers strangers to each other. Under all these circumstances
I concluded that drill and discipline were worth more to our men
than fortifications.

General Buell was a brave, intelligent officer, with as much
professional pride and ambition of a commendable sort as I ever
knew. I had been two years at West Point with him, and had
served with him afterwards, in garrison and in the Mexican war,
several years more. He was not given in early life or in mature
years to forming intimate acquaintances. He was studious by
habit, and commanded the confidence and respect of all who knew
him. He was a strict disciplinarian, and perhaps did not
distinguish sufficiently between the volunteer who “enlisted for
the war” and the soldier who serves in time of peace. One system
embraced men who risked life for a principle, and often men of
social standing, competence, or wealth and independence of
character. The other includes, as a rule, only men who could
not do as well in any other occupation. General Buell became an
object of harsh criticism later, some going so far as to
challenge his loyalty. No one who knew him ever believed him
capable of a dishonorable act, and nothing could be more
dishonorable than to accept high rank and command in war and
then betray the trust. When I came into command of the army in
1864, I requested the Secretary of War to restore General Buell
to duty.

After the war, during the summer of 1865, I travelled
considerably through the North, and was everywhere met by large
numbers of people. Every one had his opinion about the manner
in which the war had been conducted: who among the generals had
failed, how, and why. Correspondents of the press were ever on
hand to hear every word dropped, and were not always disposed to
report correctly what did not confirm their preconceived notions,
either about the conduct of the war or the individuals concerned
in it. The opportunity frequently occurred for me to defend
General Buell against what I believed to be most unjust
charges. On one occasion a correspondent put in my mouth the
very charge I had so often refuted–of disloyalty. This brought
from General Buell a very severe retort, which I saw in the New
York World some time before I received the letter itself. I
could very well understand his grievance at seeing untrue and
disgraceful charges apparently sustained by an officer who, at
the time, was at the head of the army. I replied to him, but
not through the press. I kept no copy of my letter, nor did I
ever see it in print; neither did I receive an answer.

General Albert Sidney Johnston, who commanded the Confederate
forces at the beginning of the battle, was disabled by a wound
on the afternoon of the first day. This wound, as I understood
afterwards, was not necessarily fatal, or even dangerous. But
he was a man who would not abandon what he deemed an important
trust in the face of danger and consequently continued in the
saddle, commanding, until so exhausted by the loss of blood that
he had to be taken from his horse, and soon after died. The news
was not long in reaching our side and I suppose was quite an
encouragement to the National soldiers.

I had known Johnston slightly in the Mexican war and later as an
officer in the regular army. He was a man of high character and
ability. His contemporaries at West Point, and officers
generally who came to know him personally later and who remained
on our side, expected him to prove the most formidable man to
meet that the Confederacy would produce.

I once wrote that nothing occurred in his brief command of an
army to prove or disprove the high estimate that had been placed
upon his military ability; but after studying the orders and
dispatches of Johnston I am compelled to materially modify my
views of that officer’s qualifications as a soldier. My
judgment now is that he was vacillating and undecided in his
actions.

All the disasters in Kentucky and Tennessee were so discouraging
to the authorities in Richmond that Jefferson Davis wrote an
unofficial letter to Johnston expressing his own anxiety and
that of the public, and saying that he had made such defence as
was dictated by long friendship, but that in the absence of a
report he needed facts. The letter was not a reprimand in
direct terms, but it was evidently as much felt as though it had
been one. General Johnston raised another army as rapidly as he
could, and fortified or strongly intrenched at Corinth. He knew
the National troops were preparing to attack him in his chosen
position. But he had evidently become so disturbed at the
results of his operations that he resolved to strike out in an
offensive campaign which would restore all that was lost, and if
successful accomplish still more. We have the authority of his
son and biographer for saying that his plan was to attack the
forces at Shiloh and crush them; then to cross the Tennessee and
destroy the army of Buell, and push the war across the Ohio
River. The design was a bold one; but we have the same
authority for saying that in the execution Johnston showed
vacillation and indecision. He left Corinth on the 2d of April
and was not ready to attack until the 6th. The distance his
army had to march was less than twenty miles. Beauregard, his
second in command, was opposed to the attack for two reasons:
first, he thought, if let alone the National troops would attack
the Confederates in their intrenchments; second, we were in
ground of our own choosing and would necessarily be
intrenched. Johnston not only listened to the objection of
Beauregard to an attack, but held a council of war on the
subject on the morning of the 5th. On the evening of the same
day he was in consultation with some of his generals on the same
subject, and still again on the morning of the 6th. During this
last consultation, and before a decision had been reached, the
battle began by the National troops opening fire on the enemy.
This seemed to settle the question as to whether there was to be
any battle of Shiloh. It also seems to me to settle the question
as to whether there was a surprise.

I do not question the personal courage of General Johnston, or
his ability. But he did not win the distinction predicted for
him by many of his friends. He did prove that as a general he
was over-estimated.

General Beauregard was next in rank to Johnston and succeeded to
the command, which he retained to the close of the battle and
during the subsequent retreat on Corinth, as well as in the
siege of that place. His tactics have been severely criticised
by Confederate writers, but I do not believe his fallen chief
could have done any better under the circumstances. Some of
these critics claim that Shiloh was won when Johnston fell, and
that if he had not fallen the army under me would have been
annihilated or captured. IFS defeated the Confederates at
Shiloh. There is little doubt that we would have been
disgracefully beaten IF all the shells and bullets fired by us
had passed harmlessly over the enemy and IF all of theirs had
taken effect. Commanding generals are liable to be killed
during engagements; and the fact that when he was shot Johnston
was leading a brigade to induce it to make a charge which had
been repeatedly ordered, is evidence that there was neither the
universal demoralization on our side nor the unbounded
confidence on theirs which has been claimed. There was, in
fact, no hour during the day when I doubted the eventual defeat
of the enemy, although I was disappointed that reinforcements so
near at hand did not arrive at an earlier hour.

The description of the battle of Shiloh given by Colonel Wm.
Preston Johnston is very graphic and well told. The reader will
imagine that he can see each blow struck, a demoralized and
broken mob of Union soldiers, each blow sending the enemy more
demoralized than ever towards the Tennessee River, which was a
little more than two miles away at the beginning of the onset.
If the reader does not stop to inquire why, with such
Confederate success for more than twelve hours of hard fighting,
the National troops were not all killed, captured or driven into
the river, he will regard the pen picture as perfect. But I
witnessed the fight from the National side from eight o’clock in
the morning until night closed the contest. I see but little in
the description that I can recognize. The Confederate troops
fought well and deserve commendation enough for their bravery
and endurance on the 6th of April, without detracting from their
antagonists or claiming anything more than their just dues.

The reports of the enemy show that their condition at the end of
the first day was deplorable; their losses in killed and wounded
had been very heavy, and their stragglers had been quite as
numerous as on the National side, with the difference that those
of the enemy left the field entirely and were not brought back to
their respective commands for many days. On the Union side but
few of the stragglers fell back further than the landing on the
river, and many of these were in line for duty on the second
day. The admissions of the highest Confederate officers engaged
at Shiloh make the claim of a victory for them absurd. The
victory was not to either party until the battle was over. It
was then a Union victory, in which the Armies of the Tennessee
and the Ohio both participated. But the Army of the Tennessee
fought the entire rebel army on the 6th and held it at bay until
near night; and night alone closed the conflict and not the three
regiments of Nelson’s division.

The Confederates fought with courage at Shiloh, but the
particular skill claimed I could not and still cannot see;
though there is nothing to criticise except the claims put
forward for it since. But the Confederate claimants for
superiority in strategy, superiority in generalship and
superiority in dash and prowess are not so unjust to the Union
troops engaged at Shiloh as are many Northern writers. The
troops on both sides were American, and united they need not
fear any foreign foe. It is possible that the Southern man
started in with a little more dash than his Northern brother;
but he was correspondingly less enduring.

The endeavor of the enemy on the first day was simply to hurl
their men against ours–first at one point, then at another,
sometimes at several points at once. This they did with daring
and energy, until at night the rebel troops were worn out. Our
effort during the same time was to be prepared to resist
assaults wherever made. The object of the Confederates on the
second day was to get away with as much of their army and
material as possible. Ours then was to drive them from our
front, and to capture or destroy as great a part as possible of
their men and material. We were successful in driving them
back, but not so successful in captures as if farther pursuit
could have been made. As it was, we captured or recaptured on
the second day about as much artillery as we lost on the first;
and, leaving out the one great capture of Prentiss, we took more
prisoners on Monday than the enemy gained from us on Sunday. On
the 6th Sherman lost seven pieces of artillery, McClernand six,
Prentiss eight, and Hurlbut two batteries. On the 7th Sherman
captured seven guns, McClernand three and the Army of the Ohio
twenty.

At Shiloh the effective strength of the Union forces on the
morning of the 6th was 33,000 men. Lew. Wallace brought 5,000
more after nightfall. Beauregard reported the enemy’s strength
at 40,955. According to the custom of enumeration in the South,
this number probably excluded every man enlisted as musician or
detailed as guard or nurse, and all commissioned officers–
everybody who did not carry a musket or serve a cannon. With us
everybody in the field receiving pay from the government is
counted. Excluding the troops who fled, panic-stricken, before
they had fired a shot, there was not a time during the 6th when
we had more than 25,000 men in line. On the 7th Buell brought
20,000 more. Of his remaining two divisions, Thomas’s did not
reach the field during the engagement; Wood’s arrived before
firing had ceased, but not in time to be of much service.

Our loss in the two days’ fight was 1,754 killed, 8,408 wounded
and 2,885 missing. Of these, 2,103 were in the Army of the
Ohio. Beauregard reported a total loss of 10,699, of whom 1,728
were killed, 8,012 wounded and 957 missing. This estimate must
be incorrect. We buried, by actual count, more of the enemy’s
dead in front of the divisions of McClernand and Sherman alone
than here reported, and 4,000 was the estimate of the burial
parties of the whole field. Beauregard reports the Confederate
force on the 6th at over 40,000, and their total loss during the
two days at 10,699; and at the same time declares that he could
put only 20,000 men in battle on the morning of the 7th.

The navy gave a hearty support to the army at Shiloh, as indeed
it always did both before and subsequently when I was in
command. The nature of the ground was such, however, that on
this occasion it could do nothing in aid of the troops until
sundown on the first day. The country was broken and heavily
timbered, cutting off all view of the battle from the river, so
that friends would be as much in danger from fire from the
gunboats as the foe. But about sundown, when the National
troops were back in their last position, the right of the enemy
was near the river and exposed to the fire of the two gun-boats,
which was delivered with vigor and effect. After nightfall, when
firing had entirely ceased on land, the commander of the fleet
informed himself, approximately, of the position of our troops
and suggested the idea of dropping a shell within the lines of
the enemy every fifteen minutes during the night. This was done
with effect, as is proved by the Confederate reports.

Up to the battle of Shiloh I, as well as thousands of other
citizens, believed that the rebellion against the Government
would collapse suddenly and soon, if a decisive victory could be
gained over any of its armies. Donelson and Henry were such
victories. An army of more than 21,000 men was captured or
destroyed. Bowling Green, Columbus and Hickman, Kentucky, fell
in consequence, and Clarksville and Nashville, Tennessee, the
last two with an immense amount of stores, also fell into our
hands. The Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, from their mouths
to the head of navigation, were secured. But when Confederate
armies were collected which not only attempted to hold a line
farther south, from Memphis to Chattanooga, Knoxville and on to
the Atlantic, but assumed the offensive and made such a gallant
effort to regain what had been lost, then, indeed, I gave up all
idea of saving the Union except by complete conquest. Up to that
time it had been the policy of our army, certainly of that
portion commanded by me, to protect the property of the citizens
whose territory was invaded, without regard to their sentiments,
whether Union or Secession. After this, however, I regarded it
as humane to both sides to protect the persons of those found at
their homes, but to consume everything that could be used to
support or supply armies. Protection was still continued over
such supplies as were within lines held by us and which we
expected to continue to hold; but such supplies within the reach
of Confederate armies I regarded as much contraband as arms or
ordnance stores. Their destruction was accomplished without
bloodshed and tended to the same result as the destruction of
armies. I continued this policy to the close of the war.
Promiscuous pillaging, however, was discouraged and punished.
Instructions were always given to take provisions and forage
under the direction of commissioned officers who should give
receipts to owners, if at home, and turn the property over to
officers of the quartermaster or commissary departments to be
issued as if furnished from our Northern depots. But much was
destroyed without receipts to owners, when it could not be
brought within our lines and would otherwise have gone to the
support of secession and rebellion.

This policy I believe exercised a material influence in
hastening the end.

The battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg landing, has been perhaps
less understood, or, to state the case more accurately, more
persistently misunderstood, than any other engagement between
National and Confederate troops during the entire rebellion.
Correct reports of the battle have been published, notably by
Sherman, Badeau and, in a speech before a meeting of veterans,
by General Prentiss; but all of these appeared long subsequent
to the close of the rebellion and after public opinion had been
most erroneously formed.

I myself made no report to General Halleck, further than was
contained in a letter, written immediately after the battle
informing him that an engagement had been fought and announcing
the result. A few days afterwards General Halleck moved his
headquarters to Pittsburg landing and assumed command of the
troops in the field. Although next to him in rank, and
nominally in command of my old district and army, I was ignored
as much as if I had been at the most distant point of territory
within my jurisdiction; and although I was in command of all the
troops engaged at Shiloh I was not permitted to see one of the
reports of General Buell or his subordinates in that battle,
until they were published by the War Department long after the
event. For this reason I never made a full official report of
this engagement.

CHAPTER XXVI.

HALLECK ASSUMES COMMAND IN THE FIELD–THE ADVANCE UPON
CORINTH–OCCUPATION OF CORINTH–THE ARMY SEPARATED.

General Halleck arrived at Pittsburg landing on the 11th of
April and immediately assumed command in the field. On the 21st
General Pope arrived with an army 30,000 strong, fresh from the
capture of Island Number Ten in the Mississippi River. He went
into camp at Hamburg landing five miles above Pittsburg. Halleck
had now three armies: the Army of the Ohio, Buell commanding;
the Army of the Mississippi, Pope commanding; and the Army of
the Tennessee. His orders divided the combined force into the
right wing, reserve, centre and left wing. Major-General George
H. Thomas, who had been in Buell’s army, was transferred with
his division to the Army of the Tennessee and given command of
the right wing, composed of all of that army except McClernand’s
and Lew. Wallace’s divisions. McClernand was assigned to the
command of the reserve, composed of his own and Lew. Wallace’s
divisions. Buell commanded the centre, the Army of the Ohio;
and Pope the left wing, the Army of the Mississippi. I was
named second in command of the whole, and was also supposed to
be in command of the right wing and reserve.

Orders were given to all the commanders engaged at Shiloh to
send in their reports without delay to department
headquarters. Those from officers of the Army of the Tennessee
were sent through me; but from the Army of the Ohio they were
sent by General Buell without passing through my hands. General
Halleck ordered me, verbally, to send in my report, but I
positively declined on the ground that he had received the
reports of a part of the army engaged at Shiloh without their
coming through me. He admitted that my refusal was justifiable
under the circumstances, but explained that he had wanted to get
the reports off before moving the command, and as fast as a
report had come to him he had forwarded it to Washington.

Preparations were at once made upon the arrival of the new
commander for an advance on Corinth. Owl Creek, on our right,
was bridged, and expeditions were sent to the north-west and
west to ascertain if our position was being threatened from
those quarters; the roads towards Corinth were corduroyed and
new ones made; lateral roads were also constructed, so that in
case of necessity troops marching by different routes could
reinforce each other. All commanders were cautioned against
bringing on an engagement and informed in so many words that it
would be better to retreat than to fight. By the 30th of April
all preparations were complete; the country west to the Mobile
and Ohio railroad had been reconnoitred, as well as the road to
Corinth as far as Monterey twelve miles from Pittsburg.
Everywhere small bodies of the enemy had been encountered, but
they were observers and not in force to fight battles.

Corinth, Mississippi, lies in a south-westerly direction from
Pittsburg landing and about nineteen miles away as the bird
would fly, but probably twenty-two by the nearest wagon-road. It
is about four miles south of the line dividing the States of
Tennessee and Mississippi, and at the junction of the
Mississippi and Chattanooga railroad with the Mobile and Ohio
road which runs from Columbus to Mobile. From Pittsburg to
Corinth the land is rolling, but at no point reaching an
elevation that makes high hills to pass over. In 1862 the
greater part of the country was covered with forest with
intervening clearings and houses. Underbrush was dense in the
low grounds along the creeks and ravines, but generally not so
thick on the high land as to prevent men passing through with
ease. There are two small creeks running from north of the town
and connecting some four miles south, where they form Bridge
Creek which empties into the Tuscumbia River. Corinth is on the
ridge between these streams and is a naturally strong defensive
position. The creeks are insignificant in volume of water, but
the stream to the east widens out in front of the town into a
swamp impassable in the presence of an enemy. On the crest of
the west bank of this stream the enemy was strongly intrenched.

Corinth was a valuable strategic point for the enemy to hold,
and consequently a valuable one for us to possess ourselves
of. We ought to have seized it immediately after the fall of
Donelson and Nashville, when it could have been taken without a
battle, but failing then it should have been taken, without
delay on the concentration of troops at Pittsburg landing after
the battle of Shiloh. In fact the arrival of Pope should not
have been awaited. There was no time from the battle of Shiloh
up to the evacuation of Corinth when the enemy would not have
left if pushed. The demoralization among the Confederates from
their defeats at Henry and Donelson; their long marches from
Bowling Green, Columbus, and Nashville, and their failure at
Shiloh; in fact from having been driven out of Kentucky and
Tennessee, was so great that a stand for the time would have
been impossible. Beauregard made strenuous efforts to reinforce
himself and partially succeeded. He appealed to the people of
the South-west for new regiments, and received a few. A. S.
Johnston had made efforts to reinforce in the same quarter,
before the battle of Shiloh, but in a different way. He had
negroes sent out to him to take the place of teamsters, company
cooks and laborers in every capacity, so as to put all his white
men into the ranks. The people, while willing to send their sons
to the field, were not willing to part with their negroes. It is
only fair to state that they probably wanted their blacks to
raise supplies for the army and for the families left at home.

Beauregard, however, was reinforced by Van Dorn immediately
after Shiloh with 17,000 men. Interior points, less exposed,
were also depleted to add to the strength at Corinth. With
these reinforcements and the new regiments, Beauregard had,
during the month of May, 1862, a large force on paper, but
probably not much over 50,000 effective men. We estimated his
strength at 70,000. Our own was, in round numbers, 120,000. The
defensible nature of the ground at Corinth, and the
fortifications, made 50,000 then enough to maintain their
position against double that number for an indefinite time but
for the demoralization spoken of.

On the 30th of April the grand army commenced its advance from
Shiloh upon Corinth. The movement was a siege from the start to
the close. The National troops were always behind intrenchments,
except of course the small reconnoitring parties sent to the
front to clear the way for an advance. Even the commanders of
these parties were cautioned, “not to bring on an engagement.”
“It is better to retreat than to fight.” The enemy were
constantly watching our advance, but as they were simply
observers there were but few engagements that even threatened to
become battles. All the engagements fought ought to have served
to encourage the enemy. Roads were again made in our front, and
again corduroyed; a line was intrenched, and the troops were
advanced to the new position. Cross roads were constructed to
these new positions to enable the troops to concentrate in case
of attack. The National armies were thoroughly intrenched all
the way from the Tennessee River to Corinth.

For myself I was little more than an observer. Orders were sent
direct to the right wing or reserve, ignoring me, and advances
were made from one line of intrenchments to another without
notifying me. My position was so embarrassing in fact that I
made several applications during the siege to be relieved.

General Halleck kept his headquarters generally, if not all the
time, with the right wing. Pope being on the extreme left did
not see so much of his chief, and consequently got loose as it
were at times. On the 3d of May he was at Seven Mile Creek with
the main body of his command, but threw forward a division to
Farmington, within four miles of Corinth. His troops had quite
a little engagement at Farmington on that day, but carried the
place with considerable loss to the enemy. There would then
have been no difficulty in advancing the centre and right so as
to form a new line well up to the enemy, but Pope was ordered
back to conform with the general line. On the 8th of May he
moved again, taking his whole force to Farmington, and pushed
out two divisions close to the rebel line. Again he was ordered
back. By the 4th of May the centre and right wing reached
Monterey, twelve miles out. Their advance was slow from there,
for they intrenched with every forward movement. The left wing
moved up again on the 25th of May and intrenched itself close to
the enemy. The creek with the marsh before described, separated
the two lines. Skirmishers thirty feet apart could have
maintained either line at this point.

Our centre and right were, at this time, extended so that the
right of the right wing was probably five miles from Corinth and
four from the works in their front. The creek, which was a
formidable obstacle for either side to pass on our left, became
a very slight obstacle on our right. Here the enemy occupied
two positions. One of them, as much as two miles out from his
main line, was on a commanding elevation and defended by an
intrenched battery with infantry supports. A heavy wood
intervened between this work and the National forces. In rear
to the south there was a clearing extending a mile or more, and
south of this clearing a log-house which had been loop-holed and
was occupied by infantry. Sherman’s division carried these two
positions with some loss to himself, but with probably greater
to the enemy, on the 28th of May, and on that day the investment
of Corinth was complete, or as complete as it was ever made.
Thomas’ right now rested west of the Mobile and Ohio railroad.
Pope’s left commanded the Memphis and Charleston railroad east
of Corinth.

Some days before I had suggested to the commanding general that
I thought if he would move the Army of the Mississippi at night,
by the rear of the centre and right, ready to advance at
daylight, Pope would find no natural obstacle in his front and,
I believed, no serious artificial one. The ground, or works,
occupied by our left could be held by a thin picket line, owing
to the stream and swamp in front. To the right the troops would
have a dry ridge to march over. I was silenced so quickly that I
felt that possibly I had suggested an unmilitary movement.

Later, probably on the 28th of May, General Logan, whose command
was then on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, said to me that the
enemy had been evacuating for several days and that if allowed
he could go into Corinth with his brigade. Trains of cars were
heard coming in and going out of Corinth constantly. Some of
the men who had been engaged in various capacities on railroads
before the war claimed that they could tell, by putting their
ears to the rail, not only which way the trains were moving but
which trains were loaded and which were empty. They said loaded
trains had been going out for several days and empty ones coming
in. Subsequent events proved the correctness of their
judgment. Beauregard published his orders for the evacuation of
Corinth on the 26th of May and fixed the 29th for the departure
of his troops, and on the 30th of May General Halleck had his
whole army drawn up prepared for battle and announced in orders
that there was every indication that our left was to be attacked
that morning. Corinth had already been evacuated and the
National troops marched on and took possession without
opposition. Everything had been destroyed or carried away. The
Confederate commander had instructed his soldiers to cheer on the
arrival of every train to create the impression among the Yankees
that reinforcements were arriving. There was not a sick or
wounded man left by the Confederates, nor stores of any kind.
Some ammunition had been blown up–not removed–but the trophies
of war were a few Quaker guns, logs of about the diameter of
ordinary cannon, mounted on wheels of wagons and pointed in the
most threatening manner towards us.

The possession of Corinth by the National troops was of
strategic importance, but the victory was barren in every other
particular. It was nearly bloodless. It is a question whether
the MORALE of the Confederate troops engaged at Corinth was not
improved by the immunity with which they were permitted to
remove all public property and then withdraw themselves. On our
side I know officers and men of the Army of the Tennessee–and I
presume the same is true of those of the other commands–were
disappointed at the result. They could not see how the mere
occupation of places was to close the war while large and
effective rebel armies existed. They believed that a well-
directed attack would at least have partially destroyed the army
defending Corinth. For myself I am satisfied that Corinth could
have been captured in a two days’ campaign commenced promptly on
the arrival of reinforcements after the battle of Shiloh.

General Halleck at once commenced erecting fortifications around
Corinth on a scale to indicate that this one point must be held
if it took the whole National army to do it. All commanding
points two or three miles to the south, south-east and
south-west were strongly fortified. It was expected in case of
necessity to connect these forts by rifle-pits. They were laid
out on a scale that would have required 100,000 men to fully man
them. It was probably thought that a final battle of the war
would be fought at that point. These fortifications were never
used. Immediately after the occupation of Corinth by the
National troops, General Pope was sent in pursuit of the
retreating garrison and General Buell soon followed. Buell was
the senior of the two generals and commanded the entire
column. The pursuit was kept up for some thirty miles, but did
not result in the capture of any material of war or prisoners,
unless a few stragglers who had fallen behind and were willing
captives. On the 10th of June the pursuing column was all back
at Corinth. The Army of the Tennessee was not engaged in any of
these movements.

The Confederates were now driven out of West Tennessee, and on
the 6th of June, after a well-contested naval battle, the
National forces took possession of Memphis and held the
Mississippi river from its source to that point. The railroad
from Columbus to Corinth was at once put in good condition and
held by us. We had garrisons at Donelson, Clarksville and
Nashville, on the Cumberland River, and held the Tennessee River
from its mouth to Eastport. New Orleans and Baton Rouge had
fallen into the possession of the National forces, so that now
the Confederates at the west were narrowed down for all
communication with Richmond to the single line of road running
east from Vicksburg. To dispossess them of this, therefore,
became a matter of the first importance. The possession of the
Mississippi by us from Memphis to Baton Rouge was also a most
important object. It would be equal to the amputation of a limb
in its weakening effects upon the enemy.

After the capture of Corinth a movable force of 80,000 men,
besides enough to hold all the territory acquired, could have
been set in motion for the accomplishment of any great campaign
for the suppression of the rebellion. In addition to this fresh
troops were being raised to swell the effective force. But the
work of depletion commenced. Buell with the Army of the Ohio
was sent east, following the line of the Memphis and Charleston
railroad. This he was ordered to repair as he advanced–only to
have it destroyed by small guerilla bands or other troops as soon
as he was out of the way. If he had been sent directly to
Chattanooga as rapidly as he could march, leaving two or three
divisions along the line of the railroad from Nashville forward,
he could have arrived with but little fighting, and would have
saved much of the loss of life which was afterwards incurred in
gaining Chattanooga. Bragg would then not have had time to
raise an army to contest the possession of middle and east
Tennessee and Kentucky; the battles of Stone River and
Chickamauga would not necessarily have been fought; Burnside
would not have been besieged in Knoxville without the power of
helping himself or escaping; the battle of Chattanooga would not
have been fought. These are the negative advantages, if the term
negative is applicable, which would probably have resulted from
prompt movements after Corinth fell into the possession of the
National forces. The positive results might have been: a
bloodless advance to Atlanta, to Vicksburg, or to any other
desired point south of Corinth in the interior of Mississippi.

CHAPTER XXVII.

HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO MEMPHIS–ON THE ROAD TO MEMPHIS– ESCAPING
JACKSON–COMPLAINTS AND REQUESTS–HALLECK APPOINTED
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF–RETURN TO CORINTH–MOVEMENTS OF
BRAGG–SURRENDER OF CLARKSVILLE–THE ADVANCE UPON
CHATTANOOGA–SHERIDAN COLONEL OF A MICHIGAN REGIMENT.

My position at Corinth, with a nominal command and yet no
command, became so unbearable that I asked permission of Halleck
to remove my headquarters to Memphis. I had repeatedly asked,
between the fall of Donelson and the evacuation of Corinth, to
be relieved from duty under Halleck; but all my applications
were refused until the occupation of the town. I then obtained
permission to leave the department, but General Sherman happened
to call on me as I was about starting and urged me so strongly
not to think of going, that I concluded to remain. My
application to be permitted to remove my headquarters to Memphis
was, however, approved, and on the 21st of June I started for
that point with my staff and a cavalry escort of only a part of
one company. There was a detachment of two or three companies
going some twenty-five miles west to be stationed as a guard to
the railroad. I went under cover of this escort to the end of
their march, and the next morning proceeded to La Grange with no
convoy but the few cavalry men I had with me.

From La Grange to Memphis the distance is forty-seven miles.
There were no troops stationed between these two points, except
a small force guarding a working party which was engaged in
repairing the railroad. Not knowing where this party would be
found I halted at La Grange. General Hurlbut was in command
there at the time and had his headquarters tents pitched on the
lawn of a very commodious country house. The proprietor was at
home and, learning of my arrival, he invited General Hurlbut and
me to dine with him. I accepted the invitation and spent a very
pleasant afternoon with my host, who was a thorough Southern
gentleman fully convinced of the justice of secession. After
dinner, seated in the capacious porch, he entertained me with a
recital of the services he was rendering the cause. He was too
old to be in the ranks himself–he must have been quite seventy
then–but his means enabled him to be useful in other ways. In
ordinary times the homestead where he was now living produced
the bread and meat to supply the slaves on his main plantation,
in the low-lands of Mississippi. Now he raised food and forage
on both places, and thought he would have that year a surplus
sufficient to feed three hundred families of poor men who had
gone into the war and left their families dependent upon the
“patriotism” of those better off. The crops around me looked
fine, and I had at the moment an idea that about the time they
were ready to be gathered the “Yankee” troops would be in the
neighborhood and harvest them for the benefit of those engaged
in the suppression of the rebellion instead of its support. I
felt, however, the greatest respect for the candor of my host
and for his zeal in a cause he thoroughly believed in, though
our views were as wide apart as it is possible to conceive.

The 23d of June, 1862, on the road from La Grange to Memphis was
very warm, even for that latitude and season. With my staff and
small escort I started at an early hour, and before noon we
arrived within twenty miles of Memphis. At this point I saw a
very comfortable-looking white-haired gentleman seated at the
front of his house, a little distance from the road. I let my
staff and escort ride ahead while I halted and, for an excuse,
asked for a glass of water. I was invited at once to dismount
and come in. I found my host very genial and communicative, and
staid longer than I had intended, until the lady of the house
announced dinner and asked me to join them. The host, however,
was not pressing, so that I declined the invitation and,
mounting my horse, rode on.

About a mile west from where I had been stopping a road comes up
from the southeast, joining that from La Grange to Memphis. A
mile west of this junction I found my staff and escort halted
and enjoying the shade of forest trees on the lawn of a house
located several hundred feet back from the road, their horses
hitched to the fence along the line of the road. I, too,
stopped and we remained there until the cool of the afternoon,
and then rode into Memphis.

The gentleman with whom I had stopped twenty miles from Memphis
was a Mr. De Loche, a man loyal to the Union. He had not
pressed me to tarry longer with him because in the early part of
my visit a neighbor, a Dr. Smith, had called and, on being
presented to me, backed off the porch as if something had hit
him. Mr. De Loche knew that the rebel General Jackson was in
that neighborhood with a detachment of cavalry. His neighbor
was as earnest in the southern cause as was Mr. De Loche in that
of the Union. The exact location of Jackson was entirely unknown
to Mr. De Loche; but he was sure that his neighbor would know it
and would give information of my presence, and this made my stay
unpleasant to him after the call of Dr. Smith.

I have stated that a detachment of troops was engaged in
guarding workmen who were repairing the railroad east of
Memphis. On the day I entered Memphis, Jackson captured a small
herd of beef cattle which had been sent east for the troops so
engaged. The drovers were not enlisted men and he released
them. A day or two after one of these drovers came to my
headquarters and, relating the circumstances of his capture,
said Jackson was very much disappointed that he had not captured
me; that he was six or seven miles south of the Memphis and
Charleston railroad when he learned that I was stopping at the
house of Mr. De Loche, and had ridden with his command to the
junction of the road he was on with that from La Grange and
Memphis, where he learned that I had passed three-quarters of an
hour before. He thought it would be useless to pursue with jaded
horses a well-mounted party with so much of a start. Had he gone
three-quarters of a mile farther he would have found me with my
party quietly resting under the shade of trees and without even
arms in our hands with which to defend ourselves.

General Jackson of course did not communicate his disappointment
at not capturing me to a prisoner, a young drover; but from the
talk among the soldiers the facts related were learned. A day
or two later Mr. De Loche called on me in Memphis to apologize
for his apparent incivility in not insisting on my staying for
dinner. He said that his wife accused him of marked
discourtesy, but that, after the call of his neighbor, he had
felt restless until I got away. I never met General Jackson
before the war, nor during it, but have met him since at his
very comfortable summer home at Manitou Springs, Colorado. I
reminded him of the above incident, and this drew from him the
response that he was thankful now he had not captured me. I
certainly was very thankful too.

My occupation of Memphis as district headquarters did not last
long. The period, however, was marked by a few incidents which
were novel to me. Up to that time I had not occupied any place
in the South where the citizens were at home in any great
numbers. Dover was within the fortifications at Fort Donelson,
and, as far as I remember, every citizen was gone. There were
no people living at Pittsburg landing, and but very few at
Corinth. Memphis, however, was a populous city, and there were
many of the citizens remaining there who were not only
thoroughly impressed with the justice of their cause, but who
thought that even the “Yankee soldiery” must entertain the same
views if they could only be induced to make an honest
confession. It took hours of my time every day to listen to
complaints and requests. The latter were generally reasonable,
and if so they were granted; but the complaints were not always,
or even often, well founded. Two instances will mark the general
character. First: the officer who commanded at Memphis
immediately after the city fell into the hands of the National
troops had ordered one of the churches of the city to be opened
to the soldiers. Army chaplains were authorized to occupy the
pulpit. Second: at the beginning of the war the Confederate
Congress had passed a law confiscating all property of “alien
enemies” at the South, including the debts of Southerners to
Northern men. In consequence of this law, when Memphis was
occupied the provost-marshal had forcibly collected all the
evidences he could obtain of such debts.

Almost the first complaints made to me were these two
outrages. The gentleman who made the complaints informed me
first of his own high standing as a lawyer, a citizen and a
Christian. He was a deacon in the church which had been defiled
by the occupation of Union troops, and by a Union chaplain
filling the pulpit. He did not use the word “defile,” but he
expressed the idea very clearly. He asked that the church be
restored to the former congregation. I told him that no order
had been issued prohibiting the congregation attending the
church. He said of course the congregation could not hear a
Northern clergyman who differed so radically with them on
questions of government. I told him the troops would continue
to occupy that church for the present, and that they would not
be called upon to hear disloyal sentiments proclaimed from the
pulpit. This closed the argument on the first point.

Then came the second. The complainant said that he wanted the
papers restored to him which had been surrendered to the
provost-marshal under protest; he was a lawyer, and before the
establishment of the “Confederate States Government” had been
the attorney for a number of large business houses at the North;
that “his government” had confiscated all debts due “alien
enemies,” and appointed commissioners, or officers, to collect
such debts and pay them over to the “government”: but in his
case, owing to his high standing, he had been permitted to hold
these claims for collection, the responsible officials knowing
that he would account to the “government” for every dollar
received. He said that his “government,” when it came in
possession of all its territory, would hold him personally
responsible for the claims he had surrendered to the provost-
marshal. His impudence was so sublime that I was rather amused
than indignant. I told him, however, that if he would remain in
Memphis I did not believe the Confederate government would ever
molest him. He left, no doubt, as much amazed at my assurance
as I was at the brazenness of his request.

On the 11th of July General Halleck received telegraphic orders
appointing him to the command of all the armies, with
headquarters in Washington. His instructions pressed him to
proceed to his new field of duty with as little delay as was
consistent with the safety and interests of his previous
command. I was next in rank, and he telegraphed me the same day
to report at department headquarters at Corinth. I was not
informed by the dispatch that my chief had been ordered to a
different field and did not know whether to move my headquarters
or not. I telegraphed asking if I was to take my staff with me,
and received word in reply: “This place will be your
headquarters. You can judge for yourself.” I left Memphis for
my new field without delay, and reached Corinth on the 15th of
the month. General Halleck remained until the 17th of July; but
he was very uncommunicative, and gave me no information as to
what I had been called to Corinth for.

When General Halleck left to assume the duties of
general-in-chief I remained in command of the district of West
Tennessee. Practically I became a department commander, because
no one was assigned to that position over me and I made my
reports direct to the general-in-chief; but I was not assigned
to the position of department commander until the 25th of
October. General Halleck while commanding the Department of the
Mississippi had had control as far east as a line drawn from
Chattanooga north. My district only embraced West Tennessee and
Kentucky west of the Cumberland River. Buell, with the Army of
the Ohio, had, as previously stated, been ordered east towards
Chattanooga, with instructions to repair the Memphis and
Charleston railroad as he advanced. Troops had been sent north
by Halleck along the line of the Mobile and Ohio railroad to put
it in repair as far as Columbus. Other troops were stationed on
the railroad from Jackson, Tennessee, to Grand Junction, and
still others on the road west to Memphis.

The remainder of the magnificent army of 120,000 men which
entered Corinth on the 30th of May had now become so scattered
that I was put entirely on the defensive in a territory whose
population was hostile to the Union. One of the first things I
had to do was to construct fortifications at Corinth better
suited to the garrison that could be spared to man them. The
structures that had been built during the months of May and June
were left as monuments to the skill of the engineer, and others
were constructed in a few days, plainer in design but suited to
the command available to defend them.

I disposed the troops belonging to the district in conformity
with the situation as rapidly as possible. The forces at
Donelson, Clarksville and Nashville, with those at Corinth and
along the railroad eastward, I regarded as sufficient for
protection against any attack from the west. The Mobile and
Ohio railroad was guarded from Rienzi, south of Corinth, to
Columbus; and the Mississippi Central railroad from Jackson,
Tennessee, to Bolivar. Grand Junction and La Grange on the
Memphis railroad were abandoned.

South of the Army of the Tennessee, and confronting it, was Van
Dorn, with a sufficient force to organize a movable army of
thirty-five to forty thousand men, after being reinforced by
Price from Missouri. This movable force could be thrown against
either Corinth, Bolivar or Memphis; and the best that could be
done in such event would be to weaken the points not threatened
in order to reinforce the one that was. Nothing could be gained
on the National side by attacking elsewhere, because the
territory already occupied was as much as the force present
could guard. The most anxious period of the war, to me, was
during the time the Army of the Tennessee was guarding the
territory acquired by the fall of Corinth and Memphis and before
I was sufficiently reinforced to take the offensive. The enemy
also had cavalry operating in our rear, making it necessary to
guard every point of the railroad back to Columbus, on the
security of which we were dependent for all our supplies.
Headquarters were connected by telegraph with all points of the
command except Memphis and the Mississippi below Columbus. With
these points communication was had by the railroad to Columbus,
then down the river by boat. To reinforce Memphis would take
three or four days, and to get an order there for troops to move
elsewhere would have taken at least two days. Memphis therefore
was practically isolated from the balance of the command. But
it was in Sherman’s hands. Then too the troops were well
intrenched and the gunboats made a valuable auxiliary.

During the two months after the departure of General Halleck
there was much fighting between small bodies of the contending
armies, but these encounters were dwarfed by the magnitude of
the main battles so as to be now almost forgotten except by
those engaged in them. Some of them, however, estimated by the
losses on both sides in killed and wounded, were equal in hard
fighting to most of the battles of the Mexican war which
attracted so much of the attention of the public when they
occurred. About the 23d of July Colonel Ross, commanding at
Bolivar, was threatened by a large force of the enemy so that he
had to be reinforced from Jackson and Corinth. On the 27th there
was skirmishing on the Hatchie River, eight miles from Bolivar.
On the 30th I learned from Colonel P. H. Sheridan, who had been
far to the south, that Bragg in person was at Rome, Georgia,
with his troops moving by rail (by way of Mobile) to Chattanooga
and his wagon train marching overland to join him at Rome. Price
was at this time at Holly Springs, Mississippi, with a large
force, and occupied Grand Junction as an outpost. I proposed to
the general-in-chief to be permitted to drive him away, but was
informed that, while I had to judge for myself, the best use to
make of my troops WAS NOT TO SCATTER THEM, but hold them ready
to reinforce Buell.

The movement of Bragg himself with his wagon trains to
Chattanooga across country, while his troops were transported
over a long round-about road to the same destination, without
need of guards except when in my immediate front, demonstrates
the advantage which troops enjoy while acting in a country where
the people are friendly. Buell was marching through a hostile
region and had to have his communications thoroughly guarded
back to a base of supplies. More men were required the farther
the National troops penetrated into the enemy’s country. I,
with an army sufficiently powerful to have destroyed Bragg, was
purely on the defensive and accomplishing no more than to hold a
force far inferior to my own.

On the 2d of August I was ordered from Washington to live upon
the country, on the resources of citizens hostile to the
government, so far as practicable. I was also directed to
“handle rebels within our lines without gloves,” to imprison
them, or to expel them from their homes and from our lines. I
do not recollect having arrested and confined a citizen (not a
soldier) during the entire rebellion. I am aware that a great
many were sent to northern prisons, particularly to Joliet,
Illinois, by some of my subordinates with the statement that it
was my order. I had all such released the moment I learned of
their arrest; and finally sent a staff officer north to release
every prisoner who was said to be confined by my order. There
were many citizens at home who deserved punishment because they
were soldiers when an opportunity was afforded to inflict an
injury to the National cause. This class was not of the kind
that were apt to get arrested, and I deemed it better that a few
guilty men should escape than that a great many innocent ones
should suffer.

On the 14th of August I was ordered to send two more divisions
to Buell. They were sent the same day by way of Decatur. On
the 22d Colonel Rodney Mason surrendered Clarksville with six
companies of his regiment.

Colonel Mason was one of the officers who had led their
regiments off the field at almost the first fire of the rebels
at Shiloh. He was by nature and education a gentleman, and was
terribly mortified at his action when the battle was over. He
came to me with tears in his eyes and begged to be allowed to
have another trial. I felt great sympathy for him and sent him,
with his regiment, to garrison Clarksville and Donelson. He
selected Clarksville for his headquarters, no doubt because he
regarded it as the post of danger, it being nearer the enemy.
But when he was summoned to surrender by a band of guerillas,
his constitutional weakness overcame him. He inquired the
number of men the enemy had, and receiving a response indicating
a force greater than his own he said if he could be satisfied of
that fact he would surrender. Arrangements were made for him to
count the guerillas, and having satisfied himself that the enemy
had the greater force he surrendered and informed his
subordinate at Donelson of the fact, advising him to do the
same. The guerillas paroled their prisoners and moved upon
Donelson, but the officer in command at that point marched out
to meet them and drove them away.

Among other embarrassments, at the time of which I now write,
was the fact that the government wanted to get out all the
cotton possible from the South and directed me to give every
facility toward that end. Pay in gold was authorized, and
stations on the Mississippi River and on the railroad in our
possession had to be designated where cotton would be
received. This opened to the enemy not only the means of
converting cotton into money, which had a value all over the
world and which they so much needed, but it afforded them means
of obtaining accurate and intelligent information in regard to
our position and strength. It was also demoralizing to the
troops. Citizens obtaining permits from the treasury department
had to be protected within our lines and given facilities to get
out cotton by which they realized enormous profits. Men who had
enlisted to fight the battles of their country did not like to be
engaged in protecting a traffic which went to the support of an
enemy they had to fight, and the profits of which went to men
who shared none of their dangers.

On the 30th of August Colonel M. D. Leggett, near Bolivar, with
the 20th and 29th Ohio volunteer infantry, was attacked by a
force supposed to be about 4,000 strong. The enemy was driven
away with a loss of more than one hundred men. On the 1st of
September the bridge guard at Medon was attacked by guerillas.
The guard held the position until reinforced, when the enemy
were routed leaving about fifty of their number on the field
dead or wounded, our loss being only two killed and fifteen
wounded. On the same day Colonel Dennis, with a force of less
than 500 infantry and two pieces of artillery, met the cavalry
of the enemy in strong force, a few miles west of Medon, and
drove them away with great loss. Our troops buried 179 of the
enemy’s dead, left upon the field. Afterwards it was found that
all the houses in the vicinity of the battlefield were turned
into hospitals for the wounded. Our loss, as reported at the
time, was forty-five killed and wounded. On the 2d of September
I was ordered to send more reinforcements to Buell. Jackson and
Bolivar were yet threatened, but I sent the reinforcements. On
the 4th I received direct orders to send Granger’s division also
to Louisville, Kentucky.

General Buell had left Corinth about the 10th of June to march
upon Chattanooga; Bragg, who had superseded Beauregard in
command, sent one division from Tupelo on the 27th of June for
the same place. This gave Buell about seventeen days’ start. If
he had not been required to repair the railroad as he advanced,
the march could have been made in eighteen days at the outside,
and Chattanooga must have been reached by the National forces
before the rebels could have possibly got there. The road
between Nashville and Chattanooga could easily have been put in
repair by other troops, so that communication with the North
would have been opened in a short time after the occupation of
the place by the National troops. If Buell had been permitted
to move in the first instance, with the whole of the Army of the
Ohio and that portion of the Army of the Mississippi afterwards
sent to him, he could have thrown four divisions from his own
command along the line of road to repair and guard it.

Granger’s division was promptly sent on the 4th of September. I
was at the station at Corinth when the troops reached that point,
and found General P. H. Sheridan with them. I expressed surprise
at seeing him and said that I had not expected him to go. He
showed decided disappointment at the prospect of being
detained. I felt a little nettled at his desire to get away and
did not detain him.

Sheridan was a first lieutenant in the regiment in which I had
served eleven years, the 4th infantry, and stationed on the
Pacific coast when the war broke out. He was promoted to a
captaincy in May, 1861, and before the close of the year managed
in some way, I do not know how, to get East. He went to
Missouri. Halleck had known him as a very successful young
officer in managing campaigns against the Indians on the Pacific
coast, and appointed him acting-quartermaster in south-west
Missouri. There was no difficulty in getting supplies forward
while Sheridan served in that capacity; but he got into
difficulty with his immediate superiors because of his stringent
rules for preventing the use of public transportation for private
purposes. He asked to be relieved from further duty in the
capacity in which he was engaged and his request was granted.
When General Halleck took the field in April, 1862, Sheridan was
assigned to duty on his staff. During the advance on Corinth a
vacancy occurred in the colonelcy of the 2d Michigan cavalry.
Governor Blair, of Michigan, telegraphed General Halleck asking
him to suggest the name of a professional soldier for the
vacancy, saying he would appoint a good man without reference to
his State. Sheridan was named; and was so conspicuously
efficient that when Corinth was reached he was assigned to
command a cavalry brigade in the Army of the Mississippi. He
was in command at Booneville on the 1st of July with two small
regiments, when he was attacked by a force full three times as
numerous as his own. By very skilful manoeuvres and boldness of
attack he completely routed the enemy. For this he was made a
brigadier-general and became a conspicuous figure in the army
about Corinth. On this account I was sorry to see him leaving
me. His departure was probably fortunate, for he rendered
distinguished services in his new field.

Granger and Sheridan reached Louisville before Buell got there,
and on the night of their arrival Sheridan with his command
threw up works around the railroad station for the defence of
troops as they came from the front.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

ADVANCE OF VAN DORN AND PRICE–PRICE ENTERS IUKA–BATTLE OF IUKA.

At this time, September 4th, I had two divisions of the Army of
the Mississippi stationed at Corinth, Rienzi, Jacinto and
Danville. There were at Corinth also Davies’ division and two
brigades of McArthur’s, besides cavalry and artillery. This
force constituted my left wing, of which Rosecrans was in
command. General Ord commanded the centre, from Bethel to
Humboldt on the Mobile and Ohio railroad and from Jackson to
Bolivar where the Mississippi Central is crossed by the Hatchie
River. General Sherman commanded on the right at Memphis with
two of his brigades back at Brownsville, at the crossing of the
Hatchie River by the Memphis and Ohio railroad. This made the
most convenient arrangement I could devise for concentrating all
my spare forces upon any threatened point. All the troops of the
command were within telegraphic communication of each other,
except those under Sherman. By bringing a portion of his
command to Brownsville, from which point there was a railroad
and telegraph back to Memphis, communication could be had with
that part of my command within a few hours by the use of
couriers. In case it became necessary to reinforce Corinth, by
this arrangement all the troops at Bolivar, except a small
guard, could be sent by rail by the way of Jackson in less than
twenty-four hours; while the troops from Brownsville could march
up to Bolivar to take their place.

On the 7th of September I learned of the advance of Van Dorn and
Price, apparently upon Corinth. One division was brought from
Memphis to Bolivar to meet any emergency that might arise from
this move of the enemy. I was much concerned because my first
duty, after holding the territory acquired within my command,
was to prevent further reinforcing of Bragg in Middle
Tennessee. Already the Army of Northern Virginia had defeated
the army under General Pope and was invading Maryland. In the
Centre General Buell was on his way to Louisville and Bragg
marching parallel to him with a large Confederate force for the
Ohio River.

I had been constantly called upon to reinforce Buell until at
this time my entire force numbered less than 50,000 men, of all
arms. This included everything from Cairo south within my
jurisdiction. If I too should be driven back, the Ohio River
would become the line dividing the belligerents west of the
Alleghanies, while at the East the line was already farther
north than when hostilities commenced at the opening of the
war. It is true Nashville was never given up after its first
capture, but it would have been isolated and the garrison there
would have been obliged to beat a hasty retreat if the troops in
West Tennessee had been compelled to fall back. To say at the
end of the second year of the war the line dividing the
contestants at the East was pushed north of Maryland, a State
that had not seceded, and at the West beyond Kentucky, another
State which had been always loyal, would have been discouraging
indeed. As it was, many loyal people despaired in the fall of
1862 of ever saving the Union. The administration at Washington
was much concerned for the safety of the cause it held so dear.
But I believe there was never a day when the President did not
think that, in some way or other, a cause so just as ours would
come out triumphant.

Up to the 11th of September Rosecrans still had troops on the
railroad east of Corinth, but they had all been ordered in. By
the 12th all were in except a small force under Colonel Murphy
of the 8th Wisconsin. He had been detained to guard the
remainder of the stores which had not yet been brought in to
Corinth.

On the 13th of September General Sterling Price entered Iuka, a
town about twenty miles east of Corinth on the Memphis and
Charleston railroad. Colonel Murphy with a few men was guarding
the place. He made no resistance, but evacuated the town on the
approach of the enemy. I was apprehensive lest the object of
the rebels might be to get troops into Tennessee to reinforce
Bragg, as it was afterwards ascertained to be. The authorities
at Washington, including the general-in-chief of the army, were
very anxious, as I have said, about affairs both in East and
Middle Tennessee; and my anxiety was quite as great on their
account as for any danger threatening my command. I had not
force enough at Corinth to attack Price even by stripping
everything; and there was danger that before troops could be got
from other points he might be far on his way across the
Tennessee. To prevent this all spare forces at Bolivar and
Jackson were ordered to Corinth, and cars were concentrated at
Jackson for their transportation. Within twenty-four hours from
the transmission of the order the troops were at their
destination, although there had been a delay of four hours
resulting from the forward train getting off the track and
stopping all the others. This gave a reinforcement of near
8,000 men, General Ord in command. General Rosecrans commanded
the district of Corinth with a movable force of about 9,000
independent of the garrison deemed necessary to be left
behind. It was known that General Van Dorn was about a four
days’ march south of us, with a large force. It might have been
part of his plan to attack at Corinth, Price coming from the east
while he came up from the south. My desire was to attack Price
before Van Dorn could reach Corinth or go to his relief.

General Rosecrans had previously had his headquarters at Iuka,
where his command was spread out along the Memphis and
Charleston railroad eastward. While there he had a most
excellent map prepared showing all the roads and streams in the
surrounding country. He was also personally familiar with the
ground, so that I deferred very much to him in my plans for the
approach. We had cars enough to transport all of General Ord’s
command, which was to go by rail to Burnsville, a point on the
road about seven miles west of Iuka. From there his troops were
to march by the north side of the railroad and attack Price from
the north-west, while Rosecrans was to move eastward from his
position south of Corinth by way of the Jacinto road. A small
force was to hold the Jacinto road where it turns to the
north-east, while the main force moved on the Fulton road which
comes into Iuka further east. This plan was suggested by
Rosecrans.

Bear Creek, a few miles to the east of the Fulton road, is a
formidable obstacle to the movement of troops in the absence of
bridges, all of which, in September, 1862, had been destroyed in
that vicinity. The Tennessee, to the north-east, not many miles
away, was also a formidable obstacle for an army followed by a
pursuing force. Ord was on the north-west, and even if a rebel
movement had been possible in that direction it could have
brought only temporary relief, for it would have carried Price’s
army to the rear of the National forces and isolated it from all
support. It looked to me that, if Price would remain in Iuka
until we could get there, his annihilation was inevitable.

On the morning of the 18th of September General Ord moved by
rail to Burnsville, and there left the cars and moved out to
perform his part of the programme. He was to get as near the
enemy as possible during the day and intrench himself so as to
hold his position until the next morning. Rosecrans was to be
up by the morning of the 19th on the two roads before described,
and the attack was to be from all three quarters
simultaneously. Troops enough were left at Jacinto and Rienzi
to detain any cavalry that Van Dorn might send out to make a
sudden dash into Corinth until I could be notified. There was a
telegraph wire along the railroad, so there would be no delay in
communication. I detained cars and locomotives enough at
Burnsville to transport the whole of Ord’s command at once, and
if Van Dorn had moved against Corinth instead of Iuka I could
have thrown in reinforcements to the number of 7,000 or 8,000
before he could have arrived. I remained at Burnsville with a
detachment of about 900 men from Ord’s command and communicated
with my two wings by courier. Ord met the advance of the enemy
soon after leaving Burnsville. Quite a sharp engagement ensued,
but he drove the rebels back with considerable loss, including
one general officer killed. He maintained his position and was
ready to attack by daylight the next morning. I was very much
disappointed at receiving a dispatch from Rosecrans after
midnight from Jacinto, twenty-two miles from Iuka, saying that
some of his command had been delayed, and that the rear of his
column was not yet up as far as Jacinto. He said, however, that
he would still be at Iuka by two o’clock the next day. I did not
believe this possible because of the distance and the condition
of the roads, which was bad; besides, troops after a forced
march of twenty miles are not in a good condition for fighting
the moment they get through. It might do in marching to relieve
a beleaguered garrison, but not to make an assault. I
immediately sent Ord a copy of Rosecrans’ dispatch and ordered
him to be in readiness to attack the moment he heard the sound
of guns to the south or south-east. He was instructed to notify
his officers to be on the alert for any indications of battle.
During the 19th the wind blew in the wrong direction to transmit
sound either towards the point where Ord was, or to Burnsville
where I had remained.

A couple of hours before dark on the 19th Rosecrans arrived with
the head of his column at garnets, the point where the Jacinto
road to Iuka leaves the road going east. He here turned north
without sending any troops to the Fulton road. While still
moving in column up the Jacinto road he met a force of the enemy
and had his advance badly beaten and driven back upon the main
road. In this short engagement his loss was considerable for
the number engaged, and one battery was taken from him. The
wind was still blowing hard and in the wrong direction to
transmit sounds towards either Ord or me. Neither he nor I nor
any one in either command heard a gun that was fired upon the
battle-field. After the engagement Rosecrans sent me a dispatch
announcing the result. This was brought by a courier. There was
no road between Burnsville and the position then occupied by
Rosecrans and the country was impassable for a man on
horseback. The courier bearing the message was compelled to
move west nearly to Jacinto before he found a road leading to
Burnsville. This made it a late hour of the night before I
learned of the battle that had taken place during the
afternoon. I at once notified Ord of the fact and ordered him
to attack early in the morning. The next morning Rosecrans
himself renewed the attack and went into Iuka with but little
resistance. Ord also went in according to orders, without
hearing a gun from the south of town but supposing the troops
coming from the south-west must be up by that time. Rosecrans,
however, had put no troops upon the Fulton road, and the enemy
had taken advantage of this neglect and retreated by that road
during the night. Word was soon brought to me that our troops
were in Iuka. I immediately rode into town and found that the
enemy was not being pursued even by the cavalry. I ordered
pursuit by the whole of Rosecrans’ command and went on with him
a few miles in person. He followed only a few miles after I
left him and then went into camp, and the pursuit was continued
no further. I was disappointed at the result of the battle of
Iuka–but I had so high an opinion of General Rosecrans that I
found no fault at the time.

CHAPTER XXIX.

VAN DORN’S MOVEMENTS–BATTLE OF CORINTH–COMMAND OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE.

On the 19th of September General Geo. H. Thomas was ordered east
to reinforce Buell. This threw the army at my command still more
on the defensive. The Memphis and Charleston railroad was
abandoned, except at Corinth, and small forces were left at
Chewalla and Grand Junction. Soon afterwards the latter of
these two places was given up and Bolivar became our most
advanced position on the Mississippi Central railroad. Our
cavalry was kept well to the front and frequent expeditions were
sent out to watch the movements of the enemy. We were in a
country where nearly all the people, except the negroes, were
hostile to us and friendly to the cause we were trying to
suppress. It was easy, therefore, for the enemy to get early
information of our every move. We, on the contrary, had to go
after our information in force, and then often returned without
it.

On the 22d Bolivar was threatened by a large force from south of
Grand Junction, supposed to be twenty regiments of infantry with
cavalry and artillery. I reinforced Bolivar, and went to
Jackson in person to superintend the movement of troops to
whatever point the attack might be made upon. The troops from
Corinth were brought up in time to repel the threatened movement
without a battle. Our cavalry followed the enemy south of Davis’
mills in Mississippi.

On the 30th I found that Van Dorn was apparently endeavoring to
strike the Mississippi River above Memphis. At the same time
other points within my command were so threatened that it was
impossible to concentrate a force to drive him away. There was
at this juncture a large Union force at Helena, Arkansas, which,
had it been within my command, I could have ordered across the
river to attack and break up the Mississippi Central railroad
far to the south. This would not only have called Van Dorn
back, but would have compelled the retention of a large rebel
force far to the south to prevent a repetition of such raids on
the enemy’s line of supplies. Geographical lines between the
commands during the rebellion were not always well chosen, or
they were too rigidly adhered to.

Van Dorn did not attempt to get upon the line above Memphis, as
had apparently been his intention. He was simply covering a
deeper design; one much more important to his cause. By the 1st
of October it was fully apparent that Corinth was to be attacked
with great force and determination, and that Van Dorn, Lovell,
Price, Villepigue and Rust had joined their strength for this
purpose. There was some skirmishing outside of Corinth with the
advance of the enemy on the 3d. The rebels massed in the
north-west angle of the Memphis and Charleston and the Mobile
and Ohio railroads, and were thus between the troops at Corinth
and all possible reinforcements. Any fresh troops for us must
come by a circuitous route.

On the night of the 3d, accordingly, I ordered General
McPherson, who was at Jackson, to join Rosecrans at Corinth with
reinforcements picked up along the line of the railroad equal to
a brigade. Hurlbut had been ordered from Bolivar to march for
the same destination; and as Van Dorn was coming upon Corinth
from the north-west some of his men fell in with the advance of
Hurlbut’s and some skirmishing ensued on the evening of the
3d. On the 4th Van Dorn made a dashing attack, hoping, no
doubt, to capture Rosecrans before his reinforcements could come
up. In that case the enemy himself could have occupied the
defences of Corinth and held at bay all the Union troops that
arrived. In fact he could have taken the offensive against the
reinforcements with three or four times their number and still
left a sufficient garrison in the works about Corinth to hold
them. He came near success, some of his troops penetrating the
National lines at least once, but the works that were built
after Halleck’s departure enabled Rosecrans to hold his position
until the troops of both McPherson and Hurlbut approached towards
the rebel front and rear. The enemy was finally driven back with
great slaughter: all their charges, made with great gallantry,
were repulsed. The loss on our side was heavy, but nothing to
compare with Van Dorn’s. McPherson came up with the train of
cars bearing his command as close to the enemy as was prudent,
debarked on the rebel flank and got in to the support of
Rosecrans just after the repulse. His approach, as well as that
of Hurlbut, was known to the enemy and had a moral effect.
General Rosecrans, however, failed to follow up the victory,
although I had given specific orders in advance of the battle
for him to pursue the moment the enemy was repelled. He did not
do so, and I repeated the order after the battle. In the first
order he was notified that the force of 4,000 men which was
going to his assistance would be in great peril if the enemy was
not pursued.

General Ord had joined Hurlbut on the 4th and being senior took
command of his troops. This force encountered the head of Van
Dorn’s retreating column just as it was crossing the Hatchie by
a bridge some ten miles out from Corinth. The bottom land here
was swampy and bad for the operations of troops, making a good
place to get an enemy into. Ord attacked the troops that had
crossed the bridge and drove them back in a panic. Many were
killed, and others were drowned by being pushed off the bridge
in their hurried retreat. Ord followed and met the main
force. He was too weak in numbers to assault, but he held the
bridge and compelled the enemy to resume his retreat by another
bridge higher up the stream. Ord was wounded in this engagement
and the command devolved on Hurlbut.

Rosecrans did not start in pursuit till the morning of the 5th
and then took the wrong road. Moving in the enemy’s country he
travelled with a wagon train to carry his provisions and
munitions of war. His march was therefore slower than that of
the enemy, who was moving towards his supplies. Two or three
hours of pursuit on the day of battle, without anything except
what the men carried on their persons, would have been worth
more than any pursuit commenced the next day could have possibly
been. Even when he did start, if Rosecrans had followed the
route taken by the enemy, he would have come upon Van Dorn in a
swamp with a stream in front and Ord holding the only bridge;
but he took the road leading north and towards Chewalla instead
of west, and, after having marched as far as the enemy had moved
to get to the Hatchie, he was as far from battle as when he
started. Hurlbut had not the numbers to meet any such force as
Van Dorn’s if they had been in any mood for fighting, and he
might have been in great peril.

I now regarded the time to accomplish anything by pursuit as
past and, after Rosecrans reached Jonesboro, I ordered him to
return. He kept on to Ripley, however, and was persistent in
wanting to go farther. I thereupon ordered him to halt and
submitted the matter to the general-in-chief, who allowed me to
exercise my judgment in the matter, but inquired “why not
pursue?” Upon this I ordered Rosecrans back. Had he gone much
farther he would have met a greater force than Van Dorn had at
Corinth and behind intrenchments or on chosen ground, and the
probabilities are he would have lost his army.

The battle of Corinth was bloody, our loss being 315 killed,
1,812 wounded and 232 missing. The enemy lost many more.
Rosecrans reported 1,423 dead and 2,225 prisoners. We fought
behind breastworks, which accounts in some degree for the
disparity. Among the killed on our side was General
Hackelman. General Oglesby was badly, it was for some time
supposed mortally, wounded. I received a congratulatory letter
from the President, which expressed also his sorrow for the
losses.

This battle was recognized by me as being a decided victory,
though not so complete as I had hoped for, nor nearly so
complete as I now think was within the easy grasp of the
commanding officer at Corinth. Since the war it is known that
the result, as it was, was a crushing blow to the enemy, and
felt by him much more than it was appreciated at the North. The
battle relieved me from any further anxiety for the safety of the
territory within my jurisdiction, and soon after receiving
reinforcements I suggested to the general-in-chief a forward
movement against Vicksburg.

On the 23d of October I learned of Pemberton’s being in command
at Holly Springs and much reinforced by conscripts and troops
from Alabama and Texas. The same day General Rosecrans was
relieved from duty with my command, and shortly after he
succeeded Buell in the command of the army in Middle
Tennessee. I was delighted at the promotion of General
Rosecrans to a separate command, because I still believed that
when independent of an immediate superior the qualities which I,
at that time, credited him with possessing, would show
themselves. As a subordinate I found that I could not make him
do as I wished, and had determined to relieve him from duty that
very day.

At the close of the operations just described my force, in round
numbers, was 48,500. Of these 4,800 were in Kentucky and
Illinois, 7,000 in Memphis, 19,200 from Mound City south, and
17,500 at Corinth. General McClernand had been authorized from
Washington to go north and organize troops to be used in opening
the Mississippi. These new levies with other reinforcements now
began to come in.

On the 25th of October I was placed in command of the Department
of the Tennessee. Reinforcements continued to come from the
north and by the 2d of November I was prepared to take the
initiative. This was a great relief after the two and a half
months of continued defence over a large district of country,
and where nearly every citizen was an enemy ready to give
information of our every move. I have described very
imperfectly a few of the battles and skirmishes that took place
during this time. To describe all would take more space than I
can allot to the purpose; to make special mention of all the
officers and troops who distinguished themselves, would take a
volume. (*9)

CHAPTER XXX.

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST VICKSBURG–EMPLOYING THE FREEDMEN
–OCCUPATION OF HOLLY SPRINGS–SHERMAN ORDERED TO
MEMPHIS–SHERMAN’S MOVEMENTS DOWN THE MISSISSIPPI–VAN DORN
CAPTURES HOLLY SPRINGS–COLLECTING FORAGE AND FOOD.

Vicksburg was important to the enemy because it occupied the
first high ground coming close to the river below Memphis. From
there a railroad runs east, connecting with other roads leading
to all points of the Southern States. A railroad also starts
from the opposite side of the river, extending west as far as
Shreveport, Louisiana. Vicksburg was the only channel, at the
time of the events of which this chapter treats, connecting the
parts of the Confederacy divided by the Mississippi. So long as
it was held by the enemy, the free navigation of the river was
prevented. Hence its importance. Points on the river between
Vicksburg and Port Hudson were held as dependencies; but their
fall was sure to follow the capture of the former place.

The campaign against Vicksburg commenced on the 2d of November
as indicated in a dispatch to the general-in-chief in the
following words: “I have commenced a movement on Grand
Junction, with three divisions from Corinth and two from
Bolivar. Will leave here [Jackson, Tennessee] to-morrow, and
take command in person. If found practicable, I will go to
Holly Springs, and, may be, Grenada, completing railroad and
telegraph as I go.”

At this time my command was holding the Mobile and Ohio railroad
from about twenty-five miles south of Corinth, north to Columbus,
Kentucky; the Mississippi Central from Bolivar north to its
junction with the Mobile and Ohio; the Memphis and Charleston
from Corinth east to Bear Creek, and the Mississippi River from
Cairo to Memphis. My entire command was no more than was
necessary to hold these lines, and hardly that if kept on the
defensive. By moving against the enemy and into his unsubdued,
or not yet captured, territory, driving their army before us,
these lines would nearly hold themselves; thus affording a large
force for field operations. My moving force at that time was
about 30,000 men, and I estimated the enemy confronting me,
under Pemberton, at about the same number. General McPherson
commanded my left wing and General C. S. Hamilton the centre,
while Sherman was at Memphis with the right wing. Pemberton was
fortified at the Tallahatchie, but occupied Holly Springs and
Grand Junction on the Mississippi Central railroad. On the 8th
we occupied Grand Junction and La Grange, throwing a
considerable force seven or eight miles south, along the line of
the railroad. The road from Bolivar forward was repaired and put
in running order as the troops advanced.

Up to this time it had been regarded as an axiom in war that
large bodies of troops must operate from a base of supplies
which they always covered and guarded in all forward
movements. There was delay therefore in repairing the road
back, and in gathering and forwarding supplies to the front.

By my orders, and in accordance with previous instructions from
Washington, all the forage within reach was collected under the
supervision of the chief quartermaster and the provisions under
the chief commissary, receipts being given when there was any
one to take them; the supplies in any event to be accounted for
as government stores. The stock was bountiful, but still it
gave me no idea of the possibility of supplying a moving column
in an enemy’s country from the country itself.

It was at this point, probably, where the first idea of a
“Freedman’s Bureau” took its origin. Orders of the government
prohibited the expulsion of the negroes from the protection of
the army, when they came in voluntarily. Humanity forbade
allowing them to starve. With such an army of them, of all ages
and both sexes, as had congregated about Grand Junction,
amounting to many thousands, it was impossible to advance. There
was no special authority for feeding them unless they were
employed as teamsters, cooks and pioneers with the army; but
only able-bodied young men were suitable for such work. This
labor would support but a very limited percentage of them. The
plantations were all deserted; the cotton and corn were ripe:
men, women and children above ten years of age could be employed
in saving these crops. To do this work with contrabands, or to
have it done, organization under a competent chief was
necessary. On inquiring for such a man Chaplain Eaton, now and
for many years the very able United States Commissioner of
Education, was suggested. He proved as efficient in that field
as he has since done in his present one. I gave him all the
assistants and guards he called for. We together fixed the
prices to be paid for the negro labor, whether rendered to the
government or to individuals. The cotton was to be picked from
abandoned plantations, the laborers to receive the stipulated
price (my recollection is twelve and a half cents per pound for
picking and ginning) from the quartermaster, he shipping the
cotton north to be sold for the benefit of the government.
Citizens remaining on their plantations were allowed the
privilege of having their crops saved by freedmen on the same
terms.

At once the freedmen became self-sustaining. The money was not
paid to them directly, but was expended judiciously and for
their benefit. They gave me no trouble afterwards.

Later the freedmen were engaged in cutting wood along the
Mississippi River to supply the large number of steamers on that
stream. A good price was paid for chopping wood used for the
supply of government steamers (steamers chartered and which the
government had to supply with fuel). Those supplying their own
fuel paid a much higher price. In this way a fund was created
not only sufficient to feed and clothe all, old and young, male
and female, but to build them comfortable cabins, hospitals for
the sick, and to supply them with many comforts they had never
known before.

At this stage of the campaign against Vicksburg I was very much
disturbed by newspaper rumors that General McClernand was to
have a separate and independent command within mine, to operate
against Vicksburg by way of the Mississippi River. Two
commanders on the same field are always one too many, and in
this case I did not think the general selected had either the
experience or the qualifications to fit him for so important a
position. I feared for the safety of the troops intrusted to
him, especially as he was to raise new levies, raw troops, to
execute so important a trust. But on the 12th I received a
dispatch from General Halleck saying that I had command of all
the troops sent to my department and authorizing me to fight the
enemy where I pleased. The next day my cavalry was in Holly
Springs, and the enemy fell back south of the Tallahatchie.

Holly Springs I selected for my depot of supplies and munitions
of war, all of which at that time came by rail from Columbus,
Kentucky, except the few stores collected about La Grange and
Grand Junction. This was a long line (increasing in length as
we moved south) to maintain in an enemy’s country. On the 15th
of November, while I was still at Holly Springs, I sent word to
Sherman to meet me at Columbus. We were but forty-seven miles
apart, yet the most expeditious way for us to meet was for me to
take the rail to Columbus and Sherman a steamer for the same
place. At that meeting, besides talking over my general plans I
gave him his orders to join me with two divisions and to march
them down the Mississippi Central railroad if he could. Sherman,
who was always prompt, was up by the 29th to Cottage Hill, ten
miles north of Oxford. He brought three divisions with him,
leaving a garrison of only four regiments of infantry, a couple
of pieces of artillery and a small detachment of cavalry.
Further reinforcements he knew were on their way from the north
to Memphis. About this time General Halleck ordered troops from
Helena, Arkansas (territory west of the Mississippi was not under
my command then) to cut the road in Pemberton’s rear. The
expedition was under Generals Hovey and C. C. Washburn and was
successful so far as reaching the railroad was concerned, but
the damage done was very slight and was soon repaired.

The Tallahatchie, which confronted me, was very high, the
railroad bridge destroyed and Pemberton strongly fortified on
the south side. A crossing would have been impossible in the
presence of an enemy. I sent the cavalry higher up the stream
and they secured a crossing. This caused the enemy to evacuate
their position, which was possibly accelerated by the expedition
of Hovey and Washburn. The enemy was followed as far south as
Oxford by the main body of troops, and some seventeen miles
farther by McPherson’s command. Here the pursuit was halted to
repair the railroad from the Tallahatchie northward, in order to
bring up supplies. The piles on which the railroad bridge rested
had been left standing. The work of constructing a roadway for
the troops was but a short matter, and, later, rails were laid
for cars.

During the delay at Oxford in repairing railroads I learned that
an expedition down the Mississippi now was inevitable and,
desiring to have a competent commander in charge, I ordered
Sherman on the 8th of December back to Memphis to take charge.
The following were his orders:

Headquarters 13th Army Corps,
Department of the Tennessee.
OXFORD, MISSISSIPPI, December 8,1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Right Wing:

You will proceed, with as little delay as possible, to Memphis,
Tennessee, taking with you one division of your present
command. On your arrival at Memphis you will assume command of
all the troops there, and that portion of General Curtis’s
forces at present east of the Mississippi River, and organize
them into brigades and divisions in your own army. As soon as
possible move with them down the river to the vicinity of
Vicksburg, and with the co-operation of the gunboat fleet under
command of Flag-officer Porter proceed to the reduction of that
place in such a manner as circumstances, and your own judgment,
may dictate.

The amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc.,
necessary to take, will be left entirely with yourself. The
Quartermaster at St. Louis will be instructed to send you
transportation for 30,000 men; should you still find yourself
deficient, your quartermaster will be authorized to make up the
deficiency from such transports as may come into the port of
Memphis.

On arriving in Memphis, put yourself in communication with
Admiral Porter, and arrange with him for his co-operation.

Inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you
will embark, and such plans as may then be matured. I will hold
the forces here in readiness to co-operate with you in such
manner as the movements of the enemy may make necessary.

Leave the District of Memphis in the command of an efficient
officer, and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the
siege guns, and whatever cavalry may be there.

U. S. GRANT,
Major-General.

This idea had presented itself to my mind earlier, for on the 3d
of December I asked Halleck if it would not be well to hold the
enemy south of the Yallabusha and move a force from Helena and
Memphis on Vicksburg. On the 5th again I suggested, from
Oxford, to Halleck that if the Helena troops were at my command
I though it would be possible to take them and the Memphis
forces south of the mouth of the Yazoo River, and thus secure
Vicksburg and the State of Mississippi. Halleck on the same
day, the 5th of December , directed me not to attempt to hold
the country south of the Tallahatchie, but to collect 25,000
troops at Memphis by the 20th for the Vicksburg expedition. I
sent Sherman with two divisions at once, informed the
general-in-chief of the fact, and asked whether I should command
the expedition down the river myself or send Sherman. I was
authorized to do as I though best for the accomplishment of the
great object in view. I sent Sherman and so informed General
Halleck.

As stated, my action in sending Sherman back was expedited by a
desire to get him in command of the forces separated from my
direct supervision. I feared that delay might bring McClernand,
who was his senior and who had authority from the President and
Secretary of War to exercise that particular command,–and
independently. I doubted McClernand’s fitness; and I had good
reason to believe that in forestalling him I was by no means
giving offence to those whose authority to command was above
both him and me.

Neither my orders to General Sherman, nor the correspondence
between us or between General Halleck and myself, contemplated
at the time my going further south than the Yallabusha.
Pemberton’s force in my front was the main part of the garrison
of Vicksburg, as the force with me was the defence of the
territory held by us in West Tennessee and Kentucky. I hoped to
hold Pemberton in my front while Sherman should get in his rear
and into Vicksburg. The further north the enemy could be held
the better.

It was understood, however, between General Sherman and myself
that our movements were to be co-operative; if Pemberton could
not be held away from Vicksburg I was to follow him; but at that
time it was not expected to abandon the railroad north of the
Yallabusha. With that point as a secondary base of supplies,
the possibility of moving down the Yazoo until communications
could be opened with the Mississippi was contemplated.

It was my intention, and so understood by Sherman and his
command, that if the enemy should fall back I would follow him
even to the gates of Vicksburg. I intended in such an event to
hold the road to Grenada on the Yallabusha and cut loose from
there, expecting to establish a new base of supplies on the
Yazoo, or at Vicksburg itself, with Grenada to fall back upon in
case of failure. It should be remembered that at the time I
speak of it had not been demonstrated that an army could operate
in an enemy’s territory depending upon the country for
supplies. A halt was called at Oxford with the advance
seventeen miles south of there, to bring up the road to the
latter point and to bring supplies of food, forage and munitions
to the front.

On the 18th of December I received orders from Washington to
divide my command into four army corps, with General McClernand
to command one of them and to be assigned to that part of the
army which was to operate down the Mississippi. This interfered
with my plans, but probably resulted in my ultimately taking the
command in person. McClernand was at that time in Springfield,
Illinois. The order was obeyed without any delay. Dispatches
were sent to him the same day in conformity.

On the 20th General Van Dorn appeared at Holly Springs, my
secondary base of supplies, captured the garrison of 1,500 men
commanded by Colonel Murphy, of the 8th Wisconsin regiment, and
destroyed all our munitions of war, food and forage. The
capture was a disgraceful one to the officer commanding but not
to the troops under him. At the same time Forrest got on our
line of railroad between Jackson, Tennessee, and Columbus,
Kentucky, doing much damage to it. This cut me off from all
communication with the north for more than a week, and it was
more than two weeks before rations or forage could be issued
from stores obtained in the regular way. This demonstrated the
impossibility of maintaining so long a line of road over which
to draw supplies for an army moving in an enemy’s country. I
determined, therefore, to abandon my campaign into the interior
with Columbus as a base, and returned to La Grange and Grand
Junction destroying the road to my front and repairing the road
to Memphis, making the Mississippi river the line over which to
draw supplies. Pemberton was falling back at the same time.

The moment I received the news of Van Dorn’s success I sent the
cavalry at the front back to drive him from the country. He had
start enough to move north destroying the railroad in many
places, and to attack several small garrisons intrenched as
guards to the railroad. All these he found warned of his coming
and prepared to receive him. Van Dorn did not succeed in
capturing a single garrison except the one at Holly Springs,
which was larger than all the others attacked by him put
together. Murphy was also warned of Van Dorn’s approach, but
made no preparations to meet him. He did not even notify his
command.

Colonel Murphy was the officer who, two months before, had
evacuated Iuka on the approach of the enemy. General Rosecrans
denounced him for the act and desired to have him tried and
punished. I sustained the colonel at the time because his
command was a small one compared with that of the enemy–not
one-tenth as large–and I thought he had done well to get away
without falling into their hands. His leaving large stores to
fall into Price’s possession I looked upon as an oversight and
excused it on the ground of inexperience in military matters. He
should, however, have destroyed them. This last surrender
demonstrated to my mind that Rosecrans’ judgment of Murphy’s
conduct at Iuka was correct. The surrender of Holly Springs was
most reprehensible and showed either the disloyalty of Colonel
Murphy to the cause which he professed to serve, or gross
cowardice.

After the war was over I read from the diary of a lady who
accompanied General Pemberton in his retreat from the
Tallahatchie, that the retreat was almost a panic. The roads
were bad and it was difficult to move the artillery and
trains. Why there should have been a panic I do not see. No
expedition had yet started down the Mississippi River. Had I
known the demoralized condition of the enemy, or the fact that
central Mississippi abounded so in all army supplies, I would
have been in pursuit of Pemberton while his cavalry was
destroying the roads in my rear.

After sending cavalry to drive Van Dorn away, my next order was
to dispatch all the wagons we had, under proper escort, to
collect and bring in all supplies of forage and food from a
region of fifteen miles east and west of the road from our front
back to Grand Junction, leaving two months’ supplies for the
families of those whose stores were taken. I was amazed at the
quantity of supplies the country afforded. It showed that we
could have subsisted off the country for two months instead of
two weeks without going beyond the limits designated. This
taught me a lesson which was taken advantage of later in the
campaign when our army lived twenty days with the issue of only
five days’ rations by the commissary. Our loss of supplies was
great at Holly Springs, but it was more than compensated for by
those taken from the country and by the lesson taught.

The news of the capture of Holly Springs and the destruction of
our supplies caused much rejoicing among the people remaining in
Oxford. They came with broad smiles on their faces, indicating
intense joy, to ask what I was going to do now without anything
for my soldiers to eat. I told them that I was not disturbed;
that I had already sent troops and wagons to collect all the
food and forage they could find for fifteen miles on each side
of the road. Countenances soon changed, and so did the
inquiry. The next was, “What are WE to do?” My response was
that we had endeavored to feed ourselves from our own northern
resources while visiting them; but their friends in gray had
been uncivil enough to destroy what we had brought along, and it
could not be expected that men, with arms in their hands, would
starve in the midst of plenty. I advised them to emigrate east,
or west, fifteen miles and assist in eating up what we left.

CHAPTER XXXI.

HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO HOLLY SPRINGS–GENERAL M’CLERNAND IN
COMMAND–ASSUMING COMMAND AT YOUNG’S POINT–OPERATIONS ABOVE
VICKSBURG–FORTIFICATIONS ABOUT VICKSBURG–THE CANAL–LAKE
PROVIDENCE–OPERATIONS AT YAZOO PASS.

This interruption in my communications north–I was really cut
off from communication with a great part of my own command
during this time–resulted in Sherman’s moving from Memphis
before McClernand could arrive, for my dispatch of the 18th did
not reach McClernand. Pemberton got back to Vicksburg before
Sherman got there. The rebel positions were on a bluff on the
Yazoo River, some miles above its mouth. The waters were high
so that the bottoms were generally overflowed, leaving only
narrow causeways of dry land between points of debarkation and
the high bluffs. These were fortified and defended at all
points. The rebel position was impregnable against any force
that could be brought against its front. Sherman could not use
one-fourth of his force. His efforts to capture the city, or
the high ground north of it, were necessarily unavailing.

Sherman’s attack was very unfortunate, but I had no opportunity
of communicating with him after the destruction of the road and
telegraph to my rear on the 20th. He did not know but what I
was in the rear of the enemy and depending on him to open a new
base of supplies for the troops with me. I had, before he
started from Memphis, directed him to take with him a few small
steamers suitable for the navigation of the Yazoo, not knowing
but that I might want them to supply me after cutting loose from
my base at Grenada.

On the 23d I removed my headquarters back to Holly Springs. The
troops were drawn back gradually, but without haste or confusion,
finding supplies abundant and no enemy following. The road was
not damaged south of Holly Springs by Van Dorn, at least not to
an extent to cause any delay. As I had resolved to move
headquarters to Memphis, and to repair the road to that point, I
remained at Holly Springs until this work was completed.

On the 10th of January, the work on the road from Holly Springs
to Grand Junction and thence to Memphis being completed, I moved
my headquarters to the latter place. During the campaign here
described, the losses (mostly captures) were about equal,
crediting the rebels with their Holly Springs capture, which
they could not hold.

When Sherman started on his expedition down the river he had
20,000 men, taken from Memphis, and was reinforced by 12,000
more at Helena, Arkansas. The troops on the west bank of the
river had previously been assigned to my command. McClernand
having received the orders for his assignment reached the mouth
of the Yazoo on the 2d of January, and immediately assumed
command of all the troops with Sherman, being a part of his own
corps, the 13th, and all of Sherman’s, the 15th. Sherman, and
Admiral Porter with the fleet, had withdrawn from the Yazoo.
After consultation they decided that neither the army nor navy
could render service to the cause where they were, and learning
that I had withdrawn from the interior of Mississippi, they
determined to return to the Arkansas River and to attack
Arkansas Post, about fifty miles up that stream and garrisoned
by about five or six thousand men. Sherman had learned of the
existence of this force through a man who had been captured by
the enemy with a steamer loaded with ammunition and other
supplies intended for his command. The man had made his
escape. McClernand approved this move reluctantly, as Sherman
says. No obstacle was encountered until the gunboats and
transports were within range of the fort. After three days’
bombardment by the navy an assault was made by the troops and
marines, resulting in the capture of the place, and in taking
5,000 prisoners and 17 guns. I was at first disposed to
disapprove of this move as an unnecessary side movement having
no especial bearing upon the work before us; but when the result
was understood I regarded it as very important. Five thousand
Confederate troops left in the rear might have caused us much
trouble and loss of property while navigating the Mississippi.

Immediately after the reduction of Arkansas Post and the capture
of the garrison, McClernand returned with his entire force to
Napoleon, at the mouth of the Arkansas River. From here I
received messages from both Sherman and Admiral Porter, urging
me to come and take command in person, and expressing their
distrust of McClernand’s ability and fitness for so important
and intricate an expedition.

On the 17th I visited McClernand and his command at Napoleon. It
was here made evident to me that both the army and navy were so
distrustful of McClernand’s fitness to command that, while they
would do all they could to insure success, this distrust was an
element of weakness. It would have been criminal to send troops
under these circumstances into such danger. By this time I had
received authority to relieve McClernand, or to assign any
person else to the command of the river expedition, or to assume
command in person. I felt great embarrassment about
McClernand. He was the senior major-general after myself within
the department. It would not do, with his rank and ambition, to
assign a junior over him. Nothing was left, therefore, but to
assume the command myself. I would have been glad to put
Sherman in command, to give him an opportunity to accomplish
what he had failed in the December before; but there seemed no
other way out of the difficulty, for he was junior to
McClernand. Sherman’s failure needs no apology.

On the 20th I ordered General McClernand with the entire
command, to Young’s Point and Milliken’s Bend, while I returned
to Memphis to make all the necessary preparation for leaving the
territory behind me secure. General Hurlbut with the 16th corps
was left in command. The Memphis and Charleston railroad was
held, while the Mississippi Central was given up. Columbus was
the only point between Cairo and Memphis, on the river, left
with a garrison. All the troops and guns from the posts on the
abandoned railroad and river were sent to the front.

On the 29th of January I arrived at Young’s Point and assumed
command the following day. General McClernand took exception in
a most characteristic way–for him. His correspondence with me
on the subject was more in the nature of a reprimand than a
protest. It was highly insubordinate, but I overlooked it, as I
believed, for the good of the service. General McClernand was a
politician of very considerable prominence in his State; he was a
member of Congress when the secession war broke out; he belonged
to that political party which furnished all the opposition there
was to a vigorous prosecution of the war for saving the Union;
there was no delay in his declaring himself for the Union at all
hazards, and there was no uncertain sound in his declaration of
where he stood in the contest before the country. He also gave
up his seat in Congress to take the field in defence of the
principles he had proclaimed.

The real work of the campaign and siege of Vicksburg now
began. The problem was to secure a footing upon dry ground on
the east side of the river from which the troops could operate
against Vicksburg. The Mississippi River, from Cairo south,
runs through a rich alluvial valley of many miles in width,
bound on the east by land running from eighty up to two or more
hundred feet above the river. On the west side the highest
land, except in a few places, is but little above the highest
water. Through this valley the river meanders in the most
tortuous way, varying in direction to all points of the
compass. At places it runs to the very foot of the bluffs.
After leaving Memphis, there are no such highlands coming to the
water’s edge on the east shore until Vicksburg is reached.

The intervening land is cut up by bayous filled from the river
in high water–many of them navigable for steamers. All of them
would be, except for overhanging trees, narrowness and tortuous
course, making it impossible to turn the bends with vessels of
any considerable length. Marching across this country in the
face of an enemy was impossible; navigating it proved equally
impracticable. The strategical way according to the rule,
therefore, would have been to go back to Memphis; establish that
as a base of supplies; fortify it so that the storehouses could
be held by a small garrison, and move from there along the line
of railroad, repairing as we advanced, to the Yallabusha, or to
Jackson, Mississippi. At this time the North had become very
much discouraged. Many strong Union men believed that the war
must prove a failure. The elections of 1862 had gone against
the party which was for the prosecution of the war to save the
Union if it took the last man and the last dollar. Voluntary
enlistments had ceased throughout the greater part of the North,
and the draft had been resorted to to fill up our ranks. It was
my judgment at the time that to make a backward movement as long
as that from Vicksburg to Memphis, would be interpreted, by many
of those yet full of hope for the preservation of the Union, as
a defeat, and that the draft would be resisted, desertions ensue
and the power to capture and punish deserters lost. There was
nothing left to be done but to go FORWARD TO A DECISIVE
VICTORY. This was in my mind from the moment I took command in
person at Young’s Point.

The winter of 1862-3 was a noted one for continuous high water
in the Mississippi and for heavy rains along the lower river. To
get dry land, or rather land above the water, to encamp the
troops upon, took many miles of river front. We had to occupy
the levees and the ground immediately behind. This was so
limited that one corps, the 17th, under General McPherson, was
at Lake Providence, seventy miles above Vicksburg.

It was in January the troops took their position opposite
Vicksburg. The water was very high and the rains were
incessant. There seemed no possibility of a land movement
before the end of March or later, and it would not do to lie
idle all this time. The effect would be demoralizing to the
troops and injurious to their health. Friends in the North
would have grown more and more discouraged, and enemies in the
same section more and more insolent in their gibes and
denunciation of the cause and those engaged in it.

I always admired the South, as bad as I thought their cause, for
the boldness with which they silenced all opposition and all
croaking, by press or by individuals, within their control. War
at all times, whether a civil war between sections of a common
country or between nations, ought to be avoided, if possible
with honor. But, once entered into, it is too much for human
nature to tolerate an enemy within their ranks to give aid and
comfort to the armies of the opposing section or nation.

Vicksburg, as stated before, is on the first high land coming to
the river’s edge, below that on which Memphis stands. The bluff,
or high land, follows the left bank of the Yazoo for some
distance and continues in a southerly direction to the
Mississippi River, thence it runs along the Mississippi to
Warrenton, six miles below. The Yazoo River leaves the high
land a short distance below Haines’ Bluff and empties into the
Mississippi nine miles above Vicksburg. Vicksburg is built on
this high land where the Mississippi washes the base of the
hill. Haines’ Bluff, eleven miles from Vicksburg, on the Yazoo
River, was strongly fortified. The whole distance from there to
Vicksburg and thence to Warrenton was also intrenched, with
batteries at suitable distances and rifle-pits connecting them.

From Young’s Point the Mississippi turns in a north-easterly
direction to a point just above the city, when it again turns
and runs south-westerly, leaving vessels, which might attempt to
run the blockade, exposed to the fire of batteries six miles
below the city before they were in range of the upper
batteries. Since then the river has made a cut-off, leaving
what was the peninsula in front of the city, an island. North
of the Yazoo was all a marsh, heavily timbered, cut up with
bayous, and much overflowed. A front attack was therefore
impossible, and was never contemplated; certainly not by me. The
problem then became, how to secure a landing on high ground east
of the Mississippi without an apparent retreat. Then commenced
a series of experiments to consume time, and to divert the
attention of the enemy, of my troops and of the public
generally. I, myself, never felt great confidence that any of
the experiments resorted to would prove successful. Nevertheless
I was always prepared to take advantage of them in case they did.

In 1862 General Thomas Williams had come up from New Orleans and
cut a ditch ten or twelve feet wide and about as deep, straight
across from Young’s Point to the river below. The distance
across was a little over a mile. It was Williams’ expectation
that when the river rose it would cut a navigable channel
through; but the canal started in an eddy from both ends, and,
of course, it only filled up with water on the rise without
doing any execution in the way of cutting. Mr. Lincoln had
navigated the Mississippi in his younger days and understood
well its tendency to change its channel, in places, from time to
time. He set much store accordingly by this canal. General
McClernand had been, therefore, directed before I went to
Young’s Point to push the work of widening and deepening this
canal. After my arrival the work was diligently pushed with
about 4,000 men–as many as could be used to advantage–until
interrupted by a sudden rise in the river that broke a dam at
the upper end, which had been put there to keep the water out
until the excavation was completed. This was on the 8th of
March.

Even if the canal had proven a success, so far as to be
navigable for steamers, it could not have been of much advantage
to us. It runs in a direction almost perpendicular to the line
of bluffs on the opposite side, or east bank, of the river. As
soon as the enemy discovered what we were doing he established a
battery commanding the canal throughout its length. This battery
soon drove out our dredges, two in number, which were doing the
work of thousands of men. Had the canal been completed it might
have proven of some use in running transports through, under the
cover of night, to use below; but they would yet have to run
batteries, though for a much shorter distance.

While this work was progressing we were busy in other
directions, trying to find an available landing on high ground
on the east bank of the river, or to make water-ways to get
below the city, avoiding the batteries.

On the 30th of January, the day after my arrival at the front, I
ordered General McPherson, stationed with his corps at Lake
Providence, to cut the levee at that point. If successful in
opening a channel for navigation by this route, it would carry
us to the Mississippi River through the mouth of the Red River,
just above Port Hudson and four hundred miles below Vicksburg by
the river.

Lake Providence is a part of the old bed of the Mississippi,
about a mile from the present channel. It is six miles long and
has its outlet through Bayou Baxter, Bayou Macon, and the Tensas,
Washita and Red Rivers. The last three are navigable streams at
all seasons. Bayous Baxter and Macon are narrow and tortuous,
and the banks are covered with dense forests overhanging the
channel. They were also filled with fallen timber, the
accumulation of years. The land along the Mississippi River,
from Memphis down, is in all instances highest next to the
river, except where the river washes the bluffs which form the
boundary of the valley through which it winds. Bayou Baxter, as
it reaches lower land, begins to spread out and disappears
entirely in a cypress swamp before it reaches the Macon. There
was about two feet of water in this swamp at the time. To get
through it, even with vessels of the lightest draft, it was
necessary to clear off a belt of heavy timber wide enough to
make a passage way. As the trees would have to be cut close to
the bottom–under water–it was an undertaking of great
magnitude.

On the 4th of February I visited General McPherson, and remained
with him several days. The work had not progressed so far as to
admit the water from the river into the lake, but the troops had
succeeded in drawing a small steamer, of probably not over thirty
tons’ capacity, from the river into the lake. With this we were
able to explore the lake and bayou as far as cleared. I saw
then that there was scarcely a chance of this ever becoming a
practicable route for moving troops through an enemy’s
country. The distance from Lake Providence to the point where
vessels going by that route would enter the Mississippi again,
is about four hundred and seventy miles by the main river. The
distance would probably be greater by the tortuous bayous
through which this new route would carry us. The enemy held
Port Hudson, below where the Red River debouches, and all the
Mississippi above to Vicksburg. The Red River, Washita and
Tensas were, as has been said, all navigable streams, on which
the enemy could throw small bodies of men to obstruct our
passage and pick off our troops with their sharpshooters. I let
the work go on, believing employment was better than idleness for
the men. Then, too, it served as a cover for other efforts which
gave a better prospect of success. This work was abandoned after
the canal proved a failure.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson of my staff was sent to Helena,
Arkansas, to examine and open a way through Moon Lake and the
Yazoo Pass if possible. Formerly there was a route by way of an
inlet from the Mississippi River into Moon Lake, a mile east of
the river, thence east through Yazoo Pass to Coldwater, along
the latter to the Tallahatchie, which joins the Yallabusha about
two hundred and fifty miles below Moon Lake and forms the Yazoo
River. These were formerly navigated by steamers trading with
the rich plantations along their banks; but the State of
Mississippi had built a strong levee across the inlet some years
before, leaving the only entrance for vessels into this rich
region the one by way of the mouth of the Yazoo several hundreds
of miles below.

On the 2d of February this dam, or levee, was cut. The river
being high the rush of water through the cut was so great that
in a very short time the entire obstruction was washed away. The
bayous were soon filled and much of the country was overflowed.
This pass leaves the Mississippi River but a few miles below
Helena. On the 24th General Ross, with his brigade of about
4,500 men on transports, moved into this new water-way. The
rebels had obstructed the navigation of Yazoo Pass and the
Coldwater by felling trees into them. Much of the timber in
this region being of greater specific gravity than water, and
being of great size, their removal was a matter of great labor;
but it was finally accomplished, and on the 11th of March Ross
found himself, accompanied by two gunboats under the command of
Lieutenant-Commander Watson Smith, confronting a fortification
at Greenwood, where the Tallahatchie and Yallabusha unite and
the Yazoo begins. The bends of the rivers are such at this
point as to almost form an island, scarcely above water at that
stage of the river. This island was fortified and manned. It
was named Fort Pemberton after the commander at Vicksburg. No
land approach was accessible. The troops, therefore, could
render no assistance towards an assault further than to
establish a battery on a little piece of ground which was
discovered above water. The gunboats, however, attacked on the
11th and again on the 13th of March. Both efforts were failures
and were not renewed. One gunboat was disabled and we lost six
men killed and twenty-five wounded. The loss of the enemy was
less.

Fort Pemberton was so little above the water that it was thought
that a rise of two feet would drive the enemy out. In hope of
enlisting the elements on our side, which had been so much
against us up to this time, a second cut was made in the
Mississippi levee, this time directly opposite Helena, or six
miles above the former cut. It did not accomplish the desired
result, and Ross, with his fleet, started back. On the 22d he
met Quinby with a brigade at Yazoo Pass. Quinby was the senior
of Ross, and assumed command. He was not satisfied with
returning to his former position without seeing for himself
whether anything could be accomplished. Accordingly Fort
Pemberton was revisited by our troops; but an inspection was
sufficient this time without an attack. Quinby, with his
command, returned with but little delay. In the meantime I was
much exercised for the safety of Ross, not knowing that Quinby
had been able to join him. Reinforcements were of no use in a
country covered with water, as they would have to remain on
board of their transports. Relief had to come from another
quarter. So I determined to get into the Yazoo below Fort
Pemberton.

Steel’s Bayou empties into the Yazoo River between Haines’ Bluff
and its mouth. It is narrow, very tortuous, and fringed with a
very heavy growth of timber, but it is deep. It approaches to
within one mile of the Mississippi at Eagle Bend, thirty miles
above Young’s Point. Steel’s Bayou connects with Black Bayou,
Black Bayou with Deer Creek, Deer Creek with Rolling Fork,
Rolling Fork with the Big Sunflower River, and the Big Sunflower
with the Yazoo River about ten miles above Haines’ Bluff in a
right line but probably twenty or twenty-five miles by the
winding of the river. All these waterways are of about the same
nature so far as navigation is concerned, until the Sunflower is
reached; this affords free navigation.

Admiral Porter explored this waterway as far as Deer Creek on
the 14th of March, and reported it navigable. On the next day
he started with five gunboats and four mortar-boats. I went
with him for some distance. The heavy overhanging timber
retarded progress very much, as did also the short turns in so
narrow a stream. The gunboats, however, ploughed their way
through without other damage than to their appearance. The
transports did not fare so well although they followed behind.
The road was somewhat cleared for them by the gunboats. In the
evening I returned to headquarters to hurry up reinforcements.
Sherman went in person on the 16th, taking with him Stuart’s
division of the 15th corps. They took large river transports to
Eagle Bend on the Mississippi, where they debarked and marched
across to Steel’s Bayou, where they re-embarked on the
transports. The river steamers, with their tall smokestacks and
light guards extending out, were so much impeded that the
gunboats got far ahead. Porter, with his fleet, got within a
few hundred yards of where the sailing would have been clear and
free from the obstructions caused by felling trees into the
water, when he encountered rebel sharp-shooters, and his
progress was delayed by obstructions in his front. He could do
nothing with gunboats against sharpshooters. The rebels,
learning his route, had sent in about 4,000 men–many more than
there were sailors in the fleet.

Sherman went back, at the request of the admiral, to clear out
Black Bayou and to hurry up reinforcements, which were far
behind. On the night of the 19th he received notice from the
admiral that he had been attacked by sharp-shooters and was in
imminent peril. Sherman at once returned through Black Bayou in
a canoe, and passed on until he met a steamer, with the last of
the reinforcements he had, coming up. They tried to force their
way through Black Bayou with their steamer, but, finding it slow
and tedious work, debarked and pushed forward on foot. It was
night when they landed, and intensely dark. There was but a
narrow strip of land above water, and that was grown up with
underbrush or cane. The troops lighted their way through this
with candles carried in their hands for a mile and a half, when
they came to an open plantation. Here the troops rested until
morning. They made twenty-one miles from this resting-place by
noon the next day, and were in time to rescue the fleet. Porter
had fully made up his mind to blow up the gunboats rather than
have them fall into the hands of the enemy. More welcome
visitors he probably never met than the “boys in blue” on this
occasion. The vessels were backed out and returned to their
rendezvous on the Mississippi; and thus ended in failure the
fourth attempt to get in rear of Vicksburg.

CHAPTER XXXII.

THE BAYOUS WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI–CRITICISMS OF THE NORTHERN
PRESS–RUNNING THE BATTERIES–LOSS OF THE INDIANOLA–DISPOSITION
OF THE TROOPS.

The original canal scheme was also abandoned on the 27th of
March. The effort to make a waterway through Lake Providence
and the connecting bayous was abandoned as wholly impracticable
about the same time.

At Milliken’s Bend, and also at Young’s Point, bayous or
channels start, which connecting with other bayous passing
Richmond, Louisiana, enter the Mississippi at Carthage
twenty-five or thirty miles above Grand Gulf. The Mississippi
levee cuts the supply of water off from these bayous or
channels, but all the rainfall behind the levee, at these
points, is carried through these same channels to the river
below. In case of a crevasse in this vicinity, the water
escaping would find its outlet through the same channels. The
dredges and laborers from the canal having been driven out by
overflow and the enemy’s batteries, I determined to open these
other channels, if possible. If successful the effort would
afford a route, away from the enemy’s batteries, for our
transports. There was a good road back of the levees, along
these bayous, to carry the troops, artillery and wagon trains
over whenever the water receded a little, and after a few days
of dry weather. Accordingly, with the abandonment of all the
other plans for reaching a base heretofore described, this new
one was undertaken.

As early as the 4th of February I had written to Halleck about
this route, stating that I thought it much more practicable than
the other undertaking (the Lake Providence route), and that it
would have been accomplished with much less labor if commenced
before the water had got all over the country.

The upper end of these bayous being cut off from a water supply,
further than the rainfall back of the levees, was grown up with
dense timber for a distance of several miles from their
source. It was necessary, therefore, to clear this out before
letting in the water from the river. This work was continued
until the waters of the river began to recede and the road to
Richmond, Louisiana, emerged from the water. One small steamer
and some barges were got through this channel, but no further
use could be made of it because of the fall in the river. Beyond
this it was no more successful than the other experiments with
which the winter was whiled away. All these failures would have
been very discouraging if I had expected much from the efforts;
but I had not. From the first the most I hoped to accomplish
was the passage of transports, to be used below Vicksburg,
without exposure to the long line of batteries defending that
city.

This long, dreary and, for heavy and continuous rains and high
water, unprecedented winter was one of great hardship to all
engaged about Vicksburg. The river was higher than its natural
banks from December, 1862, to the following April. The war had
suspended peaceful pursuits in the South, further than the
production of army supplies, and in consequence the levees were
neglected and broken in many places and the whole country was
covered with water. Troops could scarcely find dry ground on
which to pitch their tents. Malarial fevers broke out among the
men. Measles and small-pox also attacked them. The hospital
arrangements and medical attendance were so perfect, however,
that the loss of life was much less than might have been
expected. Visitors to the camps went home with dismal stories
to relate; Northern papers came back to the soldiers with these
stories exaggerated. Because I would not divulge my ultimate
plans to visitors, they pronounced me idle, incompetent and
unfit to command men in an emergency, and clamored for my
removal. They were not to be satisfied, many of them, with my
simple removal, but named who my successor should be.
McClernand, Fremont, Hunter and McClellan were all mentioned in
this connection. I took no steps to answer these complaints,
but continued to do my duty, as I understood it, to the best of
my ability. Every one has his superstitions. One of mine is
that in positions of great responsibility every one should do
his duty to the best of his ability where assigned by competent
authority, without application or the use of influence to change
his position. While at Cairo I had watched with very great
interest the operations of the Army of the Potomac, looking upon
that as the main field of the war. I had no idea, myself, of
ever having any large command, nor did I suppose that I was
equal to one; but I had the vanity to think that as a cavalry
officer I might succeed very well in the command of a brigade.
On one occasion, in talking about this to my staff officers, all
of whom were civilians without any military education whatever, I
said that I would give anything if I were commanding a brigade of
cavalry in the Army of the Potomac and I believed I could do some
good. Captain Hillyer spoke up and suggested that I make
application to be transferred there to command the cavalry. I
then told him that I would cut my right arm off first, and
mentioned this superstition.

In time of war the President, being by the Constitution
Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, is responsible for the
selection of commanders. He should not be embarrassed in making
his selections. I having been selected, my responsibility ended
with my doing the best I knew how. If I had sought the place,
or obtained it through personal or political influence, my
belief is that I would have feared to undertake any plan of my
own conception, and would probably have awaited direct orders
from my distant superiors. Persons obtaining important commands
by application or political influence are apt to keep a written
record of complaints and predictions of defeat, which are shown
in case of disaster. Somebody must be responsible for their
failures.

With all the pressure brought to bear upon them, both President
Lincoln and General Halleck stood by me to the end of the
campaign. I had never met Mr. Lincoln, but his support was
constant.

At last the waters began to recede; the roads crossing the
peninsula behind the levees of the bayous, were emerging from
the waters; the troops were all concentrated from distant points
at Milliken’s Bend preparatory to a final move which was to crown
the long, tedious and discouraging labors with success.

I had had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land
to a point below Vicksburg from which to operate, subject only to
the possible but not expected success of some one of the
expedients resorted to for the purpose of giving us a different
base. This could not be undertaken until the waters receded. I
did not therefore communicate this plan, even to an officer of my
staff, until it was necessary to make preparations for the
start. My recollection is that Admiral Porter was the first one
to whom I mentioned it. The co-operation of the navy was
absolutely essential to the success (even to the contemplation)
of such an enterprise. I had no more authority to command
Porter than he had to command me. It was necessary to have part
of his fleet below Vicksburg if the troops went there. Steamers
to use as ferries were also essential. The navy was the only
escort and protection for these steamers, all of which in
getting below had to run about fourteen miles of batteries.
Porter fell into the plan at once, and suggested that he had
better superintend the preparation of the steamers selected to
run the batteries, as sailors would probably understand the work
better than soldiers. I was glad to accept his proposition, not
only because I admitted his argument, but because it would
enable me to keep from the enemy a little longer our designs.
Porter’s fleet was on the east side of the river above the mouth
of the Yazoo, entirely concealed from the enemy by the dense
forests that intervened. Even spies could not get near him, on
account of the undergrowth and overflowed lands. Suspicions of
some mysterious movements were aroused. Our river guards
discovered one day a small skiff moving quietly and mysteriously
up the river near the east shore, from the direction of
Vicksburg, towards the fleet. On overhauling the boat they
found a small white flag, not much larger than a handkerchief,
set up in the stern, no doubt intended as a flag of truce in
case of discovery. The boat, crew and passengers were brought
ashore to me. The chief personage aboard proved to be Jacob
Thompson, Secretary of the Interior under the administration of
President Buchanan. After a pleasant conversation of half an
hour or more I allowed the boat and crew, passengers and all, to
return to Vicksburg, without creating a suspicion that there was
a doubt in my mind as to the good faith of Mr. Thompson and his
flag.

Admiral Porter proceeded with the preparation of the steamers
for their hazardous passage of the enemy’s batteries. The great
essential was to protect the boilers from the enemy’s shot, and
to conceal the fires under the boilers from view. This he
accomplished by loading the steamers, between the guards and
boilers on the boiler deck up to the deck above, with bales of
hay and cotton, and the deck in front of the boilers in the same
way, adding sacks of grain. The hay and grain would be wanted
below, and could not be transported in sufficient quantity by
the muddy roads over which we expected to march.

Before this I had been collecting, from St. Louis and Chicago,
yawls and barges to be used as ferries when we got below. By
the 16th of April Porter was ready to start on his perilous
trip. The advance, flagship Benton, Porter commanding, started
at ten o’clock at night, followed at intervals of a few minutes
by the Lafayette with a captured steamer, the Price, lashed to
her side, the Louisville, Mound City, Pittsburgh and
Carondelet–all of these being naval vessels. Next came the
transports–Forest Queen, Silver Wave and Henry Clay, each
towing barges loaded with coal to be used as fuel by the naval
and transport steamers when below the batteries. The gunboat
Tuscumbia brought up the rear. Soon after the start a battery
between Vicksburg and Warrenton opened fire across the
intervening peninsula, followed by the upper batteries, and then
by batteries all along the line. The gunboats ran up close under
the bluffs, delivering their fire in return at short distances,
probably without much effect. They were under fire for more
than two hours and every vessel was struck many times, but with
little damage to the gunboats. The transports did not fare so
well. The Henry Clay was disabled and deserted by her crew.
Soon after a shell burst in the cotton packed about the boilers,
set the vessel on fire and burned her to the water’s edge. The
burning mass, however, floated down to Carthage before
grounding, as did also one of the barges in tow.

The enemy were evidently expecting our fleet, for they were
ready to light up the river by means of bonfires on the east
side and by firing houses on the point of land opposite the city
on the Louisiana side. The sight was magnificent, but
terrible. I witnessed it from the deck of a river transport,
run out into the middle of the river and as low down as it was
prudent to go. My mind was much relieved when I learned that no
one on the transports had been killed and but few, if any,
wounded. During the running of the batteries men were stationed
in the holds of the transports to partially stop with cotton
shot-holes that might be made in the hulls. All damage was
afterwards soon repaired under the direction of Admiral Porter.

The experiment of passing batteries had been tried before this,
however, during the war. Admiral Farragut had run the batteries
at Port Hudson with the flagship Hartford and one iron-clad and
visited me from below Vicksburg. The 13th of February Admiral
Porter had sent the gunboat Indianola, Lieutenant-Commander
George Brown commanding, below. She met Colonel Ellet of the
Marine brigade below Natchez on a captured steamer. Two of the
Colonel’s fleet had previously run the batteries, producing the
greatest consternation among the people along the Mississippi
from Vicksburg (*10) to the Red River.

The Indianola remained about the mouth of the Red River some
days, and then started up the Mississippi. The Confederates
soon raised the Queen of the West, (*11) and repaired her. With
this vessel and the ram Webb, which they had had for some time in
the Red River, and two other steamers, they followed the
Indianola. The latter was encumbered with barges of coal in tow,
and consequently could make but little speed against the rapid
current of the Mississippi. The Confederate fleet overtook her
just above Grand Gulf, and attacked her after dark on the 24th
of February. The Indianola was superior to all the others in
armament, and probably would have destroyed them or driven them
away, but for her encumbrance. As it was she fought them for an
hour and a half, but, in the dark, was struck seven or eight
times by the ram and other vessels, and was finally disabled and
reduced to a sinking condition. The armament was thrown
overboard and the vessel run ashore. Officers and crew then
surrendered.

I had started McClernand with his corps of four divisions on the
29th of March, by way of Richmond, Louisiana, to New Carthage,
hoping that he might capture Grand Gulf before the balance of
the troops could get there; but the roads were very bad,
scarcely above water yet. Some miles from New Carthage the
levee to Bayou Vidal was broken in several places, overflowing
the roads for the distance of two miles. Boats were collected
from the surrounding bayous, and some constructed on the spot
from such material as could be collected, to transport the
troops across the overflowed interval. By the 6th of April
McClernand had reached New Carthage with one division and its
artillery, the latter ferried through the woods by these
boats. On the 17th I visited New Carthage in person, and saw
that the process of getting troops through in the way we were
doing was so tedious that a better method must be devised. The
water was falling, and in a few days there would not be depth
enough to use boats; nor would the land be dry enough to march
over. McClernand had already found a new route from Smith’s
plantation where the crevasse occurred, to Perkins’ plantation,
eight to twelve miles below New Carthage. This increased the
march from Milliken’s Bend from twenty-seven to nearly forty
miles. Four bridges had to be built across bayous, two of them
each over six hundred feet long, making about two thousand feet
of bridging in all. The river falling made the current in these
bayous very rapid, increasing the difficulty of building and
permanently fastening these bridges; but the ingenuity of the
“Yankee soldier” was equal to any emergency. The bridges were
soon built of such material as could be found near by, and so
substantial were they that not a single mishap occurred in
crossing all the army with artillery, cavalry and wagon trains,
except the loss of one siege gun (a thirty-two pounder). This,
if my memory serves me correctly, broke through the only pontoon
bridge we had in all our march across the peninsula. These
bridges were all built by McClernand’s command, under the
supervision of Lieutenant Hains of the Engineer Corps.

I returned to Milliken’s Bend on the 18th or 19th, and on the
20th issued the following final order for the movement of troops:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, MILLIKEN’S BEND,
LOUISIANA,
April 20, 1863.

Special Orders, No. 110.
* * * * *
* * VIII. The following orders are published for the
information and guidance of the “Army in the Field,” in its
present movement to obtain a foothold on the east bank of the
Mississippi River, from which Vicksburg can be approached by
practicable roads.

First.–The Thirteenth army corps, Major-General John A.
McClernand commanding, will constitute the right wing.

Second.–The Fifteenth army corps, Major-General W. T. Sherman
commanding, will constitute the left wing.

Third.–The Seventeenth army corps, Major-General James B.
McPherson commanding, will constitute the centre.

Fourth.–The order of march to New Carthage will be from right
to left.

Fifth.–Reserves will be formed by divisions from each army
corps; or, an entire army corps will be held as a reserve, as
necessity may require. When the reserve is formed by divisions,
each division will remain under the immediate command of its
respective corps commander, unless otherwise specially ordered
for a particular emergency.

Sixth.–Troops will be required to bivouac, until proper
facilities can be afforded for the transportation of camp
equipage.

Seventh.–In the present movement, one tent will be allowed to
each company for the protection of rations from rain; one wall
tent for each regimental headquarters; one wall tent for each
brigade headquarters; and one wall tent for each division
headquarters; corps commanders having the books and blanks of
their respective commands to provide for, are authorized to take
such tents as are absolutely necessary, but not to exceed the
number allowed by General Orders No. 160, A. G. O., series of
1862.

Eighth.–All the teams of the three army corps, under the
immediate charge of the quartermasters bearing them on their
returns, will constitute a train for carrying supplies and
ordnance and the authorized camp equipage of the army.

Ninth.–As fast as the Thirteenth army corps advances, the
Seventeenth army corps will take its place; and it, in turn,
will be followed in like manner by the Fifteenth army corps.

Tenth.–Two regiments from each army corps will be detailed by
corps commanders, to guard the lines from Richmond to New
Carthage.

Eleventh.–General hospitals will be established by the medical
director between Duckport and Milliken’s Bend. All sick and
disabled soldiers will be left in these hospitals. Surgeons in
charge of hospitals will report convalescents as fast as they
become fit for duty. Each corps commander will detail an
intelligent and good drill officer, to remain behind and take
charge of the convalescents of their respective corps; officers
so detailed will organize the men under their charge into squads
and companies, without regard to the regiments they belong to;
and in the absence of convalescent commissioned officers to
command them, will appoint non-commissioned officers or
privates. The force so organized will constitute the guard of
the line from Duckport to Milliken’s Bend. They will furnish
all the guards and details required for general hospitals, and
with the contrabands that may be about the camps, will furnish
all the details for loading and unloading boats.

Twelfth.–The movement of troops from Milliken’s Bend to New
Carthage will be so conducted as to allow the transportation of
ten days’ supply of rations, and one-half the allowance of
ordnance, required by previous orders.

Thirteenth.–Commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect
all the beef cattle, corn and other necessary supplies on the
line of march; but wanton destruction of property, taking of
articles useless for military purposes, insulting citizens,
going into and searching houses without proper orders from
division commanders, are positively prohibited. All such
irregularities must be summarily punished.

Fourteenth.–Brigadier-General J. C. Sullivan is appointed to
the command of all the forces detailed for the protection of the
line from here to New Carthage. His particular attention is
called to General Orders, No. 69, from Adjutant-General’s
Office, Washington, of date March 20, 1863.

By order of
MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.

McClernand was already below on the Mississippi. Two of
McPherson’s divisions were put upon the march immediately. The
third had not yet arrived from Lake Providence; it was on its
way to Milliken’s Bend and was to follow on arrival.

Sherman was to follow McPherson. Two of his divisions were at
Duckport and Young’s Point, and the third under Steele was under
orders to return from Greenville, Mississippi, where it had been
sent to expel a rebel battery that had been annoying our
transports.

It had now become evident that the army could not be rationed by
a wagon train over the single narrow and almost impassable road
between Milliken’s Bend and Perkins’ plantation. Accordingly
six more steamers were protected as before, to run the
batteries, and were loaded with supplies. They took twelve
barges in tow, loaded also with rations. On the night of the
22d of April they ran the batteries, five getting through more
or less disabled while one was sunk. About half the barges got
through with their needed freight.

When it was first proposed to run the blockade at Vicksburg with
river steamers there were but two captains or masters who were
willing to accompany their vessels, and but one crew. Volunteers
were called for from the army, men who had had experience in any
capacity in navigating the western rivers. Captains, pilots,
mates, engineers and deck-hands enough presented themselves to
take five times the number of vessels we were moving through
this dangerous ordeal. Most of them were from Logan’s division,
composed generally of men from the southern part of Illinois and
from Missouri. All but two of the steamers were commanded by
volunteers from the army, and all but one so manned. In this
instance, as in all others during the war, I found that
volunteers could be found in the ranks and among the
commissioned officers to meet every call for aid whether
mechanical or professional. Colonel W. S. Oliver was master of
transportation on this occasion by special detail.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

ATTACK ON GRAND GULF–OPERATIONS BELOW VICKSBURG.

On the 24th my headquarters were with the advance at Perkins’
plantation. Reconnoissances were made in boats to ascertain
whether there was high land on the east shore of the river where
we might land above Grand Gulf. There was none practicable.
Accordingly the troops were set in motion for Hard Times,
twenty-two miles farther down the river and nearly opposite
Grand Gulf. The loss of two steamers and six barges reduced our
transportation so that only 10,000 men could be moved by water.
Some of the steamers that had got below were injured in their
machinery, so that they were only useful as barges towed by
those less severely injured. All the troops, therefore, except
what could be transported in one trip, had to march. The road
lay west of Lake St. Joseph. Three large bayous had to be
crossed. They were rapidly bridged in the same manner as those
previously encountered. (*12)

On the 27th McClernand’s corps was all at Hard Times, and
McPherson’s was following closely. I had determined to make the
attempt to effect a landing on the east side of the river as soon
as possible. Accordingly, on the morning of the 29th, McClernand
was directed to embark all the troops from his corps that our
transports and barges could carry. About 10,000 men were so
embarked. The plan was to have the navy silence the guns at
Grand Gulf, and to have as many men as possible ready to debark
in the shortest possible time under cover of the fire of the
navy and carry the works by storm. The following order was
issued:

PERKINS PLANTATION, LA.,
April 27,1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL J. A. MCCLERNAND,
Commanding 13th A. C.

Commence immediately the embarkation of your corps, or so much
of it as there is transportation for. Have put aboard the
artillery and every article authorized in orders limiting
baggage, except the men, and hold them in readiness, with their
places assigned, to be moved at a moment’s warning.

All the troops you may have, except those ordered to remain
behind, send to a point nearly opposite Grand Gulf, where you
see, by special orders of this date, General McPherson is
ordered to send one division.

The plan of the attack will be for the navy to attack and
silence all the batteries commanding the river. Your corps will
be on the river, ready to run to and debark on the nearest
eligible land below the promontory first brought to view passing
down the river. Once on shore, have each commander instructed
beforehand to form his men the best the ground will admit of,
and take possession of the most commanding points, but avoid
separating your command so that it cannot support itself. The
first object is to get a foothold where our troops can maintain
themselves until such time as preparations can be made and
troops collected for a forward movement.

Admiral Porter has proposed to place his boats in the position
indicated to you a few days ago, and to bring over with them
such troops as may be below the city after the guns of the enemy
are silenced.

It may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from the
city, out of range of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable
to run past Grand Gulf and land at Rodney. In case this should
prove the plan, a signal will be arranged and you duly informed,
when the transports are to start with this view. Or, it may be
expedient for the boats to run past, but not the men. In this
case, then, the transports would have to be brought back to
where the men could land and move by forced marches to below
Grand Gulf, re-embark rapidly and proceed to the latter place.
There will be required, then, three signals; one, to indicate
that the transports can run down and debark the troops at Grand
Gulf; one, that the transports can run by without the troops;
and the last, that the transports can run by with the troops on
board.

Should the men have to march, all baggage and artillery will be
left to run the blockade.

If not already directed, require your men to keep three days’
rations in their haversacks, not to be touched until a movement
commences.

U. S. GRANT,
Major-General.

At 8 o’clock A.M., 29th, Porter made the attack with his entire
strength present, eight gunboats. For nearly five and a half
hours the attack was kept up without silencing a single gun of
the enemy. All this time McClernand’s 10,000 men were huddled
together on the transports in the stream ready to attempt a
landing if signalled. I occupied a tug from which I could see
the effect of the battle on both sides, within range of the
enemy’s guns; but a small tug, without armament, was not
calculated to attract the fire of batteries while they were
being assailed themselves. About half-past one the fleet
withdrew, seeing their efforts were entirely unavailing. The
enemy ceased firing as soon as we withdrew. I immediately
signalled the Admiral and went aboard his ship. The navy lost
in this engagement eighteen killed and fifty-six wounded. A
large proportion of these were of the crew of the flagship, and
most of those from a single shell which penetrated the ship’s
side and exploded between decks where the men were working their
guns. The sight of the mangled and dying men which met my eye as
I boarded the ship was sickening.

Grand Gulf is on a high bluff where the river runs at the very
foot of it. It is as defensible upon its front as Vicksburg
and, at that time, would have been just as impossible to capture
by a front attack. I therefore requested Porter to run the
batteries with his fleet that night, and to take charge of the
transports, all of which would be wanted below.

There is a long tongue of land from the Louisiana side extending
towards Grand Gulf, made by the river running nearly east from
about three miles above and nearly in the opposite direction
from that point for about the same distance below. The land was
so low and wet that it would not have been practicable to march
an army across but for a levee. I had had this explored before,
as well as the east bank below to ascertain if there was a
possible point of debarkation north of Rodney. It was found
that the top of the levee afforded a good road to march upon.

Porter, as was always the case with him, not only acquiesced in
the plan, but volunteered to use his entire fleet as
transports. I had intended to make this request, but he
anticipated me. At dusk, when concealed from the view of the
enemy at Grand Gulf, McClernand landed his command on the west
bank. The navy and transports ran the batteries successfully.
The troops marched across the point of land under cover of
night, unobserved. By the time it was light the enemy saw our
whole fleet, ironclads, gunboats, river steamers and barges,
quietly moving down the river three miles below them, black, or
rather blue, with National troops.

When the troops debarked, the evening of the 29th, it was
expected that we would have to go to Rodney, about nine miles
below, to find a landing; but that night a colored man came in
who informed me that a good landing would be found at
Bruinsburg, a few miles above Rodney, from which point there was
a good road leading to Port Gibson some twelve miles in the
interior. The information was found correct, and our landing
was effected without opposition.

Sherman had not left his position above Vicksburg yet. On the
morning of the 27th I ordered him to create a diversion by
moving his corps up the Yazoo and threatening an attack on
Haines’ Bluff.

My object was to compel Pemberton to keep as much force about
Vicksburg as I could, until I could secure a good footing on
high land east of the river. The move was eminently successful
and, as we afterwards learned, created great confusion about
Vicksburg and doubts about our real design. Sherman moved the
day of our attack on Grand Gulf, the 29th, with ten regiments of
his command and eight gunboats which Porter had left above
Vicksburg.

He debarked his troops and apparently made every preparation to
attack the enemy while the navy bombarded the main forts at
Haines’ Bluff. This move was made without a single casualty in
either branch of the service. On the first of May Sherman
received orders from me (sent from Hard Times the evening of the
29th of April) to withdraw from the front of Haines’ Bluff and
follow McPherson with two divisions as fast as he could.

I had established a depot of supplies at Perkins’ plantation.
Now that all our gunboats were below Grand Gulf it was possible
that the enemy might fit out boats in the Big Black with
improvised armament and attempt to destroy these supplies.
McPherson was at Hard Times with a portion of his corps, and the
depot was protected by a part of his command. The night of the
29th I directed him to arm one of the transports with artillery
and send it up to Perkins’ plantation as a guard; and also to
have the siege guns we had brought along moved there and put in
position.

The embarkation below Grand Gulf took place at De Shroon’s,
Louisiana, six miles above Bruinsburg, Mississippi. Early on
the morning of 30th of April McClernand’s corps and one division
of McPherson’s corps were speedily landed.

When this was effected I felt a degree of relief scarcely ever
equalled since. Vicksburg was not yet taken it is true, nor
were its defenders demoralized by any of our previous moves. I
was now in the enemy’s country, with a vast river and the
stronghold of Vicksburg between me and my base of supplies. But
I was on dry ground on the same side of the river with the
enemy. All the campaigns, labors, hardships and exposures from
the month of December previous to this time that had been made
and endured, were for the accomplishment of this one object.

I had with me the 13th corps, General McClernand commanding, and
two brigades of Logan’s division of the 17th corps, General
McPherson commanding–in all not more than twenty thousand men
to commence the campaign with. These were soon reinforced by
the remaining brigade of Logan’s division and Crocker’s division
of the 17th corps. On the 7th of May I was further reinforced by
Sherman with two divisions of his, the 15th corps. My total
force was then about thirty-three thousand men.

The enemy occupied Grand Gulf, Haines’ Bluff and Jackson with a
force of nearly sixty thousand men. Jackson is fifty miles east
of Vicksburg and is connected with it by a railroad. My first
problem was to capture Grand Gulf to use as a base.

Bruinsburg is two miles from high ground. The bottom at that
point is higher than most of the low land in the valley of the
Mississippi, and a good road leads to the bluff. It was natural
to expect the garrison from Grand Gulf to come out to meet us and
prevent, if they could, our reaching this solid base. Bayou
Pierre enters the Mississippi just above Bruinsburg and, as it
is a navigable stream and was high at the time, in order to
intercept us they had to go by Port Gibson, the nearest point
where there was a bridge to cross upon. This more than doubled
the distance from Grand Gulf to the high land back of
Bruinsburg. No time was to be lost in securing this foothold.
Our transportation was not sufficient to move all the army
across the river at one trip, or even two; but the landing of
the 13th corps and one division of the 17th was effected during
the day, April 30th, and early evening. McClernand was advanced
as soon as ammunition and two days’ rations (to last five) could
be issued to his men. The bluffs were reached an hour before
sunset and McClernand was pushed on, hoping to reach Port Gibson
and save the bridge spanning the Bayou Pierre before the enemy
could get there; for crossing a stream in the presence of an
enemy is always difficult. Port Gibson, too, is the starting
point of roads to Grand Gulf, Vicksburg and Jackson.

McClernand’s advance met the enemy about five miles west of Port
Gibson at Thompson’s plantation. There was some firing during
the night, but nothing rising to the dignity of a battle until
daylight. The enemy had taken a strong natural position with
most of the Grand Gulf garrison, numbering about seven or eight
thousand men, under General Bowen. His hope was to hold me in
check until reinforcements under Loring could reach him from
Vicksburg; but Loring did not come in time to render much
assistance south of Port Gibson. Two brigades of McPherson’s
corps followed McClernand as fast as rations and ammunition
could be issued, and were ready to take position upon the
battlefield whenever the 13th corps could be got out of the way.

The country in this part of Mississippi stands on edge, as it
were, the roads running along the ridges except when they
occasionally pass from one ridge to another. Where there are no
clearings the sides of the hills are covered with a very heavy
growth of timber and with undergrowth, and the ravines are
filled with vines and canebrakes, almost impenetrable. This
makes it easy for an inferior force to delay, if not defeat, a
far superior one.

Near the point selected by Bowen to defend, the road to Port
Gibson divides, taking two ridges which do not diverge more than
a mile or two at the widest point. These roads unite just
outside the town. This made it necessary for McClernand to
divide his force. It was not only divided, but it was separated
by a deep ravine of the character above described. One flank
could not reinforce the other except by marching back to the
junction of the roads. McClernand put the divisions of Hovey,
Carr and A. J. Smith upon the right-hand branch and Osterhaus on
the left. I was on the field by ten A.M., and inspected both
flanks in person. On the right the enemy, if not being pressed
back, was at least not repulsing our advance. On the left,
however, Osterhaus was not faring so well. He had been repulsed
with some loss. As soon as the road could be cleared of
McClernand’s troops I ordered up McPherson, who was close upon
the rear of the 13th corps, with two brigades of Logan’s
division. This was about noon. I ordered him to send one
brigade (General John E. Smith’s was selected) to support
Osterhaus, and to move to the left and flank the enemy out of
his position. This movement carried the brigade over a deep
ravine to a third ridge and, when Smith’s troops were seen well
through the ravine, Osterhaus was directed to renew his front
attack. It was successful and unattended by heavy loss. The
enemy was sent in full retreat on their right, and their left
followed before sunset. While the movement to our left was
going on, McClernand, who was with his right flank, sent me
frequent requests for reinforcements, although the force with
him was not being pressed. I had been upon the ground and knew
it did not admit of his engaging all the men he had. We
followed up our victory until night overtook us about two miles
from Port Gibson; then the troops went into bivouac for the
night.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

CAPTURE OF PORT GIBSON–GRIERSON’S RAID–OCCUPATION OF GRAND
GULF–MOVEMENT UP THE BIG BLACK–BATTLE OF RAYMOND.

We started next morning for Port Gibson as soon as it was light
enough to see the road. We were soon in the town, and I was
delighted to find that the enemy had not stopped to contest our
crossing further at the bridge, which he had burned. The troops
were set to work at once to construct a bridge across the South
Fork of the Bayou Pierre. At this time the water was high and
the current rapid. What might be called a raft-bridge was soon
constructed from material obtained from wooden buildings,
stables, fences, etc., which sufficed for carrying the whole
army over safely. Colonel J. H. Wilson, a member of my staff,
planned and superintended the construction of this bridge, going
into the water and working as hard as any one engaged. Officers
and men generally joined in this work. When it was finished the
army crossed and marched eight miles beyond to the North Fork
that day. One brigade of Logan’s division was sent down the
stream to occupy the attention of a rebel battery, which had
been left behind with infantry supports to prevent our repairing
the burnt railroad bridge. Two of his brigades were sent up the
bayou to find a crossing and reach the North Fork to repair the
bridge there. The enemy soon left when he found we were
building a bridge elsewhere. Before leaving Port Gibson we were
reinforced by Crocker’s division, McPherson’s corps, which had
crossed the Mississippi at Bruinsburg and come up without
stopping except to get two days’ rations. McPherson still had
one division west of the Mississippi River, guarding the road
from Milliken’s Bend to the river below until Sherman’s command
should relieve it.

On leaving Bruinsburg for the front I left my son Frederick, who
had joined me a few weeks before, on board one of the gunboats
asleep, and hoped to get away without him until after Grand Gulf
should fall into our hands; but on waking up he learned that I
had gone, and being guided by the sound of the battle raging at
Thompson’s Hill–called the Battle of Port Gibson–found his way
to where I was. He had no horse to ride at the time, and I had
no facilities for even preparing a meal. He, therefore, foraged
around the best he could until we reached Grand Gulf. Mr. C. A.
Dana, then an officer of the War Department, accompanied me on
the Vicksburg campaign and through a portion of the siege. He
was in the same situation as Fred so far as transportation and
mess arrangements were concerned. The first time I call to mind
seeing either of them, after the battle, they were mounted on two
enormous horses, grown white from age, each equipped with
dilapidated saddles and bridles.

Our trains arrived a few days later, after which we were all
perfectly equipped.

My son accompanied me throughout the campaign and siege, and
caused no anxiety either to me or to his mother, who was at
home. He looked out for himself and was in every battle of the
campaign. His age, then not quite thirteen, enabled him to take
in all he saw, and to retain a recollection of it that would not
be possible in more mature years.

When the movement from Bruinsburg commenced we were without a
wagon train. The train still west of the Mississippi was
carried around with proper escort, by a circuitous route from
Milliken’s Bend to Hard Times seventy or more miles below, and
did not get up for some days after the battle of Port Gibson. My
own horses, headquarters’ transportation, servants, mess chest,
and everything except what I had on, was with this train.
General A. J. Smith happened to have an extra horse at
Bruinsburg which I borrowed, with a saddle-tree without
upholstering further than stirrups. I had no other for nearly a
week.

It was necessary to have transportation for ammunition.
Provisions could be taken from the country; but all the
ammunition that can be carried on the person is soon exhausted
when there is much fighting. I directed, therefore, immediately
on landing that all the vehicles and draft animals, whether
horses, mules, or oxen, in the vicinity should be collected and
loaded to their capacity with ammunition. Quite a train was
collected during the 30th, and a motley train it was. In it
could be found fine carriages, loaded nearly to the top with
boxes of cartridges that had been pitched in promiscuously,
drawn by mules with plough, harness, straw collars, rope-lines,
etc.; long-coupled wagons, with racks for carrying cotton bales,
drawn by oxen, and everything that could be found in the way of
transportation on a plantation, either for use or pleasure. The
making out of provision returns was stopped for the time. No
formalities were to retard our progress until a position was
secured when the time could be spared to observe them.

It was at Port Gibson I first heard through a Southern paper of
the complete success of Colonel Grierson, who was making a raid
through central Mississippi. He had started from La Grange
April 17th with three regiments of about 1,700 men. On the 21st
he had detached Colonel Hatch with one regiment to destroy the
railroad between Columbus and Macon and then return to La
Grange. Hatch had a sharp fight with the enemy at Columbus and
retreated along the railroad, destroying it at Okalona and
Tupelo, and arriving in La Grange April 26. Grierson continued
his movement with about 1,000 men, breaking the Vicksburg and
Meridian railroad and the New Orleans and Jackson railroad,
arriving at Baton Rouge May 2d. This raid was of great
importance, for Grierson had attracted the attention of the
enemy from the main movement against Vicksburg.

During the night of the 2d of May the bridge over the North Fork
was repaired, and the troops commenced crossing at five the next
morning. Before the leading brigade was over it was fired upon
by the enemy from a commanding position; but they were soon
driven off. It was evident that the enemy was covering a
retreat from Grand Gulf to Vicksburg. Every commanding position
from this (Grindstone) crossing to Hankinson’s ferry over the Big
Black was occupied by the retreating foe to delay our progress.
McPherson, however, reached Hankinson’s ferry before night,
seized the ferry boat, and sent a detachment of his command
across and several miles north on the road to Vicksburg. When
the junction of the road going to Vicksburg with the road from
Grand Gulf to Raymond and Jackson was reached, Logan with his
division was turned to the left towards Grand Gulf. I went with
him a short distance from this junction. McPherson had
encountered the largest force yet met since the battle of Port
Gibson and had a skirmish nearly approaching a battle; but the
road Logan had taken enabled him to come up on the enemy’s right
flank, and they soon gave way. McPherson was ordered to hold
Hankinson’s ferry and the road back to Willow Springs with one
division; McClernand, who was now in the rear, was to join in
this as well as to guard the line back down the bayou. I did
not want to take the chances of having an enemy lurking in our
rear.

On the way from the junction to Grand Gulf, where the road comes
into the one from Vicksburg to the same place six or seven miles
out, I learned that the last of the enemy had retreated past
that place on their way to Vicksburg. I left Logan to make the
proper disposition of his troops for the night, while I rode
into the town with an escort of about twenty cavalry. Admiral
Porter had already arrived with his fleet. The enemy had
abandoned his heavy guns and evacuated the place.

When I reached Grand Gulf May 3d I had not been with my baggage
since the 27th of April and consequently had had no change of
underclothing, no meal except such as I could pick up sometimes
at other headquarters, and no tent to cover me. The first thing
I did was to get a bath, borrow some fresh underclothing from one
of the naval officers and get a good meal on the flag-ship. Then
I wrote letters to the general-in-chief informing him of our
present position, dispatches to be telegraphed from Cairo,
orders to General Sullivan commanding above Vicksburg, and gave
orders to all my corps commanders. About twelve o’clock at
night I was through my work and started for Hankinson’s ferry,
arriving there before daylight. While at Grand Gulf I heard
from Banks, who was on the Red River, and who said that he could
not be at Port Hudson before the 10th of May and then with only
15,000 men. Up to this time my intention had been to secure
Grand Gulf, as a base of supplies, detach McClernand’s corps to
Banks and co-operate with him in the reduction of Port Hudson.

The news from Banks forced upon me a different plan of campaign
from the one intended. To wait for his co-operation would have
detained me at least a month. The reinforcements would not have
reached ten thousand men after deducting casualties and necessary
river guards at all high points close to the river for over three
hundred miles. The enemy would have strengthened his position
and been reinforced by more men than Banks could have brought. I
therefore determined to move independently of Banks, cut loose
from my base, destroy the rebel force in rear of Vicksburg and
invest or capture the city.

Grand Gulf was accordingly given up as a base and the
authorities at Washington were notified. I knew well that
Halleck’s caution would lead him to disapprove of this course;
but it was the only one that gave any chance of success. The
time it would take to communicate with Washington and get a
reply would be so great that I could not be interfered with
until it was demonstrated whether my plan was practicable. Even
Sherman, who afterwards ignored bases of supplies other than what
were afforded by the country while marching through four States
of the Confederacy with an army more than twice as large as mine
at this time, wrote me from Hankinson’s ferry, advising me of the
impossibility of supplying our army over a single road. He urged
me to “stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with
wagons, and then act as quick as possible; for this road will be
jammed, as sure as life.” To this I replied: “I do not
calculate upon the possibility of supplying the army with full
rations from Grand Gulf. I know it will be impossible without
constructing additional roads. What I do expect is to get up
what rations of hard bread, coffee and salt we can, and make the
country furnish the balance.” We started from Bruinsburg with an
average of about two days’ rations, and received no more from our
own supplies for some days; abundance was found in the mean
time. A delay would give the enemy time to reinforce and
fortify.

McClernand’s and McPherson’s commands were kept substantially as
they were on the night of the 2d, awaiting supplies sufficient to
give them three days’ rations in haversacks. Beef, mutton,
poultry and forage were found in abundance. Quite a quantity of
bacon and molasses was also secured from the country, but bread
and coffee could not be obtained in quantity sufficient for all
the men. Every plantation, however, had a run of stone,
propelled by mule power, to grind corn for the owners and their
slaves. All these were kept running while we were stopping, day
and night, and when we were marching, during the night, at all
plantations covered by the troops. But the product was taken by
the troops nearest by, so that the majority of the command was
destined to go without bread until a new base was established on
the Yazoo above Vicksburg.

While the troops were awaiting the arrival of rations I ordered
reconnoissances made by McClernand and McPherson, with the view
of leading the enemy to believe that we intended to cross the
Big Black and attack the city at once.

On the 6th Sherman arrived at Grand Gulf and crossed his command
that night and the next day. Three days’ rations had been
brought up from Grand Gulf for the advanced troops and were
issued. Orders were given for a forward movement the next
day. Sherman was directed to order up Blair, who had been left
behind to guard the road from Milliken’s Bend to Hard Times with
two brigades.

The quartermaster at Young’s Point was ordered to send two
hundred wagons with Blair, and the commissary was to load them
with hard bread, coffee, sugar, salt and one hundred thousand
pounds of salt meat.

On the 3d Hurlbut, who had been left at Memphis, was ordered to
send four regiments from his command to Milliken’s Bend to
relieve Blair’s division, and on the 5th he was ordered to send
Lauman’s division in addition, the latter to join the army in
the field. The four regiments were to be taken from troops near
the river so that there would be no delay.

During the night of the 6th McPherson drew in his troops north
of the Big Black and was off at an early hour on the road to
Jackson, via Rocky Springs, Utica and Raymond. That night he
and McClernand were both at Rocky Springs ten miles from
Hankinson’s ferry. McPherson remained there during the 8th,
while McClernand moved to Big Sandy and Sherman marched from
Grand Gulf to Hankinson’s ferry. The 9th, McPherson moved to a
point within a few miles west of Utica; McClernand and Sherman
remained where they were. On the 10th McPherson moved to Utica,
Sherman to Big Sandy; McClernand was still at Big Sandy. The
11th, McClernand was at Five Mile Creek; Sherman at Auburn;
McPherson five miles advanced from Utica. May 12th, McClernand
was at Fourteen Mile Creek; Sherman at Fourteen Mile Creek;
McPherson at Raymond after a battle.

After McPherson crossed the Big Black at Hankinson’s ferry
Vicksburg could have been approached and besieged by the south
side. It is not probable, however, that Pemberton would have
permitted a close besiegement. The broken nature of the ground
would have enabled him to hold a strong defensible line from the
river south of the city to the Big Black, retaining possession of
the railroad back to that point. It was my plan, therefore, to
get to the railroad east of Vicksburg, and approach from that
direction. Accordingly, McPherson’s troops that had crossed the
Big Black were withdrawn and the movement east to Jackson
commenced.

As has been stated before, the country is very much broken and
the roads generally confined to the tops of the hills. The
troops were moved one (sometimes two) corps at a time to reach
designated points out parallel to the railroad and only from six
to ten miles from it. McClernand’s corps was kept with its left
flank on the Big Black guarding all the crossings. Fourteen
Mile Creek, a stream substantially parallel with the railroad,
was reached and crossings effected by McClernand and Sherman
with slight loss. McPherson was to the right of Sherman,
extending to Raymond. The cavalry was used in this advance in
reconnoitring to find the roads: to cover our advances and to
find the most practicable routes from one command to another so
they could support each other in case of an attack. In making
this move I estimated Pemberton’s movable force at Vicksburg at
about eighteen thousand men, with smaller forces at Haines’
Bluff and Jackson. It would not be possible for Pemberton to
attack me with all his troops at one place, and I determined to
throw my army between his and fight him in detail. This was
done with success, but I found afterwards that I had entirely
under-estimated Pemberton’s strength.

Up to this point our movements had been made without serious
opposition. My line was now nearly parallel with the Jackson
and Vicksburg railroad and about seven miles south of it. The
right was at Raymond eighteen miles from Jackson, McPherson
commanding; Sherman in the centre on Fourteen Mile Creek, his
advance thrown across; McClernand to the left, also on Fourteen
Mile Creek, advance across, and his pickets within two miles of
Edward’s station, where the enemy had concentrated a
considerable force and where they undoubtedly expected us to
attack. McClernand’s left was on the Big Black. In all our
moves, up to this time, the left had hugged the Big Black
closely, and all the ferries had been guarded to prevent the
enemy throwing a force on our rear.

McPherson encountered the enemy, five thousand strong with two
batteries under General Gregg, about two miles out of Raymond.
This was about two P.M. Logan was in advance with one of his
brigades. He deployed and moved up to engage the enemy.
McPherson ordered the road in rear to be cleared of wagons, and
the balance of Logan’s division, and Crocker’s, which was still
farther in rear, to come forward with all dispatch. The order
was obeyed with alacrity. Logan got his division in position
for assault before Crocker could get up, and attacked with
vigor, carrying the enemy’s position easily, sending Gregg
flying from the field not to appear against our front again
until we met at Jackson.

In this battle McPherson lost 66 killed, 339 wounded, and 37
missing–nearly or quite all from Logan’s division. The enemy’s
loss was 100 killed, 305 wounded, besides 415 taken prisoners.

I regarded Logan and Crocker as being as competent division
commanders as could be found in or out of the army and both
equal to a much higher command. Crocker, however, was dying of
consumption when he volunteered. His weak condition never put
him on the sick report when there was a battle in prospect, as
long as he could keep on his feet. He died not long after the
close of the rebellion.

CHAPTER XXXV.

MOVEMENT AGAINST JACKSON–FALL OF JACKSON–INTERCEPTING THE
ENEMY–BATTLE OF CHAMPION’S HILL.

When the news reached me of McPherson’s victory at Raymond about
sundown my position was with Sherman. I decided at once to turn
the whole column towards Jackson and capture that place without
delay.

Pemberton was now on my left, with, as I supposed, about 18,000
men; in fact, as I learned afterwards, with nearly 50,000. A
force was also collecting on my right, at Jackson, the point
where all the railroads communicating with Vicksburg connect.
All the enemy’s supplies of men and stores would come by that
point. As I hoped in the end to besiege Vicksburg I must first
destroy all possibility of aid. I therefore determined to move
swiftly towards Jackson, destroy or drive any force in that
direction and then turn upon Pemberton. But by moving against
Jackson, I uncovered my own communication. So I finally decided
to have none–to cut loose altogether from my base and move my
whole force eastward. I then had no fears for my
communications, and if I moved quickly enough could turn upon
Pemberton before he could attack me in the rear.

Accordingly, all previous orders given during the day for
movements on the 13th were annulled by new ones. McPherson was
ordered at daylight to move on Clinton, ten miles from Jackson;
Sherman was notified of my determination to capture Jackson and
work from there westward. He was ordered to start at four in
the morning and march to Raymond. McClernand was ordered to
march with three divisions by Dillon’s to Raymond. One was left
to guard the crossing of the Big Black.

On the 10th I had received a letter from Banks, on the Red
River, asking reinforcements. Porter had gone to his assistance
with a part of his fleet on the 3d, and I now wrote to him
describing my position and declining to send any troops. I
looked upon side movements as long as the enemy held Port Hudson
and Vicksburg as a waste of time and material.

General Joseph E. Johnston arrived at Jackson in the night of
the 13th from Tennessee, and immediately assumed command of all
the Confederate troops in Mississippi. I knew he was expecting
reinforcements from the south and east. On the 6th I had written
to General Halleck: “Information from the other side leaves me
to believe the enemy are bringing forces from Tullahoma.”

Up to this time my troops had been kept in supporting distances
of each other, as far as the nature of the country would
admit. Reconnoissances were constantly made from each corps to
enable them to acquaint themselves with the most practicable
routes from one to another in case a union became necessary.

McPherson reached Clinton with the advance early on the 13th and
immediately set to work destroying the railroad. Sherman’s
advance reached Raymond before the last of McPherson’s command
had got out of the town. McClernand withdrew from the front of
the enemy, at Edward’s station, with much skill and without
loss, and reached his position for the night in good order. On
the night of the 13th, McPherson was ordered to march at early
dawn upon Jackson, only fifteen miles away. Sherman was given
the same order; but he was to move by the direct road from
Raymond to Jackson, which is south of the road McPherson was on
and does not approach within two miles of it at the point where
it crossed the line of intrenchments which, at that time,
defended the city. McClernand was ordered to move one division
of his command to Clinton, one division a few miles beyond
Mississippi Springs following Sherman’s line, and a third to
Raymond. He was also directed to send his siege guns, four in
number with the troops going by Mississippi Springs.
McClernand’s position was an advantageous one in any event. With
one division at Clinton he was in position to reinforce
McPherson, at Jackson, rapidly if it became necessary; the
division beyond Mississippi Springs was equally available to
reinforce Sherman; the one at Raymond could take either road. He
still had two other divisions farther back now that Blair had
come up, available within a day at Jackson. If this last
command should not be wanted at Jackson, they were already one
day’s march from there on their way to Vicksburg and on three
different roads leading to the latter city. But the most
important consideration in my mind was to have a force
confronting Pemberton if he should come out to attack my rear.
This I expected him to do; as shown further on, he was directed
by Johnston to make this very move.

I notified General Halleck that I should attack the State
capital on the 14th. A courier carried the dispatch to Grand
Gulf through an unprotected country.

Sherman and McPherson communicated with each other during the
night and arranged to reach Jackson at about the same hour. It
rained in torrents during the night of the 13th and the fore
part of the day of the 14th. The roads were intolerable, and in
some places on Sherman’s line, where the land was low, they were
covered more than a foot deep with water. But the troops never
murmured. By nine o’clock Crocker, of McPherson’s corps, who
was now in advance, came upon the enemy’s pickets and speedily
drove them in upon the main body. They were outside of the
intrenchments in a strong position, and proved to be the troops
that had been driven out of Raymond. Johnston had been
reinforced; during the night by Georgia and South Carolina
regiments, so that his force amounted to eleven thousand men,
and he was expecting still more.

Sherman also came upon the rebel pickets some distance out from
the town, but speedily drove them in. He was now on the south
and south-west of Jackson confronting the Confederates behind
their breastworks, while McPherson’s right was nearly two miles
north, occupying a line running north and south across the
Vicksburg railroad. Artillery was brought up and
reconnoissances made preparatory to an assault. McPherson
brought up Logan’s division while he deployed Crocker’s for the
assault. Sherman made similar dispositions on the right. By
eleven A.M. both were ready to attack. Crocker moved his
division forward, preceded by a strong skirmish line. These
troops at once encountered the enemy’s advance and drove it back
on the main body, when they returned to their proper regiment and
the whole division charged, routing the enemy completely and
driving him into this main line. This stand by the enemy was
made more than two miles outside of his main fortifications.
McPherson followed up with his command until within range of the
guns of the enemy from their intrenchments, when he halted to
bring his troops into line and reconnoitre to determine the next
move. It was now about noon.

While this was going on Sherman was confronting a rebel battery
which enfiladed the road on which he was marching–the
Mississippi Springs road–and commanded a bridge spanning a
stream over which he had to pass. By detaching right and left
the stream was forced and the enemy flanked and speedily driven
within the main line. This brought our whole line in front of
the enemy’s line of works, which was continuous on the north,
west and south sides from the Pearl River north of the city to
the same river south. I was with Sherman. He was confronted by
a force sufficient to hold us back. Appearances did not justify
an assault where we were. I had directed Sherman to send a
force to the right, and to reconnoitre as far as to the Pearl
River. This force, Tuttle’s division, not returning I rode to
the right with my staff, and soon found that the enemy had left
that part of the line. Tuttle’s movement or McPherson’s
pressure had no doubt led Johnston to order a retreat, leaving
only the men at the guns to retard us while he was getting
away. Tuttle had seen this and, passing through the lines
without resistance, came up in the rear of the artillerists
confronting Sherman and captured them with ten pieces of
artillery. I rode immediately to the State House, where I was
soon followed by Sherman. About the same time McPherson
discovered that the enemy was leaving his front, and advanced
Crocker, who was so close upon the enemy that they could not
move their guns or destroy them. He captured seven guns and,
moving on, hoisted the National flag over the rebel capital of
Mississippi. Stevenson’s brigade was sent to cut off the rebel
retreat, but was too late or not expeditious enough.

Our loss in this engagement was: McPherson, 37 killed, 228
wounded; Sherman, 4 killed and 21 wounded and missing. The
enemy lost 845 killed, wounded and captured. Seventeen guns
fell into our hands, and the enemy destroyed by fire their
store-houses, containing a large amount of commissary stores.

On this day Blair reached New Auburn and joined McClernand’s 4th
division. He had with him two hundred wagons loaded with
rations, the only commissary supplies received during the entire
campaign.

I slept that night in the room that Johnston was said to have
occupied the night before.

About four in the afternoon I sent for the corps commanders and
directed the dispositions to be made of their troops. Sherman
was to remain in Jackson until he destroyed that place as a
railroad centre, and manufacturing city of military supplies. He
did the work most effectually. Sherman and I went together into
a manufactory which had not ceased work on account of the battle
nor for the entrance of Yankee troops. Our presence did not seem
to attract the attention of either the manager or the operatives,
most of whom were girls. We looked on for a while to see the
tent cloth which they were making roll out of the looms, with
“C. S. A.” woven in each bolt. There was an immense amount of
cotton, in bales, stacked outside. Finally I told Sherman I
thought they had done work enough. The operatives were told
they could leave and take with them what cloth they could
carry. In a few minutes cotton and factory were in a blaze.
The proprietor visited Washington while I was President to get
his pay for this property, claiming that it was private. He
asked me to give him a statement of the fact that his property
had been destroyed by National troops, so that he might use it
with Congress where he was pressing, or proposed to press, his
claim. I declined.

On the night of the 13th Johnston sent the following dispatch to
Pemberton at Edward’s station: “I have lately arrived, and learn
that Major-General Sherman is between us with four divisions at
Clinton. It is important to establish communication, that you
may be reinforced. If practicable, come up in his rear at
once. To beat such a detachment would be of immense value. All
the troops you can quickly assemble should be brought. Time is
all-important.” This dispatch was sent in triplicate, by
different messengers. One of the messengers happened to be a
loyal man who had been expelled from Memphis some months before
by Hurlbut for uttering disloyal and threatening sentiments.
There was a good deal of parade about his expulsion, ostensibly
as a warning to those who entertained the sentiments he
expressed; but Hurlbut and the expelled man understood each
other. He delivered his copy of Johnston’s dispatch to
McPherson who forwarded it to me.

Receiving this dispatch on the 14th I ordered McPherson to move
promptly in the morning back to Bolton, the nearest point where
Johnston could reach the road. Bolton is about twenty miles
west of Jackson. I also informed McClernand of the capture of
Jackson and sent him the following order: “It is evidently the
design of the enemy to get north of us and cross the Big Black,
and beat us into Vicksburg. We must not allow them to do
this. Turn all your forces towards Bolton station, and make all
dispatch in getting there. Move troops by the most direct road
from wherever they may be on the receipt of this order.”

And to Blair I wrote: “Their design is evidently to cross the
Big Black and pass down the peninsula between the Big Black and
Yazoo rivers. We must beat them. Turn your troops immediately
to Bolton; take all the trains with you. Smith’s division, and
any other troops now with you, will go to the same place. If
practicable, take parallel roads, so as to divide your troops
and train.”

Johnston stopped on the Canton road only six miles north of
Jackson, the night of the 14th. He sent from there to Pemberton
dispatches announcing the loss of Jackson, and the following
order:

“As soon as the reinforcements are all up, they must be united
to the rest of the army. I am anxious to see a force assembled
that may be able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy. Can
Grant supply himself from the Mississippi? Can you not cut him
off from it, and above all, should he be compelled to fall back
for want of supplies, beat him.”

The concentration of my troops was easy, considering the
character of the country. McPherson moved along the road
parallel with and near the railroad. McClernand’s command was,
one division (Hovey’s) on the road McPherson had to take, but
with a start of four miles. One (Osterhaus) was at Raymond, on
a converging road that intersected the other near Champion’s
Hill; one (Carr’s) had to pass over the same road with
Osterhaus, but being back at Mississippi Springs, would not be
detained by it; the fourth (Smith’s) with Blair’s division, was
near Auburn with a different road to pass over. McClernand
faced about and moved promptly. His cavalry from Raymond seized
Bolton by half-past nine in the morning, driving out the enemy’s
pickets and capturing several men.

The night of the 15th Hovey was at Bolton; Carr and Osterhaus
were about three miles south, but abreast, facing west; Smith
was north of Raymond with Blair in his rear.

McPherson’s command, with Logan in front, had marched at seven
o’clock, and by four reached Hovey and went into camp; Crocker
bivouacked just in Hovey’s rear on the Clinton road. Sherman
with two divisions, was in Jackson, completing the destruction
of roads, bridges and military factories. I rode in person out
to Clinton. On my arrival I ordered McClernand to move early in
the morning on Edward’s station, cautioning him to watch for the
enemy and not bring on an engagement unless he felt very certain
of success.

I naturally expected that Pemberton would endeavor to obey the
orders of his superior, which I have shown were to attack us at
Clinton. This, indeed, I knew he could not do; but I felt sure
he would make the attempt to reach that point. It turned out,
however, that he had decided his superior’s plans were
impracticable, and consequently determined to move south from
Edward’s station and get between me and my base. I, however,
had no base, having abandoned it more than a week before. On
the 15th Pemberton had actually marched south from Edward’s
station, but the rains had swollen Baker’s Creek, which he had
to cross so much that he could not ford it, and the bridges were
washed away. This brought him back to the Jackson road, on which
there was a good bridge over Baker’s Creek. Some of his troops
were marching until midnight to get there. Receiving here early
on the 16th a repetition of his order to join Johnston at
Clinton, he concluded to obey, and sent a dispatch to his chief,
informing him of the route by which he might be expected.

About five o’clock in the morning (16th) two men, who had been
employed on the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad, were brought to
me. They reported that they had passed through Pemberton’s army
in the night, and that it was still marching east. They reported
him to have eighty regiments of infantry and ten batteries; in
all, about twenty-five thousand men.

I had expected to leave Sherman at Jackson another day in order
to complete his work; but getting the above information I sent
him orders to move with all dispatch to Bolton, and to put one
division with an ammunition train on the road at once, with
directions to its commander to march with all possible speed
until he came up to our rear. Within an hour after receiving
this order Steele’s division was on the road. At the same time
I dispatched to Blair, who was near Auburn, to move with all
speed to Edward’s station. McClernand was directed to embrace
Blair in his command for the present. Blair’s division was a
part of the 15th army corps (Sherman’s); but as it was on its
way to join its corps, it naturally struck our left first, now
that we had faced about and were moving west. The 15th corps,
when it got up, would be on our extreme right. McPherson was
directed to get his trains out of the way of the troops, and to
follow Hovey’s division as closely as possible. McClernand had
two roads about three miles apart, converging at Edward’s
station, over which to march his troops. Hovey’s division of
his corps had the advance on a third road (the Clinton) still
farther north. McClernand was directed to move Blair’s and A.
J. Smith’s divisions by the southernmost of these roads, and
Osterhaus and Carr by the middle road. Orders were to move
cautiously with skirmishers to the front to feel for the enemy.

Smith’s division on the most southern road was the first to
encounter the enemy’s pickets, who were speedily driven in.
Osterhaus, on the middle road, hearing the firing, pushed his
skirmishers forward, found the enemy’s pickets and forced them
back to the main line. About the same time Hovey encountered
the enemy on the northern or direct wagon road from Jackson to
Vicksburg. McPherson was hastening up to join Hovey, but was
embarrassed by Hovey’s trains occupying the roads. I was still
back at Clinton. McPherson sent me word of the situation, and
expressed the wish that I was up. By half-past seven I was on
the road and proceeded rapidly to the front, ordering all trains
that were in front of troops off the road. When I arrived
Hovey’s skirmishing amounted almost to a battle.

McClernand was in person on the middle road and had a shorter
distance to march to reach the enemy’s position than
McPherson. I sent him word by a staff officer to push forward
and attack. These orders were repeated several times without
apparently expediting McClernand’s advance.

Champion’s Hill, where Pemberton had chosen his position to
receive us, whether taken by accident or design, was well
selected. It is one of the highest points in that section, and
commanded all the ground in range. On the east side of the
ridge, which is quite precipitous, is a ravine running first
north, then westerly, terminating at Baker’s Creek. It was
grown up thickly with large trees and undergrowth, making it
difficult to penetrate with troops, even when not defended. The
ridge occupied by the enemy terminated abruptly where the ravine
turns westerly. The left of the enemy occupied the north end of
this ridge. The Bolton and Edward’s station wagon-road turns
almost due south at this point and ascends the ridge, which it
follows for about a mile; then turning west, descends by a
gentle declivity to Baker’s Creek, nearly a mile away. On the
west side the slope of the ridge is gradual and is cultivated
from near the summit to the creek. There was, when we were
there, a narrow belt of timber near the summit west of the road.

From Raymond there is a direct road to Edward’s station, some
three miles west of Champion’s Hill. There is one also to
Bolton. From this latter road there is still another, leaving
it about three and a half miles before reaching Bolton and leads
direct to the same station. It was along these two roads that
three divisions of McClernand’s corps, and Blair of Sherman’s,
temporarily under McClernand, were moving. Hovey of
McClernand’s command was with McPherson, farther north on the
road from Bolton direct to Edward’s station. The middle road
comes into the northern road at the point where the latter turns
to the west and descends to Baker’s Creek; the southern road is
still several miles south and does not intersect the others
until it reaches Edward’s station. Pemberton’s lines covered
all these roads, and faced east. Hovey’s line, when it first
drove in the enemy’s pickets, was formed parallel to that of the
enemy and confronted his left.

By eleven o’clock the skirmishing had grown into a
hard-contested battle. Hovey alone, before other troops could
be got to assist him, had captured a battery of the enemy. But
he was not able to hold his position and had to abandon the
artillery. McPherson brought up his troops as fast as possible,
Logan in front, and posted them on the right of Hovey and across
the flank of the enemy. Logan reinforced Hovey with one brigade
from his division; with his other two he moved farther west to
make room for Crocker, who was coming up as rapidly as the roads
would admit. Hovey was still being heavily pressed, and was
calling on me for more reinforcements. I ordered Crocker, who
was now coming up, to send one brigade from his division.
McPherson ordered two batteries to be stationed where they
nearly enfiladed the enemy’s line, and they did good execution.

From Logan’s position now a direct forward movement carried him
over open fields, in rear of the enemy and in a line parallel
with them. He did make exactly this move, attacking, however,
the enemy through the belt of woods covering the west slope of
the hill for a short distance. Up to this time I had kept my
position near Hovey where we were the most heavily pressed; but
about noon I moved with a part of my staff by our right around,
until I came up with Logan himself. I found him near the road
leading down to Baker’s Creek. He was actually in command of
the only road over which the enemy could retreat; Hovey,
reinforced by two brigades from McPherson’s command, confronted
the enemy’s left; Crocker, with two brigades, covered their left
flank; McClernand two hours before, had been within two miles and
a half of their centre with two divisions, and the two divisions,
Blair’s and A. J. Smith’s, were confronting the rebel right;
Ransom, with a brigade of McArthur’s division of the 17th corps
(McPherson’s), had crossed the river at Grand Gulf a few days
before, and was coming up on their right flank. Neither Logan
nor I knew that we had cut off the retreat of the enemy. Just
at this juncture a messenger came from Hovey, asking for more
reinforcements. There were none to spare. I then gave an order
to move McPherson’s command by the left flank around to Hovey.
This uncovered the rebel line of retreat, which was soon taken
advantage of by the enemy.

During all this time, Hovey, reinforced as he was by a brigade
from Logan and another from Crocker, and by Crocker gallantly
coming up with two other brigades on his right, had made several
assaults, the last one about the time the road was opened to the
rear. The enemy fled precipitately. This was between three and
four o’clock. I rode forward, or rather back, to where the
middle road intersects the north road, and found the skirmishers
of Carr’s division just coming in. Osterhaus was farther south
and soon after came up with skirmishers advanced in like
manner. Hovey’s division, and McPherson’s two divisions with
him, had marched and fought from early dawn, and were not in the
best condition to follow the retreating foe. I sent orders to
Osterhaus to pursue the enemy, and to Carr, whom I saw
personally, I explained the situation and directed him to pursue
vigorously as far as the Big Black, and to cross it if he could;
Osterhaus to follow him. The pursuit was continued until after
dark.

The battle of Champion’s Hill lasted about four hours, hard
fighting, preceded by two or three hours of skirmishing, some of
which almost rose to the dignity of battle. Every man of Hovey’s
division and of McPherson’s two divisions was engaged during the
battle. No other part of my command was engaged at all, except
that as described before. Osterhaus’s and A. J. Smith’s
divisions had encountered the rebel advanced pickets as early as
half-past seven. Their positions were admirable for advancing
upon the enemy’s line. McClernand, with two divisions, was
within a few miles of the battle-field long before noon and in
easy hearing. I sent him repeated orders by staff officers
fully competent to explain to him the situation. These
traversed the wood separating us, without escort, and directed
him to push forward; but he did not come. It is true, in front
of McClernand there was a small force of the enemy and posted in
a good position behind a ravine obstructing his advance; but if
he had moved to the right by the road my staff officers had
followed the enemy must either have fallen back or been cut
off. Instead of this he sent orders to Hovey, who belonged to
his corps, to join on to his right flank. Hovey was bearing the
brunt of the battle at the time. To obey the order he would have
had to pull out from the front of the enemy and march back as far
as McClernand had to advance to get into battle and substantially
over the same ground. Of course I did not permit Hovey to obey
the order of his intermediate superior.

We had in this battle about 15,000 men absolutely engaged. This
excludes those that did not get up, all of McClernand’s command
except Hovey. Our loss was 410 killed, 1,844 wounded and 187
missing. Hovey alone lost 1,200 killed, wounded and
missing–more than one-third of his division.

Had McClernand come up with reasonable promptness, or had I
known the ground as I did afterwards, I cannot see how Pemberton
could have escaped with any organized force. As it was he lost
over three thousand killed and wounded and about three thousand
captured in battle and in pursuit. Loring’s division, which was
the right of Pemberton’s line, was cut off from the retreating
army and never got back into Vicksburg. Pemberton himself fell
back that night to the Big Black River. His troops did not stop
before midnight and many of them left before the general retreat
commenced, and no doubt a good part of them returned to their
homes. Logan alone captured 1,300 prisoners and eleven guns.
Hovey captured 300 under fire and about 700 in all, exclusive of
500 sick and wounded whom he paroled, thus making 1,200.

McPherson joined in the advance as soon as his men could fill
their cartridge-boxes, leaving one brigade to guard our
wounded. The pursuit was continued as long as it was light
enough to see the road. The night of the 16th of May found
McPherson’s command bivouacked from two to six miles west of the
battlefield, along the line of the road to Vicksburg. Carr and
Osterhaus were at Edward’s station, and Blair was about three
miles south-east; Hovey remained on the field where his troops
had fought so bravely and bled so freely. Much war material
abandoned by the enemy was picked up on the battle-field, among
it thirty pieces of artillery. I pushed through the advancing
column with my staff and kept in advance until after night.
Finding ourselves alone we stopped and took possession of a
vacant house. As no troops came up we moved back a mile or more
until we met the head of the column just going into bivouac on
the road. We had no tents, so we occupied the porch of a house
which had been taken for a rebel hospital and which was filled
with wounded and dying who had been brought from the
battle-field we had just left.

While a battle is raging one can see his enemy mowed down by the
thousand, or the ten thousand, with great composure; but after
the battle these scenes are distressing, and one is naturally
disposed to do as much to alleviate the suffering of an enemy as
a friend.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

BATTLE OF BLACK RIVER BRIDGE–CROSSING THE BIG BLACK–INVESTMENT
OF VICKSBURG–ASSAULTING THE WORKS.

We were now assured of our position between Johnston and
Pemberton, without a possibility of a junction of their
forces. Pemberton might have made a night march to the Big
Black, crossed the bridge there and, by moving north on the west
side, have eluded us and finally returned to Johnston. But this
would have given us Vicksburg. It would have been his proper
move, however, and the one Johnston would have made had he been
in Pemberton’s place. In fact it would have been in conformity
with Johnston’s orders to Pemberton.

Sherman left Jackson with the last of his troops about noon on
the 16th and reached Bolton, twenty miles west, before
halting. His rear guard did not get in until two A.M. the 17th,
but renewed their march by daylight. He paroled his prisoners at
Jackson, and was forced to leave his own wounded in care of
surgeons and attendants. At Bolton he was informed of our
victory. He was directed to commence the march early next day,
and to diverge from the road he was on to Bridgeport on the Big
Black River, some eleven miles above the point where we expected
to find the enemy. Blair was ordered to join him there with the
pontoon train as early as possible.

This movement brought Sherman’s corps together, and at a point
where I hoped a crossing of the Big Black might be effected and
Sherman’s corps used to flank the enemy out of his position in
our front, thus opening a crossing for the remainder of the
army. I informed him that I would endeavor to hold the enemy in
my front while he crossed the river.

The advance division, Carr’s (McClernand’s corps), resumed the
pursuit at half-past three A.M. on the 17th, followed closely by
Osterhaus, McPherson bringing up the rear with his corps. As I
expected, the enemy was found in position on the Big Black. The
point was only six miles from that where my advance had rested
for the night, and was reached at an early hour. Here the river
makes a turn to the west, and has washed close up to the high
land; the east side is a low bottom, sometimes overflowed at
very high water, but was cleared and in cultivation. A bayou
runs irregularly across this low land, the bottom of which,
however, is above the surface of the Big Black at ordinary
stages. When the river is full water runs through it,
converting the point of land into an island. The bayou was
grown up with timber, which the enemy had felled into the
ditch. At this time there was a foot or two of water in it. The
rebels had constructed a parapet along the inner bank of this
bayou by using cotton bales from the plantation close by and
throwing dirt over them. The whole was thoroughly commanded
from the height west of the river. At the upper end of the
bayou there was a strip of uncleared land which afforded a cover
for a portion of our men. Carr’s division was deployed on our
right, Lawler’s brigade forming his extreme right and reaching
through these woods to the river above. Osterhaus’ division was
deployed to the left of Carr and covered the enemy’s entire
front. McPherson was in column on the road, the head close by,
ready to come in wherever he could be of assistance.

While the troops were standing as here described an officer from
Banks’ staff came up and presented me with a letter from General
Halleck, dated the 11th of May. It had been sent by the way of
New Orleans to Banks to be forwarded to me. It ordered me to
return to Grand Gulf and to co-operate from there with Banks
against Port Hudson, and then to return with our combined forces
to besiege Vicksburg. I told the officer that the order came too
late, and that Halleck would not give it now if he knew our
position. The bearer of the dispatch insisted that I ought to
obey the order, and was giving arguments to support his position
when I heard great cheering to the right of our line and, looking
in that direction, saw Lawler in his shirt sleeves leading a
charge upon the enemy. I immediately mounted my horse and rode
in the direction of the charge, and saw no more of the officer
who delivered the dispatch; I think not even to this day.

The assault was successful. But little resistance was made. The
enemy fled from the west bank of the river, burning the bridge
behind him and leaving the men and guns on the east side to fall
into our hands. Many tried to escape by swimming the river.
Some succeeded and some were drowned in the attempt. Eighteen
guns were captured and 1,751 prisoners. Our loss was 39 killed,
237 wounded and 3 missing. The enemy probably lost but few men
except those captured and drowned. But for the successful and
complete destruction of the bridge, I have but little doubt that
we should have followed the enemy so closely as to prevent his
occupying his defences around Vicksburg.

As the bridge was destroyed and the river was high, new bridges
had to be built. It was but little after nine o’clock A.M. when
the capture took place. As soon as work could be commenced,
orders were given for the construction of three bridges. One
was taken charge of by Lieutenant Hains, of the Engineer Corps,
one by General McPherson himself and one by General Ransom, a
most gallant and intelligent volunteer officer. My recollection
is that Hains built a raft bridge; McPherson a pontoon, using
cotton bales in large numbers, for pontoons; and that Ransom
felled trees on opposite banks of the river, cutting only on one
side of the tree, so that they would fall with their tops
interlacing in the river, without the trees being entirely
severed from their stumps. A bridge was then made with these
trees to support the roadway. Lumber was taken from buildings,
cotton gins and wherever found, for this purpose. By eight
o’clock in the morning of the 18th all three bridges were
complete and the troops were crossing.

Sherman reached Bridgeport about noon of the 17th and found
Blair with the pontoon train already there. A few of the enemy
were intrenched on the west bank, but they made little
resistance and soon surrendered. Two divisions were crossed
that night and the third the following morning.

On the 18th I moved along the Vicksburg road in advance of the
troops and as soon as possible joined Sherman. My first anxiety
was to secure a base of supplies on the Yazoo River above
Vicksburg. Sherman’s line of march led him to the very point on
Walnut Hills occupied by the enemy the December before when he
was repulsed. Sherman was equally anxious with myself. Our
impatience led us to move in advance of the column and well up
with the advanced skirmishers. There were some detached works
along the crest of the hill. These were still occupied by the
enemy, or else the garrison from Haines’ Bluff had not all got
past on their way to Vicksburg. At all events the bullets of
the enemy whistled by thick and fast for a short time. In a few
minutes Sherman had the pleasure of looking down from the spot
coveted so much by him the December before on the ground where
his command had lain so helpless for offensive action. He
turned to me, saying that up to this minute he had felt no
positive assurance of success. This, however, he said was the
end of one of the greatest campaigns in history and I ought to
make a report of it at once. Vicksburg was not yet captured,
and there was no telling what might happen before it was taken;
but whether captured or not, this was a complete and successful
campaign. I do not claim to quote Sherman’s language; but the
substance only. My reason for mentioning this incident will
appear further on.

McPherson, after crossing the Big Black, came into the Jackson
and Vicksburg road which Sherman was on, but to his rear. He
arrived at night near the lines of the enemy, and went into
camp. McClernand moved by the direct road near the railroad to
Mount Albans, and then turned to the left and put his troops on
the road from Baldwin’s ferry to Vicksburg. This brought him
south of McPherson. I now had my three corps up the works built
for the defence of Vicksburg, on three roads–one to the north,
one to the east and one to the south-east of the city. By the
morning of the 19th the investment was as complete as my limited
number of troops would allow. Sherman was on the right, and
covered the high ground from where it overlooked the Yazoo as
far south-east as his troops would extend. McPherson joined on
to his left, and occupied ground on both sides of the Jackson
road. McClernand took up the ground to his left and extended as
far towards Warrenton as he could, keeping a continuous line.

On the 19th there was constant skirmishing with the enemy while
we were getting into better position. The enemy had been much
demoralized by his defeats at Champion’s Hill and the Big Black,
and I believed he would not make much effort to hold Vicksburg.
Accordingly, at two o’clock I ordered an assault. It resulted
in securing more advanced positions for all our troops where
they were fully covered from the fire of the enemy.

The 20th and 21st were spent in strengthening our position and
in making roads in rear of the army, from Yazoo River or
Chickasaw Bayou. Most of the army had now been for three weeks
with only five days’ rations issued by the commissary. They had
an abundance of food, however, but began to feel the want of
bread. I remember that in passing around to the left of the
line on the 21st, a soldier, recognizing me, said in rather a
low voice, but yet so that I heard him, “Hard tack.” In a
moment the cry was taken up all along the line, “Hard tack! Hard
tack!” I told the men nearest to me that we had been engaged ever
since the arrival of the troops in building a road over which to
supply them with everything they needed. The cry was instantly
changed to cheers. By the night of the 21st all the troops had
full rations issued to them. The bread and coffee were highly
appreciated.

I now determined on a second assault. Johnston was in my rear,
only fifty miles away, with an army not much inferior in numbers
to the one I had with me, and I knew he was being reinforced.
There was danger of his coming to the assistance of Pemberton,
and after all he might defeat my anticipations of capturing the
garrison if, indeed, he did not prevent the capture of the
city. The immediate capture of Vicksburg would save sending me
the reinforcements which were so much wanted elsewhere, and
would set free the army under me to drive Johnston from the
State. But the first consideration of all was–the troops
believed they could carry the works in their front, and would
not have worked so patiently in the trenches if they had not
been allowed to try.

The attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at
ten o’clock A.M. on the 22d with a furious cannonade from every
battery in position. All the corps commanders set their time by
mine so that all might open the engagement at the same minute.
The attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps
succeeded in getting up to the very parapets of the enemy and in
planting their battle flags upon them; but at no place were we
able to enter. General McClernand reported that he had gained
the enemy’s intrenchments at several points, and wanted
reinforcements. I occupied a position from which I believed I
could see as well as he what took place in his front, and I did
not see the success he reported. But his request for
reinforcements being repeated I could not ignore it, and sent
him Quinby’s division of the 17th corps. Sherman and McPherson
were both ordered to renew their assaults as a diversion in
favor of McClernand. This last attack only served to increase
our casualties without giving any benefit whatever. As soon as
it was dark our troops that had reached the enemy’s line and
been obliged to remain there for security all day, were
withdrawn; and thus ended the last assault upon Vicksburg.

CHAPTER XXXVII

SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

I now determined upon a regular siege–to “out-camp the enemy,”
as it were, and to incur no more losses. The experience of the
22d convinced officers and men that this was best, and they went
to work on the defences and approaches with a will. With the
navy holding the river, the investment of Vicksburg was
complete. As long as we could hold our position the enemy was
limited in supplies of food, men and munitions of war to what
they had on hand. These could not last always.

The crossing of troops at Bruinsburg commenced April 30th. On
the 18th of May the army was in rear of Vicksburg. On the 19th,
just twenty days after the crossing, the city was completely
invested and an assault had been made: five distinct battles
(besides continuous skirmishing) had been fought and won by the
Union forces; the capital of the State had fallen and its
arsenals, military manufactories and everything useful for
military purposes had been destroyed; an average of about one
hundred and eighty miles had been marched by the troops engaged;
but five days’ rations had been issued, and no forage; over six
thousand prisoners had been captured, and as many more of the
enemy had been killed or wounded; twenty-seven heavy cannon and
sixty-one field-pieces had fallen into our hands; and four
hundred miles of the river, from Vicksburg to Port Hudson, had
become ours. The Union force that had crossed the Mississippi
River up to this time was less than forty-three thousand men.
One division of these, Blair’s, only arrived in time to take
part in the battle of Champion’s Hill, but was not engaged
there; and one brigade, Ransom’s of McPherson’s corps, reached
the field after the battle. The enemy had at Vicksburg, Grand
Gulf, Jackson, and on the roads between these places, over sixty
thousand men. They were in their own country, where no rear
guards were necessary. The country is admirable for defence,
but difficult for the conduct of an offensive campaign. All
their troops had to be met. We were fortunate, to say the
least, in meeting them in detail: at Port Gibson seven or eight
thousand; at Raymond, five thousand; at Jackson, from eight to
eleven thousand; at Champion’s Hill, twenty-five thousand; at
the Big Black, four thousand. A part of those met at Jackson
were all that was left of those encountered at Raymond. They
were beaten in detail by a force smaller than their own, upon
their own ground. Our loss up to this time was:

KILLED. WOUNDED.MISSING.

Port Gibson….. 131 719 25
South Fork Bayou Pierre….. .. 1 ..
Skirmishes, May 3 ….. 1 9 ..
Fourteen Mile Creek….. 6 24 ..
Raymond…………… 66 339 39
Jackson….. 42 251 7
Champion’s Hill….. 410 1,844 187
Big Black….. 39 237 3
Bridgeport….. .. 1 ..
Total….. 695 3,425 259

Of the wounded many were but slightly so, and continued on
duty. Not half of them were disabled for any length of time.

After the unsuccessful assault of the 22d the work of the
regular siege began. Sherman occupied the right starting from
the river above Vicksburg, McPherson the centre (McArthur’s
division now with him) and McClernand the left, holding the road
south to Warrenton. Lauman’s division arrived at this time and
was placed on the extreme left of the line.

In the interval between the assaults of the 19th and 22d, roads
had been completed from the Yazoo River and Chickasaw Bayou,
around the rear of the army, to enable us to bring up supplies
of food and ammunition; ground had been selected and cleared on
which the troops were to be encamped, and tents and cooking
utensils were brought up. The troops had been without these
from the time of crossing the Mississippi up to this time. All
was now ready for the pick and spade. Prentiss and Hurlbut were
ordered to send forward every man that could be spared. Cavalry
especially was wanted to watch the fords along the Big Black,
and to observe Johnston. I knew that Johnston was receiving
reinforcements from Bragg, who was confronting Rosecrans in
Tennessee. Vicksburg was so important to the enemy that I
believed he would make the most strenuous efforts to raise the
siege, even at the risk of losing ground elsewhere.

My line was more than fifteen miles long, extending from Haines’
Bluff to Vicksburg, thence to Warrenton. The line of the enemy
was about seven. In addition to this, having an enemy at Canton
and Jackson, in our rear, who was being constantly reinforced, we
required a second line of defence facing the other way. I had
not troops enough under my command to man these. General
Halleck appreciated the situation and, without being asked,
forwarded reinforcements with all possible dispatch.

The ground about Vicksburg is admirable for defence. On the
north it is about two hundred feet above the Mississippi River
at the highest point and very much cut up by the washing rains;
the ravines were grown up with cane and underbrush, while the
sides and tops were covered with a dense forest. Farther south
the ground flattens out somewhat, and was in cultivation. But
here, too, it was cut up by ravines and small streams. The
enemy’s line of defence followed the crest of a ridge from the
river north of the city eastward, then southerly around to the
Jackson road, full three miles back of the city; thence in a
southwesterly direction to the river. Deep ravines of the
description given lay in front of these defences. As there is a
succession of gullies, cut out by rains along the side of the
ridge, the line was necessarily very irregular. To follow each
of these spurs with intrenchments, so as to command the slopes
on either side, would have lengthened their line very much.
Generally therefore, or in many places, their line would run
from near the head of one gully nearly straight to the head of
another, and an outer work triangular in shape, generally open
in the rear, was thrown up on the point; with a few men in this
outer work they commanded the approaches to the main line
completely.

The work to be done, to make our position as strong against the
enemy as his was against us, was very great. The problem was
also complicated by our wanting our line as near that of the
enemy as possible. We had but four engineer officers with us.
Captain Prime, of the Engineer Corps, was the chief, and the
work at the beginning was mainly directed by him. His health
soon gave out, when he was succeeded by Captain Comstock, also
of the Engineer Corps. To provide assistants on such a long
line I directed that all officers who had graduated at West
Point, where they had necessarily to study military engineering,
should in addition to their other duties assist in the work.

The chief quartermaster and the chief commissary were
graduates. The chief commissary, now the Commissary-General of
the Army, begged off, however, saying that there was nothing in
engineering that he was good for unless he would do for a
sap-roller. As soldiers require rations while working in the
ditches as well as when marching and fighting, and as we would
be sure to lose him if he was used as a sap-roller, I let him
off. The general is a large man; weighs two hundred and twenty
pounds, and is not tall.

We had no siege guns except six thirty-two pounders, and there
were none at the West to draw from. Admiral Porter, however,
supplied us with a battery of navy-guns of large calibre, and
with these, and the field artillery used in the campaign, the
siege began. The first thing to do was to get the artillery in
batteries where they would occupy commanding positions; then
establish the camps, under cover from the fire of the enemy but
as near up as possible; and then construct rifle-pits and
covered ways, to connect the entire command by the shortest
route. The enemy did not harass us much while we were
constructing our batteries. Probably their artillery ammunition
was short; and their infantry was kept down by our sharpshooters,
who were always on the alert and ready to fire at a head whenever
it showed itself above the rebel works.

In no place were our lines more than six hundred yards from the
enemy. It was necessary, therefore, to cover our men by
something more than the ordinary parapet. To give additional
protection sand bags, bullet-proof, were placed along the tops
of the parapets far enough apart to make loop-holes for
musketry. On top of these, logs were put. By these means the
men were enabled to walk about erect when off duty, without fear
of annoyance from sharpshooters. The enemy used in their defence
explosive musket-balls, no doubt thinking that, bursting over our
men in the trenches, they would do some execution; but I do not
remember a single case where a man was injured by a piece of one
of these shells. When they were hit and the ball exploded, the
wound was terrible. In these cases a solid ball would have hit
as well. Their use is barbarous, because they produce increased
suffering without any corresponding advantage to those using
them.

The enemy could not resort to our method to protect their men,
because we had an inexhaustible supply of ammunition to draw
upon and used it freely. Splinters from the timber would have
made havoc among the men behind.

There were no mortars with the besiegers, except what the navy
had in front of the city; but wooden ones were made by taking
logs of the toughest wood that could be found, boring them out
for six or twelve pound shells and binding them with strong iron
bands. These answered as cochorns, and shells were successfully
thrown from them into the trenches of the enemy.

The labor of building the batteries and intrenching was largely
done by the pioneers, assisted by negroes who came within our
lines and who were paid for their work; but details from the
troops had often to be made. The work was pushed forward as
rapidly as possible, and when an advanced position was secured
and covered from the fire of the enemy the batteries were
advanced. By the 3oth of June there were two hundred and twenty
guns in position, mostly light field-pieces, besides a battery of
heavy guns belonging to, manned and commanded by the navy. We
were now as strong for defence against the garrison of Vicksburg
as they were against us; but I knew that Johnston was in our
rear, and was receiving constant reinforcements from the east.
He had at this time a larger force than I had had at any time
prior to the battle of Champion’s Hill.

As soon as the news of the arrival of the Union army behind
Vicksburg reached the North, floods of visitors began to pour
in. Some came to gratify curiosity; some to see sons or
brothers who had passed through the terrible ordeal; members of
the Christian and Sanitary Associations came to minister to the
wants of the sick and the wounded. Often those coming to see a
son or brother would bring a dozen or two of poultry. They did
not know how little the gift would be appreciated. Many of the
soldiers had lived so much on chickens, ducks and turkeys
without bread during the march, that the sight of poultry, if
they could get bacon, almost took away their appetite. But the
intention was good.

Among the earliest arrivals was the Governor of Illinois, with
most of the State officers. I naturally wanted to show them
what there was of most interest. In Sherman’s front the ground
was the most broken and most wooded, and more was to be seen
without exposure. I therefore took them to Sherman’s
headquarters and presented them. Before starting out to look at
the lines–possibly while Sherman’s horse was being
saddled–there were many questions asked about the late
campaign, about which the North had been so imperfectly
informed. There was a little knot around Sherman and another
around me, and I heard Sherman repeating, in the most animated
manner, what he had said to me when we first looked down from
Walnut Hills upon the land below on the 18th of May, adding:
“Grant is entitled to every bit of the credit for the campaign;
I opposed it. I wrote him a letter about it.” But for this
speech it is not likely that Sherman’s opposition would have
ever been heard of. His untiring energy and great efficiency
during the campaign entitle him to a full share of all the
credit due for its success. He could not have done more if the
plan had been his own. (*13)

On the 26th of May I sent Blair’s division up the Yazoo to drive
out a force of the enemy supposed to be between the Big Black and
the Yazoo. The country was rich and full of supplies of both
food and forage. Blair was instructed to take all of it. The
cattle were to be driven in for the use of our army, and the
food and forage to be consumed by our troops or destroyed by
fire; all bridges were to be destroyed, and the roads rendered
as nearly impassable as possible. Blair went forty-five miles
and was gone almost a week. His work was effectually done. I
requested Porter at this time to send the marine brigade, a
floating nondescript force which had been assigned to his
command and which proved very useful, up to Haines’ Bluff to
hold it until reinforcements could be sent.

On the 26th I also received a letter from Banks, asking me to
reinforce him with ten thousand men at Port Hudson. Of course I
could not comply with his request, nor did I think he needed
them. He was in no danger of an attack by the garrison in his
front, and there was no army organizing in his rear to raise the
siege.

On the 3d of June a brigade from Hurlbut’s command arrived,
General Kimball commanding. It was sent to Mechanicsburg, some
miles north-east of Haines’ Bluff and about midway between the
Big Black and the Yazoo. A brigade of Blair’s division and
twelve hundred cavalry had already, on Blair’s return from the
Yazoo, been sent to the same place with instructions to watch
the crossings of the Big Black River, to destroy the roads in
his (Blair’s) front, and to gather or destroy all supplies.

On the 7th of June our little force of colored and white troops
across the Mississippi, at Milliken’s Bend, were attacked by
about 3,000 men from Richard Taylor’s trans-Mississippi
command. With the aid of the gunboats they were speedily
repelled. I sent Mower’s brigade over with instructions to
drive the enemy beyond the Tensas Bayou; and we had no further
trouble in that quarter during the siege. This was the first
important engagement of the war in which colored troops were
under fire. These men were very raw, having all been enlisted
since the beginning of the siege, but they behaved well.

On the 8th of June a full division arrived from Hurlbut’s
command, under General Sooy Smith. It was sent immediately to
Haines’ Bluff, and General C. C. Washburn was assigned to the
general command at that point.

On the 11th a strong division arrived from the Department of the
Missouri under General Herron, which was placed on our left. This
cut off the last possible chance of communication between
Pemberton and Johnston, as it enabled Lauman to close up on
McClernand’s left while Herron intrenched from Lauman to the
water’s edge. At this point the water recedes a few hundred
yards from the high land. Through this opening no doubt the
Confederate commanders had been able to get messengers under
cover of night.

On the 14th General Parke arrived with two divisions of
Burnside’s corps, and was immediately dispatched to Haines’
Bluff. These latter troops–Herron’s and Parke’s–were the
reinforcements already spoken of sent by Halleck in anticipation
of their being needed. They arrived none too soon.

I now had about seventy-one thousand men. More than half were
disposed across the peninsula, between the Yazoo at Haines’
Bluff and the Big Black, with the division of Osterhaus watching
the crossings of the latter river farther south and west from the
crossing of the Jackson road to Baldwin’s ferry and below.

There were eight roads leading into Vicksburg, along which and
their immediate sides, our work was specially pushed and
batteries advanced; but no commanding point within range of the
enemy was neglected.

On the 17th I received a letter from General Sherman and one on
the 18th from General McPherson, saying that their respective
commands had complained to them of a fulsome, congratulatory
order published by General McClernand to the 13th corps, which
did great injustice to the other troops engaged in the
campaign. This order had been sent North and published, and now
papers containing it had reached our camps. The order had not
been heard of by me, and certainly not by troops outside of
McClernand’s command until brought in this way. I at once wrote
to McClernand, directing him to send me a copy of this order. He
did so, and I at once relieved him from the command of the 13th
army corps and ordered him back to Springfield, Illinois. The
publication of his order in the press was in violation of War
Department orders and also of mine.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

JOHNSTON’S MOVEMENTS–FORTIFICATIONS AT HAINES’ BLUFF–
EXPLOSION OF THE MINE–EXPLOSION OF THE SECOND MINE– PREPARING
FOR THE ASSAULT–THE FLAG OF TRUCE–MEETING WITH
PEMBERTON–NEGOTIATIONS FOR SURRENDER–ACCEPTING THE
TERMS–SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG.

On the 22d of June positive information was received that
Johnston had crossed the Big Black River for the purpose of
attacking our rear, to raise the siege and release Pemberton.
The correspondence between Johnston and Pemberton shows that all
expectation of holding Vicksburg had by this time passed from
Johnston’s mind. I immediately ordered Sherman to the command
of all the forces from Haines’ Bluff to the Big Black River.
This amounted now to quite half the troops about Vicksburg.
Besides these, Herron and A. J. Smith’s divisions were ordered
to hold themselves in readiness to reinforce Sherman. Haines’
Bluff had been strongly fortified on the land side, and on all
commanding points from there to the Big Black at the railroad
crossing batteries had been constructed. The work of connecting
by rifle-pits where this was not already done, was an easy task
for the troops that were to defend them.

We were now looking west, besieging Pemberton, while we were
also looking east to defend ourselves against an expected siege
by Johnston. But as against the garrison of Vicksburg we were
as substantially protected as they were against us. Where we
were looking east and north we were strongly fortified, and on
the defensive. Johnston evidently took in the situation and
wisely, I think, abstained from making an assault on us because
it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides without
accomplishing any result. We were strong enough to have taken
the offensive against him; but I did not feel disposed to take
any risk of losing our hold upon Pemberton’s army, while I would
have rejoiced at the opportunity of defending ourselves against
an attack by Johnston.

From the 23d of May the work of fortifying and pushing forward
our position nearer to the enemy had been steadily
progressing. At three points on the Jackson road, in front of
Leggett’s brigade, a sap was run up to the enemy’s parapet, and
by the 25th of June we had it undermined and the mine charged.
The enemy had countermined, but did not succeed in reaching our
mine. At this particular point the hill on which the rebel work
stands rises abruptly. Our sap ran close up to the outside of
the enemy’s parapet. In fact this parapet was also our
protection. The soldiers of the two sides occasionally
conversed pleasantly across this barrier; sometimes they
exchanged the hard bread of the Union soldiers for the tobacco
of the Confederates; at other times the enemy threw over
hand-grenades, and often our men, catching them in their hands,
returned them.

Our mine had been started some distance back down the hill;
consequently when it had extended as far as the parapet it was
many feet below it. This caused the failure of the enemy in his
search to find and destroy it. On the 25th of June at three
o’clock, all being ready, the mine was exploded. A heavy
artillery fire all along the line had been ordered to open with
the explosion. The effect was to blow the top of the hill off
and make a crater where it stood. The breach was not sufficient
to enable us to pass a column of attack through. In fact, the
enemy having failed to reach our mine had thrown up a line
farther back, where most of the men guarding that point were
placed. There were a few men, however, left at the advance
line, and others working in the countermine, which was still
being pushed to find ours. All that were there were thrown into
the air, some of them coming down on our side, still alive. I
remember one colored man, who had been under ground at work when
the explosion took place, who was thrown to our side. He was not
much hurt, but terribly frightened. Some one asked him how high
he had gone up. “Dun no, massa, but t’ink ’bout t’ree mile,”
was his reply. General Logan commanded at this point and took
this colored man to his quarters, where he did service to the
end of the siege.

As soon as the explosion took place the crater was seized by two
regiments of our troops who were near by, under cover, where they
had been placed for the express purpose. The enemy made a
desperate effort to expel them, but failed, and soon retired
behind the new line. From here, however, they threw
hand-grenades, which did some execution. The compliment was
returned by our men, but not with so much effect. The enemy
could lay their grenades on the parapet, which alone divided the
contestants, and roll them down upon us; while from our side they
had to be thrown over the parapet, which was at considerable
elevation. During the night we made efforts to secure our
position in the crater against the missiles of the enemy, so as
to run trenches along the outer base of their parapet, right and
left; but the enemy continued throwing their grenades, and
brought boxes of field ammunition (shells), the fuses of which
they would light with portfires, and throw them by hand into our
ranks. We found it impossible to continue this work. Another
mine was consequently started which was exploded on the 1st of
July, destroying an entire rebel redan, killing and wounding a
considerable number of its occupants and leaving an immense
chasm where it stood. No attempt to charge was made this time,
the experience of the 25th admonishing us. Our loss in the
first affair was about thirty killed and wounded. The enemy
must have lost more in the two explosions than we did in the
first. We lost none in the second.

From this time forward the work of mining and pushing our
position nearer to the enemy was prosecuted with vigor, and I
determined to explode no more mines until we were ready to
explode a number at different points and assault immediately
after. We were up now at three different points, one in front
of each corps, to where only the parapet of the enemy divided us.

At this time an intercepted dispatch from Johnston to Pemberton
informed me that Johnston intended to make a determined attack
upon us in order to relieve the garrison at Vicksburg. I knew
the garrison would make no formidable effort to relieve
itself. The picket lines were so close to each other–where
there was space enough between the lines to post pickets–that
the men could converse. On the 21st of June I was informed,
through this means, that Pemberton was preparing to escape, by
crossing to the Louisiana side under cover of night; that he had
employed workmen in making boats for that purpose; that the men
had been canvassed to ascertain if they would make an assault on
the “Yankees” to cut their way out; that they had refused, and
almost mutinied, because their commander would not surrender and
relieve their sufferings, and had only been pacified by the
assurance that boats enough would be finished in a week to carry
them all over. The rebel pickets also said that houses in the
city had been pulled down to get material to build these boats
with. Afterwards this story was verified: on entering the city
we found a large number of very rudely constructed boats.

All necessary steps were at once taken to render such an attempt
abortive. Our pickets were doubled; Admiral Porter was notified,
so that the river might be more closely watched; material was
collected on the west bank of the river to be set on fire and
light up the river if the attempt was made; and batteries were
established along the levee crossing the peninsula on the
Louisiana side. Had the attempt been made the garrison of
Vicksburg would have been drowned, or made prisoners on the
Louisiana side. General Richard Taylor was expected on the west
bank to co-operate in this movement, I believe, but he did not
come, nor could he have done so with a force sufficient to be of
service. The Mississippi was now in our possession from its
source to its mouth, except in the immediate front of Vicksburg
and of Port Hudson. We had nearly exhausted the country, along
a line drawn from Lake Providence to opposite Bruinsburg. The
roads west were not of a character to draw supplies over for any
considerable force.

By the 1st of July our approaches had reached the enemy’s ditch
at a number of places. At ten points we could move under cover
to within from five to one hundred yards of the enemy. Orders
were given to make all preparations for assault on the 6th of
July. The debouches were ordered widened to afford easy egress,
while the approaches were also to be widened to admit the troops
to pass through four abreast. Plank, and bags filled with
cotton packed in tightly, were ordered prepared, to enable the
troops to cross the ditches.

On the night of the 1st of July Johnston was between Brownsville
and the Big Black, and wrote Pemberton from there that about the
7th of the month an attempt would be made to create a diversion
to enable him to cut his way out. Pemberton was a prisoner
before this message reached him.

On July 1st Pemberton, seeing no hope of outside relief,
addressed the following letter to each of his four division
commanders:

“Unless the siege of Vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown
in, it will become necessary very shortly to evacuate the
place. I see no prospect of the former, and there are many
great, if not insuperable obstacles in the way of the latter.
You are, therefore, requested to inform me with as little delay
as possible, as to the condition of your troops and their
ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigues necessary
to accomplish a successful evacuation.”

Two of his generals suggested surrender, and the other two
practically did the same. They expressed the opinion that an
attempt to evacuate would fail. Pemberton had previously got a
message to Johnston suggesting that he should try to negotiate
with me for a release of the garrison with their arms. Johnston
replied that it would be a confession of weakness for him to do
so; but he authorized Pemberton to use his name in making such
an arrangement.

On the 3d about ten o’clock A.M. white flags appeared on a
portion of the rebel works. Hostilities along that part of the
line ceased at once. Soon two persons were seen coming towards
our lines bearing a white flag. They proved to be General
Bowen, a division commander, and Colonel Montgomery,
aide-de-camp to Pemberton, bearing the following letter to me:

“I have the honor to propose an armistice for–hours, with the
view to arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To
this end, if agreeable to you, I will appoint three
commissioners, to meet a like number to be named by yourself at
such place and hour to-day as you may find convenient. I make
this proposition to save the further effusion of blood, which
must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself
fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite
period. This communication will be handed you under a flag of
truce, by Major-General John S. Bowen.”

It was a glorious sight to officers and soldiers on the line
where these white flags were visible, and the news soon spread
to all parts of the command. The troops felt that their long
and weary marches, hard fighting, ceaseless watching by night
and day, in a hot climate, exposure to all sorts of weather, to
diseases and, worst of all, to the gibes of many Northern papers
that came to them saying all their suffering was in vain, that
Vicksburg would never be taken, were at last at an end and the
Union sure to be saved.

Bowen was received by General A. J. Smith, and asked to see
me. I had been a neighbor of Bowen’s in Missouri, and knew him
well and favorably before the war; but his request was
refused. He then suggested that I should meet Pemberton. To
this I sent a verbal message saying that, if Pemberton desired
it, I would meet him in front of McPherson’s corps at three
o’clock that afternoon. I also sent the following written reply
to Pemberton’s letter:

“Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice
for several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of
capitulation through commissioners, to be appointed, etc. The
useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course
can be ended at any time you may choose, by the unconditional
surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much
endurance and courage as those now in Vicksburg, will always
challenge the respect of an adversary, and I can assure you will
be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war. I do
not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange
the terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than
those indicated above.”

At three o’clock Pemberton appeared at the point suggested in my
verbal message, accompanied by the same officers who had borne
his letter of the morning. Generals Ord, McPherson, Logan and
A. J. Smith, and several officers of my staff, accompanied me.
Our place of meeting was on a hillside within a few hundred feet
of the rebel lines. Near by stood a stunted oak-tree, which was
made historical by the event. It was but a short time before
the last vestige of its body, root and limb had disappeared, the
fragments taken as trophies. Since then the same tree has
furnished as many cords of wood, in the shape of trophies, as
“The True Cross.”

Pemberton and I had served in the same division during part of
the Mexican War. I knew him very well therefore, and greeted
him as an old acquaintance. He soon asked what terms I proposed
to give his army if it surrendered. My answer was the same as
proposed in my reply to his letter. Pemberton then said, rather
snappishly, “The conference might as well end,” and turned
abruptly as if to leave. I said, “Very well.” General Bowen, I
saw, was very anxious that the surrender should be consummated.
His manner and remarks while Pemberton and I were talking,
showed this. He now proposed that he and one of our generals
should have a conference. I had no objection to this, as
nothing could be made binding upon me that they might propose.
Smith and Bowen accordingly had a conference, during which
Pemberton and I, moving a short distance away towards the
enemy’s lines were in conversation. After a while Bowen
suggested that the Confederate army should be allowed to march
out with the honors of war, carrying their small arms and field
artillery. This was promptly and unceremoniously rejected. The
interview here ended, I agreeing, however, to send a letter
giving final terms by ten o’clock that night.

Word was sent to Admiral Porter soon after the correspondence
with Pemberton commenced, so that hostilities might be stopped
on the part of both army and navy. It was agreed on my paging
with Pemberton that they should not be renewed until our
correspondence ceased.

When I returned to my headquarters I sent for all the corps and
division commanders with the army immediately confronting
Vicksburg. Half the army was from eight to twelve miles off,
waiting for Johnston. I informed them of the contents of
Pemberton’s letters, of my reply and the substance of the
interview, and that I was ready to hear any suggestion; but
would hold the power of deciding entirely in my own hands. This
was the nearest approach to a “council of war” I ever held.
Against the general, and almost unanimous judgment of the
council I sent the following letter:

“In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, I will submit
the following proposition for the surrender of the City of
Vicksburg, public stores, etc. On your accepting the terms
proposed, I will march in one division as a guard, and take
possession at eight A.M. to-morrow. As soon as rolls can be
made out, and paroles be signed by officers and men, you will be
allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them
their side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff and cavalry
officers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all
their clothing, but no other property. If these conditions are
accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be
taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary
cooking utensils for preparing them. Thirty wagons also,
counting two two-horse or mule teams as one, will be allowed to
transport such articles as cannot be carried along. The same
conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and
soldiers as fast as they become able to travel. The paroles for
these latter must be signed, however, whilst officers present are
authorized to sign the roll of prisoners.”

By the terms of the cartel then in force, prisoners captured by
either army were required to be forwarded as soon as possible to
either Aiken’s landing below Dutch Gap on the James River, or to
Vicksburg, there to be exchanged, or paroled until they could be
exchanged. There was a Confederate commissioner at Vicksburg,
authorized to make the exchange. I did not propose to take him
a prisoner, but to leave him free to perform the functions of
his office. Had I insisted upon an unconditional surrender
there would have been over thirty thousand men to transport to
Cairo, very much to the inconvenience of the army on the
Mississippi. Thence the prisoners would have had to be
transported by rail to Washington or Baltimore; thence again by
steamer to Aiken’s–all at very great expense. At Aiken’s they
would have had to be paroled, because the Confederates did not
have Union prisoners to give in exchange. Then again
Pemberton’s army was largely composed of men whose homes were in
the South-west; I knew many of them were tired of the war and
would get home just as soon as they could. A large number of
them had voluntarily come into our lines during the siege, and
requested to be sent north where they could get employment until
the war was over and they could go to their homes.

Late at night I received the following reply to my last letter:

“I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of this date, proposing terms of capitulation for
this garrison and post. In the main your terms are accepted;
but, in justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops
manifested in the defence of Vicksburg, I have to submit the
following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will perfect
the agreement between us. At ten o’clock A.M. to-morrow, I
propose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg, and to
surrender the city and garrison under my command, by marching
out with my colors and arms, stacking them in front of my
present lines. After which you will take possession. Officers
to retain their side-arms and personal property, and the rights
and property of citizens to be respected.”

This was received after midnight. My reply was as follows:

“I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of 3d July. The amendment proposed by you cannot
be acceded to in full. It will be necessary to furnish every
officer and man with a parole signed by himself, which, with the
completion of the roll of prisoners, will necessarily take some
time. Again, I can make no stipulations with regard to the
treatment of citizens and their private property. While I do
not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannot
consent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. The
property which officers will be allowed to take with them will be
as stated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers
will be allowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted
officers one horse each. If you mean by your proposition for
each brigade to march to the front of the lines now occupied by
it, and stack arms at ten o’clock A.M., and then return to the
inside and there remain as prisoners until properly paroled, I
will make no objection to it. Should no notification be
received of your acceptance of my terms by nine o’clock A.M. I
shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall act
accordingly. Should these terms be accepted, white flags should
be displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may
not have been notified, from firing upon your men.”

Pemberton promptly accepted these terms.

During the siege there had been a good deal of friendly sparring
between the soldiers of the two armies, on picket and where the
lines were close together. All rebels were known as “Johnnies,”
all Union troops as “Yanks.” Often “Johnny” would call: “Well,
Yank, when are you coming into town?” The reply was sometimes:
“We propose to celebrate the 4th of July there.” Sometimes it
would be: “We always treat our prisoners with kindness and do
not want to hurt them;” or, “We are holding you as prisoners of
war while you are feeding yourselves.” The garrison, from the
commanding general down, undoubtedly expected an assault on the
fourth. They knew from the temper of their men it would be
successful when made; and that would be a greater humiliation
than to surrender. Besides it would be attended with severe
loss to them.

The Vicksburg paper, which we received regularly through the
courtesy of the rebel pickets, said prior to the fourth, in
speaking of the “Yankee” boast that they would take dinner in
Vicksburg that day, that the best receipt for cooking a rabbit
was “First ketch your rabbit.” The paper at this time and for
some time previous was printed on the plain side of wall
paper. The last number was issued on the fourth and announced
that we had “caught our rabbit.”

I have no doubt that Pemberton commenced his correspondence on
the third with a two-fold purpose: first, to avoid an assault,
which he knew would be successful, and second, to prevent the
capture taking place on the great national holiday, the
anniversary of the Declaration of American Independence. Holding
out for better terms as he did he defeated his aim in the latter
particular.

At the appointed hour the garrison of Vicksburg marched out of
their works and formed line in front, stacked arms and marched
back in good order. Our whole army present witnessed this scene
without cheering. Logan’s division, which had approached nearest
the rebel works, was the first to march in; and the flag of one
of the regiments of his division was soon floating over the
court-house. Our soldiers were no sooner inside the lines than
the two armies began to fraternize. Our men had had full
rations from the time the siege commenced, to the close. The
enemy had been suffering, particularly towards the last. I
myself saw our men taking bread from their haversacks and giving
it to the enemy they had so recently been engaged in starving
out. It was accepted with avidity and with thanks.

Pemberton says in his report:

“If it should be asked why the 4th of July was selected as the
day for surrender, the answer is obvious. I believed that upon
that day I should obtain better terms. Well aware of the vanity
of our foe, I knew they would attach vast importance to the
entrance on the 4th of July into the stronghold of the great
river, and that, to gratify their national vanity, they would
yield then what could not be extorted from them at any other
time.”

This does not support my view of his reasons for selecting the
day he did for surrendering. But it must be recollected that
his first letter asking terms was received about 10 o’clock
A.M., July 3d. It then could hardly be expected that it would
take twenty-four hours to effect a surrender. He knew that
Johnston was in our rear for the purpose of raising the siege,
and he naturally would want to hold out as long as he could. He
knew his men would not resist an assault, and one was expected on
the fourth. In our interview he told me he had rations enough to
hold out for some time–my recollection is two weeks. It was
this statement that induced me to insert in the terms that he
was to draw rations for his men from his own supplies.

On the 4th of July General Holmes, with an army of eight or nine
thousand men belonging to the trans-Mississippi department, made
an attack upon Helena, Arkansas. He was totally defeated by
General Prentiss, who was holding Helena with less than
forty-two hundred soldiers. Holmes reported his loss at 1,636,
of which 173 were killed; but as Prentiss buried 400, Holmes
evidently understated his losses. The Union loss was 57 killed,
127 wounded, and between 30 and 40 missing. This was the last
effort on the part of the Confederacy to raise the siege of
Vicksburg.

On the third, as soon as negotiations were commenced, I notified
Sherman and directed him to be ready to take the offensive
against Johnston, drive him out of the State and destroy his
army if he could. Steele and Ord were directed at the same time
to be in readiness to join Sherman as soon as the surrender took
place. Of this Sherman was notified.

I rode into Vicksburg with the troops, and went to the river to
exchange congratulations with the navy upon our joint victory.
At that time I found that many of the citizens had been living
under ground. The ridges upon which Vicksburg is built, and
those back to the Big Black, are composed of a deep yellow clay
of great tenacity. Where roads and streets are cut through,
perpendicular banks are left and stand as well as if composed of
stone. The magazines of the enemy were made by running
passage-ways into this clay at places where there were deep
cuts. Many citizens secured places of safety for their families
by carving out rooms in these embankments. A door-way in these
cases would be cut in a high bank, starting from the level of
the road or street, and after running in a few feet a room of
the size required was carved out of the clay, the dirt being
removed by the door-way. In some instances I saw where two
rooms were cut out, for a single family, with a door-way in the
clay wall separating them. Some of these were carpeted and
furnished with considerable elaboration. In these the occupants
were fully secure from the shells of the navy, which were dropped
into the city night and dav without intermission.

I returned to my old headquarters outside in the afternoon, and
did not move into the town until the sixth. On the afternoon of
the fourth I sent Captain Wm. M. Dunn of my staff to Cairo, the
nearest point where the telegraph could be reached, with a
dispatch to the general-in-chief. It was as follows:

“The enemy surrendered this morning. The only terms allowed is
their parole as prisoners of war. This I regard as a great
advantage to us at this moment. It saves, probably, several
days in the capture, and leaves troops and transports ready for
immediate service. Sherman, with a large force, moves
immediately on Johnston, to drive him from the State. I will
send troops to the relief of Banks, and return the 9th army
corps to Burnside.”

This news, with the victory at Gettysburg won the same day,
lifted a great load of anxiety from the minds of the President,
his Cabinet and the loyal people all over the North. The fate
of the Confederacy was sealed when Vicksburg fell. Much hard
fighting was to be done afterwards and many precious lives were
to be sacrificed; but the MORALE was with the supporters of the
Union ever after.

I at the same time wrote to General Banks informing him of the
fall and sending him a copy of the terms; also saying I would
send him all the troops he wanted to insure the capture of the
only foothold the enemy now had on the Mississippi River.
General Banks had a number of copies of this letter printed, or
at least a synopsis of it, and very soon a copy fell into the
hands of General Gardner, who was then in command of Port
Hudson. Gardner at once sent a letter to the commander of the
National forces saying that he had been informed of the
surrender of Vicksburg and telling how the information reached
him. He added that if this was true, it was useless for him to
hold out longer. General Banks gave him assurances that
Vicksburg had been surrendered, and General Gardner surrendered
unconditionally on the 9th of July. Port Hudson with nearly
6,000 prisoners, 51 guns, 5,000 small-arms and other stores fell
into the hands of the Union forces: from that day to the close
of the rebellion the Mississippi River, from its source to its
mouth, remained in the control of the National troops.

Pemberton and his army were kept in Vicksburg until the whole
could be paroled. The paroles were in duplicate, by
organization (one copy for each, Federals and Confederates), and
signed by the commanding officers of the companies or
regiments. Duplicates were also made for each soldier and
signed by each individually, one to be retained by the soldier
signing and one to be retained by us. Several hundred refused
to sign their paroles, preferring to be sent to the North as
prisoners to being sent back to fight again. Others again kept
out of the way, hoping to escape either alternative.

Pemberton appealed to me in person to compel these men to sign
their paroles, but I declined. It also leaked out that many of
the men who had signed their paroles, intended to desert and go
to their homes as soon as they got out of our lines. Pemberton
hearing this, again appealed to me to assist him. He wanted
arms for a battalion, to act as guards in keeping his men
together while being marched to a camp of instruction, where he
expected to keep them until exchanged. This request was also
declined. It was precisely what I expected and hoped that they
would do. I told him, however, that I would see that they
marched beyond our lines in good order. By the eleventh, just
one week after the surrender, the paroles were completed and the
Confederate garrison marched out. Many deserted, and fewer of
them were ever returned to the ranks to fight again than would
have been the case had the surrender been unconditional and the
prisoners sent to the James River to be paroled.

As soon as our troops took possession of the city guards were
established along the whole line of parapet, from the river
above to the river below. The prisoners were allowed to occupy
their old camps behind the intrenchments. No restraint was put
upon them, except by their own commanders. They were rationed
about as our own men, and from our supplies. The men of the two
armies fraternized as if they had been fighting for the same
cause. When they passed out of the works they had so long and
so gallantly defended, between lines of their late antagonists,
not a cheer went up, not a remark was made that would give
pain. Really, I believe there was a feeling of sadness just
then in the breasts of most of the Union soldiers at seeing the
dejection of their late antagonists.

The day before the departure the following order was issued:

“Paroled prisoners will be sent out of here to-morrow. They
will be authorized to cross at the railroad bridge, and move
from there to Edward’s Ferry, (*14) and on by way of Raymond.
Instruct the commands to be orderly and quiet as these prisoners
pass, to make no offensive remarks, and not to harbor any who
fall out of ranks after they have passed.”

CHAPTER XXXIX.

RETROSPECT OF THE CAMPAIGN–SHERMAN’S MOVEMENTS–PROPOSED
MOVEMENT UPON MOBILE–A PAINFUL ACCIDENT–ORDERED TO REPORT AT
CAIRO.

The capture of Vicksburg, with its garrison, ordnance and
ordnance stores, and the successful battles fought in reaching
them, gave new spirit to the loyal people of the North. New
hopes for the final success of the cause of the Union were
inspired. The victory gained at Gettysburg, upon the same day,
added to their hopes. Now the Mississippi River was entirely in
the possession of the National troops; for the fall of Vicksburg
gave us Port Hudson at once. The army of northern Virginia was
driven out of Pennsylvania and forced back to about the same
ground it occupied in 1861. The Army of the Tennessee united
with the Army of the Gulf, dividing the Confederate States
completely.

The first dispatch I received from the government after the fall
of Vicksburg was in these words:

“I fear your paroling the prisoners at Vicksburg, without actual
delivery to a proper agent as required by the seventh article of
the cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and that
the men will immediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy.
Such has been the case elsewhere. If these prisoners have not
been allowed to depart, you will detain them until further
orders.”

Halleck did not know that they had already been delivered into
the hands of Major Watts, Confederate commissioner for the
exchange of prisoners.

At Vicksburg 31,600 prisoners were surrendered, together with
172 cannon about 60,000 muskets and a large amount of
ammunition. The small-arms of the enemy were far superior to
the bulk of ours. Up to this time our troops at the West had
been limited to the old United States flint-lock muskets changed
into percussion, or the Belgian musket imported early in the
war–almost as dangerous to the person firing it as to the one
aimed at–and a few new and improved arms. These were of many
different calibers, a fact that caused much trouble in
distributing ammunition during an engagement. The enemy had
generally new arms which had run the blockade and were of
uniform caliber. After the surrender I authorized all colonels
whose regiments were armed with inferior muskets, to place them
in the stack of captured arms and replace them with the
latter. A large number of arms turned in to the Ordnance
Department as captured, were thus arms that had really been used
by the Union army in the capture of Vicksburg.

In this narrative I have not made the mention I should like of
officers, dead and alive, whose services entitle them to special
mention. Neither have I made that mention of the navy which its
services deserve. Suffice it to say, the close of the siege of
Vicksburg found us with an army unsurpassed, in proportion to
its numbers, taken as a whole of officers and men. A military
education was acquired which no other school could have given.
Men who thought a company was quite enough for them to command
properly at the beginning, would have made good regimental or
brigade commanders; most of the brigade commanders were equal to
the command of a division, and one, Ransom, would have been equal
to the command of a corps at least. Logan and Crocker ended the
campaign fitted to command independent armies.

General F. P. Blair joined me at Milliken’s Bend a full-fledged
general, without having served in a lower grade. He commanded a
division in the campaign. I had known Blair in Missouri, where I
had voted against him in 1858 when he ran for Congress. I knew
him as a frank, positive and generous man, true to his friends
even to a fault, but always a leader. I dreaded his coming; I
knew from experience that it was more difficult to command two
generals desiring to be leaders than it was to command one army
officered intelligently and with subordination. It affords me
the greatest pleasure to record now my agreeable disappointment
in respect to his character. There was no man braver than he,
nor was there any who obeyed all orders of his superior in rank
with more unquestioning alacrity. He was one man as a soldier,
another as a politician.

The navy under Porter was all it could be, during the entire
campaign. Without its assistance the campaign could not have
been successfully made with twice the number of men engaged. It
could not have been made at all, in the way it was, with any
number of men without such assistance. The most perfect harmony
reigned between the two arms of the service. There never was a
request made, that I am aware of, either of the flag-officer or
any of his subordinates, that was not promptly complied with.

The campaign of Vicksburg was suggested and developed by
circumstances. The elections of 1862 had gone against the
prosecution of the war. Voluntary enlistments had nearly ceased
and the draft had been resorted to; this was resisted, and a
defeat or backward movement would have made its execution
impossible. A forward movement to a decisive victory was
necessary. Accordingly I resolved to get below Vicksburg, unite
with Banks against Port Hudson, make New Orleans a base and, with
that base and Grand Gulf as a starting point, move our combined
forces against Vicksburg. Upon reaching Grand Gulf, after
running its batteries and fighting a battle, I received a letter
from Banks informing me that he could not be at Port Hudson under
ten days, and then with only fifteen thousand men. The time was
worth more than the reinforcements; I therefore determined to
push into the interior of the enemy’s country.

With a large river behind us, held above and below by the enemy,
rapid movements were essential to success. Jackson was captured
the day after a new commander had arrived, and only a few days
before large reinforcements were expected. A rapid movement
west was made; the garrison of Vicksburg was met in two
engagements and badly defeated, and driven back into its
stronghold and there successfully besieged. It looks now as
though Providence had directed the course of the campaign while
the Army of the Tennessee executed the decree.

Upon the surrender of the garrison of Vicksburg there were three
things that required immediate attention. The first was to send
a force to drive the enemy from our rear, and out of the
State. The second was to send reinforcements to Banks near Port
Hudson, if necessary, to complete the triumph of opening the
Mississippi from its source to its mouth to the free navigation
of vessels bearing the Stars and Stripes. The third was to
inform the authorities at Washington and the North of the good
news, to relieve their long suspense and strengthen their
confidence in the ultimate success of the cause they had so much
at heart.

Soon after negotiations were opened with General Pemberton for
the surrender of the city, I notified Sherman, whose troops
extended from Haines’ Bluff on the left to the crossing of the
Vicksburg and Jackson road over the Big Black on the right, and
directed him to hold his command in readiness to advance and
drive the enemy from the State as soon as Vicksburg
surrendered. Steele and Ord were directed to be in readiness to
join Sherman in his move against General Johnston, and Sherman
was advised of this also. Sherman moved promptly, crossing the
Big Black at three different points with as many columns, all
concentrating at Bolton, twenty miles west of Jackson.

Johnston heard of the surrender of Vicksburg almost as soon as
it occurred, and immediately fell back on Jackson. On the 8th
of July Sherman was within ten miles of Jackson and on the 11th
was close up to the defences of the city and shelling the
town. The siege was kept up until the morning of the 17th, when
it was found that the enemy had evacuated during the night. The
weather was very hot, the roads dusty and the water bad.
Johnston destroyed the roads as he passed and had so much the
start that pursuit was useless; but Sherman sent one division,
Steele’s, to Brandon, fourteen miles east of Jackson.

The National loss in the second capture of Jackson was less than
one thousand men, killed, wounded and missing. The Confederate
loss was probably less, except in captured. More than this
number fell into our hands as prisoners.

Medicines and food were left for the Confederate wounded and
sick who had to be left behind. A large amount of rations was
issued to the families that remained in Jackson. Medicine and
food were also sent to Raymond for the destitute families as
well as the sick and wounded, as I thought it only fair that we
should return to these people some of the articles we had taken
while marching through the country. I wrote to Sherman:
“Impress upon the men the importance of going through the State
in an orderly manner, abstaining from taking anything not
absolutely necessary for their subsistence while travelling.
They should try to create as favorable an impression as possible
upon the people.” Provisions and forage, when called for by
them, were issued to all the people, from Bruinsburg to Jackson
and back to Vicksburg, whose resources had been taken for the
supply of our army. Very large quantities of groceries and
provisions were so issued.

Sherman was ordered back to Vicksburg, and his troops took much
the same position they had occupied before–from the Big Black
to Haines’ Bluff. Having cleaned up about Vicksburg and
captured or routed all regular Confederate forces for more than
a hundred miles in all directions, I felt that the troops that
had done so much should be allowed to do more before the enemy
could recover from the blow he had received, and while important
points might be captured without bloodshed. I suggested to the
General-in-chief the idea of a campaign against Mobile, starting
from Lake Pontchartrain. Halleck preferred another course. The
possession of the trans-Mississippi by the Union forces seemed
to possess more importance in his mind than almost any campaign
east of the Mississippi. I am well aware that the President was
very anxious to have a foothold in Texas, to stop the clamor of
some of the foreign governments which seemed to be seeking a
pretext to interfere in the war, at least so far as to recognize
belligerent rights to the Confederate States. This, however,
could have been easily done without wasting troops in western
Louisiana and eastern Texas, by sending a garrison at once to
Brownsville on the Rio Grande.

Halleck disapproved of my proposition to go against Mobile, so
that I was obliged to settle down and see myself put again on
the defensive as I had been a year before in west Tennessee. It
would have been an easy thing to capture Mobile at the time I
proposed to go there. Having that as a base of operations,
troops could have been thrown into the interior to operate
against General Bragg’s army. This would necessarily have
compelled Bragg to detach in order to meet this fire in his
rear. If he had not done this the troops from Mobile could have
inflicted inestimable damage upon much of the country from which
his army and Lee’s were yet receiving their supplies. I was so
much impressed with this idea that I renewed my request later in
July and again about the 1st of August, and proposed sending all
the troops necessary, asking only the assistance of the navy to
protect the debarkation of troops at or near Mobile. I also
asked for a leave of absence to visit New Orleans, particularly
if my suggestion to move against Mobile should be approved. Both
requests were refused. So far as my experience with General
Halleck went it was very much easier for him to refuse a favor
than to grant one. But I did not regard this as a favor. It was
simply in line of duty, though out of my department.

The General-in-chief having decided against me, the depletion of
an army, which had won a succession of great victories,
commenced, as had been the case the year before after the fall
of Corinth when the army was sent where it would do the least
good. By orders, I sent to Banks a force of 4,000 men; returned
the 9th corps to Kentucky and, when transportation had been
collected, started a division of 5,000 men to Schofield in
Missouri where Price was raiding the State. I also detached a
brigade under Ransom to Natchez, to garrison that place
permanently. This latter move was quite fortunate as to the
time when Ransom arrived there. The enemy happened to have a
large number, about 5,000 head, of beef cattle there on the way
from Texas to feed the Eastern armies, and also a large amount
of munitions of war which had probably come through Texas from
the Rio Grande and which were on the way to Lee’s and other
armies in the East.

The troops that were left with me around Vicksburg were very
busily and unpleasantly employed in making expeditions against
guerilla bands and small detachments of cavalry which infested
the interior, and in destroying mills, bridges and rolling stock
on the railroads. The guerillas and cavalry were not there to
fight but to annoy, and therefore disappeared on the first
approach of our troops.

The country back of Vicksburg was filled with deserters from
Pemberton’s army and, it was reported, many from Johnston’s
also. The men determined not to fight again while the war
lasted. Those who lived beyond the reach of the Confederate
army wanted to get to their homes. Those who did not, wanted to
get North where they could work for their support till the war
was over. Besides all this there was quite a peace feeling, for
the time being, among the citizens of that part of Mississippi,
but this feeling soon subsided. It is not probable that
Pemberton got off with over 4,000 of his army to the camp where
he proposed taking them, and these were in a demoralized
condition.

On the 7th of August I further depleted my army by sending the
13th corps, General Ord commanding, to Banks. Besides this I
received orders to co-operate with the latter general in
movements west of the Mississippi. Having received this order I
went to New Orleans to confer with Banks about the proposed
movement. All these movements came to naught.

During this visit I reviewed Banks’ army a short distance above
Carrollton. The horse I rode was vicious and but little used,
and on my return to New Orleans ran away and, shying at a
locomotive in the street, fell, probably on me. I was rendered
insensible, and when I regained consciousness I found myself in
a hotel near by with several doctors attending me. My leg was
swollen from the knee to the thigh, and the swelling, almost to
the point of bursting, extended along the body up to the
arm-pit. The pain was almost beyond endurance. I lay at the
hotel something over a week without being able to turn myself in
bed. I had a steamer stop at the nearest point possible, and was
carried to it on a litter. I was then taken to Vicksburg, where
I remained unable to move for some time afterwards.

While I was absent General Sherman declined to assume command
because, he said, it would confuse the records; but he let all
the orders be made in my name, and was glad to render any
assistance he could. No orders were issued by my staff,
certainly no important orders, except upon consultation with and
approval of Sherman.

On the 13th of September, while I was still in New Orleans,
Halleck telegraphed to me to send all available forces to
Memphis and thence to Tuscumbia, to co-operate with Rosecrans
for the relief of Chattanooga. On the 15th he telegraphed again
for all available forces to go to Rosecrans. This was received
on the 27th. I was still confined to my bed, unable to rise
from it without assistance; but I at once ordered Sherman to
send one division to Memphis as fast as transports could be
provided. The division of McPherson’s corps, which had got off
and was on the way to join Steele in Arkansas, was recalled and
sent, likewise, to report to Hurlbut at Memphis. Hurlbut was
directed to forward these two divisions with two others from his
own corps at once, and also to send any other troops that might
be returning there. Halleck suggested that some good man, like
Sherman or McPherson, should be sent to Memphis to take charge
of the troops going east. On this I sent Sherman, as being, I
thought, the most suitable person for an independent command,
and besides he was entitled to it if it had to be given to any
one. He was directed to take with him another division of his
corps. This left one back, but having one of McPherson’s
divisions he had still the equivalent.

Before the receipt by me of these orders the battle of
Chickamauga had been fought and Rosecrans forced back into
Chattanooga. The administration as well as the General-in-chief
was nearly frantic at the situation of affairs there. Mr.
Charles A. Dana, an officer of the War Department, was sent to
Rosecrans’ headquarters. I do not know what his instructions
were, but he was still in Chattanooga when I arrived there at a
later period.

It seems that Halleck suggested that I should go to Nashville as
soon as able to move and take general direction of the troops
moving from the west. I received the following dispatch dated
October 3d: “It is the wish of the Secretary of War that as
soon as General Grant is able he will come to Cairo and report
by telegraph.” I was still very lame, but started without
delay. Arriving at Columbus on the 16th I reported by
telegraph: “Your dispatch from Cairo of the 3d directing me to
report from Cairo was received at 11.30 on the 10th. Left the
same day with staff and headquarters and am here en route for
Cairo.”

END OF VOL. I

End of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant Volume One

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Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant
This etext was prepared by Glen Bledsoe.

PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT
IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOLUME II.

PREFACE. [To both volumes]

“Man proposes and God disposes.” There are but few important
events in the affairs of men brought about by their own choice.

Although frequently urged by friends to write my memoirs I had
determined never to do so, nor to write anything for
publication. At the age of nearly sixty-two I received an
injury from a fall, which confined me closely to the house while
it did not apparently affect my general health. This made study
a pleasant pastime. Shortly after, the rascality of a business
partner developed itself by the announcement of a failure. This
was followed soon after by universal depression of all
securities, which seemed to threaten the extinction of a good
part of the income still retained, and for which I am indebted
to the kindly act of friends. At this juncture the editor of
the Century Magazine asked me to write a few articles for him. I
consented for the money it gave me; for at that moment I was
living upon borrowed money. The work I found congenial, and I
determined to continue it. The event is an important one for
me, for good or evil; I hope for the former.

In preparing these volumes for the public, I have entered upon
the task with the sincere desire to avoid doing injustice to any
one, whether on the National or Confederate side, other than the
unavoidable injustice of not making mention often where special
mention is due. There must be many errors of omission in this
work, because the subject is too large to be treated of in two
volumes in such way as to do justice to all the officers and men
engaged. There were thousands of instances, during the
rebellion, of individual, company, regimental and brigade deeds
of heroism which deserve special mention and are not here
alluded to. The troops engaged in them will have to look to the
detailed reports of their individual commanders for the full
history of those deeds.

The first volume, as well as a portion of the second, was
written before I had reason to suppose I was in a critical
condition of health. Later I was reduced almost to the point of
death, and it became impossible for me to attend to anything for
weeks. I have, however, somewhat regained my strength, and am
able, often, to devote as many hours a day as a person should
devote to such work. I would have more hope of satisfying the
expectation of the public if I could have allowed myself more
time. I have used my best efforts, with the aid of my eldest
son, F. D. Grant, assisted by his brothers, to verify from the
records every statement of fact given. The comments are my own,
and show how I saw the matters treated of whether others saw them
in the same light or not.

With these remarks I present these volumes to the public, asking
no favor but hoping they will meet the approval of the reader.

U. S. GRANT.

MOUNT MACGREGOR, NEW YORK, July 1, 1885.

PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT

VOLUME II.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XL.
FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON–GENERAL
ROSECRANS–COMMANDING MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI–ANDREW
JOHNSON’S ADDRESS–ARRIVAL AT CHATTANOOGA.

CHAPTER XLI.
ASSUMING THE COMMAND AT CHATTANOOGA–OPENING A LINE OF
SUPPLIES–BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE–ON THE PICKET LINE.

CHAPTER XLII.
CONDITION OF THE ARMY–REBUILDING THE RAILROAD–GENERAL
BURNSIDE’S SITUATION–ORDERS FOR BATTLE–PLANS FOR THE
ATTACK–HOOKER’S POSITION–SHERMAN’S MOVEMENTS.

CHAPTER XLIII.
PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE–THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OF THE
ENEMY–SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE–BATTLE OF LOOKOUT
MOUNTAIN–GENERAL HOOKER’S FIGHT.

CHAPTER XLIV.
BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA–A GALLANT CHARGE–COMPLETE ROUT OF THE
ENEMY–PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES–GENERAL BRAGG–REMARKS ON
CHATTANOOGA.

CHAPTER XLV.
THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE–HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO
NASHVILLE–VISITING KNOXVILLE–CIPHER DISPATCHES–WITHHOLDING
ORDERS.

CHAPTER XLVI.
OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI–LONGSTREET IN EAST
TENNESSEE–COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT-GENERAL–COMMANDING THE
ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES–FIRST INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT
LINCOLN.

CHAPTER XLVII.
THE MILITARY SITUATION–PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN–SHERIDAN
ASSIGNED TO COMMAND OF THE CAVALRY–FLANK MOVEMENTS–FORREST AT
FORT PILLOW–GENERAL BANKS’S EXPEDITION–COLONEL MOSBY–AN
INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN.

CHAPTER XLVIII.
COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN–GENERAL BUTLER’S
POSITION–SHERIDAN’S FIRST RAID.

CHAPTER XLIX.
SHERMAN S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA–SIEGE OF ATLANTA–DEATH OF
GENERAL MCPHERSON–ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE ANDERSONVILLE–CAPTURE OF
ATLANTA.

CHAPTER L.
GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC–CROSSING THE
RAPIDAN–ENTERING THE WILDERNESS–BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.

CHAPTER LI.
AFTER THE BATTLE–TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE–MOVEMENT BY THE
LEFT FLANK.

CHAPTER LII.
BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA–HANCOCK’S POSITION–ASSAULT OF WARREN’S
AND WRIGHT’S CORPS–UPTON PROMOTED ON THE FIELD–GOOD NEWS FROM
BUTLER AND SHERIDAN.

CHAPTER LIII.
HANCOCK’S ASSAULT–LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATES–PROMOTIONS
RECOMMENDED–DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY–EWELL’S ATTACK–REDUCING
THE ARTILLERY.

CHAPTER LIV.
MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK–BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA–AN INCIDENT OF
THE MARCH–MOVING ON RICHMOND–SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY–POSITION OF
THE NATIONAL ARMY.

CHAPTER LV.
ADVANCE ON COLD HARBOR–AN ANECDOTE OF THE WAR–BATTLE OF COLD
HARBOR–CORRESPONDENCE WITH LEE RETROSPECTIVE.

CHAPTER LVI.
LEFT FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES–GENERAL
LEE–VISIT TO BUTLER–THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG–THE INVESTMENT
OF PETERSBURG.

CHAPTER LVII.
RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD–RAID ON THE WELDON
RAILROAD–EARLY’S MOVEMENT UPON WASHINGTON–MINING THE WORKS
BEFORE PETERSBURG–EXPLOSION OF THE MINE BEFORE PETERSBURG
–CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY–CAPTURE OF THE WELDON
RAILROAD.

CHAPTER LVIII.
SHERIDAN’S ADVANCE–VISIT TO SHERIDAN–SHERIDAN’S VICTORY IN THE
SHENANDOAH–SHERIDAN’S RIDE TO WINCHESTER–CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN
FOR THE WINTER.

CHAPTER LIX.
THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA–SHERMAN’S MARCH TO THE SEA–WAR
ANECDOTES–THE MARCH ON SAVANNAH–INVESTMENT OF
SAVANNAH–CAPTURE OF SAVANNAH.

CHAPTER LX.
THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN–THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE

CHAPTER LXI.
EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER–ATTACK ON THE FORT–FAILURE OF
THE EXPEDITION–SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FORT–CAPTURE OF
FORT FISHER.

CHAPTER LXII.
SHERMAN’S MARCH NORTH–SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG–CANBY
ORDERED TO MOVE AGAINST MOBILE–MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND
THOMAS–CAPTURE OF COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA–SHERMAN IN THE
CAROLINAS.

CHAPTER LXIII.
ARRIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS–LINCOLN AND THE PEACE
COMMISSIONERS–AN ANECDOTE OF LINCOLN–THE WINTER BEFORE
PETERSBURG–SHERIDAN DESTROYS THE RAILROAD–GORDON CARRIES THE
PICKET LINE–PARKE RECAPTURES THE LINE–THE BATTLE OF WHITE OAK
ROAD.

CHAPTER LXIV.
INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN–GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE
POTOMAC–SHERIDAN’S ADVANCE ON FIVE FORKS–BATTLE OF FIVE
FORKS–PARKE AND WRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY’S LINE–BATTLES BEFORE
PETERSBURG.

CHAPTER LXV.
THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG–MEETING PRESIDENT LINCOLN IN
PETERSBURG–THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND–PURSUING THE ENEMY–VISIT
TO SHERIDAN AND MEADE.

CHAPTER LXVI.
BATTLE OF SAILOR’S CREEK–ENGAGEMENT AT
FARMVILLE–CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL LEE–SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS
THE ENEMY.

CHAPTER LXVII.
NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX–INTERVIEW WITH LEE AT MCLEAN’S
HOUSE–THE TERMS OF SURRENDER–LEE’S SURRENDER–INTERVIEW WITH
LEE AFTER THE SURRENDER.

CHAPTER LXVIII.
MORALE OF THE TWO ARMIES–RELATIVE CONDITIONS OF THE NORTH AND
SOUTH–PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND–ARRIVAL AT
WASHINGTON–PRESIDENT LINCOLN’S ASSASSINATION–PRESIDENT
JOHNSON’S POLICY.

CHAPTER LXIX.
SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON–JOHNSTON’S SURRENDER TO SHERMAN–CAPTURE
OF MOBILE–WILSON’S EXPEDITION– CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON
DAVIS–GENERAL THOMAS’S QUALITIES–ESTIMATE OF GENERAL CANBY.

CHAPTER LXX.
THE END OF THE WAR–THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON–ONE OF LINCOLN’S
ANECDOTES–GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON–CHARACTERISTICS OF
LINCOLN AND STANTON–ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS.

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX

Begin Volume Two

CHAPTER XL.

FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON–GENERAL
ROSECRANS–COMMANDING MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI– ANDREW
JOHNSON’S ADDRESS–ARRIVAL AT CHATTANOOGA.

The reply (to my telegram of October 16, 1863, from Cairo,
announcing my arrival at that point) came on the morning of the
17th, directing me to proceed immediately to the Galt House,
Louisville, where I would meet an officer of the War Department
with my instructions. I left Cairo within an hour or two after
the receipt of this dispatch, going by rail via Indianapolis.
Just as the train I was on was starting out of the depot at
Indianapolis a messenger came running up to stop it, saying the
Secretary of War was coming into the station and wanted to see
me.

I had never met Mr. Stanton up to that time, though we had held
frequent conversations over the wires the year before, when I
was in Tennessee. Occasionally at night he would order the
wires between the War Department and my headquarters to be
connected, and we would hold a conversation for an hour or
two. On this occasion the Secretary was accompanied by Governor
Brough of Ohio, whom I had never met, though he and my father had
been old acquaintances. Mr. Stanton dismissed the special train
that had brought him to Indianapolis, and accompanied me to
Louisville.

Up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted
after I left Vicksburg, except the suggestion in one of
Halleck’s dispatches that I had better go to Nashville and
superintend the operation of troops sent to relieve Rosecrans.
Soon after we started the Secretary handed me two orders, saying
that I might take my choice of them. The two were identical in
all but one particular. Both created the “Military Division of
Mississippi,” (giving me the command) composed of the
Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and
all the territory from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi River
north of Banks’s command in the south-west. One order left the
department commanders as they were, while the other relieved
Rosecrans and assigned Thomas to his place. I accepted the
latter. We reached Louisville after night and, if I remember
rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain. The Secretary of War told
me afterwards that he caught a cold on that occasion from which
he never expected to recover. He never did.

A day was spent in Louisville, the Secretary giving me the
military news at the capital and talking about the
disappointment at the results of some of the campaigns. By the
evening of the day after our arrival all matters of discussion
seemed exhausted, and I left the hotel to spend the evening
away, both Mrs. Grant (who was with me) and myself having
relatives living in Louisville. In the course of the evening
Mr. Stanton received a dispatch from Mr. C. A. Dana, then in
Chattanooga, informing him that unless prevented Rosecrans would
retreat, and advising peremptory orders against his doing so.

As stated before, after the fall of Vicksburg I urged strongly
upon the government the propriety of a movement against
Mobile. General Rosecrans had been at Murfreesboro’, Tennessee,
with a large and well-equipped army from early in the year 1863,
with Bragg confronting him with a force quite equal to his own
at first, considering it was on the defensive. But after the
investment of Vicksburg Bragg’s army was largely depleted to
strengthen Johnston, in Mississippi, who was being reinforced to
raise the siege. I frequently wrote General Halleck suggesting
that Rosecrans should move against Bragg. By so doing he would
either detain the latter’s troops where they were or lay
Chattanooga open to capture. General Halleck strongly approved
the suggestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly
ordered Rosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly
failed to comply with the order, and at last, after having held a
council of war, had replied in effect that it was a military
maxim “not to fight two decisive battles at the same time.” If
true, the maxim was not applicable in this case. It would be
bad to be defeated in two decisive battles fought the same day,
but it would not be bad to win them. I, however, was fighting
no battle, and the siege of Vicksburg had drawn from Rosecrans’
front so many of the enemy that his chances of victory were much
greater than they would be if he waited until the siege was over,
when these troops could be returned. Rosecrans was ordered to
move against the army that was detaching troops to raise the
siege. Finally he did move, on the 24th of June, but ten days
afterwards Vicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from Bragg
were free to return.

It was at this time that I recommended to the general-in-chief
the movement against Mobile. I knew the peril the Army of the
Cumberland was in, being depleted continually, not only by
ordinary casualties, but also by having to detach troops to hold
its constantly extending line over which to draw supplies, while
the enemy in front was as constantly being strengthened. Mobile
was important to the enemy, and in the absence of a threatening
force was guarded by little else than artillery. If threatened
by land and from the water at the same time the prize would fall
easily, or troops would have to be sent to its defence. Those
troops would necessarily come from Bragg. My judgment was
overruled, and the troops under my command were dissipated over
other parts of the country where it was thought they could
render the most service.

Soon it was discovered in Washington that Rosecrans was in
trouble and required assistance. The emergency was now too
immediate to allow us to give this assistance by making an
attack in rear of Bragg upon Mobile. It was therefore necessary
to reinforce directly, and troops were sent from every available
point.

Rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred Bragg south of the
Tennessee River, and through and beyond Chattanooga. If he had
stopped and intrenched, and made himself strong there, all would
have been right and the mistake of not moving earlier partially
compensated. But he pushed on, with his forces very much
scattered, until Bragg’s troops from Mississippi began to join
him. Then Bragg took the initiative. Rosecrans had to fall
back in turn, and was able to get his army together at
Chickamauga, some miles south-east of Chattanooga, before the
main battle was brought on. The battle was fought on the 19th
and 20th of September, and Rosecrans was badly defeated, with a
heavy loss in artillery and some sixteen thousand men killed,
wounded and captured. The corps under Major-General George H.
Thomas stood its ground, while Rosecrans, with Crittenden and
McCook, returned to Chattanooga. Thomas returned also, but
later, and with his troops in good order. Bragg followed and
took possession of Missionary Ridge, overlooking Chattanooga. He
also occupied Lookout Mountain, west of the town, which Rosecrans
had abandoned, and with it his control of the river and the river
road as far back as Bridgeport. The National troops were now
strongly intrenched in Chattanooga Valley, with the Tennessee
River behind them and the enemy occupying commanding heights to
the east and west, with a strong line across the valley from
mountain to mountain, and with Chattanooga Creek, for a large
part of the way, in front of their line.

On the 29th Halleck telegraphed me the above results, and
directed all the forces that could be spared from my department
to be sent to Rosecrans. Long before this dispatch was received
Sherman was on his way, and McPherson was moving east with most
of the garrison of Vicksburg.

A retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster. It
would not only have been the loss of a most important strategic
position to us, but it would have been attended with the loss of
all the artillery still left with the Army of the Cumberland and
the annihilation of that army itself, either by capture or
demoralization.

All supplies for Rosecrans had to be brought from Nashville. The
railroad between this base and the army was in possession of the
government up to Bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses
to the south side of the Tennessee River; but Bragg, holding
Lookout and Raccoon mountains west of Chattanooga, commanded the
railroad, the river and the shortest and best wagon-roads, both
south and north of the Tennessee, between Chattanooga and
Bridgeport. The distance between these two places is but
twenty-six miles by rail, but owing to the position of Bragg,
all supplies for Rosecrans had to be hauled by a circuitous
route north of the river and over a mountainous country,
increasing the distance to over sixty miles.

This country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly
ten thousand of which had already starved, and not enough were
left to draw a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances
to convey the sick. The men had been on half rations of hard
bread for a considerable time, with but few other supplies
except beef driven from Nashville across the country. The
region along the road became so exhausted of food for the cattle
that by the time they reached Chattanooga they were much in the
condition of the few animals left alive there–“on the lift.”
Indeed, the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit
of saying, with a faint facetiousness, that they were living on
“half rations of hard bread and BEEF DRIED ON THE HOOF.”

Nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were
without sufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the
advancing season. What they had was well worn. The fuel within
the Federal lines was exhausted, even to the stumps of trees.
There were no teams to draw it from the opposite bank, where it
was abundant. The only way of supplying fuel, for some time
before my arrival, had been to cut trees on the north bank of
the river at a considerable distance up the stream, form rafts
of it and float it down with the current, effecting a landing on
the south side within our lines by the use of paddles or poles.
It would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their
camps.

If a retreat had occurred at this time it is not probable that
any of the army would have reached the railroad as an organized
body, if followed by the enemy.

On the receipt of Mr. Dana’s dispatch Mr. Stanton sent for me.
Finding that I was out he became nervous and excited, inquiring
of every person he met, including guests of the house, whether
they knew where I was, and bidding them find me and send me to
him at once. About eleven o’clock I returned to the hotel, and
on my way, when near the house, every person met was a messenger
from the Secretary, apparently partaking of his impatience to see
me. I hastened to the room of the Secretary and found him pacing
the floor rapidly in his dressing-gown. Saying that the retreat
must be prevented, he showed me the dispatch. I immediately
wrote an order assuming command of the Military Division of the
Mississippi, and telegraphed it to General Rosecrans. I then
telegraphed to him the order from Washington assigning Thomas to
the command of the Army of the Cumberland; and to Thomas that he
must hold Chattanooga at all hazards, informing him at the same
time that I would be at the front as soon as possible. A prompt
reply was received from Thomas, saying, “We will hold the town
till we starve.” I appreciated the force of this dispatch later
when I witnessed the condition of affairs which prompted it. It
looked, indeed, as if but two courses were open: one to starve,
the other to surrender or be captured.

On the morning of the 20th of October I started, with my staff,
and proceeded as far as Nashville. At that time it was not
prudent to travel beyond that point by night, so I remained in
Nashville until the next morning. Here I met for the first time
Andrew Johnson, Military Governor of Tennessee. He delivered a
speech of welcome. His composure showed that it was by no means
his maiden effort. It was long, and I was in torture while he
was delivering it, fearing something would be expected from me
in response. I was relieved, however, the people assembled
having apparently heard enough. At all events they commenced a
general hand-shaking, which, although trying where there is so
much of it, was a great relief to me in this emergency.

From Nashville I telegraphed to Burnside, who was then at
Knoxville, that important points in his department ought to be
fortified, so that they could be held with the least number of
men; to Admiral Porter at Cairo, that Sherman’s advance had
passed Eastport, Mississippi, that rations were probably on
their way from St. Louis by boat for supplying his army, and
requesting him to send a gunboat to convoy them; and to Thomas,
suggesting that large parties should be put at work on the
wagon-road then in use back to Bridgeport.

On the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front,
reaching Stevenson Alabama, after dark. Rosecrans was there on
his way north. He came into my car and we held a brief
interview, in which he described very clearly the situation at
Chattanooga, and made some excellent suggestions as to what
should be done. My only wonder was that he had not carried them
out. We then proceeded to Bridgeport, where we stopped for the
night. From here we took horses and made our way by Jasper and
over Waldron’s Ridge to Chattanooga. There had been much rain,
and the roads were almost impassable from mud, knee-deep in
places, and from wash-outs on the mountain sides. I had been on
crutches since the time of my fall in New Orleans, and had to be
carried over places where it was not safe to cross on
horseback. The roads were strewn with the debris of broken
wagons and the carcasses of thousands of starved mules and
horses. At Jasper, some ten or twelve miles from Bridgeport,
there was a halt. General O. O. Howard had his headquarters
there. From this point I telegraphed Burnside to make every
effort to secure five hundred rounds of ammunition for his
artillery and small-arms. We stopped for the night at a little
hamlet some ten or twelve miles farther on. The next day we
reached Chattanooga a little before dark. I went directly to
General Thomas’s headquarters, and remaining there a few days,
until I could establish my own.

During the evening most of the general officers called in to pay
their respects and to talk about the condition of affairs. They
pointed out on the map the line, marked with a red or blue
pencil, which Rosecrans had contemplated falling back upon. If
any of them had approved the move they did not say so to me. I
found General W. F. Smith occupying the position of chief
engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. I had known Smith as a
cadet at West Point, but had no recollection of having met him
after my graduation, in 1843, up to this time. He explained the
situation of the two armies and the topography of the country so
plainly that I could see it without an inspection. I found that
he had established a saw-mill on the banks of the river, by
utilizing an old engine found in the neighborhood; and, by
rafting logs from the north side of the river above, had got out
the lumber and completed pontoons and roadway plank for a second
bridge, one flying bridge being there already. He was also
rapidly getting out the materials and constructing the boats for
a third bridge. In addition to this he had far under way a
steamer for plying between Chattanooga and Bridgeport whenever
we might get possession of the river. This boat consisted of a
scow, made of the plank sawed out at the mill, housed in, and a
stern wheel attached which was propelled by a second engine
taken from some shop or factory.

I telegraphed to Washington this night, notifying General
Halleck of my arrival, and asking to have General Sherman
assigned to the command of the Army of the Tennessee,
headquarters in the field. The request was at once complied
with.

CHAPTER XLI.

ASSUMING THE COMMAND AT CHATTANOOGA–OPENING A LINE OF
SUPPLIES–BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE–ON THE PICKET LINE.

The next day, the 24th, I started out to make a personal
inspection, taking Thomas and Smith with me, besides most of the
members of my personal staff. We crossed to the north side of
the river, and, moving to the north of detached spurs of hills,
reached the Tennessee at Brown’s Ferry, some three miles below
Lookout Mountain, unobserved by the enemy. Here we left our
horses back from the river and approached the water on foot.
There was a picket station of the enemy on the opposite side, of
about twenty men, in full view, and we were within easy range.
They did not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by our
presence. They must have seen that we were all commissioned
officers. But, I suppose, they looked upon the garrison of
Chattanooga as prisoners of war, feeding or starving themselves,
and thought it would be inhuman to kill any of them except in
self-defence.

That night I issued orders for opening the route to
Bridgeport–a cracker line, as the soldiers appropriately termed
it. They had been so long on short rations that my first thought
was the establishment of a line over which food might reach them.

Chattanooga is on the south bank of the Tennessee, where that
river runs nearly due west. It is at the northern end of a
valley five or six miles in width, through which Chattanooga
Creek runs. To the east of the valley is Missionary Ridge,
rising from five to eight hundred feet above the creek and
terminating somewhat abruptly a half mile or more before
reaching the Tennessee. On the west of the valley is Lookout
Mountain, twenty-two hundred feet above-tide water. Just below
the town the Tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to the
base of Lookout Mountain, leaving no level ground between the
mountain and river. The Memphis and Charleston Railroad passes
this point, where the mountain stands nearly perpendicular. East
of Missionary Ridge flows the South Chickamauga River; west of
Lookout Mountain is Lookout Creek; and west of that, Raccoon
Mountains. Lookout Mountain, at its northern end, rises almost
perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in a gentle
slope of cultivated fields to near the summit, where it ends in
a palisade thirty or more feet in height. On the gently sloping
ground, between the upper and lower palisades, there is a single
farmhouse, which is reached by a wagon-road from the valley east.

The intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of
Missionary Ridge and extended along the crest for some distance
south, thence across Chattanooga valley to Lookout Mountain.
Lookout Mountain was also fortified and held by the enemy, who
also kept troops in Lookout valley west, and on Raccoon
Mountain, with pickets extending down the river so as to command
the road on the north bank and render it useless to us. In
addition to this there was an intrenched line in Chattanooga
valley extending from the river east of the town to Lookout
Mountain, to make the investment complete. Besides the
fortifications on Mission Ridge, there was a line at the base of
the hill, with occasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the
front. The enemy’s pickets extended out into the valley towards
the town, so far that the pickets of the two armies could
converse. At one point they were separated only by the narrow
creek which gives its name to the valley and town, and from
which both sides drew water. The Union lines were shorter than
those of the enemy.

Thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly
fortified to the east, south, and west, and commanded the river
below. Practically, the Army of the Cumberland was besieged.
The enemy had stopped with his cavalry north of the river the
passing of a train loaded with ammunition and medical
supplies. The Union army was short of both, not having
ammunition enough for a day’s fighting.

General Halleck had, long before my coming into this new field,
ordered parts of the 11th and 12th corps, commanded respectively
by Generals Howard and Slocum, Hooker in command of the whole,
from the Army of the Potomac to reinforce Rosecrans. It would
have been folly to send them to Chattanooga to help eat up the
few rations left there. They were consequently left on the
railroad, where supplies could be brought to them. Before my
arrival, Thomas ordered their concentration at Bridgeport.

General W. F. Smith had been so instrumental in preparing for
the move which I was now about to make, and so clear in his
judgment about the manner of making it, that I deemed it but
just to him that he should have command of the troops detailed
to execute the design, although he was then acting as a staff
officer and was not in command of troops.

On the 24th of October, after my return to Chattanooga, the
following details were made: General Hooker, who was now at
Bridgeport, was ordered to cross to the south side of the
Tennessee and march up by Whitesides and Wauhatchie to Brown’s
Ferry. General Palmer, with a division of the 14th corps, Army
of the Cumberland, was ordered to move down the river on the
north side, by a back road, until opposite Whitesides, then
cross and hold the road in Hooker’s rear after he had passed.
Four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act under
General Smith directly from Chattanooga. Eighteen hundred of
them, under General Hazen, were to take sixty pontoon boats, and
under cover of night float by the pickets of the enemy at the
north base of Lookout, down to Brown’s Ferry, then land on the
south side and capture or drive away the pickets at that
point. Smith was to march with the remainder of the detail,
also under cover of night, by the north bank of the river to
Brown’s Ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the
bridge as soon as the crossing was secured.

On the 26th, Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport and
commenced his eastward march. At three o’clock on the morning
of the 27th, Hazen moved into the stream with his sixty pontoons
and eighteen hundred brave and well-equipped men. Smith started
enough in advance to be near the river when Hazen should
arrive. There are a number of detached spurs of hills north of
the river at Chattanooga, back of which is a good road parallel
to the stream, sheltered from the view from the top of
Lookout. It was over this road Smith marched. At five o’clock
Hazen landed at Brown’s Ferry, surprised the picket guard, and
captured most of it. By seven o’clock the whole of Smith’s
force was ferried over and in possession of a height commanding
the ferry. This was speedily fortified, while a detail was
laying the pontoon bridge. By ten o’clock the bridge was laid,
and our extreme right, now in Lookout valley, was fortified and
connected with the rest of the army. The two bridges over the
Tennessee River–a flying one at Chattanooga and the new one at
Brown’s Ferry–with the road north of the river, covered from
both the fire and the view of the enemy, made the connection
complete. Hooker found but slight obstacles in his way, and on
the afternoon of the 28th emerged into Lookout valley at
Wauhatchie. Howard marched on to Brown’s Ferry, while Geary,
who commanded a division in the 12th corps, stopped three miles
south. The pickets of the enemy on the river below were now cut
off, and soon came in and surrendered.

The river was now opened to us from Lookout valley to
Bridgeport. Between Brown’s Ferry and Kelly’s Ferry the
Tennessee runs through a narrow gorge in the mountains, which
contracts the stream so much as to increase the current beyond
the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem it. To get up these
rapids, steamers must be cordelled; that is, pulled up by ropes
from the shore. But there is no difficulty in navigating the
stream from Bridgeport to Kelly’s Ferry. The latter point is
only eight miles from Chattanooga and connected with it by a
good wagon-road, which runs through a low pass in the Raccoon
Mountains on the south side of the river to Brown’s Ferry,
thence on the north side to the river opposite Chattanooga.
There were several steamers at Bridgeport, and abundance of
forage, clothing and provisions.

On the way to Chattanooga I had telegraphed back to Nashville
for a good supply of vegetables and small rations, which the
troops had been so long deprived of. Hooker had brought with
him from the east a full supply of land transportation. His
animals had not been subjected to hard work on bad roads without
forage, but were in good condition. In five days from my arrival
in Chattanooga the way was open to Bridgeport and, with the aid
of steamers and Hooker’s teams, in a week the troops were
receiving full rations. It is hard for any one not an
eye-witness to realize the relief this brought. The men were
soon reclothed and also well fed, an abundance of ammunition was
brought up, and a cheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in
many weeks. Neither officers nor men looked upon themselves any
longer as doomed. The weak and languid appearance of the troops,
so visible before, disappeared at once. I do not know what the
effect was on the other side, but assume it must have been
correspondingly depressing. Mr. Davis had visited Bragg but a
short time before, and must have perceived our condition to be
about as Bragg described it in his subsequent report. “These
dispositions,” he said, “faithfully sustained, insured the
enemy’s speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and
forage. Possessed of the shortest route to his depot, and the
one by which reinforcements must reach him, we held him at our
mercy, and his destruction was only a question of time.” But
the dispositions were not “faithfully sustained,” and I doubt
not but thousands of men engaged in trying to “sustain” them now
rejoice that they were not. There was no time during the
rebellion when I did not think, and often say, that the South
was more to be benefited by its defeat than the North. The
latter had the people, the institutions, and the territory to
make a great and prosperous nation. The former was burdened
with an institution abhorrent to all civilized people not
brought up under it, and one which degraded labor, kept it in
ignorance, and enervated the governing class. With the outside
world at war with this institution, they could not have extended
their territory. The labor of the country was not skilled, nor
allowed to become so. The whites could not toil without
becoming degraded, and those who did were denominated “poor
white trash.” The system of labor would have soon exhausted the
soil and left the people poor. The non-slaveholders would have
left the country, and the small slaveholder must have sold out
to his more fortunate neighbor. Soon the slaves would have
outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathy with them,
would have risen in their might and exterminated them. The war
was expensive to the South as well as to the North, both in
blood and treasure, but it was worth all it cost.

The enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a
line of supplies. He appreciated its importance, and hastened
to try to recover the line from us. His strength on Lookout
Mountain was not equal to Hooker’s command in the valley
below. From Missionary Ridge he had to march twice the distance
we had from Chattanooga, in order to reach Lookout Valley; but on
the night of the 28th and 29th an attack was made on Geary at
Wauhatchie by Longstreet’s corps. When the battle commenced,
Hooker ordered Howard up from Brown’s Ferry. He had three miles
to march to reach Geary. On his way he was fired upon by rebel
troops from a foot-hill to the left of the road and from which
the road was commanded. Howard turned to the left, charged up
the hill and captured it before the enemy had time to intrench,
taking many prisoners. Leaving sufficient men to hold this
height, he pushed on to reinforce Geary. Before he got up,
Geary had been engaged for about three hours against a vastly
superior force. The night was so dark that the men could not
distinguish one from another except by the light of the flashes
of their muskets. In the darkness and uproar Hooker’s teamsters
became frightened and deserted their teams. The mules also
became frightened, and breaking loose from their fastenings
stampeded directly towards the enemy. The latter, no doubt,
took this for a charge, and stampeded in turn. By four o’clock
in the morning the battle had entirely ceased, and our “cracker
line” was never afterward disturbed.

In securing possession of Lookout Valley, Smith lost one man
killed and four or five wounded. The enemy lost most of his
pickets at the ferry, captured. In the night engagement of the
28th-9th Hooker lost 416 killed and wounded. I never knew the
loss of the enemy, but our troops buried over one hundred and
fifty of his dead and captured more than a hundred.

After we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring
our supplies to the army, I made a personal inspection to see
the situation of the pickets of the two armies. As I have
stated, Chattanooga Creek comes down the centre of the valley to
within a mile or such a matter of the town of Chattanooga, then
bears off westerly, then north-westerly, and enters the
Tennessee River at the foot of Lookout Mountain. This creek,
from its mouth up to where it bears off west, lay between the
two lines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew their
water from the same stream. As I would be under short-range
fire and in an open country, I took nobody with me, except, I
believe, a bugler, who stayed some distance to the rear. I rode
from our right around to our left. When I came to the camp of
the picket guard of our side, I heard the call, “Turn out the
guard for the commanding general.” I replied, “Never mind the
guard,” and they were dismissed and went back to their tents.
Just back of these, and about equally distant from the creek,
were the guards of the Confederate pickets. The sentinel on
their post called out in like manner, “Turn out the guard for
the commanding general,” and, I believe, added, “General
Grant.” Their line in a moment front-faced to the north, facing
me, and gave a salute, which I returned.

The most friendly relations seemed to exist between the pickets
of the two armies. At one place there was a tree which had
fallen across the stream, and which was used by the soldiers of
both armies in drawing water for their camps. General
Longstreet’s corps was stationed there at the time, and wore
blue of a little different shade from our uniform. Seeing a
soldier in blue on this log, I rode up to him, commenced
conversing with him, and asked whose corps he belonged to. He
was very polite, and, touching his hat to me, said he belonged
to General Longstreet’s corps. I asked him a few questions–but
not with a view of gaining any particular information–all of
which he answered, and I rode off.

CHAPTER XLII.

CONDITION OF THE ARMY–REBUILDING THE RAILROAD–GENERAL
BURNSIDE’S SITUATION–ORDERS FOR BATTLE–PLANS FOR THE
ATTACK–HOOKER’S POSITION–SHERMAN’S MOVEMENTS.

Having got the Army of the Cumberland in a comfortable position,
I now began to look after the remainder of my new command.
Burnside was in about as desperate a condition as the Army of
the Cumberland had been, only he was not yet besieged. He was a
hundred miles from the nearest possible base, Big South Fork of
the Cumberland River, and much farther from any railroad we had
possession of. The roads back were over mountains, and all
supplies along the line had long since been exhausted. His
animals, too, had been starved, and their carcasses lined the
road from Cumberland Gap, and far back towards Lexington, Ky.
East Tennessee still furnished supplies of beef, bread and
forage, but it did not supply ammunition, clothing, medical
supplies, or small rations, such as coffee, sugar, salt and rice.

Sherman had started from Memphis for Corinth on the 11th of
October. His instructions required him to repair the road in
his rear in order to bring up supplies. The distance was about
three hundred and thirty miles through a hostile country. His
entire command could not have maintained the road if it had been
completed. The bridges had all been destroyed by the enemy, and
much other damage done. A hostile community lived along the
road; guerilla bands infested the country, and more or less of
the cavalry of the enemy was still in the West. Often Sherman’s
work was destroyed as soon as completed, and he only a short
distance away.

The Memphis and Charleston Railroad strikes the Tennessee River
at Eastport, Mississippi. Knowing the difficulty Sherman would
have to supply himself from Memphis, I had previously ordered
supplies sent from St. Louis on small steamers, to be convoyed
by the navy, to meet him at Eastport. These he got. I now
ordered him to discontinue his work of repairing roads and to
move on with his whole force to Stevenson, Alabama, without
delay. This order was borne to Sherman by a messenger, who
paddled down the Tennessee in a canoe and floated over Muscle
Shoals; it was delivered at Iuka on the 27th. In this Sherman
was notified that the rebels were moving a force towards
Cleveland, East Tennessee, and might be going to Nashville, in
which event his troops were in the best position to beat them
there. Sherman, with his characteristic promptness, abandoned
the work he was engaged upon and pushed on at once. On the 1st
of November he crossed the Tennessee at Eastport, and that day
was in Florence, Alabama, with the head of column, while his
troops were still crossing at Eastport, with Blair bringing up
the rear.

Sherman’s force made an additional army, with cavalry,
artillery, and trains, all to be supplied by the single track
road from Nashville. All indications pointed also to the
probable necessity of supplying Burnside’s command in East
Tennessee, twenty-five thousand more, by the same route. A
single track could not do this. I gave, therefore, an order to
Sherman to halt General G. M. Dodge’s command, of about eight
thousand men, at Athens, and subsequently directed the latter to
arrange his troops along the railroad from Decatur north towards
Nashville, and to rebuild that road. The road from Nashville to
Decatur passes over a broken country, cut up with innumerable
streams, many of them of considerable width, and with valleys
far below the road-bed. All the bridges over these had been
destroyed, and the rails taken up and twisted by the enemy. All
the cars and locomotives not carried off had been destroyed as
effectually as they knew how to destroy them. All bridges and
culverts had been destroyed between Nashville and Decatur, and
thence to Stevenson, where the Memphis and Charleston and the
Nashville and Chattanooga roads unite. The rebuilding of this
road would give us two roads as far as Stevenson over which to
supply the army. From Bridgeport, a short distance farther
east, the river supplements the road.

General Dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an
experienced railroad builder. He had no tools to work with
except those of the pioneers–axes, picks, and spades. With
these he was able to intrench his men and protect them against
surprises by small parties of the enemy. As he had no base of
supplies until the road could be completed back to Nashville,
the first matter to consider after protecting his men was the
getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country. He
had his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or
all they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food
as could be found. Millers were detailed from the ranks to run
the mills along the line of the army. When these were not near
enough to the troops for protection they were taken down and
moved up to the line of the road. Blacksmith shops, with all
the iron and steel found in them, were moved up in like
manner. Blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the
tools necessary in railroad and bridge building. Axemen were
put to work getting out timber for bridges and cutting fuel for
locomotives when the road should be completed. Car-builders
were set to work repairing the locomotives and cars. Thus every
branch of railroad building, making tools to work with, and
supplying the workmen with food, was all going on at once, and
without the aid of a mechanic or laborer except what the command
itself furnished. But rails and cars the men could not make
without material, and there was not enough rolling stock to keep
the road we already had worked to its full capacity. There were
no rails except those in use. To supply these deficiencies I
ordered eight of the ten engines General McPherson had at
Vicksburg to be sent to Nashville, and all the cars he had
except ten. I also ordered the troops in West Tennessee to
points on the river and on the Memphis and Charleston road, and
ordered the cars, locomotives and rails from all the railroads
except the Memphis and Charleston to Nashville. The military
manager of railroads also was directed to furnish more rolling
stock and, as far as he could, bridge material. General Dodge
had the work assigned him finished within forty days after
receiving his orders. The number of bridges to rebuild was one
hundred and eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms;
the length of road repaired was one hundred and two miles.

The enemy’s troops, which it was thought were either moving
against Burnside or were going to Nashville, went no farther
than Cleveland. Their presence there, however, alarmed the
authorities at Washington, and, on account of our helpless
condition at Chattanooga, caused me much uneasiness. Dispatches
were constantly coming, urging me to do something for Burnside’s
relief; calling attention to the importance of holding East
Tennessee; saying the President was much concerned for the
protection of the loyal people in that section, etc. We had not
at Chattanooga animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much
less a supply train. Reinforcements could not help Burnside,
because he had neither supplies nor ammunition sufficient for
them; hardly, indeed, bread and meat for the men he had. There
was no relief possible for him except by expelling the enemy
from Missionary Ridge and about Chattanooga.

On the 4th of November Longstreet left our front with about
fifteen thousand troops, besides Wheeler’s cavalry, five
thousand more, to go against Burnside. The situation seemed
desperate, and was more aggravating because nothing could be
done until Sherman should get up. The authorities at Washington
were now more than ever anxious for the safety of Burnside’s
army, and plied me with dispatches faster than ever, urging that
something should be done for his relief. On the 7th, before
Longstreet could possibly have reached Knoxville, I ordered
Thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy’s right, so as to force
the return of the troops that had gone up the valley. I
directed him to take mules, officers’ horses, or animals
wherever he could get them to move the necessary artillery. But
he persisted in the declaration that he could not move a single
piece of artillery, and could not see how he could possibly
comply with the order. Nothing was left to be done but to
answer Washington dispatches as best I could; urge Sherman
forward, although he was making every effort to get forward, and
encourage Burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time
he should be relieved. All of Burnside’s dispatches showed the
greatest confidence in his ability to hold his position as long
as his ammunition held out. He even suggested the propriety of
abandoning the territory he held south and west of Knoxville, so
as to draw the enemy farther from his base and make it more
difficult for him to get back to Chattanooga when the battle
should begin. Longstreet had a railroad as far as Loudon; but
from there to Knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains.
Burnside’s suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was
adopted. On the 14th I telegraphed him:

“Sherman’s advance has reached Bridgeport. His whole force will
be ready to move from there by Tuesday at farthest. If you can
hold Longstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing and
falling back can avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time, I
will be able to force the enemy back from here and place a force
between Longstreet and Bragg that must inevitably make the former
take to the mountain-passes by every available road, to get to
his supplies. Sherman would have been here before this but for
high water in Elk River driving him some thirty miles up that
river to cross.”

And again later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief,
as follows:

“Your dispatch and Dana’s just received. Being there, you can
tell better how to resist Longstreet’s attack than I can
direct. With your showing you had better give up Kingston at
the last moment and save the most productive part of your
possessions. Every arrangement is now made to throw Sherman’s
force across the river, just at and below the mouth of
Chickamauga Creek, as soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on
his left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry
Missionary Ridge, and from there push a force on to the railroad
between Cleveland and Dalton. Hooker will at the same time
attack, and, if he can, carry Lookout Mountain. The enemy now
seems to be looking for an attack on his left flank. This
favors us. To further confirm this, Sherman’s advance division
will march direct from Whiteside to Trenton. The remainder of
his force will pass over a new road just made from Whiteside to
Kelly’s Ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and leave
him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout Valley.
Sherman’s advance has only just reached Bridgeport. The rear
will only reach there on the 16th. This will bring it to the
19th as the earliest day for making the combined movement as
desired. Inform me if you think you can sustain yourself until
this time. I can hardly conceive of the enemy breaking through
at Kingston and pushing for Kentucky. If they should, however,
a new problem would be left for solution. Thomas has ordered a
division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I will ascertain
if they have started, and inform you. It will be entirely out
of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they
cannot be spared, but how would they be fed after they got even
one day east from here?”

Longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at Loudon until
the 13th. That being the terminus of his railroad
communications, it is probable he was directed to remain there
awaiting orders. He was in a position threatening Knoxville,
and at the same time where he could be brought back speedily to
Chattanooga. The day after Longstreet left Loudon, Sherman
reached Bridgeport in person and proceeded on to see me that
evening, the 14th, and reached Chattanooga the next day.

My orders for battle were all prepared in advance of Sherman’s
arrival (*15), except the dates, which could not be fixed while
troops to be engaged were so far away. The possession of
Lookout Mountain was of no special advantage to us now. Hooker
was instructed to send Howard’s corps to the north side of the
Tennessee, thence up behind the hills on the north side, and to
go into camp opposite Chattanooga; with the remainder of the
command, Hooker was, at a time to be afterwards appointed, to
ascend the western slope between the upper and lower palisades,
and so get into Chattanooga valley.

The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack the enemy’s right
flank, form a line across it, extend our left over South
Chickamauga River so as to threaten or hold the railroad in
Bragg’s rear, and thus force him either to weaken his lines
elsewhere or lose his connection with his base at Chickamauga
Station. Hooker was to perform like service on our right. His
problem was to get from Lookout Valley to Chattanooga Valley in
the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley
rapidly to Rossville, south of Bragg’s line on Missionary Ridge,
form line there across the ridge facing north, with his right
flank extended to Chickamauga Valley east of the ridge, thus
threatening the enemy’s rear on that flank and compelling him to
reinforce this also. Thomas, with the Army of the Cumberland,
occupied the centre, and was to assault while the enemy was
engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks.

To carry out this plan, Sherman was to cross the Tennessee at
Brown’s Ferry and move east of Chattanooga to a point opposite
the north end of Mission Ridge, and to place his command back of
the foot-hills out of sight of the enemy on the ridge. There are
two streams called Chickamauga emptying into the Tennessee River
east of Chattanooga–North Chickamauga, taking its rise in
Tennessee, flowing south, and emptying into the river some seven
or eight miles east; while the South Chickamauga, which takes its
rise in Georgia, flows northward, and empties into the Tennessee
some three or four miles above the town. There were now one
hundred and sixteen pontoons in the North Chickamauga River,
their presence there being unknown to the enemy.

At night a division was to be marched up to that point, and at
two o’clock in the morning moved down with the current, thirty
men in each boat. A few were to land east of the mouth of the
South Chickamauga, capture the pickets there, and then lay a
bridge connecting the two banks of the river. The rest were to
land on the south side of the Tennessee, where Missionary Ridge
would strike it if prolonged, and a sufficient number of men to
man the boats were to push to the north side to ferry over the
main body of Sherman’s command while those left on the south
side intrenched themselves. Thomas was to move out from his
lines facing the ridge, leaving enough of Palmer’s corps to
guard against an attack down the valley. Lookout Valley being
of no present value to us, and being untenable by the enemy if
we should secure Missionary Ridge, Hooker’s orders were
changed. His revised orders brought him to Chattanooga by the
established route north of the Tennessee. He was then to move
out to the right to Rossville.

Hooker’s position in Lookout Valley was absolutely essential to
us so long as Chattanooga was besieged. It was the key to our
line for supplying the army. But it was not essential after the
enemy was dispersed from our front, or even after the battle for
this purpose was begun. Hooker’s orders, therefore, were
designed to get his force past Lookout Mountain and Chattanooga
Valley, and up to Missionary Ridge. By crossing the north face
of Lookout the troops would come into Chattanooga Valley in rear
of the line held by the enemy across the valley, and would
necessarily force its evacuation. Orders were accordingly given
to march by this route. But days before the battle began the
advantages as well as the disadvantages of this plan of action
were all considered. The passage over the mountain was a
difficult one to make in the face of an enemy. It might consume
so much time as to lose us the use of the troops engaged in it at
other points where they were more wanted. After reaching
Chattanooga Valley, the creek of the same name, quite a
formidable stream to get an army over, had to be crossed. I was
perfectly willing that the enemy should keep Lookout Mountain
until we got through with the troops on Missionary Ridge. By
marching Hooker to the north side of the river, thence up the
stream, and recrossing at the town, he could be got in position
at any named time; when in this new position, he would have
Chattanooga Creek behind him, and the attack on Missionary Ridge
would unquestionably cause the evacuation by the enemy of his
line across the valley and on Lookout Mountain. Hooker’s order
was changed accordingly. As explained elsewhere, the original
order had to be reverted to, because of a flood in the river
rendering the bridge at Brown’s Ferry unsafe for the passage of
troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring all the
troops together against Missionary Ridge.

The next day after Sherman’s arrival I took him, with Generals
Thomas and Smith and other officers, to the north side of the
river, and showed them the ground over which Sherman had to
march, and pointed out generally what he was expected to do. I,
as well as the authorities in Washington, was still in a great
state of anxiety for Burnside’s safety. Burnside himself, I
believe, was the only one who did not share in this anxiety.
Nothing could be done for him, however, until Sherman’s troops
were up. As soon, therefore, as the inspection was over,
Sherman started for Bridgeport to hasten matters, rowing a boat
himself, I believe, from Kelly’s Ferry. Sherman had left
Bridgeport the night of the 14th, reached Chattanooga the
evening of the 15th, made the above-described inspection on the
morning of the 16th, and started back the same evening to hurry
up his command, fully appreciating the importance of time.

His march was conducted with as much expedition as the roads and
season would admit of. By the 20th he was himself at Brown’s
Ferry with the head of column, but many of his troops were far
behind, and one division (Ewing’s) was at Trenton, sent that way
to create the impression that Lookout was to be taken from the
south. Sherman received his orders at the ferry, and was asked
if he could not be ready for the assault the following
morning. News had been received that the battle had been
commenced at Knoxville. Burnside had been cut off from
telegraphic communications. The President, the Secretary of
War, and General Halleck, were in an agony of suspense. My
suspense was also great, but more endurable, because I was where
I could soon do something to relieve the situation. It was
impossible to get Sherman’s troops up for the next day. I then
asked him if they could not be got up to make the assault on the
morning of the 22d, and ordered Thomas to move on that date. But
the elements were against us. It rained all the 20th and 21st.
The river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep the
pontoons in place.

General Orlando B. Willcox, a division commander under Burnside,
was at this time occupying a position farther up the valley than
Knoxville–about Maynardville–and was still in telegraphic
communication with the North. A dispatch was received from him
saying that he was threatened from the east. The following was
sent in reply:

“If you can communicate with General Burnside, say to him that
our attack on Bragg will commence in the morning. If
successful, such a move will be made as I think will relieve
East Tennessee, if he can hold out. Longstreet passing through
our lines to Kentucky need not cause alarm. He would find the
country so bare that he would lose his transportation and
artillery before reaching Kentucky, and would meet such a force
before he got through, that he could not return.”

Meantime, Sherman continued his crossing without intermission as
fast as his troops could be got up. The crossing had to be
effected in full view of the enemy on the top of Lookout
Mountain. Once over, however, the troops soon disappeared
behind the detached hill on the north side, and would not come
to view again, either to watchmen on Lookout Mountain or
Missionary Ridge, until they emerged between the hills to strike
the bank of the river. But when Sherman’s advance reached a
point opposite the town of Chattanooga, Howard, who, it will be
remembered, had been concealed behind the hills on the north
side, took up his line of march to join the troops on the south
side. His crossing was in full view both from Missionary Ridge
and the top of Lookout, and the enemy of course supposed these
troops to be Sherman’s. This enabled Sherman to get to his
assigned position without discovery.

CHAPTER XLIII.

PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE–THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OF THE
ENEMY–SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE–BATTLE OF LOOKOUT
MOUNTAIN–GENERAL HOOKER’S FIGHT.

On the 20th, when so much was occurring to discourage–rains
falling so heavily as to delay the passage of troops over the
river at Brown’s Ferry and threatening the entire breaking of
the bridge; news coming of a battle raging at Knoxville; of
Willcox being threatened by a force from the east–a letter was
received from Bragg which contained these words: “As there may
still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to
notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal.”
Of course, I understood that this was a device intended to
deceive; but I did not know what the intended deception was. On
the 22d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that Bragg
was leaving our front, and on that day Buckner’s division was
sent to reinforce Longstreet at Knoxville, and another division
started to follow but was recalled. The object of Bragg’s
letter, no doubt, was in some way to detain me until Knoxville
could be captured, and his troops there be returned to
Chattanooga.

During the night of the 21st the rest of the pontoon boats,
completed, one hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to
and placed in North Chickamauga. The material for the roadway
over these was deposited out of view of the enemy within a few
hundred yards of the bank of the Tennessee, where the north end
of the bridge was to rest.

Hearing nothing from Burnside, and hearing much of the distress
in Washington on his account, I could no longer defer operations
for his relief. I determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, with
the Army of the Cumberland, what had been intended to be done on
the 24th.

The position occupied by the Army of the Cumberland had been
made very strong for defence during the months it had been
besieged. The line was about a mile from the town, and extended
from Citico Creek, a small stream running near the base of
Missionary Ridge and emptying into the Tennessee about two miles
below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, on the left, to
Chattanooga Creek on the right. All commanding points on the
line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery. The
important elevations within the line had all been carefully
fortified and supplied with a proper armament. Among the
elevations so fortified was one to the east of the town, named
Fort Wood. It owed its importance chiefly to the fact that it
lay between the town and Missionary Ridge, where most of the
strength of the enemy was. Fort Wood had in it twenty-two
pieces of artillery, most of which would reach the nearer points
of the enemy’s line. On the morning of the 23d Thomas, according
to instructions, moved Granger’s corps of two divisions, Sheridan
and T. J. Wood commanding, to the foot of Fort Wood, and formed
them into line as if going on parade, Sheridan on the right,
Wood to the left, extending to or near Citico Creek. Palmer,
commanding the 14th corps, held that part of our line facing
south and southwest.. He supported Sheridan with one division
(Baird’s), while his other division under Johnson remained in
the trenches, under arms, ready to be moved to any point.
Howard’s corps was moved in rear of the centre. The picket
lines were within a few hundred yards of each other. At two
o’clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance. By this
time the clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his
elevated position all that was going on. The signal for advance
was given by a booming of cannon from Fort Wood and other points
on the line. The rebel pickets were soon driven back upon the
main guards, which occupied minor and detached heights between
the main ridge and our lines. These too were carried before
halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce their
advance guards. But it was not without loss on both sides. This
movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one
we occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had
occupied up to this time. The fortifications were rapidly
turned to face the other way. During the following night they
were made strong. We lost in this preliminary action about
eleven hundred killed and wounded, while the enemy probably lost
quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were captured.
With the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from
Missionary Ridge and Fort Wood until night closed in, this ended
the fighting for the first day.

The advantage was greatly on our side now, and if I could only
have been assured that Burnside could hold out ten days longer I
should have rested more easily. But we were doing the best we
could for him and the cause.

By the night of the 23d Sherman’s command was in a position to
move, though one division (Osterhaus’s) had not yet crossed the
river at Brown’s Ferry. The continuous rise in the Tennessee
had rendered it impossible to keep the bridge at that point in
condition for troops to cross; but I was determined to move that
night even without this division. Orders were sent to Osterhaus
accordingly to report to Hooker, if he could not cross by eight
o’clock on the morning of the 24th. Because of the break in the
bridge, Hooker’s orders were again changed, but this time only
back to those first given to him.

General W. F. Smith had been assigned to duty as Chief Engineer
of the Military Division. To him were given the general
direction of moving troops by the boats from North Chickamauga,
laying the bridge after they reached their position, and
generally all the duties pertaining to his office of chief
engineer. During the night General Morgan L. Smith’s division
was marched to the point where the pontoons were, and the
brigade of Giles A. Smith was selected for the delicate duty of
manning the boats and surprising the enemy’s pickets on the
south bank of the river. During this night also General J. M.
Brannan, chief of artillery, moved forty pieces of artillery,
belonging to the Army of the Cumberland, and placed them on the
north side of the river so as to command the ground opposite, to
aid in protecting the approach to the point where the south end
of the bridge was to rest. He had to use Sherman’s artillery
horses for this purpose, Thomas having none.

At two o’clock in the morning, November 24th, Giles A. Smith
pushed out from the North Chickamauga with his one hundred and
sixteen boats, each loaded with thirty brave and well-armed
men. The boats with their precious freight dropped down quietly
with the current to avoid attracting the attention of any one who
could convey information to the enemy, until arriving near the
mouth of South Chickamauga. Here a few boats were landed, the
troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the picket guard known
to be at that point. The guard were surprised, and twenty of
their number captured. The remainder of the troops effected a
landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally
good results. The work of ferrying over Sherman’s command from
the north side of the Tennessee was at once commenced, using the
pontoons for the purpose. A steamer was also brought up from the
town to assist. The rest of M. L. Smith’s division came first,
then the division of John E. Smith. The troops as they landed
were put to work intrenching their position. By daylight the
two entire divisions were over, and well covered by the works
they had built.

The work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery
and cavalry, was now begun. The ferrying over the infantry was
continued with the steamer and the pontoons, taking the
pontoons, however, as fast as they were wanted to put in their
place in the bridge. By a little past noon the bridge was
completed, as well as one over the South Chickamauga connecting
the troops left on that side with their comrades below, and all
the infantry and artillery were on the south bank of the
Tennessee.

Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on Missionary
Ridge. By one o’clock he started with M. L. Smith on his left,
keeping nearly the course of Chickamauga River; J. E. Smith next
to the right and a little to the rear; and Ewing still farther to
the right and also a little to the rear of J. E. Smith’s command,
in column, ready to deploy to the right if an enemy should come
from that direction. A good skirmish line preceded each of
these columns. Soon the foot of the hill was reached; the
skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their
supports. By half-past three Sherman was in possession of the
height without having sustained much loss. A brigade from each
division was now brought up, and artillery was dragged to the
top of the hill by hand. The enemy did not seem to be aware of
this movement until the top of the hill was gained. There had
been a drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds were so low
that Lookout Mountain and the top of Missionary Ridge were
obscured from the view of persons in the valley. But now the
enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several
attempts with their skirmishers to drive them away, but without
avail. Later in the day a more determined attack was made, but
this, too, failed, and Sherman was left to fortify what he had
gained.

Sherman’s cavalry took up its line of march soon after the
bridge was completed, and by half-past three the whole of it was
over both bridges and on its way to strike the enemy’s
communications at Chickamauga Station. All of Sherman’s command
was now south of the Tennessee. During the afternoon General
Giles A. Smith was severely wounded and carried from the field.

Thomas having done on the 23d what was expected of him on the
24th, there was nothing for him to do this day except to
strengthen his position. Howard, however, effected a crossing
of Citico Creek and a junction with Sherman, and was directed to
report to him. With two or three regiments of his command he
moved in the morning along the banks of the Tennessee, and
reached the point where the bridge was being laid. He went out
on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end, and
saw Sherman superintending the work from the north side and
moving himself south as fast as an additional boat was put in
and the roadway put upon it. Howard reported to his new chief
across the chasm between them, which was now narrow and in a few
minutes closed.

While these operations were going on to the east of Chattanooga,
Hooker was engaged on the west. He had three divisions:
Osterhaus’s, of the 15th corps, Army of the Tennessee; Geary’s,
12th corps, Army of the Potomac; and Cruft’s, 14th corps, Army
of the Cumberland. Geary was on the right at Wauhatchie, Cruft
at the centre, and Osterhaus near Brown’s Ferry. These troops
were all west of Lookout Creek. The enemy had the east bank of
the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and three brigades
of troops in the rear to reinforce them if attacked. These
brigades occupied the summit of the mountain. General Carter L.
Stevenson was in command of the whole. Why any troops, except
artillery with a small infantry guard, were kept on the
mountain-top, I do not see. A hundred men could have held the
summit–which is a palisade for more than thirty feet
down–against the assault of any number of men from the position
Hooker occupied.

The side of Lookout Mountain confronting Hooker’s command was
rugged, heavily timbered, and full of chasms, making it
difficult to advance with troops, even in the absence of an
opposing force. Farther up, the ground becomes more even and
level, and was in cultivation. On the east side the slope is
much more gradual, and a good wagon road, zigzagging up it,
connects the town of Chattanooga with the summit.

Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved Geary’s division,
supported by a brigade of Cruft’s, up Lookout Creek, to effect a
crossing. The remainder of Cruft’s division was to seize the
bridge over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad.
Osterhaus was to move up to the bridge and cross it. The bridge
was seized by Gross’s brigade after a slight skirmish with the
pickets guarding it. This attracted the enemy so that Geary’s
movement farther up was not observed. A heavy mist obscured him
from the view of the troops on the top of the mountain. He
crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured the picket of
over forty men on guard near by. He then commenced ascending
the mountain directly in his front. By this time the enemy was
seen coming down from their camps on the mountain slope, and
filing into their rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the
bridge. By eleven o’clock the bridge was complete. Osterhaus
was up, and after some sharp skirmishing the enemy was driven
away with considerable loss in killed and captured.

While the operations at the bridge were progressing, Geary was
pushing up the hill over great obstacles, resisted by the enemy
directly in his front, and in face of the guns on top of the
mountain. The enemy, seeing their left flank and rear menaced,
gave way, and were followed by Cruft and Osterhaus. Soon these
were up abreast of Geary, and the whole command pushed up the
hill, driving the enemy in advance. By noon Geary had gained
the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with his
right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were
strong fortifications in his front. The rest of the command
coming up, a line was formed from the base of the upper palisade
to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek.

Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knob. Hooker’s advance
now made our line a continuous one. It was in full view,
extending from the Tennessee River, where Sherman had crossed,
up Chickamauga River to the base of Mission Ridge, over the top
of the north end of the ridge to Chattanooga Valley, then along
parallel to the ridge a mile or more, across the valley to the
mouth of Chattanooga Creek, thence up the slope of Lookout
Mountain to the foot of the upper palisade. The day was hazy,
so that Hooker’s operations were not visible to us except at
moments when the clouds would rise. But the sound of his
artillery and musketry was heard incessantly. The enemy on his
front was partially fortified, but was soon driven out of his
works. During the afternoon the clouds, which had so obscured
the top of Lookout all day as to hide whatever was going on from
the view of those below, settled down and made it so dark where
Hooker was as to stop operations for the time. At four o’clock
Hooker reported his position as impregnable. By a little after
five direct communication was established, and a brigade of
troops was sent from Chattanooga to reinforce him. These troops
had to cross Chattanooga Creek and met with some opposition, but
soon overcame it, and by night the commander, General Carlin,
reported to Hooker and was assigned to his left. I now
telegraphed to Washington: “The fight to-day progressed
favorably. Sherman carried the end of Missionary Ridge, and his
right is now at the tunnel, and his left at Chickamauga Creek.
Troops from Lookout Valley carried the point of the mountain,
and now hold the eastern slope and a point high up. Hooker
reports two thousand prisoners taken, besides which a small
number have fallen into our hands from Missionary Ridge.” The
next day the President replied: “Your dispatches as to fighting
on Monday and Tuesday are here. Well done. Many thanks to
all. Remember Burnside.” And Halleck also telegraphed: “I
congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans. I fear
that Burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay may
prove fatal. I know you will do all in your power to relieve
him.”

The division of Jefferson C. Davis, Army of the Cumberland, had
been sent to the North Chickamauga to guard the pontoons as they
were deposited in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress
of citizens. On the night of the 24th his division, having
crossed with Sherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper
bridge over the plain to the north base of Missionary Ridge.
Firing continued to a late hour in the night, but it was not
connected with an assault at any point.

CHAPTER XLIV.

BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA–A GALLANT CHARGE–COMPLETE ROUT OF THE
ENEMY–PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES–GENERAL BRAGG–REMARKS ON
CHATTANOOGA.

At twelve o’clock at night, when all was quiet, I began to give
orders for the next day, and sent a dispatch to Willcox to
encourage Burnside. Sherman was directed to attack at
daylight. Hooker was ordered to move at the same hour, and
endeavor to intercept the enemy’s retreat if he still remained;
if he had gone, then to move directly to Rossville and operate
against the left and rear of the force on Missionary Ridge.
Thomas was not to move until Hooker had reached Missionary
Ridge. As I was with him on Orchard Knob, he would not move
without further orders from me.

The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole
field was in full view from the top of Orchard Knob. It
remained so all day. Bragg’s headquarters were in full view,
and officers–presumably staff officers–could be seen coming
and going constantly.

The point of ground which Sherman had carried on the 24th was
almost disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. A
low pass, over which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and
near which there is a railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two
hills. The problem now was to get to the main ridge. The enemy
was fortified on the point; and back farther, where the ground
was still higher, was a second fortification commanding the
first. Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to see,
and by sunrise his command was in motion. Three brigades held
the hill already gained. Morgan L. Smith moved along the east
base of Missionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base, supported
by two brigades of John E. Smith’s division; and Corse with his
brigade was between the two, moving directly towards the hill to
be captured. The ridge is steep and heavily wooded on the east
side, where M. L. Smith’s troops were advancing, but cleared and
with a more gentle slope on the west side. The troops advanced
rapidly and carried the extreme end of the rebel works. Morgan
L. Smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy off from the
railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by rail
from Chickamauga Station, where the main depot was located. The
enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from
the position we had gained, but without success. The contest
lasted for two hours. Corse, a brave and efficient commander,
was badly wounded in this assault. Sherman now threatened both
Bragg’s flank and his stores, and made it necessary for him to
weaken other points of his line to strengthen his right. From
the position I occupied I could see column after column of
Bragg’s forces moving against Sherman. Every Confederate gun
that could be brought to bear upon the Union forces was
concentrated upon him. J. E. Smith, with two brigades, charged
up the west side of the ridge to the support of Corse’s command,
over open ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both
artillery and musketry, and reached the very parapet of the
enemy. He lay here for a time, but the enemy coming with a
heavy force upon his right flank, he was compelled to fall back,
followed by the foe. A few hundred yards brought Smith’s troops
into a wood, where they were speedily reformed, when they
charged and drove the attacking party back to his intrenchments.

Seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of J. E. Smith
from the position I occupied, I directed Thomas to send a
division to reinforce him. Baird’s division was accordingly
sent from the right of Orchard Knob. It had to march a
considerable distance directly under the eye of the enemy to
reach its position. Bragg at once commenced massing in the same
direction. This was what I wanted. But it had now got to be
late in the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see
Hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and
compelling Bragg to mass in that direction also.

The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain during the night, as I
expected he would. In crossing the valley he burned the bridge
over Chattanooga Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the
roads behind him. Hooker was off bright and early, with no
obstructions in his front but distance and the destruction above
named. He was detained four hours crossing Chattanooga Creek,
and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expected from his
forces. His reaching Bragg’s flank and extending across it was
to be the signal for Thomas’s assault of the ridge. But
Sherman’s condition was getting so critical that the assault for
his relief could not be delayed any longer.

Sheridan’s and Wood’s divisions had been lying under arms from
early morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. I
now directed Thomas to order the charge at once (*16). I watched
eagerly to see the effect, and became impatient at last that
there was no indication of any charge being made. The centre of
the line which was to make the charge was near where Thomas and I
stood, but concealed from view by an intervening forest. Turning
to Thomas to inquire what caused the delay, I was surprised to
see Thomas J. Wood, one of the division commanders who was to
make the charge, standing talking to him. I spoke to General
Wood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour
before. He replied very promptly that this was the first he had
heard of it, but that he had been ready all day to move at a
moment’s notice. I told him to make the charge at once. He was
off in a moment, and in an incredibly short time loud cheering
was heard, and he and Sheridan were driving the enemy’s advance
before them towards Missionary Ridge. The Confederates were
strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front of us,
and had a second line half-way down and another at the base.
Our men drove the troops in front of the lower line of
rifle-pits so rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel
and Union troops went over the first line of works almost at the
same time. Many rebels were captured and sent to the rear under
the fire of their own friends higher up the hill. Those that
were not captured retreated, and were pursued. The retreating
hordes being between friends and pursuers caused the enemy to
fire high to avoid killing their own men. In fact, on that
occasion the Union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest
position. Without awaiting further orders or stopping to
reform, on our troops went to the second line of works; over
that and on for the crest–thus effectually carrying out my
orders of the 18th for the battle and of the 24th (*17) for this
charge.

I watched their progress with intense interest. The fire along
the rebel line was terrific. Cannon and musket balls filled the
air: but the damage done was in small proportion to the
ammunition expended. The pursuit continued until the crest was
reached, and soon our men were seen climbing over the
Confederate barriers at different points in front of both
Sheridan’s and Wood’s divisions. The retreat of the enemy along
most of his line was precipitate and the panic so great that
Bragg and his officers lost all control over their men. Many
were captured, and thousands threw away their arms in their
flight.

Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River
at a point above where the enemy crossed. He met some
resistance from troops occupying a second hill in rear of
Missionary Ridge, probably to cover the retreat of the main body
and of the artillery and trains. It was now getting dark, but
Sheridan, without halting on that account pushed his men forward
up this second hill slowly and without attracting the attention
of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right
and left to surround the position. The enemy discovered the
movement before these dispositions were complete, and beat a
hasty retreat, leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many
prisoners in our hands. To Sheridan’s prompt movement the Army
of the Cumberland, and the nation, are indebted for the bulk of
the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small-arms that day.
Except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this way would not
have been accomplished.

While the advance up Mission Ridge was going forward, General
Thomas with staff, General Gordon Granger, commander of the
corps making the assault, and myself and staff occupied Orchard
Knob, from which the entire field could be observed. The moment
the troops were seen going over the last line of rebel defences,
I ordered Granger to join his command, and mounting my horse I
rode to the front. General Thomas left about the same time.
Sheridan on the extreme right was already in pursuit of the
enemy east of the ridge. Wood, who commanded the division to
the left of Sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback in the
charge, but did not join Sheridan in the pursuit. To the left,
in Baird’s front where Bragg’s troops had massed against
Sherman, the resistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted
longer. I ordered Granger to follow the enemy with Wood’s
division, but he was so much excited, and kept up such a roar of
musketry in the direction the enemy had taken, that by the time I
could stop the firing the enemy had got well out of the way. The
enemy confronting Sherman, now seeing everything to their left
giving way, fled also. Sherman, however, was not aware of the
extent of our success until after nightfall, when he received
orders to pursue at daylight in the morning.

As soon as Sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front
he directed his reserves, Davis’s division of the Army of the
Cumberland, to push over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the
Chickamauga, and to move forward to Chickamauga Station. He
ordered Howard to move up the stream some two miles to where
there was an old bridge, repair it during the night, and follow
Davis at four o’clock in the morning. Morgan L. Smith was
ordered to reconnoitre the tunnel to see if that was still
held. Nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both
armies. The rest of Sherman’s command was directed to follow
Howard at daylight in the morning to get on to the railroad
towards Graysville.

Hooker, as stated, was detained at Chattanooga Creek by the
destruction of the bridge at that point. He got his troops
over, with the exception of the artillery, by fording the stream
at a little after three o’clock. Leaving his artillery to follow
when the bridge should be reconstructed, he pushed on with the
remainder of his command. At Rossville he came upon the flank
of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along
the ridge. This threw them on Palmer. They could make but
little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as
many of them as could do so escaped. Many, however, were
captured. Hooker’s position during the night of the 25th was
near Rossville, extending east of the ridge. Palmer was on his
left, on the road to Graysville.

During the night I telegraphed to Willcox that Bragg had been
defeated, and that immediate relief would be sent to Burnside if
he could hold out; to Halleck I sent an announcement of our
victory, and informed him that forces would be sent up the
valley to relieve Burnside.

Before the battle of Chattanooga opened I had taken measures for
the relief of Burnside the moment the way should be clear. Thomas
was directed to have the little steamer that had been built at
Chattanooga loaded to its capacity with rations and
ammunition. Granger’s corps was to move by the south bank of
the Tennessee River to the mouth of the Holston, and up that to
Knoxville accompanied by the boat. In addition to the supplies
transported by boat, the men were to carry forty rounds of
ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days’ rations in
haversacks.

In the battle of Chattanooga, troops from the Army of the
Potomac, from the Army of the Tennessee, and from the Army of
the Cumberland participated. In fact, the accidents growing out
of the heavy rains and the sudden rise in the Tennessee River so
mingled the troops that the organizations were not kept
together, under their respective commanders, during the
battle. Hooker, on the right, had Geary’s division of the 12th
corps, Army of the Potomac; Osterhaus’s division of the 15th
corps, Army of the Tennessee; and Cruft’s division of the Army
of the Cumberland. Sherman had three divisions of his own army,
Howard’s corps from the Army of the Potomac, and Jefferson C.
Davis’s division of the Army of the Cumberland. There was no
jealousy–hardly rivalry. Indeed, I doubt whether officers or
men took any note at the time of the fact of this intermingling
of commands. All saw a defiant foe surrounding them, and took
it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him, and
it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end
was accomplished.

The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds,
considering the advantage the enemy had of position, and was
accomplished more easily than was expected by reason of Bragg’s
making several grave mistakes: first, in sending away his
ablest corps commander with over twenty thousand troops; second,
in sending away a division of troops on the eve of battle; third,
in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of his
impregnable position.

It was known that Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited Bragg on
Missionary Ridge a short time before my reaching Chattanooga. It
was reported and believed that he had come out to reconcile a
serious difference between Bragg and Longstreet, and finding
this difficult to do, planned the campaign against Knoxville, to
be conducted by the latter general. I had known both Bragg and
Longstreet before the war, the latter very well. We had been
three years at West Point together, and, after my graduation,
for a time in the same regiment. Then we served together in the
Mexican War. I had known Bragg in Mexico, and met him
occasionally subsequently. I could well understand how there
might be an irreconcilable difference between them.

Bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man,
professionally and otherwise. He was also thoroughly upright.
But he was possessed of an irascible temper, and was naturally
disputatious. A man of the highest moral character and the most
correct habits, yet in the old army he was in frequent trouble.
As a subordinate he was always on the lookout to catch his
commanding officer infringing his prerogatives; as a post
commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest
neglect, even of the most trivial order.

I have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of
Bragg. On one occasion, when stationed at a post of several
companies commanded by a field officer, he was himself
commanding one of the companies and at the same time acting as
post quartermaster and commissary. He was first lieutenant at
the time, but his captain was detached on other duty. As
commander of the company he made a requisition upon the
quartermaster–himself–for something he wanted. As
quartermaster he declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed
on the back of it his reasons for so doing. As company
commander he responded to this, urging that his requisition
called for nothing but what he was entitled to, and that it was
the duty of the quartermaster to fill it. As quartermaster he
still persisted that he was right. In this condition of affairs
Bragg referred the whole matter to the commanding officer of the
post. The latter, when he saw the nature of the matter
referred, exclaimed: “My God, Mr. Bragg, you have quarrelled
with every officer in the army, and now you are quarrelling with
yourself!”

Longstreet was an entirely different man. He was brave, honest,
intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his
superiors, just and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his
own rights, which he had the courage to maintain. He was never
on the lookout to detect a slight, but saw one as soon as
anybody when intentionally given.

It may be that Longstreet was not sent to Knoxville for the
reason stated, but because Mr. Davis had an exalted opinion of
his own military genius, and thought he saw a chance of “killing
two birds with one stone.” On several occasions during the war
he came to the relief of the Union army by means of his SUPERIOR
MILITARY GENIUS.

I speak advisedly when I saw Mr. Davis prided himself on his
military capacity. He says so himself, virtually, in his answer
to the notice of his nomination to the Confederate presidency.
Some of his generals have said so in their writings since the
downfall of the Confederacy.

My recollection is that my first orders for the battle of
Chattanooga were as fought. Sherman was to get on Missionary
Ridge, as he did; Hooker to cross the north end of Lookout
Mountain, as he did, sweep across Chattanooga Valley and get
across the south end of the ridge near Rossville. When Hooker
had secured that position the Army of the Cumberland was to
assault in the centre. Before Sherman arrived, however, the
order was so changed as that Hooker was directed to come to
Chattanooga by the north bank of the Tennessee River. The
waters in the river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the
bridge at Brown’s Ferry could not be maintained in a condition to
be used in crossing troops upon it. For this reason Hooker’s
orders were changed by telegraph back to what they were
originally.
_____

NOTE.–From this point on this volume was written (with the
exception of the campaign in the Wilderness, which had been
previously written) by General Grant, after his great illness in
April, and the present arrangement of the subject-matter was made
by him between the 10th and 18th of July, 1885.

CHAPTER XLV.

THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE–HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE
–VISITING KNOXVILLE-CIPHER CIPHER DISPATCHES–WITHHOLDING
ORDERS.

Chattanooga now being secure to the National troops beyond any
doubt, I immediately turned my attention to relieving Knoxville,
about the situation of which the President, in particular, was
very anxious. Prior to the battles, I had made preparations for
sending troops to the relief of Burnside at the very earliest
moment after securing Chattanooga. We had there two little
steamers which had been built and fitted up from the remains of
old boats and put in condition to run. General Thomas was
directed to have one of these boats loaded with rations and
ammunition and move up the Tennessee River to the mouth of the
Holston, keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops.
General Granger, with the 4th corps reinforced to make twenty
thousand men, was to start the moment Missionary Ridge was
carried, and under no circumstances were the troops to return to
their old camps. With the provisions carried, and the little
that could be got in the country, it was supposed he could hold
out until Longstreet was driven away, after which event East
Tennessee would furnish abundance of food for Burnside’s army
and his own also.

While following the enemy on the 26th, and again on the morning
of the 27th, part of the time by the road to Ringgold, I
directed Thomas, verbally, not to start Granger until he
received further orders from me; advising him that I was going
to the front to more fully see the situation. I was not right
sure but that Bragg’s troops might be over their stampede by the
time they reached Dalton. In that case Bragg might think it well
to take the road back to Cleveland, move thence towards
Knoxville, and, uniting with Longstreet, make a sudden dash upon
Burnside.

When I arrived at Ringgold, however, on the 27th, I saw that the
retreat was most earnest. The enemy had been throwing away guns,
caissons and small-arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether,
seemed to be moving like a disorganized mob, with the exception
of Cleburne’s division, which was acting as rear-guard to cover
the retreat.

When Hooker moved from Rossville toward Ringgold Palmer’s
division took the road to Graysville, and Sherman moved by the
way of Chickamauga Station toward the same point. As soon as I
saw the situation at Ringgold I sent a staff officer back to
Chattanooga to advise Thomas of the condition of affairs, and
direct him by my orders to start Granger at once. Feeling now
that the troops were already on the march for the relief of
Burnside I was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at Ringgold
through the day to prepare for the return of our troops.

Ringgold is in a valley in the mountains, situated between East
Chickamauga Creek and Taylor’s Ridge, and about twenty miles
south-east from Chattanooga. I arrived just as the artillery
that Hooker had left behind at Chattanooga Creek got up. His
men were attacking Cleburne’s division, which had taken a strong
position in the adjacent hills so as to cover the retreat of the
Confederate army through a narrow gorge which presents itself at
that point. Just beyond the gorge the valley is narrow, and the
creek so tortuous that it has to be crossed a great many times
in the course of the first mile. This attack was unfortunate,
and cost us some men unnecessarily. Hooker captured, however, 3
pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel dead were
left upon the field.

I directed General Hooker to collect the flour and wheat in the
neighboring mills for the use of the troops, and then to destroy
the mills and all other property that could be of use to the
enemy, but not to make any wanton destruction.

At this point Sherman came up, having reached Graysville with
his troops, where he found Palmer had preceded him. Palmer had
picked up many prisoners and much abandoned property on the
route. I went back in the evening to Graysville with Sherman,
remained there over night and did not return to Chattanooga
until the following night, the 29th. I then found that Thomas
had not yet started Granger, thus having lost a full day which I
deemed of so much importance in determining the fate of
Knoxville. Thomas and Granger were aware that on the 23d of the
month Burnside had telegraphed that his supplies would last for
ten or twelve days and during that time he could hold out
against Longstreet, but if not relieved within the time
indicated he would be obliged to surrender or attempt to
retreat. To effect a retreat would have been an
impossibility. He was already very low in ammunition, and with
an army pursuing he would not have been able to gather supplies.

Finding that Granger had not only not started but was very
reluctant to go, he having decided for himself that it was a
very bad move to make, I sent word to General Sherman of the
situation and directed him to march to the relief of
Knoxville. I also gave him the problem that we had to
solve–that Burnside had now but four to six days supplies left,
and that he must be relieved within that time.

Sherman, fortunately, had not started on his return from
Graysville, having sent out detachments on the railroad which
runs from Dalton to Cleveland and Knoxville to thoroughly
destroy that road, and these troops had not yet returned to
camp. I was very loath to send Sherman, because his men needed
rest after their long march from Memphis and hard fighting at
Chattanooga. But I had become satisfied that Burnside would not
be rescued if his relief depended upon General Granger’s
movements.

Sherman had left his camp on the north side of the Tennessee
River, near Chattanooga, on the night of the 23d, the men having
two days’ cooked rations in their haversacks. Expecting to be
back in their tents by that time and to be engaged in battle
while out, they took with them neither overcoats nor blankets.
The weather was already cold, and at night they must have
suffered more or less. The two days’ rations had already lasted
them five days; and they were now to go through a country which
had been run over so much by Confederate troops that there was
but little probability of finding much food. They did, however,
succeed in capturing some flour. They also found a good deal of
bran in some of the mills, which the men made up into bread; and
in this and other ways they eked out an existence until they
could reach Knoxville.

I was so very anxious that Burnside should get news of the steps
being taken for his relief, and thus induce him to hold out a
little longer if it became necessary, that I determined to send
a message to him. I therefore sent a member of my staff,
Colonel J. H. Wilson, to get into Knoxville if he could report
to Burnside the situation fully, and give him all the
encouragement possible. Mr. Charles A. Dana was at Chattanooga
during the battle, and had been there even before I assumed
command. Mr. Dana volunteered to accompany Colonel Wilson, and
did accompany him. I put the information of what was being done
for the relief of Knoxville into writing, and directed that in
some way or other it must be secretly managed so as to have a
copy of this fall into the hands of General Longstreet. They
made the trip safely; General Longstreet did learn of Sherman’s
coming in advance of his reaching there, and Burnside was
prepared to hold out even for a longer time if it had been
necessary.

Burnside had stretched a boom across the Holston River to catch
scows and flats as they floated down. On these, by previous
arrangements with the loyal people of East Tennessee, were
placed flour and corn, with forage and provisions generally, and
were thus secured for the use of the Union troops. They also
drove cattle into Knoxville by the east side, which was not
covered by the enemy; so that when relief arrived Burnside had
more provisions on hand than when he had last reported.

Our total loss (not including Burnside’s) in all these
engagements amounted to 757 killed, 4,529 wounded and 330
missing. We captured 6,142 prisoners–about 50 per cent. more
than the enemy reported for their total loss–40 pieces of
artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons and over 7,000
stands of small-arms. The enemy’s loss in arms was probably
much greater than here reported, because we picked up a great
many that were found abandoned.

I had at Chattanooga, in round numbers, about 60,000 men. Bragg
had about half this number, but his position was supposed to be
impregnable. It was his own fault that he did not have more men
present. He had sent Longstreet away with his corps swelled by
reinforcements up to over twenty thousand men, thus reducing his
own force more than one-third and depriving himself of the
presence of the ablest general of his command. He did this,
too, after our troops had opened a line of communication by way
of Brown’s and Kelly’s ferries with Bridgeport, thus securing
full rations and supplies of every kind; and also when he knew
reinforcements were coming to me. Knoxville was of no earthly
use to him while Chattanooga was in our hands. If he should
capture Chattanooga, Knoxville with its garrison would have
fallen into his hands without a struggle. I have never been
able to see the wisdom of this move.

Then, too, after Sherman had arrived, and when Bragg knew that
he was on the north side of the Tennessee River, he sent
Buckner’s division to reinforce Longstreet. He also started
another division a day later, but our attack having commenced
before it reached Knoxville Bragg ordered it back. It had got
so far, however, that it could not return to Chattanooga in time
to be of service there. It is possible this latter blunder may
have been made by Bragg having become confused as to what was
going on on our side. Sherman had, as already stated, crossed
to the north side of the Tennessee River at Brown’s Ferry, in
full view of Bragg’s troops from Lookout Mountain, a few days
before the attack. They then disappeared behind foot hills, and
did not come to the view of the troops on Missionary Ridge until
they met their assault. Bragg knew it was Sherman’s troops that
had crossed, and, they being so long out of view, may have
supposed that they had gone up the north bank of the Tennessee
River to the relief of Knoxville and that Longstreet was
therefore in danger. But the first great blunder, detaching
Longstreet, cannot be accounted for in any way I know of. If he
had captured Chattanooga, East Tennessee would have fallen
without a struggle. It would have been a victory for us to have
got our army away from Chattanooga safely. It was a manifold
greater victory to drive away the besieging army; a still
greater one to defeat that army in his chosen ground and nearly
annihilate it.

The probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier,
as we were the attacking party. The enemy reported his loss in
killed at 361: but as he reported his missing at 4,146, while
we held over 6,000 of them as prisoners, and there must have
been hundreds if not thousands who deserted, but little reliance
can be placed on this report. There was certainly great
dissatisfaction with Bragg on the part of the soldiers for his
harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away if they
could. Then, too, Chattanooga, following in the same half year
with Gettysburg in the East and Vicksburg in the West, there was
much the same feeling in the South at this time that there had
been in the North the fall and winter before. If the same
license had been allowed the people and press in the South that
was allowed in the North, Chattanooga would probably have been
the last battle fought for the preservation of the Union.

General William F. Smith’s services in these battles had been
such that I thought him eminently entitled to promotion. I was
aware that he had previously been named by the President for
promotion to the grade of major-general, but that the Senate had
rejected the nomination. I was not aware of the reasons for this
course, and therefore strongly recommended him for a
major-generalcy. My recommendation was heeded and the
appointment made.

Upon the raising of the siege of Knoxville I, of course,
informed the authorities at Washington–the President and
Secretary of War–of the fact, which caused great rejoicing
there. The President especially was rejoiced that Knoxville had
been relieved (*18) without further bloodshed. The safety of
Burnside’s army and the loyal people of East Tennessee had been
the subject of much anxiety to the President for several months,
during which time he was doing all he could to relieve the
situation; sending a new commander (*19) with a few thousand
troops by the way of Cumberland Gap, and telegraphing me daily,
almost hourly, to “remember Burnside,” “do something for
Burnside,” and other appeals of like tenor. He saw no escape
for East Tennessee until after our victory at Chattanooga. Even
then he was afraid that Burnside might be out of ammunition, in
a starving condition, or overpowered: and his anxiety was still
intense until he heard that Longstreet had been driven from the
field.

Burnside followed Longstreet only to Strawberry Plains, some
twenty miles or more east, and then stopped, believing that
Longstreet would leave the State. The latter did not do so,
however, but stopped only a short distance farther on and
subsisted his army for the entire winter off East Tennessee.
Foster now relieved Burnside. Sherman made disposition of his
troops along the Tennessee River in accordance with
instructions. I left Thomas in command at Chattanooga, and,
about the 20th of December, moved my headquarters to Nashville,
Tennessee.

Nashville was the most central point from which to communicate
with my entire military division, and also with the authorities
at Washington. While remaining at Chattanooga I was liable to
have my telegraphic communications cut so as to throw me out of
communication with both my command and Washington.

Nothing occurred at Nashville worthy of mention during the
winter, (*20) so I set myself to the task of having troops in
positions from which they could move to advantage, and in
collecting all necessary supplies so as to be ready to claim a
due share of the enemy’s attention upon the appearance of the
first good weather in the spring. I expected to retain the
command I then had, and prepared myself for the campaign against
Atlanta. I also had great hopes of having a campaign made against
Mobile from the Gulf. I expected after Atlanta fell to occupy
that place permanently, and to cut off Lee’s army from the West
by way of the road running through Augusta to Atlanta and thence
south-west. I was preparing to hold Atlanta with a small
garrison, and it was my expectation to push through to Mobile if
that city was in our possession: if not, to Savannah; and in
this manner to get possession of the only east and west railroad
that would then be left to the enemy. But the spring campaign
against Mobile was not made.

The Army of the Ohio had been getting supplies over Cumberland
Gap until their animals had nearly all starved. I now
determined to go myself to see if there was any possible chance
of using that route in the spring, and if not to abandon it.
Accordingly I left Nashville in the latter part of December by
rail for Chattanooga. From Chattanooga I took one of the little
steamers previously spoken of as having been built there, and,
putting my horses aboard, went up to the junction of the Clinch
with the Tennessee. From that point the railroad had been
repaired up to Knoxville and out east to Strawberry Plains. I
went by rail therefore to Knoxville, where I remained for
several days. General John G. Foster was then commanding the
Department of the Ohio. It was an intensely cold winter, the
thermometer being down as low as zero every morning for more
than a week while I was at Knoxville and on my way from there on
horseback to Lexington, Kentucky, the first point where I could
reach rail to carry me back to my headquarters at Nashville.

The road over Cumberland Gap, and back of it, was strewn with
debris of broken wagons and dead animals, much as I had found it
on my first trip to Chattanooga over Waldron’s Ridge. The road
had been cut up to as great a depth as clay could be by mules
and wagons, and in that condition frozen; so that the ride of
six days from Strawberry Plains to Lexington over these holes
and knobs in the road was a very cheerless one, and very
disagreeable.

I found a great many people at home along that route, both in
Tennessee and Kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely
loyal. They would collect in little places where we would stop
of evenings, to see me, generally hearing of my approach before
we arrived. The people naturally expected to see the commanding
general the oldest person in the party. I was then forty-one
years of age, while my medical director was gray-haired and
probably twelve or more years my senior. The crowds would
generally swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity of
quietly dismounting and getting into the house. It also gave me
an opportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to
another about their general. Those remarks were apt to be more
complimentary to the cause than to the appearance of the
supposed general, owing to his being muffled up, and also owing
to the travel-worn condition we were all in after a hard day’s
ride. I was back in Nashville by the 13th of January, 1864.

When I started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some
person along who could turn dispatches into cipher, and who could
also read the cipher dispatches which I was liable to receive
daily and almost hourly. Under the rules of the War Department
at that time, Mr. Stanton had taken entire control of the matter
of regulating the telegraph and determining how it should be
used, and of saying who, and who alone, should have the
ciphers. The operators possessed of the ciphers, as well as the
ciphers used, were practically independent of the commanders whom
they were serving immediately under, and had to report to the War
Department through General Stager all the dispatches which they
received or forwarded.

I was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator back at
Nashville, because that was the point at which all dispatches to
me would come, to be forwarded from there. As I have said, it
was necessary for me also to have an operator during this
inspection who had possession of this cipher to enable me to
telegraph to my division and to the War Department without my
dispatches being read by all the operators along the line of
wires over which they were transmitted. Accordingly I ordered
the cipher operator to turn over the key to Captain Cyrus B.
Comstock, of the Corps of Engineers, whom I had selected as a
wise and discreet man who certainly could be trusted with the
cipher if the operator at my headquarters could.

The operator refused point blank to turn over the key to Captain
Comstock as directed by me, stating that his orders from the War
Department were not to give it to anybody–the commanding
general or any one else. I told him I would see whether he
would or not. He said that if he did he would be punished. I
told him if he did not he most certainly would be punished.
Finally, seeing that punishment was certain if he refused longer
to obey my order, and being somewhat remote (even if he was not
protected altogether from the consequences of his disobedience
to his orders) from the War Department, he yielded. When I
returned from Knoxville I found quite a commotion. The operator
had been reprimanded very severely and ordered to be relieved. I
informed the Secretary of War, or his assistant secretary in
charge of the telegraph, Stager, that the man could not be
relieved, for he had only obeyed my orders. It was absolutely
necessary for me to have the cipher, and the man would most
certainly have been punished if he had not delivered it; that
they would have to punish me if they punished anybody, or words
to that effect.

This was about the only thing approaching a disagreeable
difference between the Secretary of War and myself that occurred
until the war was over, when we had another little spat. Owing
to his natural disposition to assume all power and control in
all matters that he had anything whatever to do with, he boldly
took command of the armies, and, while issuing no orders on the
subject, prohibited any order from me going out of the
adjutant-general’s office until he had approved it. This was
done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders that
came from me to be issued from the adjutant-general’s office
until he had examined them and given his approval. He never
disturbed himself, either, in examining my orders until it was
entirely convenient for him; so that orders which I had prepared
would often lie there three or four days before he would sanction
them. I remonstrated against this in writing, and the Secretary
apologetically restored me to my rightful position of
General-in-Chief of the Army. But he soon lapsed again and took
control much as before.

After the relief of Knoxville Sherman had proposed to Burnside
that he should go with him to drive Longstreet out of Tennessee;
but Burnside assured him that with the troops which had been
brought by Granger, and which were to be left, he would be amply
prepared to dispose of Longstreet without availing himself of
this offer. As before stated Sherman’s command had left their
camps north of the Tennessee, near Chattanooga, with two days’
rations in their haversacks, without coats or blankets, and
without many wagons, expecting to return to their camps by the
end of that time. The weather was now cold and they were
suffering, but still they were ready to make the further
sacrifice, had it been required, for the good of the cause which
had brought them into service. Sherman, having accomplished the
object for which he was sent, marched back leisurely to his old
camp on the Tennessee River.

CHAPTER XLVI.

OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI–LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE
–COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT-GENERAL–COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE
UNITED STATES–FIRST INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

Soon after his return from Knoxville I ordered Sherman to
distribute his forces from Stevenson to Decatur and thence north
to Nashville; Sherman suggested that he be permitted to go back
to Mississippi, to the limits of his own department and where
most of his army still remained, for the purpose of clearing out
what Confederates might still be left on the east bank of the
Mississippi River to impede its navigation by our boats. He
expected also to have the co-operation of Banks to do the same
thing on the west shore. Of course I approved heartily.

About the 10th of January Sherman was back in Memphis, where
Hurlbut commanded, and got together his Memphis men, or ordered
them collected and sent to Vicksburg. He then went to Vicksburg
and out to where McPherson was in command, and had him organize
his surplus troops so as to give him about 20,000 men in all.

Sherman knew that General (Bishop) Polk was occupying Meridian
with his headquarters, and had two divisions of infantry with a
considerable force of cavalry scattered west of him. He
determined, therefore, to move directly upon Meridian.

I had sent some 2,500 cavalry under General Sooy Smith to
Sherman’s department, and they had mostly arrived before Sherman
got to Memphis. Hurlbut had 7,000 cavalry, and Sherman ordered
him to reinforce Smith so as to give the latter a force of about
7,000 with which to go against Forrest, who was then known to be
south-east from Memphis. Smith was ordered to move about the
1st of February.

While Sherman was waiting at Vicksburg for the arrival of
Hurlbut with his surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain
the position and strength of the enemy and to bring back all the
information they could gather. When these scouts returned it was
through them that he got the information of General Polk’s being
at Meridian, and of the strength and disposition of his command.

Forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him, composed of thoroughly
well-disciplined men, who under so able a leader were very
effective. Smith’s command was nearly double that of Forrest,
but not equal, man to man, for the lack of a successful
experience such as Forrest’s men had had. The fact is, troops
who have fought a few battles and won, and followed up their
victories, improve upon what they were before to an extent that
can hardly be counted by percentage. The difference in result
is often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat. This
same difference, too, is often due to the way troops are
officered, and for the particular kind of warfare which Forrest
had carried on neither army could present a more effective
officer than he was.

Sherman got off on the 3d of February and moved out on his
expedition, meeting with no opposition whatever until he crossed
the Big Black, and with no great deal of opposition after that
until he reached Jackson, Mississippi. This latter place he
reached on the 6th or 7th, Brandon on the 8th, and Morton on the
9th. Up to this time he moved in two columns to enable him to
get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite the march. Here,
however, there were indications of the concentration of
Confederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his army close
together. He had no serious engagement; but he met some of the
enemy who destroyed a few of his wagons about Decatur,
Mississippi, where, by the way, Sherman himself came near being
picked up.

He entered Meridian on the 14th of the month, the enemy having
retreated toward Demopolis, Alabama. He spent several days in
Meridian in thoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and
south, and also for the purpose of hearing from Sooy Smith, who
he supposed had met Forrest before this time and he hoped had
gained a decisive victory because of a superiority of numbers.
Hearing nothing of him, however, he started on his return trip
to Vicksburg. There he learned that Smith, while waiting for a
few of his men who had been ice-bound in the Ohio River, instead
of getting off on the 1st as expected, had not left until the
11th. Smith did meet Forrest, but the result was decidedly in
Forrest’s favor.

Sherman had written a letter to Banks, proposing a co-operative
movement with him against Shreveport, subject to my approval. I
disapproved of Sherman’s going himself, because I had other
important work for him to do, but consented that he might send a
few troops to the aid of Banks, though their time to remain
absent must be limited. We must have them for the spring
campaign. The trans-Mississippi movement proved abortive.

My eldest son, who had accompanied me on the Vicksburg campaign
and siege, had while there contracted disease, which grew worse,
until he had grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of January
I obtained permission to go to St. Louis, where he was staying at
the time, to see him, hardly expecting to find him alive on my
arrival. While I was permitted to go, I was not permitted to
turn over my command to any one else, but was directed to keep
the headquarters with me and to communicate regularly with all
parts of my division and with Washington, just as though I had
remained at Nashville.

When I obtained this leave I was at Chattanooga, having gone
there again to make preparations to have the troops of Thomas in
the southern part of Tennessee co-operate with Sherman’s movement
in Mississippi. I directed Thomas, and Logan who was at
Scottsboro, Alabama, to keep up a threatening movement to the
south against J. E. Johnston, who had again relieved Bragg, for
the purpose of making him keep as many troops as possible there.

I learned through Confederate sources that Johnston had already
sent two divisions in the direction of Mobile, presumably to
operate against Sherman, and two more divisions to Longstreet in
East Tennessee. Seeing that Johnston had depleted in this way, I
directed Thomas to send at least ten thousand men, besides
Stanley’s division which was already to the east, into East
Tennessee, and notified Schofield, who was now in command in
East Tennessee, of this movement of troops into his department
and also of the reinforcements Longstreet had received. My
object was to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee as a part
of the preparations for my spring campaign.

About this time General Foster, who had been in command of the
Department of the Ohio after Burnside until Schofield relieved
him (*21), advised me that he thought it would be a good thing
to keep Longstreet just where he was; that he was perfectly
quiet in East Tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there,
his whole well-equipped army would be free to go to any place
where it could effect the most for their cause. I thought the
advice was good, and, adopting that view, countermanded the
orders for pursuit of Longstreet.

On the 12th of February I ordered Thomas to take Dalton and hold
it, if possible; and I directed him to move without delay.
Finding that he had not moved, on the 17th I urged him again to
start, telling him how important it was, that the object of the
movement was to co-operate with Sherman, who was moving eastward
and might be in danger. Then again on the 21st, he not yet
having started, I asked him if he could not start the next
day. He finally got off on the 22d or 23d. The enemy fell back
from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite as
strong and farther to the rear. Thomas reported that he could
not go any farther, because it was impossible with his poor
teams, nearly starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads
were repaired. He soon fell back.

Schofield also had to return for the same reason. He could not
carry supplies with him, and Longstreet was between him and the
supplies still left in the country. Longstreet, in his retreat,
would be moving towards his supplies, while our forces,
following, would be receding from theirs. On the 2d of March,
however, I learned of Sherman’s success, which eased my mind
very much. The next day, the 3d, I was ordered to Washington.

The bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general of the army
had passed through Congress and became a law on the 26th of
February. My nomination had been sent to the Senate on the 1st
of March and confirmed the next day (the 2d). I was ordered to
Washington on the 3d to receive my commission, and started the
day following that. The commission was handed to me on the
9th. It was delivered to me at the Executive Mansion by
President Lincoln in the presence of his Cabinet, my eldest son,
those of my staff who were with me and and a few other visitors.

The President in presenting my commission read from a
paper–stating, however, as a preliminary, and prior to the
delivery of it, that he had drawn that up on paper, knowing my
disinclination to speak in public, and handed me a copy in
advance so that I might prepare a few lines of reply. The
President said:

“General Grant, the nation’s appreciation of what you have done,
and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the
existing great struggle, are now presented, with this commission
constituting you lieutenant-general in the Army of the United
States. With this high honor, devolves upon you, also, a
corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you,
so, under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add,
that, with what I here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty
personal concurrence.”

To this I replied: “Mr. President, I accept the commission,
with gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of
the noble armies that have fought in so many fields for our
common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint
your expectations. I feel the full weight of the
responsibilities now devolving on me; and I know that if they
are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, to the
favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men.”

On the 10th I visited the headquarters of the Army of the
Potomac at Brandy Station; then returned to Washington, and
pushed west at once to make my arrangements for turning over the
commands there and giving general directions for the preparations
to be made for the spring campaign.

It had been my intention before this to remain in the West, even
if I was made lieutenant-general; but when I got to Washington
and saw the situation it was plain that here was the point for
the commanding general to be. No one else could, probably,
resist the pressure that would be brought to bear upon him to
desist from his own plans and pursue others. I determined,
therefore, before I started back to have Sherman advanced to my
late position, McPherson to Sherman’s in command of the
department, and Logan to the command of McPherson’s corps. These
changes were all made on my recommendation and without
hesitation. My commission as lieutenant-general was given to me
on the 9th of March, 1864. On the following day, as already
stated, I visited General Meade, commanding the Army of the
Potomac, at his headquarters at Brandy Station, north of the
Rapidan. I had known General Meade slightly in the Mexican war,
but had not met him since until this visit. I was a stranger to
most of the Army of the Potomac, I might say to all except the
officers of the regular army who had served in the Mexican
war. There had been some changes ordered in the organization of
that army before my promotion. One was the consolidation of five
corps into three, thus throwing some officers of rank out of
important commands. Meade evidently thought that I might want
to make still one more change not yet ordered. He said to me
that I might want an officer who had served with me in the West,
mentioning Sherman specially, to take his place. If so, he
begged me not to hesitate about making the change. He urged
that the work before us was of such vast importance to the whole
nation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand
in the way of selecting the right men for all positions. For
himself, he would serve to the best of his ability wherever
placed. I assured him that I had no thought of substituting any
one for him. As to Sherman, he could not be spared from the
West.

This incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of Meade
than did his great victory at Gettysburg the July before. It is
men who wait to be selected, and not those who seek, from whom we
may always expect the most efficient service.

Meade’s position afterwards proved embarrassing to me if not to
him. He was commanding an army and, for nearly a year previous
to my taking command of all the armies, was in supreme command
of the Army of the Potomac–except from the authorities at
Washington. All other general officers occupying similar
positions were independent in their commands so far as any one
present with them was concerned. I tried to make General
Meade’s position as nearly as possible what it would have been
if I had been in Washington or any other place away from his
command. I therefore gave all orders for the movements of the
Army of the Potomac to Meade to have them executed. To avoid
the necessity of having to give orders direct, I established my
headquarters near his, unless there were reasons for locating
them elsewhere. This sometimes happened, and I had on occasions
to give orders direct to the troops affected. On the 11th I
returned to Washington and, on the day after, orders were
published by the War Department placing me in command of all the
armies. I had left Washington the night before to return to my
old command in the West and to meet Sherman whom I had
telegraphed to join me in Nashville.

Sherman assumed command of the military division of the
Mississippi on the 18th of March, and we left Nashville together
for Cincinnati. I had Sherman accompany me that far on my way
back to Washington so that we could talk over the matters about
which I wanted to see him, without losing any more time from my
new command than was necessary. The first point which I wished
to discuss was particularly about the co-operation of his
command with mine when the spring campaign should commence.
There were also other and minor points, minor as compared with
the great importance of the question to be decided by sanguinary
war–the restoration to duty of officers who had been relieved
from important commands, namely McClellan, Burnside and Fremont
in the East, and Buell, McCook, Negley and Crittenden in the
West.

Some time in the winter of 1863-64 I had been invited by the
general-in-chief to give my views of the campaign I thought
advisable for the command under me–now Sherman’s. General J.
E. Johnston was defending Atlanta and the interior of Georgia
with an army, the largest part of which was stationed at Dalton,
about 38 miles south of Chattanooga. Dalton is at the junction of
the railroad from Cleveland with the one from Chattanooga to
Atlanta.

There could have been no difference of opinion as to the first
duty of the armies of the military division of the
Mississippi. Johnston’s army was the first objective, and that
important railroad centre, Atlanta, the second. At the time I
wrote General Halleck giving my views of the approaching
campaign, and at the time I met General Sherman, it was expected
that General Banks would be through with the campaign which he
had been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of
all the armies, and would be ready to co-operate with the armies
east of the Mississippi, his part in the programme being to move
upon Mobile by land while the navy would close the harbor and
assist to the best of its ability. (*22) The plan therefore was
for Sherman to attack Johnston and destroy his army if possible,
to capture Atlanta and hold it, and with his troops and those of
Banks to hold a line through to Mobile, or at least to hold
Atlanta and command the railroad running east and west, and the
troops from one or other of the armies to hold important points
on the southern road, the only east and west road that would be
left in the possession of the enemy. This would cut the
Confederacy in two again, as our gaining possession of the
Mississippi River had done before. Banks was not ready in time
for the part assigned to him, and circumstances that could not
be foreseen determined the campaign which was afterwards made,
the success and grandeur of which has resounded throughout all
lands.

In regard to restoring officers who had been relieved from
important commands to duty again, I left Sherman to look after
those who had been removed in the West while I looked out for
the rest. I directed, however, that he should make no
assignment until I could speak to the Secretary of War about the
matter. I shortly after recommended to the Secretary the
assignment of General Buell to duty. I received the assurance
that duty would be offered to him; and afterwards the Secretary
told me that he had offered Buell an assignment and that the
latter had declined it, saying that it would be degradation to
accept the assignment offered. I understood afterwards that he
refused to serve under either Sherman or Canby because he had
ranked them both. Both graduated before him and ranked him in
the old army. Sherman ranked him as a brigadier-general. All
of them ranked me in the old army, and Sherman and Buell did as
brigadiers. The worse excuse a soldier can make for declining
service is that he once ranked the commander he is ordered to
report to.

On the 23d of March I was back in Washington, and on the 26th
took up my headquarters at Culpeper Court-House, a few miles
south of the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac.

Although hailing from Illinois myself, the State of the
President, I never met Mr. Lincoln until called to the capital
to receive my commission as lieutenant-general. I knew him,
however, very well and favorably from the accounts given by
officers under me at the West who had known him all their
lives. I had also read the remarkable series of debates between
Lincoln and Douglas a few years before, when they were rival
candidates for the United States Senate. I was then a resident
of Missouri, and by no means a “Lincoln man” in that contest;
but I recognized then his great ability.

In my first interview with Mr. Lincoln alone he stated to me
that he had never professed to be a military man or to know how
campaigns should be conducted, and never wanted to interfere in
them: but that procrastination on the part of commanders, and
the pressure from the people at the North and Congress, WHICH
WAS ALWAYS WITH HIM, forced him into issuing his series of
“Military Orders”–one, two, three, etc. He did not know but
they were all wrong, and did know that some of them were. All
he wanted or had ever wanted was some one who would take the
responsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance
needed, pledging himself to use all the power of the government
in rendering such assistance. Assuring him that I would do the
best I could with the means at hand, and avoid as far as
possible annoying him or the War Department, our first interview
ended.

The Secretary of War I had met once before only, but felt that I
knew him better.

While commanding in West Tennessee we had occasionally held
conversations over the wires, at night, when they were not being
otherwise used. He and General Halleck both cautioned me against
giving the President my plans of campaign, saying that he was so
kind-hearted, so averse to refusing anything asked of him, that
some friend would be sure to get from him all he knew. I should
have said that in our interview the President told me he did not
want to know what I proposed to do. But he submitted a plan of
campaign of his own which he wanted me to hear and then do as I
pleased about. He brought out a map of Virginia on which he had
evidently marked every position occupied by the Federal and
Confederate armies up to that time. He pointed out on the map
two streams which empty into the Potomac, and suggested that the
army might be moved on boats and landed between the mouths of
these streams. We would then have the Potomac to bring our
supplies, and the tributaries would protect our flanks while we
moved out. I listened respectfully, but did not suggest that
the same streams would protect Lee’s flanks while he was
shutting us up.

I did not communicate my plans to the President, nor did I to
the Secretary of War or to General Halleck.

March the 26th my headquarters were, as stated, at Culpeper, and
the work of preparing for an early campaign commenced.

CHAPTER XLVII.

THE MILITARY SITUATION–PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN–SHERIDAN
ASSIGNED TO COMMAND OF THE CAVALRY–FLANK MOVEMENTS–FORREST AT
FORT PILLOW–GENERAL BANKS’S EXPEDITION–COLONEL MOSBY–AN
INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN.

When I assumed command of all the armies the situation was about
this: the Mississippi River was guarded from St. Louis to its
mouth; the line of the Arkansas was held, thus giving us all the
North-west north of that river. A few points in Louisiana not
remote from the river were held by the Federal troops, as was
also the mouth of the Rio Grande. East of the Mississippi we
held substantially all north of the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad as far east as Chattanooga, thence along the line of
the Tennessee and Holston rivers, taking in nearly all of the
State of Tennessee. West Virginia was in our hands; and that
part of old Virginia north of the Rapidan and east of the Blue
Ridge we also held. On the sea-coast we had Fortress Monroe and
Norfolk in Virginia; Plymouth, Washington and New Berne in North
Carolina; Beaufort, Folly and Morris islands, Hilton Head, Port
Royal and Fort Pulaski in South Carolina and Georgia;
Fernandina, St. Augustine, Key West and Pensacola in Florida.
The balance of the Southern territory, an empire in extent, was
still in the hands of the enemy.

Sherman, who had succeeded me in the command of the military
division of the Mississippi, commanded all the troops in the
territory west of the Alleghanies and north of Natchez, with a
large movable force about Chattanooga. His command was
subdivided into four departments, but the commanders all
reported to Sherman and were subject to his orders. This
arrangement, however, insured the better protection of all lines
of communication through the acquired territory, for the reason
that these different department commanders could act promptly in
case of a sudden or unexpected raid within their respective
jurisdictions without awaiting the orders of the division
commander.

In the East the opposing forces stood in substantially the same
relations towards each other as three years before, or when the
war began; they were both between the Federal and Confederate
capitals. It is true, footholds had been secured by us on the
sea-coast, in Virginia and North Carolina, but, beyond that, no
substantial advantage had been gained by either side. Battles
had been fought of as great severity as had ever been known in
war, over ground from the James River and Chickahominy, near
Richmond, to Gettysburg and Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania, with
indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the National army,
sometimes to the Confederate army; but in every instance, I
believe, claimed as victories for the South by the Southern
press if not by the Southern generals. The Northern press, as a
whole, did not discourage these claims; a portion of it always
magnified rebel success and belittled ours, while another
portion, most sincerely earnest in their desire for the
preservation of the Union and the overwhelming success of the
Federal armies, would nevertheless generally express
dissatisfaction what whatever victories were gained because they
were not more complete.

That portion of the Army of the Potomac not engaged in guarding
lines of communication was on the northern bank of the
Rapidan. The Army of Northern Virginia confronting it on the
opposite bank of the same river, was strongly intrenched and
commanded by the acknowledged ablest general in the Confederate
army. The country back to the James River is cut up with many
streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross except
where bridged. The region is heavily timbered, and the roads
narrow, and very bad after the least rain. Such an enemy was
not, of course, unprepared with adequate fortifications at
convenient intervals all the way back to Richmond, so that when
driven from one fortified position they would always have
another farther to the rear to fall back into.

To provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a foe
through such a country, from wagons alone seemed almost
impossible. System and discipline were both essential to its
accomplishment.

The Union armies were now divided into nineteen departments,
though four of them in the West had been concentrated into a
single military division. The Army of the Potomac was a
separate command and had no territorial limits. There were thus
seventeen distinct commanders. Before this time these various
armies had acted separately and independently of each other,
giving the enemy an opportunity often of depleting one command,
not pressed, to reinforce another more actively engaged. I
determined to stop this. To this end I regarded the Army of the
Potomac as the centre, and all west to Memphis along the line
described as our position at the time, and north of it, the
right wing; the Army of the James, under General Butler, as the
left wing, and all the troops south, as a force in rear of the
enemy. Some of these latter were occupying positions from which
they could not render service proportionate to their numerical
strength. All such were depleted to the minimum necessary to
hold their positions as a guard against blockade runners; where
they could not do this their positions were abandoned
altogether. In this way ten thousand men were added to the Army
of the James from South Carolina alone, with General Gillmore in
command. It was not contemplated that General Gillmore should
leave his department; but as most of his troops were taken,
presumably for active service, he asked to accompany them and
was permitted to do so. Officers and soldiers on furlough, of
whom there were many thousands, were ordered to their proper
commands; concentration was the order of the day, and to have it
accomplished in time to advance at the earliest moment the roads
would permit was the problem.

As a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or to act in
support of it, the 9th army corps, over twenty thousand strong,
under General Burnside, had been rendezvoused at Annapolis,
Maryland. This was an admirable position for such a
reinforcement. The corps could be brought at the last moment as
a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or it could be thrown
on the sea-coast, south of Norfolk, in Virginia or North
Carolina, to operate against Richmond from that direction. In
fact Burnside and the War Department both thought the 9th corps
was intended for such an expedition up to the last moment.

My general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible
against the Confederate armies in the field. There were but two
such, as we have seen, east of the Mississippi River and facing
north. The Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee
commanding, was on the south bank of the Rapidan, confronting
the Army of the Potomac; the second, under General Joseph E.
Johnston, was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed to Sherman who was
still at Chattanooga. Beside these main armies the Confederates
had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse to feed
their armies from, and their line of communications from
Richmond to Tennessee. Forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry
general, was in the West with a large force; making a larger
command necessary to hold what we had gained in Middle and West
Tennessee. We could not abandon any territory north of the line
held by the enemy because it would lay the Northern States open
to invasion. But as the Army of the Potomac was the principal
garrison for the protection of Washington even while it was
moving on Lee, so all the forces to the west, and the Army of
the James, guarded their special trusts when advancing them from
as well as when remaining at them. Better indeed, for they
forced the enemy to guard his own lines and resources at a
greater distance from ours, and with a greater force. Little
expeditions could not so well be sent out to destroy a bridge or
tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn a storehouse, or
inflict other little annoyances. Accordingly I arranged for a
simultaneous movement all along the line. Sherman was to move
from Chattanooga, Johnston’s army and Atlanta being his
objective points.(*23) Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was
to move from the mouth of the Gauley River with a cavalry force
and some artillery, the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad to be
his objective. Either the enemy would have to keep a large
force to protect their communications, or see them destroyed and
a large amount of forage and provision, which they so much
needed, fall into our hands. Sigel was in command in the Valley
of Virginia. He was to advance up the valley, covering the North
from an invasion through that channel as well while advancing as
by remaining near Harper’s Ferry. Every mile he advanced also
gave us possession of stores on which Lee relied. Butler was to
advance by the James River, having Richmond and Petersburg as his
objective.

Before the advance commenced I visited Butler at Fort Monroe.
This was the first time I had ever met him. Before giving him
any order as to the part he was to play in the approaching
campaign I invited his views. They were very much such as I
intended to direct, and as I did direct (*24), in writing,
before leaving.

General W. F. Smith, who had been promoted to the rank of
major-general shortly after the battle of Chattanooga on my
recommendation, had not yet been confirmed. I found a decided
prejudice against his confirmation by a majority of the Senate,
but I insisted that his services had been such that he should be
rewarded. My wishes were now reluctantly complied with, and I
assigned him to the command of one of the corps under General
Butler. I was not long in finding out that the objections to
Smith’s promotion were well founded.

In one of my early interviews with the President I expressed my
dissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by
the cavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was
capable of accomplishing much more than it had done if under a
thorough leader. I said I wanted the very best man in the army
for that command. Halleck was present and spoke up, saying:
“How would Sheridan do?” I replied: “The very man I want.”
The President said I could have anybody I wanted. Sheridan was
telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assigned to the
command of the cavalry corps with the Army of the Potomac. This
relieved General Alfred Pleasonton. It was not a reflection on
that officer, however, for I did not know but that he had been
as efficient as any other cavalry commander.

Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered to assemble all
the troops he had at New Orleans in time to join in the general
move, Mobile to be his objective.

At this time I was not entirely decided as to whether I should
move the Army of the Potomac by the right flank of the enemy, or
by his left. Each plan presented advantages. (*25) If by his
right–my left–the Potomac, Chesapeake Bay and tributaries
would furnish us an easy hauling distance of every position the
army could occupy from the Rapidan to the James River. But Lee
could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a
line rather interior to the one I would have to take in
following. A movement by his left–our right–would obviate
this; but all that was done would have to be done with the
supplies and ammunition we started with. All idea of adopting
this latter plan was abandoned when he limited quantity of
supplies possible to take with us was considered. The country
over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or
forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us.

While these preparations were going on the enemy was not
entirely idle. In the West Forrest made a raid in West
Tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of
four or five hundred men at Union City, and followed it up by an
attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio. While he
was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any
part of the garrison. On the first intelligence of Forrest’s
raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against him,
and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself
into. Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him
before he got my order.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at
Fort Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of
the Mississippi River. The garrison consisted of a regiment of
colored troops, infantry, and a detachment of Tennessee
cavalry. These troops fought bravely, but were overpowered. I
will leave Forrest in his dispatches to tell what he did with
them.

“The river was dyed,” he says, “with the blood of the
slaughtered for two hundred yards. The approximate loss was
upward of five hundred killed, but few of the officers
escaping. My loss was about twenty killed. It is hoped that
these facts will demonstrate to the Northern people that negro
soldiers cannot cope with Southerners.” Subsequently Forrest
made a report in which he left out the part which shocks
humanity to read.

At the East, also, the rebels were busy. I had said to Halleck
that Plymouth and Washington, North Carolina, were unnecessary
to hold. It would be better to have the garrisons engaged there
added to Butler’s command. If success attended our arms both
places, and others too, would fall into our hands naturally.
These places had been occupied by Federal troops before I took
command of the armies, and I knew that the Executive would be
reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained my views; but
before my views were carried out the rebels captured the garrison
at Plymouth. I then ordered the abandonment of Washington, but
directed the holding of New Berne at all hazards. This was
essential because New Berne was a port into which blockade
runners could enter.

General Banks had gone on an expedition up the Red River long
before my promotion to general command. I had opposed the
movement strenuously, but acquiesced because it was the order of
my superior at the time. By direction of Halleck I had
reinforced Banks with a corps of about ten thousand men from
Sherman’s command. This reinforcement was wanted back badly
before the forward movement commenced. But Banks had got so far
that it seemed best that he should take Shreveport on the Red
River, and turn over the line of that river to Steele, who
commanded in Arkansas, to hold instead of the line of the
Arkansas. Orders were given accordingly, and with the
expectation that the campaign would be ended in time for Banks
to return A. J. Smith’s command to where it belonged and get
back to New Orleans himself in time to execute his part in the
general plan. But the expedition was a failure. Banks did not
get back in time to take part in the programme as laid down. Nor
was Smith returned until long after the movements of May, 1864,
had been begun. The services of forty thousand veteran troops,
over and above the number required to hold all that was
necessary in the Department of the Gulf, were thus paralyzed. It
is but just to Banks, however, to say that his expedition was
ordered from Washington and he was in no way responsible except
for the conduct of it. I make no criticism on this point. He
opposed the expedition.

By the 27th of April spring had so far advanced as to justify me
in fixing a day for the great move. On that day Burnside left
Annapolis to occupy Meade’s position between Bull Run and the
Rappahannock. Meade was notified and directed to bring his
troops forward to his advance. On the following day Butler was
notified of my intended advance on the 4th of May, and he was
directed to move the night of the same day and get as far up the
James River as possible by daylight, and push on from there to
accomplish the task given him. He was also notified that
reinforcements were being collected in Washington City, which
would be forwarded to him should the enemy fall back into the
trenches at Richmond. The same day Sherman was directed to get
his forces up ready to advance on the 5th. Sigel was in
Winchester and was notified to move in conjunction with the
others.

The criticism has been made by writers on the campaign from the
Rapidan to the James River that all the loss of life could have
been obviated by moving the army there on transports. Richmond
was fortified and intrenched so perfectly that one man inside to
defend was more than equal to five outside besieging or
assaulting. To get possession of Lee’s army was the first great
object. With the capture of his army Richmond would necessarily
follow. It was better to fight him outside of his stronghold
than in it. If the Army of the Potomac had been moved bodily to
the James River by water Lee could have moved a part of his
forces back to Richmond, called Beauregard from the south to
reinforce it, and with the balance moved on to Washington. Then,
too, I ordered a move, simultaneous with that of the Army of the
Potomac, up the James River by a formidable army already
collected at the mouth of the river.

While my headquarters were at Culpeper, from the 26th of March
to the 4th of May, I generally visited Washington once a week to
confer with the Secretary of War and President. On the last
occasion, a few days before moving, a circumstance occurred
which came near postponing my part in the campaign altogether.
Colonel John S. Mosby had for a long time been commanding a
partisan corps, or regiment, which operated in the rear of the
Army of the Potomac. On my return to the field on this
occasion, as the train approached Warrenton Junction, a heavy
cloud of dust was seen to the east of the road as if made by a
body of cavalry on a charge. Arriving at the junction the train
was stopped and inquiries made as to the cause of the dust. There
was but one man at the station, and he informed us that Mosby had
crossed a few minutes before at full speed in pursuit of Federal
cavalry. Had he seen our train coming, no doubt he would have
let his prisoners escape to capture the train. I was on a
special train, if I remember correctly, without any guard.

Since the close of the war I have come to know Colonel Mosby
personally, and somewhat intimately. He is a different man
entirely from what I had supposed. He is slender, not tall,
wiry, and looks as if he could endure any amount of physical
exercise. He is able, and thoroughly honest and truthful. There
were probably but few men in the South who could have commanded
successfully a separate detachment in the rear of an opposing
army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long as he did
without losing his entire command.

On this same visit to Washington I had my last interview with
the President before reaching the James River. He had of course
become acquainted with the fact that a general movement had been
ordered all along the line, and seemed to think it a new feature
in war. I explained to him that it was necessary to have a great
number of troops to guard and hold the territory we had captured,
and to prevent incursions into the Northern States. These troops
could perform this service just as well by advancing as by
remaining still; and by advancing they would compel the enemy to
keep detachments to hold them back, or else lay his own territory
open to invasion. His answer was: “Oh, yes! I see that. As we
say out West, if a man can’t skin he must hold a leg while
somebody else does.”

There was a certain incident connected with the Wilderness
campaign of which it may not be out of place to speak; and to
avoid a digression further on I will mention it here.

A few days before my departure from Culpeper the Honorable E. B.
Washburne visited me there, and remained with my headquarters for
some distance south, through the battle in the Wilderness and, I
think, to Spottsylvania. He was accompanied by a Mr. Swinton,
whom he presented as a literary gentleman who wished to
accompany the army with a view of writing a history of the war
when it was over. He assured me–and I have no doubt Swinton
gave him the assurance–that he was not present as a
correspondent of the press. I expressed an entire willingness
to have him (Swinton) accompany the army, and would have allowed
him to do so as a correspondent, restricted, however, in the
character of the information he could give. We received
Richmond papers with about as much regularity as if there had
been no war, and knew that our papers were received with equal
regularity by the Confederates. It was desirable, therefore,
that correspondents should not be privileged spies of the enemy
within our lines.

Probably Mr. Swinton expected to be an invited guest at my
headquarters, and was disappointed that he was not asked to
become so. At all events he was not invited, and soon I found
that he was corresponding with some paper (I have now forgotten
which one), thus violating his word either expressed or
implied. He knew of the assurance Washburne had given as to the
character of his mission. I never saw the man from the day of
our introduction to the present that I recollect. He
accompanied us, however, for a time at least.

The second night after crossing the Rapidan (the night of the
5th of May) Colonel W. R. Rowley, of my staff, was acting as
night officer at my headquarters. A short time before midnight
I gave him verbal instructions for the night. Three days later
I read in a Richmond paper a verbatim report of these
instructions.

A few nights still later (after the first, and possibly after
the second, day’s fighting in the Wilderness) General Meade came
to my tent for consultation, bringing with him some of his staff
officers. Both his staff and mine retired to the camp-fire some
yards in front of the tent, thinking our conversation should be
private. There was a stump a little to one side, and between
the front of the tent and camp-fire. One of my staff, Colonel
T. S. Bowers, saw what he took to be a man seated on the ground
and leaning against the stump, listening to the conversation
between Meade and myself. He called the attention of Colonel
Rowley to it. The latter immediately took the man by the
shoulder and asked him, in language more forcible than polite,
what he was doing there. The man proved to be Swinton, the
“historian,” and his replies to the question were evasive and
unsatisfactory, and he was warned against further eaves-dropping.

The next I heard of Mr. Swinton was at Cold Harbor. General
Meade came to my headquarters saying that General Burnside had
arrested Swinton, who at some previous time had given great
offence, and had ordered him to be shot that afternoon. I
promptly ordered the prisoner to be released, but that he must
be expelled from the lines of the army not to return again on
pain of punishment.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN–GENERAL BUTLER’S
POSITION–SHERIDAN’S FIRST RAID.

The armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of
a single object. They were acting as a unit so far as such a
thing was possible over such a vast field. Lee, with the
capital of the Confederacy, was the main end to which all were
working. Johnston, with Atlanta, was an important obstacle in
the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at, and was
therefore almost an independent objective. It was of less
importance only because the capture of Johnston and his army
would not produce so immediate and decisive a result in closing
the rebellion as would the possession of Richmond, Lee and his
army. All other troops were employed exclusively in support of
these two movements. This was the plan; and I will now endeavor
to give, as concisely as I can, the method of its execution,
outlining first the operations of minor detached but
co-operative columns.

As stated before, Banks failed to accomplish what he had been
sent to do on the Red River, and eliminated the use of forty
thousand veterans whose cooperation in the grand campaign had
been expected–ten thousand with Sherman and thirty thousand
against Mobile.

Sigel’s record is almost equally brief. He moved out, it is
true, according to programme; but just when I was hoping to hear
of good work being done in the valley I received instead the
following announcement from Halleck: “Sigel is in full retreat
on Strasburg. He will do nothing but run; never did anything
else.” The enemy had intercepted him about New Market and
handled him roughly, leaving him short six guns, and some nine
hundred men out of his six thousand.

The plan had been for an advance of Sigel’s forces in two
columns. Though the one under his immediate command failed
ingloriously the other proved more fortunate. Under Crook and
Averell his western column advanced from the Gauley in West
Virginia at the appointed time, and with more happy results.
They reached the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad at Dublin and
destroyed a depot of supplies, besides tearing up several miles
of road and burning the bridge over New River. Having
accomplished this they recrossed the Alleghanies to Meadow
Bluffs and there awaited further orders.

Butler embarked at Fort Monroe with all his command, except the
cavalry and some artillery which moved up the south bank of the
James River. His steamers moved first up Chesapeake Bay and
York River as if threatening the rear of Lee’s army. At
midnight they turned back, and Butler by daylight was far up the
James River. He seized City Point and Bermuda Hundred early in
the day, without loss and, no doubt, very much to the surprise
of the enemy.

This was the accomplishment of the first step contemplated in my
instructions to Butler. He was to act from here, looking to
Richmond as his objective point. I had given him to understand
that I should aim to fight Lee between the Rapidan and Richmond
if he would stand; but should Lee fall back into Richmond I
would follow up and make a junction of the armies of the Potomac
and the James on the James River. He was directed to secure a
footing as far up the south side of the river as he could at as
early a date as possible.

Butler was in position by the 6th of May and had begun
intrenching, and on the 7th he sent out his cavalry from Suffolk
to cut the Weldon Railroad. He also sent out detachments to
destroy the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond, but no
great success attended these latter efforts. He made no great
effort to establish himself on that road and neglected to attack
Petersburg, which was almost defenceless. About the 11th he
advanced slowly until he reached the works at Drury’s Bluff,
about half way between Bermuda Hundred and Richmond. In the
mean time Beauregard had been gathering reinforcements. On the
16th he attacked Butler with great vigor, and with such success
as to limit very materially the further usefulness of the Army
of the James as a distinct factor in the campaign. I afterward
ordered a portion of it to join the Army of the Potomac, leaving
a sufficient force with Butler to man his works, hold securely
the footing he had already gained and maintain a threatening
front toward the rear of the Confederate capital.

The position which General Butler had chosen between the two
rivers, the James and Appomattox, was one of great natural
strength, one where a large area of ground might be thoroughly
inclosed by means of a single intrenched line, and that a very
short one in comparison with the extent of territory which it
thoroughly protected. His right was protected by the James
River, his left by the Appomattox, and his rear by their
junction–the two streams uniting near by. The bends of the two
streams shortened the line that had been chosen for
intrenchments, while it increased the area which the line
inclosed.

Previous to ordering any troops from Butler I sent my chief
engineer, General Barnard, from the Army of the Potomac to that
of the James to inspect Butler’s position and ascertain whether
I could again safely make an order for General Butler’s movement
in co-operation with mine, now that I was getting so near
Richmond; or, if I could not, whether his position was strong
enough to justify me in withdrawing some of his troops and
having them brought round by water to White House to join me and
reinforce the Army of the Potomac. General Barnard reported the
position very strong for defensive purposes, and that I could do
the latter with great security; but that General Butler could not
move from where he was, in co-operation, to produce any effect.
He said that the general occupied a place between the James and
Appomattox rivers which was of great strength, and where with an
inferior force he could hold it for an indefinite length of time
against a superior; but that he could do nothing offensively. I
then asked him why Butler could not move out from his lines and
push across the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad to the rear and
on the south side of Richmond. He replied that it was
impracticable, because the enemy had substantially the same line
across the neck of land that General Butler had. He then took
out his pencil and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that
the position was like a bottle and that Butler’s line of
intrenchments across the neck represented the cork; that the
enemy had built an equally strong line immediately in front of
him across the neck; and it was therefore as if Butler was in a
bottle. He was perfectly safe against an attack; but, as
Barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with a
small force could hold the cork in its place. This struck me as
being very expressive of his position, particularly when I saw
the hasty sketch which General Barnard had drawn; and in making
my subsequent report I used that expression without adding
quotation marks, never thinking that anything had been said that
would attract attention–as this did, very much to the annoyance,
no doubt, of General Butler and, I know, very much to my own. I
found afterwards that this was mentioned in the notes of General
Badeau’s book, which, when they were shown to me, I asked to have
stricken out; yet it was retained there, though against my
wishes.

I make this statement here because, although I have often made
it before, it has never been in my power until now to place it
where it will correct history; and I desire to rectify all
injustice that I may have done to individuals, particularly to
officers who were gallantly serving their country during the
trying period of the war for the preservation of the Union.
General Butler certainly gave his very earnest support to the
war; and he gave his own best efforts personally to the
suppression of the rebellion.

The further operations of the Army of the James can best be
treated of in connection with those of the Army of the Potomac,
the two being so intimately associated and connected as to be
substantially one body in which the individuality of the
supporting wing is merged.

Before giving the reader a summary of Sherman’s great Atlanta
campaign, which must conclude my description of the various
co-operative movements preparatory to proceeding with that of
the operations of the centre, I will briefly mention Sheridan’s
first raid upon Lee’s communications which, though an incident
of the operations on the main line and not specifically marked
out in the original plan, attained in its brilliant execution
and results all the proportions of an independent campaign. By
thus anticipating, in point of time, I will be able to more
perfectly observe the continuity of events occurring in my
immediate front when I shall have undertaken to describe our
advance from the Rapidan.

On the 8th of May, just after the battle of the Wilderness and
when we were moving on Spottsylvania I directed Sheridan
verbally to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac, pass around
the left of Lee’s army and attack his cavalry: to cut the two
roads–one running west through Gordonsville, Charlottesville
and Lynchburg, the other to Richmond, and, when compelled to do
so for want of forage and rations, to move on to the James River
and draw these from Butler’s supplies. This move took him past
the entire rear of Lee’s army. These orders were also given in
writing through Meade.

The object of this move was three-fold. First, if successfully
executed, and it was, he would annoy the enemy by cutting his
line of supplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or
get for his own use supplies in store in the rear and coming
up. Second, he would draw the enemy’s cavalry after him, and
thus better protect our flanks, rear and trains than by
remaining with the army. Third, his absence would save the
trains drawing his forage and other supplies from
Fredericksburg, which had now become our base. He started at
daylight the next morning, and accomplished more than was
expected. It was sixteen days before he got back to the Army of
the Potomac.

The course Sheridan took was directly to Richmond. Before night
Stuart, commanding the Confederate cavalry, came on to the rear
of his command. But the advance kept on, crossed the North
Anna, and at Beaver Dam, a station on the Virginia Central
Railroad, recaptured four hundred Union prisoners on their way
to Richmond, destroyed the road and used and destroyed a large
amount of subsistence and medical stores.

Stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing towards Richmond,
abandoned the pursuit on the morning of the 10th and, by a
detour and an exhausting march, interposed between Sheridan and
Richmond at Yellow Tavern, only about six miles north of the
city. Sheridan destroyed the railroad and more supplies at
Ashland, and on the 11th arrived in Stuart’s front. A severe
engagement ensued in which the losses were heavy on both sides,
but the rebels were beaten, their leader mortally wounded, and
some guns and many prisoners were captured.

Sheridan passed through the outer defences of Richmond, and
could, no doubt, have passed through the inner ones. But having
no supports near he could not have remained. After caring for
his wounded he struck for the James River below the city, to
communicate with Butler and to rest his men and horses as well
as to get food and forage for them.

He moved first between the Chickahominy and the James, but in
the morning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at
Mechanicsville. He then turned to cross to the north side of
the Chickahominy by Meadow Bridge. He found this barred, and
the defeated Confederate cavalry, reorganized, occupying the
opposite side. The panic created by his first entrance within
the outer works of Richmond having subsided troops were sent out
to attack his rear.

He was now in a perilous position, one from which but few
generals could have extricated themselves. The defences of
Richmond, manned, were to the right, the Chickahominy was to the
left with no bridge remaining and the opposite bank guarded, to
the rear was a force from Richmond. This force was attacked and
beaten by Wilson’s and Gregg’s divisions, while Sheridan turned
to the left with the remaining division and hastily built a
bridge over the Chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forced
a crossing and soon dispersed the Confederates he found there.
The enemy was held back from the stream by the fire of the
troops not engaged in bridge building.

On the 13th Sheridan was at Bottom’s Bridge, over the
Chickahominy. On the 14th he crossed this stream and on that
day went into camp on the James River at Haxall’s Landing. He
at once put himself into communication with General Butler, who
directed all the supplies he wanted to be furnished.

Sheridan had left the Army of the Potomac at Spottsylvania, but
did not know where either this or Lee’s army was now. Great
caution therefore had to be exercised in getting back. On the
17th, after resting his command for three days, he started on
his return. He moved by the way of White House. The bridge
over the Pamunkey had been burned by the enemy, but a new one
was speedily improvised and the cavalry crossed over it. On the
22d he was at Aylett’s on the Matapony, where he learned the
position of the two armies. On the 24th he joined us on the
march from North Anna to Cold Harbor, in the vicinity of
Chesterfield.

Sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around Lee’s
army: encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated
them in all; recaptured four hundred Union prisoners and killed
and captured many of the enemy; destroyed and used many supplies
and munitions of war; destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph,
and freed us from annoyance by the cavalry of the enemy for more
than two weeks.

CHAPTER XLIX.

SHERMAN’S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA–SIEGE OF ATLANTA–DEATH OF
GENERAL MCPHERSON–ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE ANDERSONVILLE–CAPTURE OF
ATLANTA.

After separating from Sherman in Cincinnati I went on to
Washington, as already stated, while he returned to Nashville to
assume the duties of his new command. His military division was
now composed of four departments and embraced all the territory
west of the Alleghany Mountains and east of the Mississippi
River, together with the State of Arkansas in the
trans-Mississippi. The most easterly of these was the
Department of the Ohio, General Schofield commanding; the next
was the Department of the Cumberland, General Thomas commanding;
the third the Department of the Tennessee, General McPherson
commanding; and General Steele still commanded the
trans-Mississippi, or Department of Arkansas. The last-named
department was so far away that Sherman could not communicate
with it very readily after starting on his spring campaign, and
it was therefore soon transferred from his military division to
that of the Gulf, where General Canby, who had relieved General
Banks, was in command.

The movements of the armies, as I have stated in a former
chapter, were to be simultaneous, I fixing the day to start when
the season should be far enough advanced, it was hoped, for the
roads to be in a condition for the troops to march.

General Sherman at once set himself to work preparing for the
task which was assigned him to accomplish in the spring
campaign. McPherson lay at Huntsville with about twenty-four
thousand men, guarding those points of Tennessee which were
regarded as most worth holding; Thomas, with over sixty thousand
men of the Army of the Cumberland, was at Chattanooga; and
Schofield, with about fourteen thousand men, was at Knoxville.
With these three armies, numbering about one hundred thousand
men in all, Sherman was to move on the day fixed for the general
advance, with a view of destroying Johnston’s army and capturing
Atlanta. He visited each of these commands to inform himself as
to their condition, and it was found to be, speaking generally,
good.

One of the first matters to turn his attention to was that of
getting, before the time arrived for starting, an accumulation
of supplies forward to Chattanooga, sufficiently large to
warrant a movement. He found, when he got to that place, that
the trains over the single-track railroad, which was frequently
interrupted for a day or two at a time, were only sufficient to
meet the daily wants of the troops without bringing forward any
surplus of any kind. He found, however, that trains were being
used to transport all the beef cattle, horses for the cavalry,
and even teams that were being brought to the front. He at once
changed all this, and required beef cattle, teams, cavalry
horses, and everything that could travel, even the troops, to be
marched, and used the road exclusively for transporting
supplies. In this way he was able to accumulate an abundance
before the time finally fixed upon for the move, the 4th of May.

As I have said already, Johnston was at Dalton, which was nearly
one-fourth of the way between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The
country is mountainous all the way to Atlanta, abounding in
mountain streams, some of them of considerable volume. Dalton
is on ground where water drains towards Atlanta and into one of
the main streams rising north-east from there and flowing
south-west–this being the general direction which all the main
streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries entering
into them. Johnston had been preparing himself for this
campaign during the entire winter. The best positions for
defence had been selected all the way from Dalton back to
Atlanta, and very strongly intrenched; so that, as he might be
forced to fall back from one position, he would have another to
fall into in his rear. His position at Dalton was so very
strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least
hoped, to hold Sherman there and prevent him from getting any
further. With a less skilful general, and one disposed to take
no risks, I have no doubt that he would have succeeded.

Sherman’s plan was to start Schofield, who was farthest back, a
few days in advance from Knoxville, having him move on the
direct road to Dalton. Thomas was to move out to Ringgold. It
had been Sherman’s intention to cross McPherson over the
Tennessee River at Huntsville or Decatur, and move him south
from there so as to have him come into the road running from
Chattanooga to Atlanta a good distance to the rear of the point
Johnston was occupying; but when that was contemplated it was
hoped that McPherson alone would have troops enough to cope with
Johnston, if the latter should move against him while unsupported
by the balance of the army. In this he was disappointed. Two of
McPherson’s veteran divisions had re-enlisted on the express
provision that they were to have a furlough. This furlough had
not yet expired, and they were not back.

Then, again, Sherman had lent Banks two divisions under A. J.
Smith, the winter before, to co-operate with the
trans-Mississippi forces, and this with the express pledge that
they should be back by a time specified, so as to be prepared
for this very campaign. It is hardly necessary to say they were
not returned. That department continued to absorb troops to no
purpose to the end of the war. This left McPherson so weak that
the part of the plan above indicated had to be changed. He was
therefore brought up to Chattanooga and moved from there on a
road to the right of Thomas–the two coming together about
Dalton. The three armies were abreast, all ready to start
promptly on time.

Sherman soon found that Dalton was so strongly fortified that it
was useless to make any attempt to carry it by assault; and even
to carry it by regular approaches was impracticable. There was
a narrowing up in the mountain, between the National and
Confederate armies, through which a stream, a wagon road and a
railroad ran. Besides, the stream had been dammed so that the
valley was a lake. Through this gorge the troops would have to
pass. McPherson was therefore sent around by the right, to come
out by the way of Snake Creek Gap into the rear of the enemy.
This was a surprise to Johnston, and about the 13th he decided
to abandon his position at Dalton.

On the 15th there was very hard fighting about Resaca; but our
cavalry having been sent around to the right got near the road
in the enemy’s rear. Again Johnston fell back, our army
pursuing. The pursuit was continued to Kingston, which was
reached on the 19th with very little fighting, except that
Newton’s division overtook the rear of Johnston’s army and
engaged it. Sherman was now obliged to halt for the purpose of
bringing up his railroad trains. He was depending upon the
railroad for all of his supplies, and as of course the railroad
was wholly destroyed as Johnston fell back, it had to be
rebuilt. This work was pushed forward night and day, and caused
much less delay than most persons would naturally expect in a
mountainous country where there were so many bridges to be
rebuilt.

The campaign to Atlanta was managed with the most consummate
skill, the enemy being flanked out of one position after another
all the way there. It is true this was not accomplished without
a good deal of fighting–some of it very hard fighting, rising
to the dignity of very important battles–neither were single
positions gained in a day. On the contrary, weeks were spent at
some; and about Atlanta more than a month was consumed.

It was the 23d of May before the road was finished up to the
rear of Sherman’s army and the pursuit renewed. This pursuit
brought him up to the vicinity of Allatoona. This place was very
strongly intrenched, and naturally a very defensible position. An
assault upon it was not thought of, but preparations were made to
flank the enemy out of it. This was done by sending a large
force around our right, by the way of Dallas, to reach the rear
of the enemy. Before reaching there, however, they found the
enemy fortified in their way, and there resulted hard fighting
for about a week at a place called New Hope Church. On the left
our troops also were fortified, and as close up to the enemy as
they could get. They kept working still farther around to the
left toward the railroad. This was the case more particularly
with the cavalry. By the 4th of June Johnston found that he was
being hemmed in so rapidly that he drew off and Allatoona was
left in our possession.

Allatoona, being an important place, was strongly intrenched for
occupation by our troops before advancing farther, and made a
secondary base of supplies. The railroad was finished up to
that point, the intrenchments completed, storehouses provided
for food, and the army got in readiness for a further advance.
The rains, however, were falling in such torrents that it was
impossible to move the army by the side roads which they would
have to move upon in order to turn Johnston out of his new
position.

While Sherman’s army lay here, General F. P. Blair returned to
it, bringing with him the two divisions of veterans who had been
on furlough.

Johnston had fallen back to Marietta and Kenesaw Mountain, where
strong intrenchments awaited him. At this latter place our
troops made an assault upon the enemy’s lines after having got
their own lines up close to him, and failed, sustaining
considerable loss. But during the progress of the battle
Schofield was gaining ground to the left; and the cavalry on his
left were gaining still more toward the enemy’s rear. These
operations were completed by the 3d of July, when it was found
that Johnston had evacuated the place. He was pursued at
once. Sherman had made every preparation to abandon the
railroad, leaving a strong guard in his intrenchments. He had
intended, moving out with twenty days’ rations and plenty of
ammunition, to come in on the railroad again at the
Chattahoochee River. Johnston frustrated this plan by himself
starting back as above stated. This time he fell back to the
Chattahoochee.

About the 5th of July he was besieged again, Sherman getting
easy possession of the Chattahoochee River both above and below
him. The enemy was again flanked out of his position, or so
frightened by flanking movements that on the night of the 9th he
fell back across the river.

Here Johnston made a stand until the 17th, when Sherman’s old
tactics prevailed again and the final movement toward Atlanta
began. Johnston was now relieved of the command, and Hood
superseded him.

Johnston’s tactics in this campaign do not seem to have met with
much favor, either in the eyes of the administration at Richmond,
or of the people of that section of the South in which he was
commanding. The very fact of a change of commanders being
ordered under such circumstances was an indication of a change
of policy, and that now they would become the aggressors–the
very thing our troops wanted.

For my own part, I think that Johnston’s tactics were right.
Anything that could have prolonged the war a year beyond the
time that it did finally close, would probably have exhausted
the North to such an extent that they might then have abandoned
the contest and agreed to a separation.

Atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way around in a
circle about a mile and a half outside of the city. In addition
to this, there were advanced intrenchments which had to be taken
before a close siege could be commenced.

Sure enough, as indicated by the change of commanders, the enemy
was about to assume the offensive. On the 20th he came out and
attacked the Army of the Cumberland most furiously. Hooker’s
corps, and Newton’s and Johnson’s divisions were the principal
ones engaged in this contest, which lasted more than an hour;
but the Confederates were then forced to fall back inside their
main lines. The losses were quite heavy on both sides. On this
day General Gresham, since our Postmaster-General, was very badly
wounded. During the night Hood abandoned his outer lines, and
our troops were advanced. The investment had not been
relinquished for a moment during the day.

During the night of the 21st Hood moved out again, passing by
our left flank, which was then in motion to get a position
farther in rear of him, and a desperate battle ensued, which
lasted most of the day of the 22d. At first the battle went
very much in favor of the Confederates, our troops being
somewhat surprised. While our troops were advancing they were
struck in flank, and their flank was enveloped. But they had
become too thorough veterans to be thrown into irreparable
confusion by an unexpected attack when off their guard, and soon
they were in order and engaging the enemy, with the advantage now
of knowing where their antagonist was. The field of battle
continued to expand until it embraced about seven miles of
ground. Finally, however, and before night, the enemy was
driven back into the city (*26).

It was during this battle that McPherson, while passing from one
column to another, was instantly killed. In his death the army
lost one of its ablest, purest and best generals.

Garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to get upon the
railroad east of Atlanta and to cut it in the direction of
Augusta. He was successful in this, and returned about the time
of the battle. Rousseau had also come up from Tennessee with a
small division of cavalry, having crossed the Tennessee River
about Decatur and made a raid into Alabama. Finally, when hard
pressed, he had come in, striking the railroad in rear of
Sherman, and reported to him about this time.

The battle of the 22d is usually known as the Battle of Atlanta,
although the city did not fall into our hands until the 2d of
September. Preparations went on, as before, to flank the enemy
out of his position. The work was tedious, and the lines that
had to be maintained were very long. Our troops were gradually
worked around to the east until they struck the road between
Decatur and Atlanta. These lines were strongly fortified, as
were those to the north and west of the city–all as close up to
the enemy’s lines as practicable–in order to hold them with the
smallest possible number of men, the design being to detach an
army to move by our right and try to get upon the railroad down
south of Atlanta.

On the 27th the movement by the right flank commenced. On the
28th the enemy struck our right flank, General Logan commanding,
with great vigor. Logan intrenched himself hastily, and by that
means was enabled to resist all assaults and inflict a great
deal of damage upon the enemy. These assaults were continued to
the middle of the afternoon, and resumed once or twice still
later in the day. The enemy’s losses in these unsuccessful
assaults were fearful.

During that evening the enemy in Logan’s front withdrew into the
town. This now left Sherman’s army close up to the Confederate
lines, extending from a point directly east of the city around
by the north and west of it for a distance of fully ten miles;
the whole of this line being intrenched, and made stronger every
day they remained there.

In the latter part of July Sherman sent Stoneman to destroy the
railroads to the south, about Macon. He was then to go east
and, if possible, release our prisoners about Andersonville.
There were painful stories current at the time about the great
hardships these prisoners had to endure in the way of general
bad treatment, in the way in which they were housed, and in the
way in which they were fed. Great sympathy was felt for them;
and it was thought that even if they could be turned loose upon
the country it would be a great relief to them. But the attempt
proved a failure. McCook, who commanded a small brigade, was
first reported to have been captured; but he got back, having
inflicted a good deal of damage upon the enemy. He had also
taken some prisoners; but encountering afterwards a largely
superior force of the enemy he was obliged to drop his prisoners
and get back as best he could with what men he had left. He had
lost several hundred men out of his small command. On the 4th
of August Colonel Adams, commanding a little brigade of about a
thousand men, returned reporting Stoneman and all but himself as
lost. I myself had heard around Richmond of the capture of
Stoneman, and had sent Sherman word, which he received. The
rumor was confirmed there, also, from other sources. A few days
after Colonel Adams’s return Colonel Capron also got in with a
small detachment and confirmed the report of the capture of
Stoneman with something less than a thousand men.

It seems that Stoneman, finding the escape of all his force was
impossible, had made arrangements for the escape of two
divisions. He covered the movement of these divisions to the
rear with a force of about seven hundred men, and at length
surrendered himself and this detachment to the commanding
Confederate. In this raid, however, much damage was inflicted
upon the enemy by the destruction of cars, locomotives, army
wagons, manufactories of military supplies, etc.

On the 4th and 5th Sherman endeavored to get upon the railroad
to our right, where Schofield was in command, but these attempts
failed utterly. General Palmer was charged with being the cause
of this failure, to a great extent, by both General Sherman and
General Schofield; but I am not prepared to say this, although a
question seems to have arisen with Palmer as to whether Schofield
had any right to command him. If he did raise this question
while an action was going on, that act alone was exceedingly
reprehensible.

About the same time Wheeler got upon our railroad north of
Resaca and destroyed it nearly up to Dalton. This cut Sherman
off from communication with the North for several days. Sherman
responded to this attack on his lines of communication by
directing one upon theirs.

Kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of August to reach
the Macon road about Jonesboro. He succeeded in doing so,
passed entirely around the Confederate lines of Atlanta, and was
back again in his former position on our left by the 22d. These
little affairs, however, contributed but very little to the
grand result. They annoyed, it is true, but any damage thus
done to a railroad by any cavalry expedition is soon repaired.

Sherman made preparations for a repetition of his tactics; that
is, for a flank movement with as large a force as could be got
together to some point in the enemy’s rear. Sherman commenced
this last movement on the 25th of August, and on the 1st of
September was well up towards the railroad twenty miles south of
Atlanta. Here he found Hardee intrenched, ready to meet him. A
battle ensued, but he was unable to drive Hardee away before
night set in. Under cover of the night, however, Hardee left of
his own accord. That night Hood blew up his military works, such
as he thought would be valuable in our hands, and decamped.

The next morning at daylight General H. W. Slocum, who was
commanding north of the city, moved in and took possession of
Atlanta, and notified Sherman. Sherman then moved deliberately
back, taking three days to reach the city, and occupied a line
extending from Decatur on the left to Atlanta in the centre,
with his troops extending out of the city for some distance to
the right.

The campaign had lasted about four months, and was one of the
most memorable in history. There was but little if anything in
the whole campaign, now that it is over, to criticise at all,
and nothing to criticise severely. It was creditable alike to
the general who commanded and the army which had executed it.
Sherman had on this campaign some bright, wide-awake division
and brigade commanders whose alertness added a host to the
efficiency of his command.

The troops now went to work to make themselves comfortable, and
to enjoy a little rest after their arduous campaign. The city
of Atlanta was turned into a military base. The citizens were
all compelled to leave. Sherman also very wisely prohibited the
assembling of the army of sutlers and traders who always follow
in the wake of an army in the field, if permitted to do so, from
trading with the citizens and getting the money of the soldiers
for articles of but little use to them, and for which they are
made to pay most exorbitant prices. He limited the number of
these traders to one for each of his three armies.

The news of Sherman’s success reached the North instantaneously,
and set the country all aglow. This was the first great
political campaign for the Republicans in their canvass of
1864. It was followed later by Sheridan’s campaign in the
Shenandoah Valley; and these two campaigns probably had more
effect in settling the election of the following November than
all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the parading with
banners and bands of music in the North.

CHAPTER L.

GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC–CROSSING THE
RAPIDAN–ENTERING THE WILDERNESS–BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.

Soon after midnight, May 3d-4th, the Army of the Potomac moved
out from its position north Rapidan, to start upon that
memorable campaign, destined to result in the capture of the
Confederate capital and the army defending it. This was not to
be accomplished, however, without as desperate fighting as the
world has ever witnessed; not to be consummated in a day, a
week, a month, single season. The losses inflicted, and
endured, were destined to be severe; but the armies now
confronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a
period of three years, with immense losses in killed, by death
from sickness, captured and wounded; and neither had made any
real progress accomplishing the final end. It is true the
Confederates had, so far, held their capital, and they claimed
this to be their sole object. But previously they had boldly
proclaimed their intention to capture Philadelphia, New York,
and the National Capital, and had made several attempts to do
so, and once or twice had come fearfully near making their boast
good–too near for complacent contemplation by the loyal North.
They had also come near losing their own capital on at least one
occasion. So here was a stand-off. The campaign now begun was
destined to result in heavier losses, to both armies, in a given
time, than any previously suffered; but the carnage was to be
limited to a single year, and to accomplish all that had been
anticipated or desired at the beginning in that time. We had to
have hard fighting to achieve this. The two armies had been
confronting each other so long, without any decisive result,
that they hardly knew which could whip.

Ten days’ rations, with a supply of forage and ammunition were
taken in wagons. Beef cattle were driven with the trains, and
butchered as wanted. Three days rations in addition, in
haversacks, and fifty rounds of cartridges, were carried on the
person of each soldier.

The country over which the army had to operate, from the Rapidan
to the crossing of the James River, is rather flat, and is cut by
numerous streams which make their way to the Chesapeake Bay. The
crossings of these streams by the army were generally made not
far above tide-water, and where formed a considerable obstacle
to the rapid advance of troops even when the enemy did not
appear in opposition. The country roads were narrow and poor.
Most of the country is covered with a dense forest, in places,
like the Wilderness and along the Chickahominy, almost
impenetrable even for infantry except along the roads. All
bridges were naturally destroyed before the National troops came
to them.

The Army of the Potomac was composed of three infantry and one
cavalry corps, commanded respectively by Generals W. S. Hancock,
G. K. Warren, (*27) John Sedgwick and P. H. Sheridan. The
artillery was commanded by General Henry J. Hunt. This arm was
in such abundance that the fourth of it could not be used to
advantage in such a country as we were destined to pass
through. The surplus was much in the way, taking up as it did
so much of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of
the forage and other stores brought up by the trains.

The 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was in advance on the
right, and marched directly for Germania Ford, preceded by one
division of cavalry, under General J. H. Wilson. General
Sedgwick followed Warren with the 6th corps. Germania Ford was
nine or ten miles below the right of Lee’s line. Hancock, with
the 2d corps, moved by another road, farther cast, directly upon
Ely’s Ford, six miles below Germania, preceded by Gregg’s
division of cavalry, and followed by the artillery. Torbert’s
division of cavalry was left north of the Rapidan, for the time,
to picket the river and prevent the enemy from crossing and
getting into our rear. The cavalry seized the two crossings
before daylight, drove the enemy’s pickets guarding them away,
and by six o’clock A.M. had the pontoons laid ready for the
crossing of the infantry and artillery. This was undoubtedly a
surprise to Lee. The fact that the movement was unopposed
proves this.

Burnside, with the 9th corps, was left back at Warrenton,
guarding the railroad from Bull Run forward to preserve control
of it in case our crossing the Rapidan should be long delayed.
He was instructed, however, to advance at once on receiving
notice that the army had crossed; and a dispatch was sent to him
a little after one P.M. giving the information that our crossing
had been successful.

The country was heavily wooded at all the points of crossing,
particularly on the south side of the river. The battle-field
from the crossing of the Rapidan until the final movement from
the Wilderness toward Spottsylvania was of the same character.
There were some clearings and small farms within what might be
termed the battle-field; but generally the country was covered
with a dense forest. The roads were narrow and bad. All the
conditions were favorable for defensive operations.

There are two roads, good for that part of Virginia, running
from Orange Court House to the battle-field. The most southerly
of these roads is known as the Orange Court House Plank Road, the
northern one as the Orange Turnpike. There are also roads from
east of the battle-field running to Spottsylvania Court House,
one from Chancellorsville, branching at Aldrich’s; the western
branch going by Piney Branch Church, Alsop’s, thence by the
Brock Road to Spottsylvania; the east branch goes by Gates’s,
thence to Spottsylvania. The Brock Road runs from Germania Ford
through the battle-field and on to the Court House. As
Spottsylvania is approached the country is cut up with numerous
roads, some going to the town direct, and others crossing so as
to connect the farms with roads going there.

Lee’s headquarters were at Orange Court House. From there to
Fredericksburg he had the use of the two roads above described
running nearly parallel to the Wilderness. This gave him
unusual facilities, for that country, for concentrating his
forces to his right. These roads strike the road from Germania
Ford in the Wilderness.

As soon as the crossing of the infantry was assured, the cavalry
pushed forward, Wilson’s division by Wilderness Tavern to
Parker’s store, on the Orange Plank Road; Gregg to the left
towards Chancellorsville. Warren followed Wilson and reached
the Wilderness Tavern by noon, took position there and
intrenched. Sedgwick followed Warren. He was across the river
and in camp on the south bank, on the right of Warren, by
sundown. Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved parallel with Warren
and camped about six miles east of him. Before night all the
troops, and by the evening of the 5th the trains of more than
four thousand wagons, were safely on the south side of the river.

There never was a corps better organized than was the
quartermaster’s corps with the Army of the Potomac in 1864. With
a wagon-train that would have extended from the Rapidan to
Richmond, stretched along in single file and separated as the
teams necessarily would be when moving, we could still carry
only three days’ forage and about ten to twelve days’ rations,
besides a supply of ammunition. To overcome all difficulties,
the chief quartermaster, General Rufus Ingalls, had marked on
each wagon the corps badge with the division color and the
number of the brigade. At a glance, the particular brigade to
which any wagon belonged could be told. The wagons were also
marked to note the contents: if ammunition, whether for
artillery or infantry; if forage, whether grain or hay; if
rations, whether, bread, pork, beans, rice, sugar, coffee or
whatever it might be. Empty wagons were never allowed to follow
the army or stay in camp. As soon as a wagon was empty it would
return to the base of supply for a load of precisely the same
article that had been taken from it. Empty trains were obliged
to leave the road free for loaded ones. Arriving near the army
they would be parked in fields nearest to the brigades they
belonged to. Issues, except of ammunition, were made at night
in all cases. By this system the hauling of forage for the
supply train was almost wholly dispensed with. They consumed
theirs at the depots.

I left Culpeper Court House after all the troops had been put in
motion, and passing rapidly to the front, crossed the Rapidan in
advance of Sedgwick’s corps; and established headquarters for
the afternoon and night in a deserted house near the river.

Orders had been given, long before this movement began, to cut
down the baggage of officers and men to the lowest point
possible. Notwithstanding this I saw scattered along the road
from Culpeper to Germania Ford wagon-loads of new blankets and
overcoats, thrown away by the troops to lighten their knapsacks;
an improvidence I had never witnessed before.

Lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have discovered at
a very early hour on the morning of the 4th of May, that the
Army of the Potomac was moving, evidently did not learn until
about one o’clock in the afternoon by what route we would
confront his army. This I judge from the fact that at 1.15
P.M., an hour and a quarter after Warren had reached Old
Wilderness Tavern, our officers took off rebel signals which,
when translated, were seen to be an order to his troops to
occupy their intrenchments at Mine Run.

Here at night dispatches were received announcing that Sherman,
Butler and Crook had moved according to programme.

On discovering the advance of the Army of the Potomac, Lee
ordered Hill, Ewell and Longstreet, each commanding corps, to
move to the right to attack us, Hill on the Orange Plank Road,
Longstreet to follow on the same road. Longstreet was at this
time–middle of the afternoon–at Gordonsville, twenty or more
miles away. Ewell was ordered by the Orange Pike. He was near
by and arrived some four miles east of Mine Run before
bivouacking for the night.

My orders were given through General Meade for an early advance
on the morning of the 5th. Warren was to move to Parker’s
store, and Wilson’s cavalry–then at Parker’s store–to move on
to Craig’s meeting-house. Sedgwick followed Warren, closing in
on his right. The Army of the Potomac was facing to the west,
though our advance was made to the south, except when facing the
enemy. Hancock was to move south-westward to join on the left of
Warren, his left to reach to Shady Grove Church.

At six o’clock, before reaching Parker’s store, Warren
discovered the enemy. He sent word back to this effect, and was
ordered to halt and prepare to meet and attack him. Wright, with
his division of Sedgwick’s corps, was ordered, by any road he
could find, to join on to Warren’s right, and Getty with his
division, also of Sedgwick’s corps, was ordered to move rapidly
by Warren’s rear and get on his left. This was the speediest
way to reinforce Warren who was confronting the enemy on both
the Orange plank and turnpike roads.

Burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on receiving word that
the Army of the Potomac had safely crossed the Rapidan. By
making a night march, although some of his troops had to march
forty miles to reach the river, he was crossing with the head of
his column early on the morning of the 5th. Meade moved his
headquarters on to Old Wilderness Tavern, four miles south of
the river, as soon as it was light enough to see the road. I
remained to hasten Burnside’s crossing and to put him in,
position. Burnside at this time was not under Meade’s command,
and was his senior in rank. Getting information of the
proximity of the enemy, I informed Meade, and without waiting to
see Burnside, at once moved forward my headquarters to where
Meade was.

It was my plan then, as it was on all other occasions, to take
the initiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his
intrenchments if we were not intrenched ourselves. Warren had
not yet reached the point where he was to halt, when he
discovered the enemy near by. Neither party had any advantage
of position. Warren was, therefore, ordered to attack as soon
as he could prepare for it. At nine o’clock Hancock was ordered
to come up to the support of Getty. He himself arrived at
Getty’s front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the
rear. Getty was directed to hold his position at all hazards
until relieved. About this hour Warren was ready, and attacked
with favorable though not decisive results. Getty was somewhat
isolated from Warren and was in a precarious condition for a
time. Wilson, with his division of cavalry, was farther south,
and was cut off from the rest of the army. At two o’clock
Hancock’s troops began to arrive, and immediately he was ordered
to join Getty and attack the enemy. But the heavy timber and
narrow roads prevented him from getting into position for attack
as promptly as he generally did when receiving such orders. At
four o’clock he again received his orders to attack, and General
Getty received orders from Meade a few minutes later to attack
whether Hancock was ready or not. He met the enemy under Heth
within a few hundred yards.

Hancock immediately sent two divisions, commanded by Birney and
Mott, and later two brigades, Carroll’s and Owen’s, to the
support of Getty. This was timely and saved Getty. During the
battle Getty and Carroll were wounded, but remained on the
field. One of Birney’s most gallant brigade commanders
–Alexander Hays–was killed.

I had been at West Point with Hays for three years, and had
served with him through the Mexican war, a portion of the time
in the same regiment. He was a most gallant officer, ready to
lead his command wherever ordered. With him it was “Come,
boys,” not “Go.”

Wadsworth’s division and Baxter’s brigade of the 2d division
were sent to reinforce Hancock and Getty; but the density of the
intervening forest was such that, there being no road to march
upon, they did not get up with the head of column until night,
and bivouacked where they were without getting into position.

During the afternoon Sheridan sent Gregg’s division of cavalry
to Todd’s Tavern in search of Wilson. This was fortunate. He
found Wilson engaged with a superior force under General Rosser,
supported by infantry, and falling back before it. Together they
were strong enough to turn the tables upon the enemy and
themselves become aggressive. They soon drove the rebel cavalry
back beyond Corbin’s Bridge.

Fighting between Hancock and Hill continued until night put a
close to it. Neither side made any special progress.

After the close of the battle of the 5th of May my orders were
given for the following morning. We knew Longstreet with 12,000
men was on his way to join Hill’s right, near the Brock Road, and
might arrive during the night. I was anxious that the rebels
should not take the initiative in the morning, and therefore
ordered Hancock to make an assault at 4.30 o’clock. Meade asked
to have the hour changed to six. Deferring to his wishes as far
as I was willing, the order was modified and five was fixed as
the hour to move.

Hancock had now fully one-half of the Army of the Potomac.
Wadsworth with his division, which had arrived the night before,
lay in a line perpendicular to that held by Hill, and to the
right of Hancock. He was directed to move at the same time, and
to attack Hill’s left.

Burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, was directed to
get in between Warren and Wadsworth, and attack as soon as he
could get in position to do so. Sedgwick and Warren were to
make attacks in their front, to detain as many of the enemy as
they could and to take advantage of any attempt to reinforce
Hill from that quarter. Burnside was ordered if he should
succeed in breaking the enemy’s centre, to swing around to the
left and envelop the right of Lee’s army. Hancock was informed
of all the movements ordered.

Burnside had three divisions, but one of them–a colored
division–was sent to guard the wagon train, and he did not see
it again until July.

Lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on
his right until Longstreet got up. This is evident from the fact
that notwithstanding the early hour at which I had ordered the
assault, both for the purpose of being the attacking party and
to strike before Longstreet got up, Lee was ahead in his assault
on our right. His purpose was evident, but he failed.

Hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in
time that Longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the
Catharpin Road, thus threatening his left flank, sent a division
of infantry, commanded by General Barlow, with all his artillery,
to cover the approaches by which Longstreet was expected. This
disposition was made in time to attack as ordered. Hancock
moved by the left of the Orange Plank Road, and Wadsworth by the
right of it. The fighting was desperate for about an hour, when
the enemy began to break up in great confusion.

I believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now,
that if the country had been such that Hancock and his command
could have seen the confusion and panic in the lines of the
enemy, it would have been taken advantage of so effectually that
Lee would not have made another stand outside of his Richmond
defences.

Gibbon commanded Hancock’s left, and was ordered to attack, but
was not able to accomplish much.

On the morning of the 6th Sheridan was sent to connect with
Hancock’s left and attack the enemy’s cavalry who were trying to
get on our left and rear. He met them at the intersection of the
Furnace and Brock roads and at Todd’s Tavern, and defeated them
at both places. Later he was attacked, and again the enemy was
repulsed.

Hancock heard the firing between Sheridan and Stuart, and
thinking the enemy coming by that road, still further reinforced
his position guarding the entrance to the Brock Road. Another
incident happened during the day to further induce Hancock to
weaken his attacking column. Word reached him that troops were
seen moving towards him from the direction of Todd’s Tavern, and
Brooke’s brigade was detached to meet this new enemy; but the
troops approaching proved to be several hundred convalescents
coming from Chancellorsville, by the road Hancock had advanced
upon, to join their respective commands. At 6.50 o’clock A.M.,
Burnside, who had passed Wilderness Tavern at six o’clock, was
ordered to send a division to the support of Hancock, but to
continue with the remainder of his command in the execution of
his previous order. The difficulty of making a way through the
dense forests prevented Burnside from getting up in time to be
of any service on the forenoon of the sixth.

Hancock followed Hill’s retreating forces, in the morning, a
mile or more. He maintained this position until, along in the
afternoon, Longstreet came upon him. The retreating column of
Hill meeting reinforcements that had not yet been engaged,
became encouraged and returned with them. They were enabled,
from the density of the forest, to approach within a few hundred
yards of our advance before being discovered. Falling upon a
brigade of Hancock’s corps thrown to the advance, they swept it
away almost instantly. The enemy followed up his advantage and
soon came upon Mott’s division, which fell back in great
confusion. Hancock made dispositions to hold his advanced
position, but after holding it for a time, fell back into the
position that he had held in the morning, which was strongly
intrenched. In this engagement the intrepid Wadsworth while
trying to rally his men was mortally wounded and fell into the
hands of the enemy. The enemy followed up, but made no
immediate attack.

The Confederate General Jenkins was killed and Longstreet
seriously wounded in this engagement. Longstreet had to leave
the field, not to resume command for many weeks. His loss was a
severe one to Lee, and compensated in a great measure for the
mishap, or misapprehensions, which had fallen to our lot during
the day.

After Longstreet’s removal from the field Lee took command of
his right in person. He was not able, however, to rally his men
to attack Hancock’s position, and withdrew from our front for the
purpose of reforming. Hancock sent a brigade to clear his front
of all remnants that might be left of Longstreet’s or Hill’s
commands. This brigade having been formed at right angles to
the intrenchments held by Hancock’s command, swept down the
whole length of them from left to right. A brigade of the enemy
was encountered in this move; but it broke and disappeared
without a contest.

Firing was continued after this, but with less fury. Burnside
had not yet been able to get up to render any assistance. But
it was now only about nine in the morning, and he was getting
into position on Hancock’s right.

At 4.15 in the afternoon Lee attacked our left. His line moved
up to within a hundred yards of ours and opened a heavy fire.
This status was maintained for about half an hour. Then a part
of Mott’s division and Ward’s brigade of Birney’s division gave
way and retired in disorder. The enemy under R. H. Anderson
took advantage of this and pushed through our line, planting
their flags on a part of the intrenchments not on fire. But
owing to the efforts of Hancock, their success was but
temporary. Carroll, of Gibbon’s division, moved at a double
quick with his brigade and drove back the enemy, inflicting
great loss. Fighting had continued from five in the morning
sometimes along the whole line, at other times only in places.
The ground fought over had varied in width, but averaged
three-quarters of a mile. The killed, and many of the severely
wounded, of both armies, lay within this belt where it was
impossible to reach them. The woods were set on fire by the
bursting shells, and the conflagration raged. The wounded who
had not strength to move themselves were either suffocated or
burned to death. Finally the fire communicated with our
breastworks, in places. Being constructed of wood, they burned
with great fury. But the battle still raged, our men firing
through the flames until it became too hot to remain longer.

Lee was now in distress. His men were in confusion, and his
personal efforts failed to restore order. These facts, however,
were learned subsequently, or we would have taken advantage of
his condition and no doubt gained a decisive success. His
troops were withdrawn now, but I revoked the order, which I had
given previously to this assault, for Hancock to attack, because
his troops had exhausted their ammunition and did not have time
to replenish from the train, which was at some distance.

Burnside, Sedgwick, and Warren had all kept up an assault during
all this time; but their efforts had no other effect than to
prevent the enemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in
their front.

I had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the Rapidan to
be taken up except one at Germania Ford.

The troops on Sedgwick’s right had been sent to inforce our
left. This left our right in danger of being turned, and us of
being cut off from all present base of supplies. Sedgwick had
refused his right and intrenched it for protection against
attack. But late in the afternoon of the 6th Early came out
from his lines in considerable force and got in upon Sedgwick’s
right, notwithstanding the precautions taken, and created
considerable confusion. Early captured several hundred
prisoners, among them two general officers. The defence,
however, was vigorous; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown
into as much confusion as our troops, engaged, were. Early says
in his Memoirs that if we had discovered the confusion in his
lines we might have brought fresh troops to his great
discomfort. Many officers, who had not been attacked by Early,
continued coming to my headquarters even after Sedgwick had
rectified his lines a little farther to the rear, with news of
the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy was
pushing on and would soon be upon me.

During the night all of Lee’s army withdrew within their
intrenchments. On the morning of the 7th General Custer drove
the enemy’s cavalry from Catharpin Furnace to Todd’s Tavern.
Pickets and skirmishers were sent along our entire front to find
the position of the enemy. Some went as far as a mile and a half
before finding him. But Lee showed no disposition to come out of
his Works. There was no battle during the day, and but little
firing except in Warren’s front; he being directed about noon to
make a reconnoissance in force. This drew some sharp firing, but
there was no attempt on the part of Lee to drive him back. This
ended the Battle of the Wilderness.

CHAPTER LI.

AFTER THE BATTLE–TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE–MOVEMENT BY THE
LEFT FLANK.

More desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent
than that of the 5th and 6th of May. Our victory consisted in
having successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the
face of an enemy, and in getting the army together as a unit.
We gained an advantage on the morning of the 6th, which, if it
had been followed up, must have proven very decisive. In the
evening the enemy gained an advantage; but was speedily
repulsed. As we stood at the close, the two armies were
relatively in about the same condition to meet each other as
when the river divided them. But the fact of having safely
crossed was a victory.

Our losses in the Wilderness were very severe. Those of the
Confederates must have been even more so; but I have no means of
speaking with accuracy upon this point. The Germania Ford bridge
was transferred to Ely’s Ford to facilitate the transportation of
the wounded to Washington.

It may be as well here as elsewhere to state two things
connected with all movements of the Army of the Potomac: first,
in every change of position or halt for the night, whether
confronting the enemy or not, the moment arms were stacked the
men intrenched themselves. For this purpose they would build up
piles of logs or rails if they could be found in their front, and
dig a ditch, throwing the dirt forward on the timber. Thus the
digging they did counted in making a depression to stand in, and
increased the elevation in front of them. It was wonderful how
quickly they could in this way construct defences of
considerable strength. When a halt was made with the view of
assaulting the enemy, or in his presence, these would be
strengthened or their positions changed under the direction of
engineer officers. The second was, the use made of the
telegraph and signal corps. Nothing could be more complete than
the organization and discipline of this body of brave and
intelligent men. Insulated wires–insulated so that they would
transmit messages in a storm, on the ground or under water–were
wound upon reels, making about two hundred pounds weight of wire
to each reel. Two men and one mule were detailed to each
reel. The pack-saddle on which this was carried was provided
with a rack like a sawbuck placed crosswise of the saddle, and
raised above it so that the reel, with its wire, would revolve
freely. There was a wagon, supplied with a telegraph operator,
battery and telegraph instruments for each division, each corps,
each army, and one for my headquarters. There were wagons also
loaded with light poles, about the size and length of a wall
tent pole, supplied with an iron spike in one end, used to hold
the wires up when laid, so that wagons and artillery would not
run over them. The mules thus loaded were assigned to brigades,
and always kept with the command they were assigned to. The
operators were also assigned to particular headquarters, and
never changed except by special orders.

The moment the troops were put in position to go into camp all
the men connected with this branch of service would proceed to
put up their wires. A mule loaded with a coil of wire would be
led to the rear of the nearest flank of the brigade he belonged
to, and would be led in a line parallel thereto, while one man
would hold an end of the wire and uncoil it as the mule was led
off. When he had walked the length of the wire the whole of it
would be on the ground. This would be done in rear of every
brigade at the same time. The ends of all the wires would then
be joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole
army. The men, attached to brigades or divisions, would all
commence at once raising the wires with their telegraph poles.
This was done by making a loop in the wire and putting it over
the spike and raising the pole to a perpendicular position. At
intervals the wire would be attached to trees, or some other
permanent object, so that one pole was sufficient at a place. In
the absence of such a support two poles would have to be used, at
intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm in its
place. While this was being done the telegraph wagons would
take their positions near where the headquarters they belonged
to were to be established, and would connect with the wire.
Thus, in a few minutes longer time than it took a mule to walk
the length of its coil, telegraphic communication would be
effected between all the headquarters of the army. No orders
ever had to be given to establish the telegraph.

The signal service was used on the march. The men composing
this corps were assigned to specified commands. When movements
were made, they would go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize
upon high points of ground giving a commanding view of the
country, if cleared, or would climb tall trees on the highest
points if not cleared, and would denote, by signals, the
positions of different parts of our own army, and often the
movements of the enemy. They would also take off the signals of
the enemy and transmit them. It would sometimes take too long a
time to make translations of intercepted dispatches for us to
receive any benefit from them. But sometimes they gave useful
information.

On the afternoon of the 7th I received news from Washington
announcing that Sherman had probably attacked Johnston that day,
and that Butler had reached City Point safely and taken it by
surprise on the 5th. I had given orders for a movement by the
left flank, fearing that Lee might move rapidly to Richmond to
crush Butler before I could get there.

My order for this movement was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S.,
May 7, 1864, 6.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding A. P.

Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take
position at Spottsylvania C. H. with one army corps, at Todd’s
Tavern with one, and another near the intersection of the Piney
Branch and Spottsylvania road with the road from Alsop’s to Old
Court House. If this move is made the trains should be thrown
forward early in the morning to the Ny River.

I think it would be advisable in making the change to leave
Hancock where he is until Warren passes him. He could then
follow and become the right of the new line. Burnside will move
to Piney Branch Church. Sedgwick can move along the pike to
Chancellorsville and on to his destination. Burnside will move
on the plank road to the intersection of it with the Orange and
Fredericksburg plank road, then follow Sedgwick to his place of
destination.

All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before
the troops move, and then move off quietly.

It is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy
attack on Hancock this afternoon. In case they do we must be
prepared to resist them, and follow up any success we may gain,
with our whole force. Such a result would necessarily modify
these instructions.

All the hospitals should be moved to-day to Chancellorsville.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

During the 7th Sheridan had a fight with the rebel cavalry at
Todd’s Tavern, but routed them, thus opening the way for the
troops that were to go by that route at night. Soon after dark
Warren withdrew from the front of the enemy, and was soon
followed by Sedgwick. Warren’s march carried him immediately
behind the works where Hancock’s command lay on the Brock
Road. With my staff and a small escort of cavalry I preceded
the troops. Meade with his staff accompanied me. The greatest
enthusiasm was manifested by Hancock’s men as we passed by. No
doubt it was inspired by the fact that the movement was south.
It indicated to them that they had passed through the “beginning
of the end” in the battle just fought. The cheering was so lusty
that the enemy must have taken it for a night attack. At all
events it drew from him a furious fusillade of artillery and
musketry, plainly heard but not felt by us.

Meade and I rode in advance. We had passed but a little way
beyond our left when the road forked. We looked to see, if we
could, which road Sheridan had taken with his cavalry during the
day. It seemed to be the right-hand one, and accordingly we took
it. We had not gone far, however, when Colonel C. B. Comstock,
of my staff, with the instinct of the engineer, suspecting that
we were on a road that would lead us into the lines of the
enemy, if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at a rapid gallop
and all alone. In a few minutes he returned and reported that
Lee was moving, and that the road we were on would bring us into
his lines in a short distance. We returned to the forks of the
road, left a man to indicate the right road to the head of
Warren’s column when it should come up, and continued our
journey to Todd’s Tavern, where we arrived after midnight.

My object in moving to Spottsylvania was two-fold: first, I did
not want Lee to get back to Richmond in time to attempt to crush
Butler before I could get there; second, I wanted to get between
his army and Richmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into
the open field. But Lee, by accident, beat us to
Spottsylvania. Our wagon trains had been ordered easterly of
the roads the troops were to march upon before the movement
commenced. Lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the Army
of the Potomac to Fredericksburg, and so informed his
government. Accordingly he ordered Longstreet’s corps–now
commanded by Anderson–to move in the morning (the 8th) to
Spottsylvania. But the woods being still on fire, Anderson
could not go into bivouac, and marched directly on to his
destination that night. By this accident Lee got possession of
Spottsylvania. It is impossible to say now what would have been
the result if Lee’s orders had been obeyed as given; but it is
certain that we would have been in Spottsylvania, and between
him and his capital. My belief is that there would have been a
race between the two armies to see which could reach Richmond
first, and the Army of the Potomac would have had the shorter
line. Thus, twice since crossing the Rapidan we came near
closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, from the
Rapidan to the James River or Richmond. The first failure was
caused by our not following up the success gained over Hill’s
corps on the morning of the 6th, as before described: the
second, when fires caused by that battle drove Anderson to make
a march during the night of the 7th-8th which he was ordered to
commence on the morning of the 8th. But accident often decides
the fate of battle.

Sheridan’s cavalry had had considerable fighting during the
afternoon of the 7th, lasting at Todd’s Tavern until after
night, with the field his at the close. He issued the necessary
orders for seizing Spottsylvania and holding the bridge over the
Po River, which Lee’s troops would have to cross to get to
Spottsylvania. But Meade changed Sheridan’s orders to
Merritt–who was holding the bridge–on his arrival at Todd’s
Tavern, and thereby left the road free for Anderson when he came
up. Wilson, who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his
division of cavalry; but he could not hold it against the
Confederate corps which had not been detained at the crossing of
the Po, as it would have been but for the unfortunate change in
Merritt’s orders. Had he been permitted to execute the orders
Sheridan gave him, he would have been guarding with two brigades
of cavalry the bridge over the Po River which Anderson had to
cross, and must have detained him long enough to enable Warren
to reinforce Wilson and hold the town.

Anderson soon intrenched himself–if indeed the intrenchments
were not already made–immediately across Warren’s front. Warren
was not aware of his presence, but probably supposed it was the
cavalry which Merritt had engaged earlier in the day. He
assaulted at once, but was repulsed. He soon organized his men,
as they were not pursued by the enemy, and made a second attack,
this time with his whole corps. This time he succeeded in
gaining a position immediately in the enemy’s front, where he
intrenched. His right and left divisions–the former
Crawford’s, the latter Wadsworth’s, now commanded by
Cutler–drove the enemy back some distance.

At this time my headquarters had been advanced to Piney Branch
Church. I was anxious to crush Anderson before Lee could get a
force to his support. To this end Sedgwick who was at Piney
Branch Church, was ordered to Warren’s support. Hancock, who
was at Todd’s Tavern, was notified of Warren’s engagement, and
was directed to be in readiness to come up. Burnside, who was
with the wagon trains at Aldrich’s on our extreme left, received
the same instructions. Sedgwick was slow in getting up for some
reason–probably unavoidable, because he was never at fault when
serious work was to be done–so that it was near night before the
combined forces were ready to attack. Even then all of
Sedgwick’s command did not get into the engagement. Warren led
the last assault, one division at a time, and of course it
failed.

Warren’s difficulty was twofold: when he received an order to
do anything, it would at once occur to his mind how all the
balance of the army should be engaged so as properly to
co-operate with him. His ideas were generally good, but he
would forget that the person giving him orders had thought of
others at the time he had of him. In like manner, when he did
get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligent
instructions to division commanders, he would go in with one
division, holding the others in reserve until he could
superintend their movements in person also, forgetting that
division commanders could execute an order without his
presence. His difficulty was constitutional and beyond his
control. He was an officer of superior ability, quick
perceptions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that
could be done with a small command.

Lee had ordered Hill’s corps–now commanded by Early–to move by
the very road we had marched upon. This shows that even early in
the morning of the 8th Lee had not yet become acquainted with my
move, but still thought that the Army of the Potomac had gone to
Fredericksburg. Indeed, he informed the authorities at Richmond
he had possession of Spottsylvania and was on my flank. Anderson
was in possession of Spottsylvania, through no foresight of Lee,
however. Early only found that he had been following us when he
ran against Hancock at Todd’s Tavern. His coming detained
Hancock from the battle-field of Spottsylvania for that day; but
he, in like manner, kept Early back and forced him to move by
another route.

Had I ordered the movement for the night of the 7th by my left
flank, it would have put Hancock in the lead. It would also
have given us an hour or earlier start. It took all that time
for Warren to get the head of his column to the left of Hancock
after he had got his troops out of their line confronting the
enemy. This hour, and Hancock’s capacity to use his whole force
when necessary, would, no doubt, have enabled him to crush
Anderson before he could be reinforced. But the movement made
was tactical. It kept the troops in mass against a possible
assault by the enemy. Our left occupied its intrenchments while
the two corps to the right passed. If an attack had been made by
the enemy he would have found the 2d corps in position,
fortified, and, practically, the 5th and 6th corps in position
as reserves, until his entire front was passed. By a left flank
movement the army would have been scattered while still passing
the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got by
it would have been very much exposed. Then, too, I had not yet
learned the special qualifications of the different corps
commanders. At that time my judgment was that Warren was the
man I would suggest to succeed Meade should anything happen to
that gallant soldier to take him from the field. As I have
before said, Warren was a gallant soldier, an able man; and he
was beside thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and importance
of the duty he had to perform.

CHAPTER LII.

BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA–HANCOCK’S POSITION–ASSAULT OF WARREN’S
AND WRIGHT’S CORPS–UPTON PROMOTED ON THE FIELD–GOOD NEWS FROM
BUTLER AND SHERIDAN.

The Mattapony River is formed by the junction of the Mat, the
Ta, the Po and the Ny rivers, the last being the northernmost of
the four. It takes its rise about a mile south and a little east
of the Wilderness Tavern. The Po rises south-west of the place,
but farther away. Spottsylvania is on the ridge dividing these
two streams, and where they are but a few miles apart. The
Brock Road reaches Spottsylvania without crossing either of
these streams. Lee’s army coming up by the Catharpin Road, had
to cross the Po at Wooden Bridge. Warren and Hancock came by
the Brock Road. Sedgwick crossed the Ny at Catharpin Furnace.
Burnside coming by Aldrich’s to Gates’s house, had to cross the
Ny near the enemy. He found pickets at the bridge, but they
were soon driven off by a brigade of Willcox’s division, and the
stream was crossed. This brigade was furiously attacked; but the
remainder of the division coming up, they were enabled to hold
their position, and soon fortified it.

About the time I received the news of this attack, word came
from Hancock that Early had left his front. He had been forced
over to the Catharpin Road, crossing the Po at Corbin’s and
again at Wooden Bridge. These are the bridges Sheridan had
given orders to his cavalry to occupy on the 8th, while one
division should occupy Spottsylvania. These movements of the
enemy gave me the idea that Lee was about to make the attempt to
get to, or towards, Fredericksburg to cut off my supplies. I
made arrangements to attack his right and get between him and
Richmond if he should try to execute this design. If he had any
such intention it was abandoned as soon as Burnside was
established south of the Ny.

The Po and the Ny are narrow little streams, but deep, with
abrupt banks, and bordered by heavily wooded and marshy
bottoms–at the time we were there–and difficult to cross
except where bridged. The country about was generally heavily
timbered, but with occasional clearings. It was a much better
country to conduct a defensive campaign in than an offensive one.

By noon of the 9th the position of the two armies was as
follows: Lee occupied a semicircle facing north, north-west and
north-east, inclosing the town. Anderson was on his left
extending to the Po, Ewell came next, then Early. Warren
occupied our right, covering the Brock and other roads
converging at Spottsylvania; Sedgwick was to his left and
Burnside on our extreme left. Hancock was yet back at Todd’s
Tavern, but as soon as it was known that Early had left
Hancock’s front the latter was ordered up to Warren’s right. He
formed a line with three divisions on the hill overlooking the Po
early in the afternoon, and was ordered to cross the Po and get
on the enemy’s flank. The fourth division of Hancock’s corps,
Mott commanding, was left at Todd’s when the corps first came
up; but in the afternoon it was brought up and placed to the
left of Sedgwick’s–now Wright’s–6th corps. In the morning
General Sedgwick had been killed near the right of his
intrenchments by rebel sharpshooters. His loss was a severe one
to the Army of the Potomac and to the Nation. General H. G.
Wright succeeded him in the command of his corps.

Hancock was now, nine P.M. of the 9th of May, across the left
flank of Lee’s army, but separated from it, and also from the
remainder of Meade’s army, by the Po River. But for the
lateness of the, hour and the darkness of the night he would
have attempted to cross the river again at Wooden Bridge, thus
bringing himself on the same side with both friend and foe.

The Po at the points where Hancock’s corps crossed runs nearly
due east. just below his lower crossing–the troops crossed at
three points–it turns due south. and after passing under Wooden
Bridge soon resumes a more easterly direction. During the night
this corps built three bridges over the Po; but these were in
rear.

The position assumed by Hancock’s corps forced Lee to reinforce
his left during the night. Accordingly on the morning of the
10th, when Hancock renewed his effort to get over the Po to his
front, he found himself confronted by some of Early’s command,
which had been brought from the extreme right of the enemy
during the night. He succeeded in effecting a crossing with one
brigade, however, but finding the enemy intrenched in his front,
no more were crossed.

Hancock reconnoitred his front on the morning of the 10th, with
the view of forcing a crossing, if it was found that an
advantage could be gained. The enemy was found strongly
intrenched on the high ground overlooking the river, and
commanding the Wooden Bridge with artillery. Anderson’s left
rested on the Po, where it turns south; therefore, for Hancock
to cross over–although it would bring him to the same side of
the stream with the rest of the army–would still farther
isolate him from it. The stream would have to be crossed twice
in the face of the enemy to unite with the main body. The idea
of crossing was therefore abandoned.

Lee had weakened the other parts of his line to meet this
movement of Hancock’s, and I determined to take advantage of
it. Accordingly in the morning, orders were issued for an
attack in the afternoon on the centre by Warren’s and Wright’s
corps, Hancock to command all the attacking force. Two of his
divisions were brought to the north side of the Po. Gibbon was
placed to the right of Warren, and Birney in his rear as a
reserve. Barlow’s division was left south of the stream, and
Mott of the same corps was still to the left of Wright’s
corps. Burnside was ordered to reconnoitre his front in force,
and, if an opportunity presented, to attack with vigor. The
enemy seeing Barlow’s division isolated from the rest of the
army, came out and attacked with fury. Barlow repulsed the
assault with great slaughter, and with considerable loss to
himself. But the enemy reorganized and renewed the assault.
Birney was now moved to the high ground overlooking the river
crossings built by our troops, and covered the crossings. The
second assault was repulsed, again with severe loss to the
enemy, and Barlow was withdrawn without further molestation.
General T. G. Stevenson was killed in this move.

Between the lines, where Warren’s assault was to take place,
there was a ravine grown up with large trees and underbrush,
making it almost impenetrable by man. The slopes on both sides
were also covered with a heavy growth of timber. Warren, before
noon, reconnoitred his front twice, the first time with one and
the second with two divisions. He was repulsed on both
occasions, but gained such information of the ground as to
induce him to report recommending the assault.

Wright also reconnoitred his front and gained a considerably
advanced position from the one he started from. He then
organized a storming party, consisting of twelve regiments, and
assigned Colonel Emory Upton, of the 121st New York Volunteers,
to the command of it. About four o’clock in the afternoon the
assault was ordered, Warren’s and Wright’s corps, with Mott’s
division of Hancock’s corps, to move simultaneously. The
movement was prompt, and in a few minutes the fiercest of
struggles began. The battle-field was so densely covered with
forest that but little could be seen, by any one person, as to
the progress made. Meade and I occupied the best position we
could get, in rear of Warren.

Warren was repulsed with heavy loss, General J. C. Rice being
among the killed. He was not followed, however, by the enemy,
and was thereby enabled to reorganize his command as soon as
covered from the guns of the enemy. To the left our success was
decided, but the advantage was lost by the feeble action of
Mott. Upton with his assaulting party pushed forward and
crossed the enemy’s intrenchments. Turning to the right and
left he captured several guns and some hundreds of prisoners.
Mott was ordered to his assistance but failed utterly. So much
time was lost in trying to get up the troops which were in the
right position to reinforce, that I ordered Upton to withdraw;
but the officers and men of his command were so averse to giving
up the advantage they had gained that I withdrew the order. To
relieve them, I ordered a renewal of the assault. By this time
Hancock, who had gone with Birney’s division to relieve Barlow,
had returned, bringing the division with him. His corps was now
joined with Warren’s and Wright’s in this last assault. It was
gallantly made, many men getting up to, and over, the works of
the enemy; but they were not able to hold them. At night they
were withdrawn. Upton brought his prisoners with him, but the
guns he had captured he was obliged to abandon. Upton had
gained an important advantage, but a lack in others of the
spirit and dash possessed by him lost it to us. Before leaving
Washington I had been authorized to promote officers on the
field for special acts of gallantry. By this authority I
conferred the rank of brigadier-general upon Upton on the spot,
and this act was confirmed by the President. Upton had been
badly wounded in this fight.

Burnside on the left had got up to within a few hundred yards of
Spottsylvania Court House, completely turning Lee’s right. He
was not aware of the importance of the advantage he had gained,
and I, being with the troops where the heavy fighting was, did
not know of it at the time. He had gained his position with but
little fighting, and almost without loss. Burnside’s position
now separated him widely from Wright’s corps, the corps nearest
to him. At night he was ordered to join on to this. This
brought him back about a mile, and lost to us an important
advantage. I attach no blame to Burnside for this, but I do to
myself for not having had a staff officer with him to report to
me his position.

The enemy had not dared to come out of his line at any point to
follow up his advantage, except in the single instance of his
attack on Barlow. Then he was twice repulsed with heavy loss,
though he had an entire corps against two brigades. Barlow took
up his bridges in the presence of this force.

On the 11th there was no battle and but little firing; none
except by Mott who made a reconnoissance to ascertain if there
was a weak point in the enemy’s line.

I wrote the following letter to General Halleck:

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H.,
May 11, 1864–8.3O A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington,
D. C.

We have now ended the 6th day of very hard fighting. The result
up to this time is much in our favor. But our losses have been
heavy as well as those of the enemy. We have lost to this time
eleven general officers killed, wounded and missing, and
probably twenty thousand men. I think the loss of the enemy
must be greater–we having taken over four thousand prisoners in
battle, whilst he has taken from us but few except a few
stragglers. I am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons
for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to
fight it out on this line if it takes all summer.

The arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to
the men, and I hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and
in as great numbers. My object in having them sent to Belle
Plain was to use them as an escort to our supply trains. If it
is more convenient to send them out by train to march from the
railroad to Belle Plain or Fredericksburg, send them so.

I am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to
the mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers,
and by keeping them intrenched in every position they take.

Up to this time there is no indication of any portion of Lee’s
army being detached for the defence of Richmond.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

And also, I received information, through the War Department,
from General Butler that his cavalry under Kautz had cut the
railroad south of Petersburg, separating Beauregard from
Richmond, and had whipped Hill, killing, wounding and capturing
many. Also that he was intrenched, and could maintain
himself. On this same day came news from Sheridan to the effect
that he had destroyed ten miles of the railroad and telegraph
between Lee and Richmond, one and a half million rations, and
most of the medical stores for his army.

On the 8th I had directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose from
the Army of the Potomac and pass around the left of Lee’s army
and attack his cavalry and communications, which was
successfully executed in the manner I have already described.

CHAPTER LIII.

HANCOCK’S ASSAULT-LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATES–PROMOTIONS
RECOMMENDED–DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY–EWELL’S ATTACK-REDUCING
THE ARTILLERY.

In the reconnoissance made by Mott on the 11th, a salient was
discovered at the right centre. I determined that an assault
should be made at that point. (*28) Accordingly in the afternoon
Hancock was ordered to move his command by the rear of Warren and
Wright, under cover of night, to Wright’s left, and there form it
for an assault at four o’clock the next morning. The night was
dark, it rained heavily, and the road was difficult, so that it
was midnight when he reached the point where he was to halt. It
took most of the night to get the men in position for their
advance in the morning. The men got but little rest. Burnside
was ordered to attack (*29) on the left of the salient at the
same hour. I sent two of my staff officers to impress upon him
the importance of pushing forward vigorously. Hancock was
notified of this. Warren and Wright were ordered to hold
themselves in readiness to join in the assault if circumstances
made it advisable. I occupied a central position most
convenient for receiving information from all points. Hancock
put Barlow on his left, in double column, and Birney to his
right. Mott followed Birney, and Gibbon was held in reserve.

The morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying the start more
than half an hour.

The ground over which Hancock had to pass to reach the enemy,
was ascending and heavily wooded to within two or three hundred
yards of the enemy’s intrenchments. In front of Birney there
was also a marsh to cross. But, notwithstanding all these
difficulties, the troops pushed on in quick time without firing
a gun, and when within four or five hundred yards of the enemy’s
line broke out in loud cheers, and with a rush went up to and
over the breastworks. Barlow and Birney entered almost
simultaneously. Here a desperate hand-to-hand conflict took
place. The men of the two sides were too close together to
fire, but used their guns as clubs. The hand conflict was soon
over. Hancock’s corps captured some four thousand prisoners
among them a division and a brigade commander twenty or more
guns with their horses, caissons, and ammunition, several
thousand stand of arms, and many colors. Hancock, as soon as
the hand-to-hand conflict was over, turned the guns of the enemy
against him and advanced inside the rebel lines. About six
o’clock I ordered Warren’s corps to the support of Hancock’s.
Burnside, on the left, had advanced up east of the salient to
the very parapet of the enemy. Potter, commanding one of his
divisions, got over but was not able to remain there. However,
he inflicted a heavy loss upon the enemy; but not without loss
in return.

This victory was important, and one that Lee could not afford to
leave us in full possession of. He made the most strenuous
efforts to regain the position he had lost. Troops were brought
up from his left and attacked Hancock furiously. Hancock was
forced to fall back: but he did so slowly, with his face to the
enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss, until behind the breastworks
he had captured. These he turned, facing them the other way, and
continued to hold. Wright was ordered up to reinforce Hancock,
and arrived by six o’clock. He was wounded soon after coming up
but did not relinquish the command of his corps, although the
fighting lasted until one o’clock the next morning. At eight
o’clock Warren was ordered up again, but was so slow in making
his dispositions that his orders were frequently repeated, and
with emphasis. At eleven o’clock I gave Meade written orders to
relieve Warren from his command if he failed to move promptly.
Hancock placed batteries on high ground in his rear, which he
used against the enemy, firing over the heads of his own troops.

Burnside accomplished but little on our left of a positive
nature, but negatively a great deal. He kept Lee from
reinforcing his centre from that quarter. If the 5th corps, or
rather if Warren, had been as prompt as Wright was with the 6th
corps, better results might have been obtained.

Lee massed heavily from his left flank on the broken point of
his line. Five times during the day he assaulted furiously, but
without dislodging our troops from their new position. His
losses must have been fearful. Sometimes the belligerents would
be separated by but a few feet. In one place a tree, eighteen
inches in diameter, was cut entirely down by musket balls. All
the trees between the lines were very much cut to pieces by
artillery and musketry. It was three o’clock next morning
before the fighting ceased. Some of our troops had then been
twenty hours under fire. In this engagement we did not lose a
single organization, not even a company. The enemy lost one
division with its commander, one brigade and one regiment, with
heavy losses elsewhere.(*30) Our losses were heavy, but, as
stated, no whole company was captured. At night Lee took a
position in rear of his former one, and by the following morning
he was strongly intrenched in it.

Warren’s corps was now temporarily broken up, Cutler’s division
sent to Wright, and Griffin’s to Hancock. Meade ordered his
chief of staff, General Humphreys, to remain with Warren and the
remaining division, and authorized him to give it orders in his
name.

During the day I was passing along the line from wing to wing
continuously. About the centre stood a house which proved to be
occupied by an old lady and her daughter. She showed such
unmistakable signs of being strongly Union that I stopped. She
said she had not seen a Union flag for so long a time that it
did her heart good to look upon it again. She said her husband
and son, being, Union men, had had to leave early in the war,
and were now somewhere in the Union army, if alive. She was
without food or nearly so, so I ordered rations issued to her,
and promised to find out if I could where the husband and son
were.

There was no fighting on the 13th, further than a little
skirmishing between Mott’s division and the enemy. I was afraid
that Lee might be moving out, and I did not want him to go
without my knowing it. The indications were that he was moving,
but it was found that he was only taking his new position back
from the salient that had been captured. Our dead were buried
this day. Mott’s division was reduced to a brigade, and
assigned to Birney’s division.

During this day I wrote to Washington recommending Sherman and
Meade (*31) for promotion to the grade of Major-General in the
regular army; Hancock for Brigadier-General; Wright, Gibbon and
Humphreys to be Major-Generals of Volunteers; and Upton and
Carroll to be Brigadiers. Upton had already been named as such,
but the appointment had to be confirmed by the Senate on the
nomination of the President.

The night of the 13th Warren and Wright were moved by the rear
to the left of Burnside. The night was very dark and it rained
heavily, the roads were so bad that the troops had to cut trees
and corduroy the road a part of the way, to get through. It was
midnight before they got to the point where they were to halt,
and daylight before the troops could be organized to advance to
their position in line. They gained their position in line,
however, without any fighting, except a little in Wright’s
front. Here Upton had to contend for an elevation which we
wanted and which the enemy was not disposed to yield. Upton
first drove the enemy, and was then repulsed in turn. Ayres
coming to his support with his brigade (of Griffin’s division,
Warren’s corps), the position was secured and fortified. There
was no more battle during the 14th. This brought our line cast
of the Court House and running north and south and facing west.

During the night of the 14th-15th Lee moved to cover this new
front. This left Hancock without an enemy confronting him. He
was brought to the rear of our new centre, ready to be moved in
any direction he might be wanted.

On the 15th news came from Butler and Averill. The former
reported the capture of the outer works at Drury’s Bluff, on the
James River, and that his cavalry had cut the railroad and
telegraph south of Richmond on the Danville road: and the
latter, the destruction of a depot of supplies at Dublin, West
Virginia, and the breaking of New River Bridge on the Virginia
and Tennessee Railroad. The next day news came from Sherman and
Sheridan. Sherman had forced Johnston out of Dalton, Georgia,
and was following him south. The report from Sheridan embraced
his operations up to his passing the outer defences of
Richmond. The prospect must now have been dismal in Richmond.
The road and telegraph were cut between the capital and Lee. The
roads and wires were cut in every direction from the rebel
capital. Temporarily that city was cut off from all
communication with the outside except by courier. This
condition of affairs, however, was of but short duration.

I wrote Halleck:

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H.,
May 16, 1864, 8 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
Washington, D. C.:

We have had five days almost constant rain without any prospect
yet of it clearing up. The roads have now become so impassable
that ambulances with wounded men can no longer run between here
and Fredericksburg. All offensive operations necessarily cease
until we can have twenty-four hours of dry weather. The army is
in the best of spirits, and feel the greatest confidence of
ultimate success.
* * * * * * You can
assure the President and Secretary of War that the elements
alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no manner
due to weakness or exhaustion on our part.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

The condition of the roads was such that nothing was done on the
17th. But that night Hancock and Wright were to make a night
march back to their old positions, and to make an assault at
four o’clock in the morning. Lee got troops back in time to
protect his old line, so the assault was unsuccessful. On this
day (18th) the news was almost as discouraging to us as it had
been two days before in the rebel capital. As stated above,
Hancock’s and Wright’s corps had made an unsuccessful assault.
News came that Sigel had been defeated at New Market, badly, and
was retreating down the valley. Not two hours before, I had sent
the inquiry to Halleck whether Sigel could not get to Staunton to
stop supplies coming from there to Lee. I asked at once that
Sigel might be relieved, and some one else put in his place.
Hunter’s name was suggested, and I heartily approved. Further
news from Butler reported him driven from Drury’s Bluff, but
still in possession of the Petersburg road. Banks had been
defeated in Louisiana, relieved, and Canby put in his place.
This change of commander was not on my suggestion. All this
news was very discouraging. All of it must have been known by
the enemy before it was by me. In fact, the good news (for the
enemy) must have been known to him at the moment I thought he
was in despair, and his anguish had been already relieved when
we were enjoying his supposed discomfiture, But this was no time
for repining. I immediately gave orders for a movement by the
left flank, on towards Richmond, to commence on the night of the
19th. I also asked Halleck to secure the cooperation of the navy
in changing our base of supplies from Fredericksburg to Port
Royal, on the Rappahannock.

Up to this time I had received no reinforcements, except six
thousand raw troops under Brigadier General Robert O. Tyler,
just arrived. They had not yet joined their command, Hancock’s
corps, but were on our right. This corps had been brought to
the rear of the centre, ready to move in any direction. Lee,
probably suspecting some move on my part, and seeing our right
entirely abandoned, moved Ewell’s corps about five o’clock in
the afternoon, with Early’s as a reserve, to attack us in that
quarter. Tyler had come up from Fredericksburg, and had been
halted on the road to the right of our line, near Kitching’s
brigade of Warren’s corps. Tyler received the attack with his
raw troops, and they maintained their position, until
reinforced, in a manner worthy of veterans.

Hancock was in a position to reinforce speedily, and was the
soldier to do it without waiting to make dispositions. Birney
was thrown to Tyler’s right and Crawford to his left, with
Gibbon as a reserve; and Ewell was whirled back speedily and
with heavy loss.

Warren had been ordered to get on Ewell’s flank and in his rear,
to cut him off from his intrenchments. But his efforts were so
feeble that under the cover of night Ewell got back with only
the loss of a few hundred prisoners, besides his killed and
wounded. The army being engaged until after dark, I rescinded
the order for the march by our left flank that night.

As soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to
attack, I naturally supposed they would detach a force to
destroy our trains. The withdrawal of Hancock from the right
uncovered one road from Spottsylvania to Fredericksburg over
which trains drew our supplies. This was guarded by a division
of colored troops, commanded by General Ferrero, belonging to
Burnside’s corps. Ferrero was therefore promptly notified, and
ordered to throw his cavalry pickets out to the south and be
prepared to meet the enemy if he should come; if he had to
retreat to do so towards Fredericksburg. The enemy did detach
as expected, and captured twenty-five or thirty wagons which,
however, were soon retaken.

In consequence of the disasters that had befallen us in the past
few days, Lee could be reinforced largely, and I had no doubt he
would be. Beauregard had come up from the south with troops to
guard the Confederate capital when it was in danger. Butler
being driven back, most of the troops could be sent to Lee. Hoke
was no longer needed in North Carolina; and Sigel’s troops having
gone back to Cedar Creek, whipped, many troops could be spared
from the valley.

The Wilderness and Spottsylvania battles convinced me that we
had more artillery than could ever be brought into action at any
one time. It occupied much of the road in marching, and taxed
the trains in bringing up forage. Artillery is very useful when
it can be brought into action, but it is a very burdensome luxury
where it cannot be used. Before leaving Spottsylvania,
therefore, I sent back to the defences of Washington over one
hundred pieces of artillery, with the horses and caissons. This
relieved the roads over which we were to march of more than two
hundred six-horse teams, and still left us more artillery than
could be advantageously used. In fact, before reaching the
James River I again reduced the artillery with the army largely.

I believed that, if one corps of the army was exposed on the
road to Richmond, and at a distance from the main army, Lee
would endeavor to attack the exposed corps before reinforcements
could come up; in which case the main army could follow Lee up
and attack him before he had time to intrench. So I issued the
following orders:

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., VA.,
May 18, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Before daylight to-morrow morning I propose to draw Hancock and
Burnside from the position they now hold, and put Burnside to
the left of Wright. Wright and Burnside should then force their
way up as close to the enemy as they can get without a general
engagement, or with a general engagement if the enemy will come
out of their works to fight, and intrench. Hancock should march
and take up a position as if in support of the two left corps.
To-morrow night, at twelve or one o’clock, he will be moved
south-east with all his force and as much cavalry as can be
given to him, to get as far towards Richmond on the line of the
Fredericksburg Railroad as he can make, fighting the enemy in
whatever force he can find him. If the enemy make a general
move to meet this, they will be followed by the other three
corps of the army, and attacked, if possible, before time is
given to intrench.

Suitable directions will at once be given for all trains and
surplus artillery to conform to this movement.

U. S. GRANT.

On the 20th, Lee showing no signs of coming out of his lines,
orders were renewed for a left-flank movement, to commence after
night.

CHAPTER LIV.

MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK–BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA–AN INCIDENT OF
THE MARCH–MOVING ON RICHMOND–SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY–POSITION OF
THE NATIONAL ARMY.

We were now to operate in a different country from any we had
before seen in Virginia. The roads were wide and good, and the
country well cultivated. No men were seen except those bearing
arms, even the black man having been sent away. The country,
however, was new to us, and we had neither guides nor maps to
tell us where the roads were, or where they led to. Engineer
and staff officers were put to the dangerous duty of supplying
the place of both maps and guides. By reconnoitring they were
enabled to locate the roads in the vicinity of each army
corps. Our course was south, and we took all roads leading in
that direction which would not separate the army too widely.

Hancock who had the lead had marched easterly to Guiney’s
Station, on the Fredericksburg Railroad, thence southerly to
Bowling Green and Milford. He was at Milford by the night of
the 21st. Here he met a detachment of Pickett’s division coming
from Richmond to reinforce Lee. They were speedily driven away,
and several hundred captured. Warren followed on the morning of
the 21st, and reached Guiney’s Station that night without
molestation. Burnside and Wright were retained at Spottsylvania
to keep up the appearance of an intended assault, and to hold
Lee, if possible, while Hancock and Warren should get start
enough to interpose between him and Richmond.

Lee had now a superb opportunity to take the initiative either
by attacking Wright and Burnside alone, or by following by the
Telegraph Road and striking Hancock’s and Warren’s corps, or
even Hancock’s alone, before reinforcements could come up. But
he did not avail himself of either opportunity. He seemed
really to be misled as to my designs; but moved by his interior
line–the Telegraph Road–to make sure of keeping between his
capital and the Army of the Potomac. He never again had such an
opportunity of dealing a heavy blow.

The evening of the 21st Burnside, 9th corps, moved out followed
by Wright, 6th corps. Burnside was to take the Telegraph Road;
but finding Stanard’s Ford, over the Po, fortified and guarded,
he turned east to the road taken by Hancock and Warren without
an attempt to dislodge the enemy. The night of the 21st I had
my headquarters near the 6th corps, at Guiney’s Station, and the
enemy’s cavalry was between us and Hancock. There was a slight
attack on Burnside’s and Wright’s corps as they moved out of
their lines; but it was easily repulsed. The object probably
was only to make sure that we were not leaving a force to follow
upon the rear of the Confederates.

By the morning of the 22d Burnside and Wright were at Guiney’s
Station. Hancock’s corps had now been marching and fighting
continuously for several days, not having had rest even at night
much of the time. They were, therefore, permitted to rest during
the 22d. But Warren was pushed to Harris’s Store, directly west
of Milford, and connected with it by a good road, and Burnside
was sent to New Bethel Church. Wright’s corps was still back at
Guiney’s Station.

I issued the following order for the movement of the troops the
next day:

NEW BETHEL, VA., May 22, 1864

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readiness to
march at five A.M. to-morrow. At that hour each command will
send out cavalry and infantry on all roads to their front
leading south, and ascertain, if possible, where the enemy is.
If beyond the South Anna, the 5th and 6th corps will march to
the forks of the road, where one branch leads to Beaver Dam
Station, the other to Jericho Bridge, then south by roads
reaching the Anna, as near to and east of Hawkins Creek as they
can be found.

The 2d corps will move to Chesterfield Ford. The 9th corps will
be directed to move at the same time to Jericho Bridge. The map
only shows two roads or the four corps to march upon, but, no
doubt, by the use of plantation roads, and pressing in guides,
others can be found, to give one for each corps.

The troops will follow their respective reconnoitring parties.
The trains will be moved at the same time to Milford Station.

Headquarters will follow the 9th corps.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

Warren’s corps was moved from Harris’s Store to Jericho Ford,
Wright’s following. Warren arrived at the ford early in the
afternoon, and by five o’clock effected a crossing under the
protection of sharpshooters. The men had to wade in water up to
their waists. As soon as enough troops were over to guard the
ford, pontoons were laid and the artillery and the rest of the
troops crossed. The line formed was almost perpendicular to the
course of the river–Crawford on the left, next to the river,
Griffin in the centre, and Cutler on the right. Lee was found
intrenched along the front of their line. The whole of Hill’s
corps was sent against Warren’s right before it had got in
position. A brigade of Cutler’s division was driven back, the
enemy following, but assistance coming up the enemy was in turn
driven back into his trenches with heavy loss in killed and
wounded, with about five hundred prisoners left in our hands. By
night Wright’s corps was up ready to reinforce Warren.

On the 23d Hancock’s corps was moved to the wooden bridge which
spans the North Anna River just west of where the Fredericksburg
Railroad crosses. It was near night when the troops arrived.
They found the bridge guarded, with troops intrenched, on the
north side. Hancock sent two brigades, Egan’s and Pierce’s, to
the right and left, and when properly disposed they charged
simultaneously. The bridge was carried quickly, the enemy
retreating over it so hastily that many were shoved into the
river, and some of them were drowned. Several hundred prisoners
were captured. The hour was so late that Hancock did not cross
until next morning.

Burnside’s corps was moved by a middle road running between
those described above, and which strikes the North Anna at Ox
Ford, midway between Telegraph Road and Jericho Ford. The hour
of its arrival was too late to cross that night.

On the 24th Hancock’s corps crossed to the south side of the
river without opposition, and formed line facing nearly west.
The railroad in rear was taken possession of and destroyed as
far as possible. Wright’s corps crossed at Jericho early the
same day, and took position to the right of Warren’s corps,
extending south of the Virginia Central Railroad. This road was
torn up for a considerable distance to the rear (west), the ties
burned, and the rails bent and twisted by heating them over the
burning ties. It was found, however, that Burnside’s corps
could not cross at Ox Ford. Lee had taken a position with his
centre on the river at this point, with the two wings thrown
back, his line making an acute angle where it overlooked the
river.

Before the exact position of the whole of Lee’s line was
accurately known, I directed Hancock and Warren each to send a
brigade to Ox Ford by the south side of the river. They found
the enemy too strong to justify a serious attack. A third ford
was found between Ox Ford and Jericho. Burnside was directed to
cross a division over this ford, and to send one division to
Hancock. Crittenden was crossed by this newly-discovered ford,
and formed up the river to connect with Crawford’s left. Potter
joined Hancock by way of the wooden bridge. Crittenden had a
severe engagement with some of Hill’s corps on his crossing the
river, and lost heavily. When joined to Warren’s corps he was
no further molested. Burnside still guarded Ox Ford from the
north side.

Lee now had his entire army south of the North Anna. Our lines
covered his front, with the six miles separating the two wings
guarded by but a single division. To get from one wing to the
other the river would have to be crossed twice. Lee could
reinforce any part of his line from all points of it in a very
short march; or could concentrate the whole of it wherever he
might choose to assault. We were, for the time, practically two
armies besieging.

Lee had been reinforced, and was being reinforced, largely.
About this time the very troops whose coming I had predicted,
had arrived or were coming in. Pickett with a full division
from Richmond was up; Hoke from North Carolina had come with a
brigade; and Breckinridge was there: in all probably not less
than fifteen thousand men. But he did not attempt to drive us
from the field.

On the 22d or 23d I received dispatches from Washington saying
that Sherman had taken Kingston, crossed the Etowah River and
was advancing into Georgia.

I was seated at the time on the porch of a fine plantation house
waiting for Burnside’s corps to pass. Meade and his staff,
besides my own staff, were with me. The lady of the house, a
Mrs. Tyler, and an elderly lady, were present. Burnside seeing
us, came up on the porch, his big spurs and saber rattling as he
walked. He touched his hat politely to the ladies, and remarked
that he supposed they had never seen so many “live Yankees”
before in their lives. The elderly lady spoke up promptly
saying, “Oh yes, I have; many more.” “Where?” said Burnside.
“In Richmond.” Prisoners, of course, was understood.

I read my dispatch aloud, when it was received. This threw the
younger lady into tears. I found the information she had
received (and I suppose it was the information generally in
circulation through the South) was that Lee was driving us from
the State in the most demoralized condition and that in the
South-west our troops were but little better than prisoners of
war. Seeing our troops moving south was ocular proof that a
part of her information was incorrect, and she asked me if my
news from Sherman was true. I assured her that there was no
doubt about it. I left a guard to protect the house from
intrusion until the troops should have all passed, and assured
her that if her husband was in hiding she could bring him in and
he should be protected also. But I presume he was in the
Confederate army.

On the 25th I gave orders, through Halleck, to Hunter, who had
relieved Sigel, to move up the Valley of Virginia, cross over
the Blue Ridge to Charlottesville and go as far as Lynchburg if
possible, living upon the country and cutting the railroads and
canal as he went. After doing this he could find his way back
to his base, or join me.

On the same day news was received that Lee was falling back,on
Richmond. This proved not to be true. But we could do nothing
where we were unless Lee would assume the offensive. I
determined, therefore, to draw out of our present position and
make one more effort to get between him and Richmond. I had no
expectation now, however, of succeeding in this; but I did
expect to hold him far enough west to enable me to reach the
James River high up. Sheridan was now again with the Army of
the Potomac.

On the 26th I informed the government at Washington of the
position of the two armies; of the reinforcements the enemy had
received; of the move I proposed to make (*32); and directed
that our base of supplies should be shifted to White House, on
the Pamunkey. The wagon train and guards moved directly from
Port Royal to White House. Supplies moved around by water,
guarded by the navy. Orders had previously been sent, through
Halleck, for Butler to send Smith’s corps to White House. This
order was repeated on the 25th, with directions that they should
be landed on the north side of the Pamunkey, and marched until
they joined the Army of the Potomac.

It was a delicate move to get the right wing of the Army of the
Potomac from its position south of the North Anna in the
presence of the enemy. To accomplish it, I issued the following
order:

QUARLES’ MILLS, VA., May 25, 1864.

MAJOR GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding A. P.

Direct Generals Warren and Wright to withdraw all their teams
and artillery, not in position, to the north side of the river
to-morrow. Send that belonging to General Wright’s corps as far
on the road to Hanover Town as it can go, without attracting
attention to the fact. Send with it Wright’s best division or
division under his ablest commander. Have their places filled
up in the line so if possible the enemy will not notice their
withdrawal. Send the cavalry to-morrow afternoon, or as much of
it as you may deem necessary, to watch and seize, if they can,
Littlepage’s Bridge and Taylor’s Ford, and to remain on one or
other side of the river at these points until the infantry and
artillery all pass. As soon as it is dark to-morrow night start
the division which you withdraw first from Wright’s corps to make
a forced march to Hanover Town, taking with them no teams to
impede their march. At the same time this division starts
commence withdrawing all of the 5th and 6th corps from the south
side of the river, and march them for the same place. The two
divisions of the 9th corps not now with Hancock, may be moved
down the north bank of the river where they will be handy to
support Hancock if necessary, or will be that much on their road
to follow the 5th and 6th corps. Hancock should hold his command
in readiness to follow as soon as the way is clear for him.
To-morrow it will leave nothing for him to do, but as soon as he
can he should get all his teams and spare artillery on the road
or roads which he will have to take. As soon as the troops
reach Hanover Town they should get possession of all the
crossings they can in that neighborhood. I think it would be
well to make a heavy cavalry demonstration on the enemy’s left,
to-morrow afternoon, also.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

Wilson’s division of cavalry was brought up from the left and
moved by our right south to Little River. Here he manoeuvred to
give the impression that we were going to attack the left flank
of Lee’s army.

Under cover of night our right wing was withdrawn to the north
side of the river, Lee being completely deceived by Wilson’s
feint. On the afternoon of the 26th Sheridan moved, sending
Gregg’s and Torbert’s cavalry to Taylor’s and Littlepage’s fords
towards Hanover. As soon as it was dark both divisions moved
quietly to Hanover Ferry, leaving small guards behind to keep up
the impression that crossings were to be attempted in the
morning. Sheridan was followed by a division of infantry under
General Russell. On the morning of the 27th the crossing was
effected with but little loss, the enemy losing thirty or forty,
taken prisoners. Thus a position was secured south of the
Pamunkey.

Russell stopped at the crossing while the cavalry pushed on to
Hanover Town. Here Barringer’s, formerly Gordon’s, brigade of
rebel cavalry was encountered, but it was speedily driven away.

Warren’s and Wright’s corps were moved by the rear of Burnside’s
and Hancock’s corps. When out of the way these latter corps
followed, leaving pickets confronting the enemy. Wilson’s
cavalry followed last, watching all the fords until everything
had recrossed; then taking up the pontoons and destroying other
bridges, became the rear-guard.

Two roads were traversed by the troops in this move. The one
nearest to and north of the North Anna and Pamunkey was taken by
Wright, followed by Hancock. Warren, followed by Burnside, moved
by a road farther north, and longer. The trains moved by a road
still farther north, and had to travel a still greater
distance. All the troops that had crossed the Pamunkey on the
morning of the 27th remained quiet during the rest of the day,
while the troops north of that stream marched to reach the
crossing that had been secured for them.

Lee had evidently been deceived by our movement from North Anna;
for on the morning of the 27th he telegraphed to Richmond:
“Enemy crossed to north side, and cavalry and infantry crossed
at Hanover Town.” The troops that had then crossed left his
front the night of the 25th.

The country we were now in was a difficult one to move troops
over. The streams were numerous, deep and sluggish, sometimes
spreading out into swamps grown up with impenetrable growths of
trees and underbrush. The banks were generally low and marshy,
making the streams difficult to approach except where there were
roads and bridges.

Hanover Town is about twenty miles from Richmond. There are two
roads leading there; the most direct and shortest one crossing
the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge, near the Virginia Central
Railroad, the second going by New and Old Cold Harbor. A few
miles out from Hanover Town there is a third road by way of
Mechanicsville to Richmond. New Cold Harbor was important to us
because while there we both covered the roads back to White House
(where our supplies came from), and the roads south-east over
which we would have to pass to get to the James River below the
Richmond defences.

On the morning of the 28th the army made an early start, and by
noon all had crossed except Burnside’s corps. This was left on
the north side temporarily to guard the large wagon train. A
line was at once formed extending south from the river, Wright’s
corps on the right, Hancock’s in the centre, and Warren’s on the
left, ready to meet the enemy if he should come.

At the same time Sheridan was directed to reconnoitre towards
Mechanicsville to find Lee’s position. At Hawes’ Shop, just
where the middle road leaves the direct road to Richmond, he
encountered the Confederate cavalry dismounted and partially
intrenched. Gregg attacked with his division, but was unable to
move the enemy. In the evening Custer came up with a brigade.
The attack was now renewed, the cavalry dismounting and charging
as infantry. This time the assault was successful, both sides
losing a considerable number of men. But our troops had to bury
the dead, and found that more Confederate than Union soldiers had
been killed. The position was easily held, because our infantry
was near.

On the 29th a reconnoissance was made in force, to find the
position of Lee. Wright’s corps pushed to Hanover Court
House. Hancock’s corps pushed toward Totopotomoy Creek;
Warren’s corps to the left on the Shady Grove Church Road, while
Burnside was held in reserve. Our advance was pushed forward
three miles on the left with but little fighting. There was now
an appearance of a movement past our left flank, and Sheridan was
sent to meet it.

On the 30th Hancock moved to the Totopotomoy, where he found the
enemy strongly fortified. Wright was moved to the right of
Hancock’s corps, and Burnside was brought forward and crossed,
taking position to the left of Hancock. Warren moved up near
Huntley Corners on the Shady Grove Church Road. There was some
skirmishing along the centre, and in the evening Early attacked
Warren with some vigor, driving him back at first, and
threatening to turn our left flank. As the best means of
reinforcing the left, Hancock was ordered to attack in his
front. He carried and held the rifle-pits. While this was
going on Warren got his men up, repulsed Early, and drove him
more than a mile.

On this day I wrote to Halleck ordering all the pontoons in
Washington to be sent to City Point.

In the evening news was received of the arrival of Smith with
his corps at White House. I notified Meade, in writing, as
follows:

NEAR HAWES’ SHOP, VA.,
6.40 P.M., May 30, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding A. P.

General Smith will debark his force at the White House tonight
and start up the south bank of the Pamunkey at an early hour,
probably at 3 A.M. in the morning. It is not improbable that
the enemy, being aware of Smith’s movement, will be feeling to
get on our left flank for the purpose of cutting him off, or by
a dash to crush him and get back before we are aware of it.
Sheridan ought to be notified to watch the enemy’s movements
well out towards Cold Harbor, and also on the Mechanicsville
road. Wright should be got well massed on Hancock’s right, so
that, if it becomes necessary, he can take the place of the
latter readily whilst troops are being thrown east of the
Totopotomoy if necessary.

I want Sheridan to send a cavalry force of at least half a
brigade, if not a whole brigade, at 5 A.M. in the morning, to
communicate with Smith and to return with him. I will send
orders for Smith by the messenger you send to Sheridan with his
orders.

U. S. GRANT.

I also notified Smith of his danger, and the precautions that
would be taken to protect him.

The night of the 30th Lee’s position was substantially from
Atlee’s Station on the Virginia Central Railroad south and cast
to the vicinity of Cold Harbor. Ours was: The left of Warren’s
corps was on the Shady Grove Road, extending to the
Mechanicsville Road and about three miles south of the
Totopotomoy. Burnside to his right, then Hancock, and Wright on
the extreme right, extending towards Hanover Court House, six
miles south-east of it. Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry
was watching our left front towards Cold Harbor. Wilson with
his division on our right was sent to get on the Virginia
Central Railroad and destroy it as far back as possible. He got
possession of Hanover Court House the next day after a skirmish
with Young’s cavalry brigade. The enemy attacked Sheridan’s
pickets, but reinforcements were sent up and the attack was
speedily repulsed and the enemy followed some distance towards
Cold Harbor.

CHAPTER LV.

ADVANCE ON COLD HARBOR–AN ANECDOTE OF THE WAR–BATTLE OF COLD
HARBOR–CORRESPONDENCE WITH LEE–RETROSPECTIVE.

On the 31st Sheridan advanced to near Old Cold Harbor. He found
it intrenched and occupied by cavalry and infantry. A hard fight
ensued but the place was carried. The enemy well knew the
importance of Cold Harbor to us, and seemed determined that we
should not hold it. He returned with such a large force that
Sheridan was about withdrawing without making any effort to hold
it against such odds; but about the time he commenced the
evacuation he received orders to hold the place at all hazards,
until reinforcements could be sent to him. He speedily turned
the rebel works to face against them and placed his men in
position for defence. Night came on before the enemy was ready
for assault.

Wright’s corps was ordered early in the evening to march
directly to Cold Harbor passing by the rear of the army. It was
expected to arrive by daylight or before; but the night was dark
and the distance great, so that it was nine o’clock the 1st of
June before it reached its destination. Before the arrival of
Wright the enemy had made two assaults on Sheridan, both of
which were repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy. Wright’s
corps coming up, there was no further assault on Cold Harbor.

Smith, who was coming up from White House, was also directed to
march directly to Cold Harbor, and was expected early on the
morning of the 1st of June; but by some blunder the order which
reached Smith directed him to Newcastle instead of Cold
Harbor. Through this blunder Smith did not reach his
destination until three o’clock in the afternoon, and then with
tired and worn-out men from their long and dusty march. He
landed twelve thousand five hundred men from Butler’s command,
but a division was left at White House temporarily and many men
had fallen out of ranks in their long march.

Before the removal of Wright’s corps from our right, after dark
on the 31st, the two lines, Federal and Confederate, were so
close together at that point that either side could detect
directly any movement made by the other. Finding at daylight
that Wright had left his front, Lee evidently divined that he
had gone to our left. At all events, soon after light on the
1st of June Anderson, who commanded the corps on Lee’s left, was
seen moving along Warren’s front. Warren was ordered to attack
him vigorously in flank, while Wright was directed to move out
and get on his front. Warren fired his artillery at the enemy;
but lost so much time in making ready that the enemy got by, and
at three o’clock he reported the enemy was strongly intrenched in
his front, and besides his lines were so long that he had no mass
of troops to move with. He seemed to have forgotten that lines
in rear of an army hold themselves while their defenders are
fighting in their front. Wright reconnoitred some distance to
his front: but the enemy finding Old Cold Harbor already taken
had halted and fortified some distance west.

By six o’clock in the afternoon Wright and Smith were ready to
make an assault. In front of both the ground was clear for
several hundred yards and then became wooded. Both charged
across this open space and into the wood, capturing and holding
the first line of rifle-pits of the enemy, and also capturing
seven or eight hundred prisoners.

While this was going on, the enemy charged Warren three separate
times with vigor, but were repulsed each time with loss. There
was no officer more capable, nor one more prompt in acting, than
Warren when the enemy forced him to it. There was also an attack
upon Hancock’s and Burnside’s corps at the same time; but it was
feeble and probably only intended to relieve Anderson who was
being pressed by Wright and Smith.

During the night the enemy made frequent attacks with the view
of dispossessing us of the important position we had gained, but
without effecting their object.

Hancock was moved from his place in line during the night and
ordered to the left of Wright. I expected to take the offensive
on the morning of the 2d, but the night was so dark, the heat and
dust so excessive and the roads so intricate and hard to keep,
that the head of column only reached Old Cold Harbor at six
o’clock, but was in position at 7.30 A.M. Preparations were
made for an attack in the afternoon, but did not take place
until the next morning. Warren’s corps was moved to the left to
connect with Smith: Hancock’s corps was got into position to the
left of Wright’s, and Burnside was moved to Bethesda Church in
reserve. While Warren and Burnside were making these changes the
enemy came out several times and attacked them, capturing several
hundred prisoners. The attacks were repulsed, but not followed
up as they should have been. I was so annoyed at this that I
directed Meade to instruct his corps commanders that they should
seize all such opportunities when they occurred, and not wait for
orders, all of our manoeuvres being made for the very purpose of
getting the enemy out of his cover.

On this day Wilson returned from his raid upon the Virginia
Central Railroad, having damaged it considerably. But, like
ourselves, the rebels had become experts in repairing such
damage. Sherman, in his memoirs, relates an anecdote of his
campaign to Atlanta that well illustrates this point. The rebel
cavalry lurking in his rear to burn bridges and obstruct his
communications had become so disgusted at hearing trains go
whistling by within a few hours after a bridge had been burned,
that they proposed to try blowing up some of the tunnels. One
of them said, “No use, boys, Old Sherman carries duplicate
tunnels with him, and will replace them as fast as you can blow
them up; better save your powder.”

Sheridan was engaged reconnoitring the banks of the
Chickahominy, to find crossings and the condition of the
roads. He reported favorably.

During the night Lee moved his left up to make his line
correspond to ours. His lines extended now from the Totopotomoy
to New Cold Harbor. Mine from Bethesda Church by Old Cold Harbor
to the Chickahominy, with a division of cavalry guarding our
right. An assault was ordered for the 3d, to be made mainly by
the corps of Hancock, Wright and Smith; but Warren and Burnside
were to support it by threatening Lee’s left, and to attack with
great earnestness if he should either reinforce more threatened
points by drawing from that quarter or if a favorable
opportunity should present itself.

The corps commanders were to select the points in their
respective fronts where they would make their assaults. The
move was to commence at half-past four in the morning. Hancock
sent Barlow and Gibbon forward at the appointed hour, with
Birney as a reserve. Barlow pushed forward with great vigor,
under a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, through
thickets and swamps. Notwithstanding all the resistance of the
enemy and the natural obstructions to overcome, he carried a
position occupied by the enemy outside their main line where the
road makes a deep cut through a bank affording as good a shelter
for troops as if it had been made for that purpose. Three
pieces of artillery had been captured here, and several hundred
prisoners. The guns were immediately turned against the men who
had just been using them. No (*33) assistance coming to him, he
(Barlow) intrenched under fire and continued to hold his
place. Gibbon was not so fortunate in his front. He found the
ground over which he had to pass cut up with deep ravines, and a
morass difficult to cross. But his men struggled on until some
of them got up to the very parapet covering the enemy. Gibbon
gained ground much nearer the enemy than that which he left, and
here he intrenched and held fast.

Wright’s corps moving in two lines captured the outer rifle-pits
in their front, but accomplished nothing more. Smith’s corps
also gained the outer rifle-pits in its front. The ground over
which this corps (18th) had to move was the most exposed of any
over which charges were made. An open plain intervened between
the contending forces at this point, which was exposed both to a
direct and a cross fire. Smith, however, finding a ravine
running towards his front, sufficiently deep to protect men in
it from cross fire, and somewhat from a direct fire, put
Martindale’s division in it, and with Brooks supporting him on
the left and Devens on the right succeeded in gaining the
outer–probably picket–rifle-pits. Warren and Burnside also
advanced and gained ground–which brought the whole army on one
line.

This assault cost us heavily and probably without benefit to
compensate: but the enemy was not cheered by the occurrence
sufficiently to induce him to take the offensive. In fact,
nowhere after the battle of the Wilderness did Lee show any
disposition to leave his defences far behind him.

Fighting was substantially over by half-past seven in the
morning. At eleven o’clock I started to visit all the corps
commanders to see for myself the different positions gained and
to get their opinion of the practicability of doing anything
more in their respective fronts.

Hancock gave the opinion that in his front the enemy was too
strong to make any further assault promise success. Wright
thought he could gain the lines of the enemy, but it would
require the cooperation of Hancock’s and Smith’s corps. Smith
thought a lodgment possible, but was not sanguine: Burnside
thought something could be done in his front, but Warren
differed. I concluded, therefore to make no more assaults, and
a little after twelve directed in the following letter that all
offensive action should cease.

COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864.-12.30 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

Commanding A. P.

The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in
case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of
farther advance for the present. Hold our most advanced
positions and strengthen them. Whilst on the defensive our line
may be contracted from the right if practicable.

Reconnoissances should be made in front of every corps and
advances made to advantageous positions by regular approaches.
To aid the expedition under General Hunter it is necessary that
we should detain all the army now with Lee until the former gets
well on his way to Lynchburg. To do this effectually it will be
better to keep the enemy out of the intrenchments of Richmond
than to have them go back there.

Wright and Hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy
should break through General Smith’s lines, and all should be
ready to resist an assault.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

The remainder of the day was spent in strengthening the line we
now held. By night we were as strong against Lee as he was
against us.

During the night the enemy quitted our right front, abandoning
some of their wounded, and without burying their dead. These we
were able to care for. But there were many dead and wounded men
between the lines of the contending forces, which were now close
together, who could not be cared for without a cessation of
hostilities.

So I wrote the following:

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 5, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE,
Commanding Confederate Army.

It is reported to me that there are wounded men, probably of
both armies, now lying exposed and suffering between the lines
occupied respectively by the two armies. Humanity would dictate
that some provision should be made to provide against such
hardships. I would propose, therefore, that hereafter, when no
battle is raging, either party be authorized to send to any
point between the pickets or skirmish lines, unarmed men bearing
litters to pick up their dead or wounded, without being fired
upon by the other party. Any other method, equally fair to both
parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired will be
accepted by me.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

Lee replied that he feared such an arrangement would lead to
misunderstanding, and proposed that in future, when either party
wished to remove their dead and wounded, a flag of truce be
sent. I answered this immediately by saying:

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 6, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE,
Commanding Army of N. Va.

“Your communication of yesterday’s date is received. I will
send immediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and
wounded between the lines of the two armies, and will also
instruct that you be allowed to do the same. I propose that the
time for doing this be between the hours of 12 M. and 3 P.M.
to-day. I will direct all parties going out to bear a white
flag, and not to attempt to go beyond where we have dead or
wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

Lee’s response was that he could not consent to the burial of
the dead and removal of the wounded in the way I proposed, but
when either party desired such permission it should be asked for
by flag of truce and he had directed that any parties I may have
sent out, as mentioned in my letter, to be turned back. I
answered:

COLD HARBOR, VA, June 6, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE.
Commanding Army, N. Va.

The knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of
attention, between the two armies, compels me to ask a
suspension of hostilities for sufficient time to collect them
in, say two hours. Permit me to say that the hours you may fix
upon for this will be agreeable to me, and the same privilege
will be extended to such parties as you may wish to send out on
the same duty without further application.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

Lee acceded to this; but delays in transmitting the
correspondence brought it to the 7th of June–forty-eight hours
after it commenced–before parties were got out to collect the
men left upon the field. In the meantime all but two of the
wounded had died. And I wrote to Lee:

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 7, 1864.
10.30 A.M.

GEN. R. E. LEE,
Commanding Army of N. Va.

I regret that your note of seven P.M. yesterday should have been
received at the nearest corps headquarters, to where it was
delivered, after the hour which had been given for the removal
of the dead and wounded had expired; 10.45 P.M. was the hour at
which it was received at corps headquarters, and between eleven
and twelve it reached my headquarters. As a consequence, it was
not understood by.the troops of this army that there was a
cessation of hostilities for the purpose of collecting the dead
and wounded, and none were collected. Two officers and six men
of the 8th and 25th North Carolina Regts., who were out in
search of the bodies of officers of their respective regiments,
were captured and brought into our lines, owing to this want of
understanding. I regret this, but will state that as soon as I
learned the fact, I directed that they should not be held as
prisoners, but must be returned to their commands. These
officers and men having been carelessly brought through our
lines to the rear have not determined whether they will be sent
back the way they came, or whether they will be sent by some
other route.

Regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the sufferings of
wounded men left upon the battle-field have been rendered
nugatory, I remain, &c.,

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was
ever made. I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d
of May, 1863, at Vicksburg. At Cold Harbor no advantage
whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we
sustained. Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative
losses, were on the Confederate side. Before that, the Army of
Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired a wholesome regard for
the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities generally of the
Army of the Potomac. They no longer wanted to fight them “one
Confederate to five Yanks.” Indeed, they seemed to have given
up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the
open field. They had come to much prefer breastworks in their
front to the Army of the Potomac. This charge seemed to revive
their hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration. The
effect upon the Army of the Potomac was the reverse. When we
reached the James River, however, all effects of the battle of
Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared.

There was more justification for the assault at Vicksburg. We
were in a Southern climate, at the beginning of the hot
season. The Army of the Tennessee had won five successive
victories over the garrison of Vicksburg in the three preceding
weeks. They had driven a portion of that army from Port Gibson
with considerable loss, after having flanked them out of their
stronghold at Grand Gulf. They had attacked another portion of
the same army at Raymond, more than fifty miles farther in the
interior of the State, and driven them back into Jackson with
great loss in killed, wounded, captured and missing, besides
loss of large and small arms: they had captured the capital of
the State of Mississippi, with a large amount of materials of
war and manufactures. Only a few days before, they had beaten
the enemy then penned up in the town first at Champion’s Hill,
next at Big Black River Bridge, inflicting upon him a loss of
fifteen thousand or more men (including those cut off from
returning) besides large losses in arms and ammunition. The
Army of the Tennessee had come to believe that they could beat
their antagonist under any circumstances. There was no telling
how long a regular siege might last. As I have stated, it was
the beginning of the hot season in a Southern climate. There
was no telling what the casualties might be among Northern
troops working and living in trenches, drinking surface water
filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun. If
Vicksburg could have been carried in May, it would not only have
saved the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the
bullets of the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid
army, well equipped and officered, to operate elsewhere with.
These are reasons justifying the assault. The only benefit we
gained–and it was a slight one for so great a sacrifice–was
that the men worked cheerfully in the trenches after that, being
satisfied with digging the enemy out. Had the assault not been
made, I have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in the
siege of Vicksburg would have believed that had we assaulted it
would have proven successful, and would have saved life, health
and comfort.

CHAPTER LVI.

LEFT FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES–GENERAL
LEE–VISIT TO BUTLER–THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG–THE INVESTMENT
OF PETERSBURG.

Lee’s position was now so near Richmond, and the intervening
swamps of the Chickahominy so great an obstacle to the movement
of troops in the face of an enemy, that I determined to make my
next left flank move carry the Army of the Potomac south of the
James River. (*34) Preparations for this were promptly
commenced. The move was a hazardous one to make: the
Chickahominy River, with its marshy and heavily timbered
approaches, had to be crossed; all the bridges over it east of
Lee were destroyed; the enemy had a shorter line and better
roads to travel on to confront me in crossing; more than fifty
miles intervened between me and Butler, by the roads I should
have to travel, with both the James and the Chickahominy
unbridged to cross; and last, the Army of the Potomac had to be
got out of a position but a few hundred yards from the enemy at
the widest place. Lee, if he did not choose to follow me,
might, with his shorter distance to travel and his bridges over
the Chickahominy and the James, move rapidly on Butler and crush
him before the army with me could come to his relief. Then too
he might spare troops enough to send against Hunter who was
approaching Lynchburg, living upon the country he passed
through, and without ammunition further than what he carried
with him.

But the move had to be made, and I relied upon Lee’s not seeing
my danger as I saw it. Besides we had armies on both sides of
the James River and not far from the Confederate capital. I
knew that its safety would be a matter of the first
consideration with the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of the so-called Confederate government, if it was not
with the military commanders. But I took all the precaution I
knew of to guard against all dangers.

Sheridan was sent with two divisions, to communicate with Hunter
and to break up the Virginia Central Railroad and the James River
Canal, on the 7th of June, taking instructions to Hunter to come
back with him (*35). Hunter was also informed by way of
Washington and the Valley that Sheridan was on the way to meet
him. The canal and Central Road, and the regions penetrated by
them, were of vast importance to the enemy, furnishing and
carrying a large per cent. of all the supplies for the Army of
Northern Virginia and the people of Richmond. Before Sheridan
got off on the 7th news was received from Hunter reporting his
advance to Staunton and successful engagement with the enemy
near that place on the 5th, in which the Confederate commander,
W. S. Jones, was killed. On the 4th of June the enemy having
withdrawn his left corps, Burnside on our right was moved up
between Warren and Smith. On the 5th Birney returned to
Hancock, which extended his left now to the Chickahominy, and
Warren was withdrawn to Cold Harbor. Wright was directed to
send two divisions to the left to extend down the banks of that
stream to Bottom’s Bridge. The cavalry extended still farther
east to Jones’s Bridge.

On the 7th Abercrombie–who was in command at White House, and
who had been in command at our base of supplies in all the
changes made from the start–was ordered to take up the iron
from the York River Railroad and put it on boats, and to be in
readiness to move by water to City Point.

On the 8th Meade was directed to fortify a line down the bank
overlooking the Chickahominy, under cover of which the army
could move.

On the 9th Abercrombie was directed to send all organized troops
arriving at White House, without debarking from their transports,
to report to Butler. Halleck was at this time instructed to send
all reinforcements to City Point.

On the 11th I wrote:

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 11, 1864.

MAJOR-GEN. B. F. BUTLER,
Commanding Department of Va. and N. C.

The movement to transfer this army to the south side of the
James River will commence after dark to-morrow night. Col.
Comstock, of my staff, was sent specially to ascertain what was
necessary to make your position secure in the interval during
which the enemy might use most of his force against you, and
also, to ascertain what point on the river we should reach to
effect a crossing if it should not be practicable to reach this
side of the river at Bermuda Hundred. Colonel Comstock has not
yet returned, so that I cannot make instructions as definite as
I would wish, but the time between this and Sunday night being
so short in which to get word to you, I must do the best I
can. Colonel Dent goes to the Chickahominy to take to you the
18th corps. The corps will leave its position in the trenches
as early in the evening, tomorrow, as possible, and make a
forced march to Cole’s Landing or Ferry, where it should reach
by ten A.M. the following morning. This corps numbers now
15,300 men. They take with them neither wagons nor artillery;
these latter marching with the balance of the army to the James
River. The remainder of the army will cross the Chickahominy at
Long Bridge and at Jones’s, and strike the river at the most
practicable crossing below City Point.

I directed several days ago that all reinforcements for the army
should be sent to you. I am not advised of the number that may
have gone, but suppose you have received from six to ten
thousand. General Smith will also reach you as soon as the
enemy could, going by the way of Richmond.

The balance of the force will not be more than one day behind,
unless detained by the whole of Lee’s army, in which case you
will be strong enough.

I wish you would direct the proper staff officers, your
chief-engineer and your chief-quartermaster, to commence at once
the collection of all the means in their reach for crossing the
army on its arrival. If there is a point below City Point where
a pontoon bridge can be thrown, have it laid.

Expecting the arrival of the 18th corps by Monday night, if you
deem it practicable from the force you have to seize and hold
Petersburg, you may prepare to start, on the arrival of troops
to hold your present lines. I do not want Petersburg visited,
however, unless it is held, nor an attempt to take it, unless
you feel a reasonable degree of confidence of success. If you
should go there, I think troops should take nothing with them
except what they can carry, depending upon supplies being sent
after the place is secured. If Colonel Dent should not succeed
in securing the requisite amount of transportation for the 18th
corps before reaching you, please have the balance supplied.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

P. S.–On reflection I will send the 18th corps by way of White
House. The distance which they will have to march will be
enough shorter to enable them to reach you about the same time,
and the uncertainty of navigation on the Chickahominy will be
avoided.

U. S. GRANT.

COLD HARBOR, VA., June 11,1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL G. G. MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Colonel Comstock, who visited the James River for the purpose of
ascertaining the best point below Bermuda Hundred to which to
march the army has not yet returned. It is now getting so late,
however, that all preparations may be made for the move to-morrow
night without waiting longer.

The movement will be made as heretofore agreed upon, that is,
the 18th corps make a rapid march with the infantry alone, their
wagons and artillery accompanying the balance of the army to
Cole’s Landing or Ferry, and there embark for City Point, losing
no time for rest until they reach the latter point.

The 5th corps will seize Long Bridge and move out on the Long
Bridge Road to its junction with Quaker Road, or until stopped
by the enemy.

The other three corps will follow in such order as you may
direct, one of them crossing at Long Bridge, and two at Jones’s
Bridge. After the crossing is effected, the most practicable
roads will be taken to reach about Fort Powhattan. Of course,
this is supposing the enemy makes no opposition to our
advance. The 5th corps, after securing the passage of the
balance of the army, will join or follow in rear of the corps
which crosses the same bridge with themselves. The wagon trains
should be kept well east of the troops, and if a crossing can be
found, or made lower down than Jones’s they should take it.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

P. S.–In view of the long march to reach Cole’s Landing, and
the uncertainty of being able to embark a large number of men
there, the direction of the 18th corps may be changed to White
House. They should be directed to load up transports, and start
them as fast as loaded without waiting for the whole corps or
even whole divisions to go together.

U. S. GRANT.

About this time word was received (through the Richmond papers
of the 11th) that Crook and Averell had united and were moving
east. This, with the news of Hunter’s successful engagement
near Staunton, was no doubt known to Lee before it was to me.
Then Sheridan leaving with two divisions of cavalry, looked
indeed threatening, both to Lee’s communications and supplies.
Much of his cavalry was sent after Sheridan, and Early with
Ewell’s entire corps was sent to the Valley. Supplies were
growing scarce in Richmond, and the sources from which to draw
them were in our hands. People from outside began to pour into
Richmond to help eat up the little on hand. Consternation
reigned there.

On the 12th Smith was ordered to move at night to White House,
not to stop until he reached there, and to take boats at once
for City Point, leaving his trains and artillery to move by land.

Soon after dark some of the cavalry at Long Bridge effected a
crossing by wading and floundering through the water and mud,
leaving their horses behind, and drove away the cavalry
pickets. A pontoon bridge was speedily thrown across, over
which the remainder of the army soon passed and pushed out for a
mile or two to watch and detain any advance that might be made
from the other side. Warren followed the cavalry, and by the
morning of the 13th had his whole corps over. Hancock followed
Warren. Burnside took the road to Jones’s Bridge, followed by
Wright. Ferrero’s division, with the wagon train, moved farther
east, by Window Shades and Cole’s Ferry, our rear being covered
by cavalry.

It was known that the enemy had some gunboats at Richmond. These
might run down at night and inflict great damage upon us before
they could be sunk or captured by our navy. General Butler had,
in advance, loaded some vessels with stone ready to be sunk so as
to obstruct the channel in an emergency. On the 13th I sent
orders to have these sunk as high up the river as we could guard
them, and prevent their removal by the enemy.

As soon as Warren’s corps was over the Chickahominy it marched
out and joined the cavalry in holding the roads from Richmond
while the army passed. No attempt was made by the enemy to
impede our march, however, but Warren and Wilson reported the
enemy strongly fortified in their front. By the evening of the
13th Hancock’s corps was at Charles City Court House on the
James River. Burnside’s and Wright’s corps were on the
Chickahominy, and crossed during the night, Warren’s corps and
the cavalry still covering the army. The material for a pontoon
bridge was already at hand and the work of laying it was
commenced immediately, under the superintendence of
Brigadier-General Benham, commanding the engineer brigade. On
the evening of the 14th the crossing commenced, Hancock in
advance, using both the bridge and boats.

When the Wilderness campaign commenced the Army of the Potomac,
including Burnside’s –which was a separate command until the
24th of May when it was incorporated with the main
army–numbered about 116,000 men. During the progress of the
campaign about 40,000 reinforcements were received. At the
crossing of the James River June 14th-l5th the army numbered
about 115,000. Besides the ordinary losses incident to a
campaign of six weeks’ nearly constant fighting or skirmishing,
about one-half of the artillery was sent back to Washington, and
many men were discharged by reason of the expiration of their
term of service.* In estimating our strength every enlisted man
and every commissioned officer present is included, no matter
how employed; in bands, sick in field hospitals, hospital
attendants, company cooks and all. Operating in an enemy’s
country, and being supplied always from a distant base, large
detachments had at all times to be sent from the front, not only
to guard the base of supplies and the roads to it, but all the
roads leading to our flanks and rear. We were also operating in
a country unknown to us, and without competent guides or maps
showing the roads accurately.

The manner of estimating numbers in the two armies differs
materially. In the Confederate army often only bayonets are
taken into account, never, I believe, do they estimate more than
are handling the guns of the artillery and armed with muskets
(*36) or carbines. Generally the latter are far enough away to
be excluded from the count in any one field. Officers and
details of enlisted men are not included. In the Northern
armies the estimate is most liberal, taking in all connected
with the army and drawing pay.

Estimated in the same manner as ours, Lee had not less than
80,000 men at the start. His reinforcements were about equal to
ours during the campaign, deducting the discharged men and those
sent back. He was on the defensive, and in a country in which
every stream, every road, every obstacle to the movement of
troops and every natural defence was familiar to him and his
army. The citizens were all friendly to him and his cause, and
could and did furnish him with accurate reports of our every
move. Rear guards were not necessary for him, and having always
a railroad at his back, large wagon trains were not required. All
circumstances considered we did not have any advantage in
numbers.

General Lee, who had led the Army of Northern Virginia in all
these contests, was a very highly estimated man in the
Confederate army and States, and filled also a very high place
in the estimation of the people and press of the Northern
States. His praise was sounded throughout the entire North
after every action he was engaged in: the number of his forces
was always lowered and that of the National forces
exaggerated. He was a large, austere man, and I judge difficult
of approach to his subordinates. To be extolled by the entire
press of the South after every engagement, and by a portion of
the press North with equal vehemence, was calculated to give him
the entire confidence of his troops and to make him feared by his
antagonists. It was not an uncommon thing for my staff-officers
to hear from Eastern officers, “Well, Grant has never met Bobby
Lee yet.” There were good and true officers who believe now
that the Army of Northern Virginia was superior to the Army of
the Potomac man to man. I do not believe so, except as the
advantages spoken of above made them so. Before the end I
believe the difference was the other way. The Army of Northern
Virginia became despondent and saw the end. It did not please
them. The National army saw the same thing, and were encouraged
by it.

The advance of the Army of the Potomac reached the James on the
14th of June. Preparations were at once commenced for laying
the pontoon bridges and crossing the river. As already stated,
I had previously ordered General Butler to have two vessels
loaded with stone and carried up the river to a point above that
occupied by our gunboats, where the channel was narrow, and sunk
there so as to obstruct the passage and prevent Confederate
gunboats from coming down the river. Butler had had these boats
filled and put in position, but had not had them sunk before my
arrival. I ordered this done, and also directed that he should
turn over all material and boats not then in use in the river to
be used in ferrying the troops across.

I then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran up to Bermuda
Hundred to see General Butler for the purpose of directing a
movement against Petersburg, while our troops of the Army of the
Potomac were crossing.

I had sent General W. F. Smith back from Cold Harbor by the way
of White House, thence on steamers to City Point for the purpose
of giving General Butler more troops with which to accomplish
this result. General Butler was ordered to send Smith with his
troops reinforced, as far as that could be conveniently done,
from other parts of the Army of the James. He gave Smith about
six thousand reinforcements, including some twenty-five hundred
cavalry under Kautz, and about thirty-five hundred colored
infantry under Hinks.

The distance which Smith had to move to reach the enemy’s lines
was about six miles, and the Confederate advance line of works
was but two miles outside of Petersburg. Smith was to move
under cover of night, up close to the enemy’s works, and assault
as soon as he could after daylight. I believed then, and still
believe, that Petersburg could have been easily captured at that
time. It only had about 2,500 men in the defences besides some
irregular troops, consisting of citizens and employees in the
city who took up arms in case of emergency. Smith started as
proposed, but his advance encountered a rebel force intrenched
between City Point and their lines outside of Petersburg. This
position he carried, with some loss to the enemy; but there was
so much delay that it was daylight before his troops really got
off from there. While there I informed General Butler that
Hancock’s corps would cross the river and move to Petersburg to
support Smith in case the latter was successful, and that I
could reinforce there more rapidly than Lee could reinforce from
his position.

I returned down the river to where the troops of the Army of the
Potomac now were, communicated to General Meade, in writing, the
directions I had given to General Butler and directed him
(Meade) to cross Hancock’s corps over under cover of night, and
push them forward in the morning to Petersburg; halting them,
however, at a designated point until they could hear from
Smith. I also informed General Meade that I had ordered rations
from Bermuda Hundred for Hancock’s corps, and desired him to
issue them speedily, and to lose no more time than was
absolutely necessary. The rations did not reach him, however,
and Hancock, while he got all his corps over during the night,
remained until half-past ten in the hope of receiving them. He
then moved without them, and on the road received a note from
General W. F. Smith, asking him to come on. This seems to be
the first information that General Hancock had received of the
fact that he was to go to Petersburg, or that anything
particular was expected of him. Otherwise he would have been
there by four o’clock in the afternoon.

Smith arrived in front of the enemy’s lines early in the
forenoon of the 15th, and spent the day until after seven
o’clock in the evening in reconnoitering what appeared to be
empty works. The enemy’s line consisted of redans occupying
commanding positions, with rifle-pits connecting them. To the
east side of Petersburg, from the Appomattox back, there were
thirteen of these redans extending a distance of several miles,
probably three. If they had been properly manned they could
have held out against any force that could have attacked them,
at least until reinforcements could have got up from the north
of Richmond.

Smith assaulted with the colored troops, and with success. By
nine o’clock at night he was in possession of five of these
redans and, of course, of the connecting lines of rifle-pits.
All of them contained artillery, which fell into our hands.
Hancock came up and proposed to take any part assigned to him;
and Smith asked him to relieve his men who were in the trenches.

Next morning, the 16th, Hancock himself was in command, and
captured another redan. Meade came up in the afternoon and
succeeded Hancock, who had to be relieved, temporarily, from the
command of his corps on account of the breaking out afresh of the
wound he had received at Gettysburg. During the day Meade
assaulted and carried one more redan to his right and two to his
left. In all this we lost very heavily. The works were not
strongly manned, but they all had guns in them which fell into
our hands, together with the men who were handling them in the
effort to repel these assaults.

Up to this time Beauregard, who had commanded south of Richmond,
had received no reinforcements, except Hoke’s division from
Drury’s Bluff,(*37) which had arrived on the morning of the
16th; though he had urged the authorities very strongly to send
them, believing, as he did, that Petersburg would be a valuable
prize which we might seek.

During the 17th the fighting was very severe and the losses
heavy; and at night our troops occupied about the same position
they had occupied in the morning, except that they held a redan
which had been captured by Potter during the day. During the
night, however, Beauregard fell back to the line which had been
already selected, and commenced fortifying it. Our troops
advanced on the 18th to the line which he had abandoned, and
found that the Confederate loss had been very severe, many of
the enemy’s dead still remaining in the ditches and in front of
them.

Colonel J. L. Chamberlain, of the 20th Maine, was wounded on the
18th. He was gallantly leading his brigade at the time, as he
had been in the habit of doing in all the engagements in which
he had previously been engaged. He had several times been
recommended for a brigadier-generalcy for gallant and
meritorious conduct. On this occasion, however, I promoted him
on the spot, and forwarded a copy of my order to the War
Department, asking that my act might be confirmed and
Chamberlain’s name sent to the Senate for confirmation without
any delay. This was done, and at last a gallant and meritorious
officer received partial justice at the hands of his government,
which he had served so faithfully and so well.

If General Hancock’s orders of the 15th had been communicated to
him, that officer, with his usual promptness, would undoubtedly
have been upon the ground around Petersburg as early as four
o’clock in the afternoon of the 15th. The days were long and it
would have given him considerable time before night. I do not
think there is any doubt that Petersburg itself could have been
carried without much loss; or, at least, if protected by inner
detached works, that a line could have been established very
much in rear of the one then occupied by the enemy. This would
have given us control of both the Weldon and South Side
railroads. This would also have saved an immense amount of hard
fighting which had to be done from the 15th to the 18th, and
would have given us greatly the advantage in the long siege
which ensued.

I now ordered the troops to be put under cover and allowed some
of the rest which they had so long needed. They remained quiet,
except that there was more or less firing every day, until the
22d, when General Meade ordered an advance towards the Weldon
Railroad. We were very anxious to get to that road, and even
round to the South Side Railroad if possible.

Meade moved Hancock’s corps, now commanded by Birney, to the
left, with a view to at least force the enemy to stay within the
limits of his own line. General Wright, with the 6th corps, was
ordered by a road farther south, to march directly for the
Weldon road. The enemy passed in between these two corps and
attacked vigorously, and with very serious results to the
National troops, who were then withdrawn from their advanced
position.

The Army of the Potomac was given the investment of Petersburg,
while the Army of the James held Bermuda Hundred and all the
ground we possessed north of the James River. The 9th corps,
Burnside’s, was placed upon the right at Petersburg; the 5th,
Warren’s, next; the 2d, Birney’s, next; then the 6th, Wright’s,
broken off to the left and south. Thus began the siege of
Petersburg.

CHAPTER LVII.

RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD–RAID ON THE WELDON
RAILROAD–EARLY ‘S MOVEMENT UPON WASHINGTON–MINING THE WORKS
BEFORE PETERSBURG–EXPLOSION OF THE MINE BEFORE
PETERSBURG–CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY–CAPTURE OF THE
WELDON RAILROAD.

On the 7th of June, while at Cold Harbor, I had as already
indicated sent Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry to destroy
as much as he could of the Virginia Central Railroad. General
Hunter had been operating up the Shenandoah Valley with some
success, having fought a battle near Staunton where he captured
a great many prisoners, besides killing and wounding a good many
men. After the battle he formed a junction at Staunton with
Averell and Crook, who had come up from the Kanawha, or Gauley
River. It was supposed, therefore, that General Hunter would be
about Charlottesville, Virginia, by the time Sheridan could get
there, doing on the way the damage that he was sent to do.

I gave Sheridan instructions to have Hunter, in case he should
meet him about Charlottesville, join and return with him to the
Army of the Potomac. Lee, hearing of Hunter’s success in the
valley, started Breckinridge out for its defence at once.
Learning later of Sheridan’s going with two divisions, he also
sent Hampton with two divisions of cavalry, his own and
Fitz-Hugh Lee’s.

Sheridan moved to the north side of the North Anna to get out
west, and learned of the movement of these troops to the south
side of the same stream almost as soon as they had started. He
pushed on to get to Trevilian Station to commence his
destruction at that point. On the night of the 10th he
bivouacked some six or seven miles east of Trevilian, while
Fitz-Hugh Lee was the same night at Trevilian Station and
Hampton but a few miles away.

During the night Hampton ordered an advance on Sheridan, hoping,
no doubt, to surprise and very badly cripple him. Sheridan,
however, by a counter move sent Custer on a rapid march to get
between the two divisions of the enemy and into their rear. This
he did successfully, so that at daylight, when the assault was
made, the enemy found himself at the same time resisted in front
and attacked in rear, and broke in some confusion. The losses
were probably very light on both sides in killed and wounded,
but Sheridan got away with some five hundred prisoners and sent
them to City Point.

During that day, the 11th, Sheridan moved into Trevilian
Station, and the following day proceeded to tear up the road
east and west. There was considerable fighting during the whole
of the day, but the work of destruction went on. In the
meantime, at night, the enemy had taken possession of the
crossing which Sheridan had proposed to take to go north when he
left Trevilian. Sheridan learned, however, from some of the
prisoners he had captured here, that General Hunter was about
Lynchburg, and therefore that there was no use of his going on
to Charlottesville with a view to meet him.

Sheridan started back during the night of the 12th, and made his
way north and farther east, coming around by the north side of
White House, and arriving there on the 21st. Here he found an
abundance of forage for his animals, food for his men, and
security while resting. He had been obliged to leave about
ninety of his own men in the field-hospital which he had
established near Trevilian, and these necessarily fell into the
hands of the enemy.

White House up to this time had been a depot; but now that our
troops were all on the James River, it was no longer wanted as a
store of supplies. Sheridan was, therefore, directed to break it
up; which he did on the 22d of June, bringing the garrison and an
immense wagon train with him. All these were over the James
River by the 26th of the month, and Sheridan ready to follow.

In the meantime Meade had sent Wilson’s division on a raid to
destroy the Weldon and South Side roads. Now that Sheridan was
safe and Hampton free to return to Richmond with his cavalry,
Wilson’s position became precarious. Meade therefore, on the
27th, ordered Sheridan over the river to make a demonstration in
favor of Wilson. Wilson got back, though not without severe
loss, having struck both roads, but the damage done was soon
repaired.

After these events comparative quiet reigned about Petersburg
until late in July. The time, however, was spent in
strengthening the intrenchments and making our position
generally more secure against a sudden attack. In the meantime
I had to look after other portions of my command, where things
had not been going on so favorably, always, as I could have
wished.

General Hunter who had been appointed to succeed Sigel in the
Shenandoah Valley immediately took up the offensive. He met the
enemy on the 5th of June at Piedmont, and defeated him. On the
8th he formed a junction with Crook and Averell at Staunton,
from which place he moved direct on Lynchburg, via Lexington,
which he reached and invested on the 16th. Up to this time he
was very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with
him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a
hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured Lynchburg.
The destruction of the enemy’s supplies and manufactories had
been very great. To meet this movement under General Hunter,
General Lee sent Early with his corps, a part of which reached
Lynchburg before Hunter. After some skirmishing on the 17th and
18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give
battle, retired from before the place. Unfortunately, this want
of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by
the way of the Gauley and Kanawha rivers, thence up the Ohio
River, returning to Harper’s Ferry by way of the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad. A long time was consumed in making this
movement. Meantime the valley was left open to Early’s troops,
and others in that quarter; and Washington also was uncovered.
Early took advantage of this condition of affairs and moved on
Washington.

In the absence of Hunter, General Lew Wallace, with headquarters
at Baltimore, commanded the department in which the Shenandoah
lay. His surplus of troops with which to move against the enemy
was small in number. Most of these were raw and, consequently,
very much inferior to our veterans and to the veterans which
Early had with him; but the situation of Washington was
precarious, and Wallace moved with commendable promptitude to
meet the enemy at the Monocacy. He could hardly have expected
to defeat him badly, but he hoped to cripple and delay him until
Washington could be put into a state of preparation for his
reception. I had previously ordered General Meade to send a
division to Baltimore for the purpose of adding to the defences
of Washington, and he had sent Ricketts’s division of the 6th
corps (Wright’s), which arrived in Baltimore on the 8th of
July. Finding that Wallace had gone to the front with his
command, Ricketts immediately took the cars and followed him to
the Monocacy with his entire division. They met the enemy and,
as might have been expected, were defeated; but they succeeded
in stopping him for the day on which the battle took place. The
next morning Early started on his march to the capital of the
Nation, arriving before it on the 11th.

Learning of the gravity of the situation I had directed General
Meade to also order Wright with the rest of his corps directly
to Washington for the relief of that place, and the latter
reached there the very day that Early arrived before it. The
19th corps, which had been stationed in Louisiana, having been
ordered up to reinforce the armies about Richmond, had about
this time arrived at Fortress Monroe, on their way to join us. I
diverted them from that point to Washington, which place they
reached, almost simultaneously with Wright, on the 11th. The
19th corps was commanded by Major-General Emory.

Early made his reconnoissance with a view of attacking on the
following morning, the 12th; but the next morning he found our
intrenchments, which were very strong, fully manned. He at once
commenced to retreat, Wright following. There is no telling how
much this result was contributed to by General Lew Wallace’s
leading what might well be considered almost a forlorn hope. If
Early had been but one day earlier he might have entered the
capital before the arrival of the reinforcements I had sent.
Whether the delay caused by the battle amounted to a day or not,
General Wallace contributed on this occasion, by the defeat of
the troops under him a greater benefit to the cause than often
falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render by
means of a victory.

Farther west also the troubles were threatening. Some time
before, Forrest had met Sturgis in command of some of our
cavalry in Mississippi and handled him very roughly, gaining a
very great victory over him. This left Forrest free to go
almost where he pleased, and to cut the roads in rear of Sherman
who was then advancing. Sherman was abundantly able to look
after the army that he was immediately with, and all of his
military division so long as he could communicate with it; but
it was my place to see that he had the means with which to hold
his rear. Two divisions under A. J. Smith had been sent to
Banks in Louisiana some months before. Sherman ordered these
back, with directions to attack Forrest. Smith met and defeated
him very badly. I then directed that Smith should hang to
Forrest and not let him go; and to prevent by all means his
getting upon the Memphis and Nashville Railroad. Sherman had
anticipated me in this matter, and given the same orders in
substance; but receiving my directions for this order to Smith,
he repeated it.

On the 25th of June General Burnside had commenced running a
mine from about the centre of his front under the Confederate
works confronting him. He was induced to do this by Colonel
Pleasants, of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, whose regiment was
mostly composed of miners, and who was himself a practical
miner. Burnside had submitted the scheme to Meade and myself,
and we both approved of it, as a means of keeping the men
occupied. His position was very favorable for carrying on this
work, but not so favorable for the operations to follow its
completion. The position of the two lines at that point were
only about a hundred yards apart with a comparatively deep
ravine intervening. In the bottom of this ravine the work
commenced. The position was unfavorable in this particular:
that the enemy’s line at that point was re-entering, so that its
front was commanded by their own lines both to the right and
left. Then, too, the ground was sloping upward back of the
Confederate line for a considerable distance, and it was
presumable that the enemy had, at least, a detached work on this
highest point. The work progressed, and on the 23d of July the
mine was finished ready for charging; but I had this work of
charging deferred until we were ready for it.

On the 17th of July several deserters came in and said that
there was great consternation in Richmond, and that Lee was
coming out to make an attack upon us the object being to put us
on the defensive so that he might detach troops to go to Georgia
where the army Sherman was operating against was said to be in
great trouble. I put the army commanders, Meade and Butler, on
the lookout, but the attack was not made.

I concluded, then, a few days later, to do something in the way
of offensive movement myself, having in view something of the
same object that Lee had had. Wright’s and Emory’s corps were
in Washington, and with this reduction of my force Lee might
very readily have spared some troops from the defences to send
West. I had other objects in view, however, besides keeping Lee
where he was. The mine was constructed and ready to be exploded,
and I wanted to take that occasion to carry Petersburg if I
could. It was the object, therefore, to get as many of Lee’s
troops away from the south side of the James River as
possible. Accordingly, on the 26th, we commenced a movement
with Hancock’s corps and Sheridan’s cavalry to the north side by
the way of Deep Bottom, where Butler had a pontoon bridge laid.
The plan, in the main, was to let the cavalry cut loose and,
joining with Kautz’s cavalry of the Army of the James, get by
Lee’s lines and destroy as much as they could of the Virginia
Central Railroad, while, in the mean time, the infantry was to
move out so as to protect their rear and cover their retreat
back when they should have got through with their work. We were
successful in drawing the enemy’s troops to the north side of the
James as I expected. The mine was ordered to be charged, and the
morning of the 30th of July was the time fixed for its
explosion. I gave Meade minute orders (*38) on the 24th
directing how I wanted the assault conducted, which orders he
amplified into general instructions for the guidance of the
troops that were to be engaged.

Meade’s instructions, which I, of course, approved most
heartily, were all that I can see now was necessary. The only
further precaution which he could have taken, and which he could
not foresee, would have been to have different men to execute
them.

The gallery to the mine was over five hundred feet long from
where it entered the ground to the point where it was under the
enemy’s works, and with a cross gallery of something over eighty
feet running under their lines. Eight chambers had been left,
requiring a ton of powder each to charge them. All was ready by
the time I had prescribed; and on the 29th Hancock and Sheridan
were brought back near the James River with their troops. Under
cover of night they started to recross the bridge at Deep Bottom,
and to march directly for that part of our lines in front of the
mine.

Warren was to hold his line of intrenchments with a sufficient
number of men and concentrate the balance on the right next to
Burnside’s corps, while Ord, now commanding the 18th corps,
temporarily under Meade, was to form in the rear of Burnside to
support him when he went in. All were to clear off the parapets
and the _abatis_ in their front so as to leave the space as open
as possible, and be able to charge the moment the mine had been
sprung and Burnside had taken possession. Burnside’s corps was
not to stop in the crater at all but push on to the top of the
hill, supported on the right and left by Ord’s and Warren’s
corps.

Warren and Ord fulfilled their instructions perfectly so far as
making ready was concerned. Burnside seemed to have paid no
attention whatever to the instructions, and left all the
obstruction in his own front for his troops to get over in the
best way they could. The four divisions of his corps were
commanded by Generals Potter, Willcox, Ledlie and Ferrero. The
last was a colored division; and Burnside selected it to make
the assault. Meade interfered with this. Burnside then took
Ledlie’s division–a worse selection than the first could have
been. In fact, Potter and Willcox were the only division
commanders Burnside had who were equal to the occasion. Ledlie
besides being otherwise inefficient, proved also to possess
disqualification less common among soldiers.

There was some delay about the explosion of the mine so that it
did not go off until about five o’clock in the morning. When it
did explode it was very successful, making a crater twenty feet
deep and something like a hundred feet in length. Instantly one
hundred and ten cannon and fifty mortars, which had been placed
in the most commanding positions covering the ground to the
right and left of where the troops were to enter the enemy’s
lines, commenced playing. Ledlie’s division marched into the
crater immediately on the explosion, but most of the men stopped
there in the absence of any one to give directions; their
commander having found some safe retreat to get into before they
started. There was some delay on the left and right in
advancing, but some of the troops did get in and turn to the
right and left, carrying the rifle-pits as I expected they would
do.

There had been great consternation in Petersburg, as we were
well aware, about a rumored mine that we were going to
explode. They knew we were mining, and they had failed to cut
our mine off by countermining, though Beauregard had taken the
precaution to run up a line of intrenchments to the rear of that
part of their line fronting where they could see that our men
were at work. We had learned through deserters who had come in
that the people had very wild rumors about what was going on on
our side. They said that we had undermined the whole of
Petersburg; that they were resting upon a slumbering volcano and
did not know at what moment they might expect an eruption. I
somewhat based my calculations upon this state of feeling, and
expected that when the mine was exploded the troops to the right
and left would flee in all directions, and that our troops, if
they moved promptly, could get in and strengthen themselves
before the enemy had come to a realization of the true
situation. It was just as I expected it would be. We could see
the men running without any apparent object except to get away.
It was half an hour before musketry firing, to amount to
anything, was opened upon our men in the crater. It was an hour
before the enemy got artillery up to play upon them; and it was
nine o’clock before Lee got up reinforcements from his right to
join in expelling our troops.

The effort was a stupendous failure. It cost us about four
thousand men, mostly, however, captured; and all due to
inefficiency on the part of the corps commander and the
incompetency of the division commander who was sent to lead the
assault.

After being fully assured of the failure of the mine, and
finding that most of that part of Lee’s army which had been
drawn north of the James River were still there, I gave Meade
directions to send a corps of infantry and the cavalry next
morning, before Lee could get his forces back, to destroy
fifteen or twenty miles of the Weldon Railroad. But misfortunes
never come singly. I learned during that same afternoon that
Wright’s pursuit of Early was feeble because of the constant and
contrary orders he had been receiving from Washington, while I
was cut off from immediate communication by reason of our cable
across Chesapeake Bay being broken. Early, however, was not
aware of the fact that Wright was not pursuing until he had
reached Strasburg. Finding that he was not pursued he turned
back to Winchester, where Crook was stationed with a small
force, and drove him out. He then pushed north until he had
reached the Potomac, then he sent McCausland across to
Chambersburg, Pa., to destroy that town. Chambersburg was a
purely defenceless town with no garrison whatever, and no
fortifications; yet McCausland, under Early’s orders, burned the
place and left about three hundred families houseless. This
occurred on the 30th of July. I rescinded my orders for the
troops to go out to destroy the Weldon Railroad, and directed
them to embark for Washington City. After burning Chambersburg
McCausland retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards
Cumberland. They were met and defeated by General Kelley and
driven into Virginia.

The Shenandoah Valley was very important to the Confederates,
because it was the principal storehouse they now had for feeding
their armies about Richmond. It was well known that they would
make a desperate struggle to maintain it. It had been the
source of a great deal of trouble to us heretofore to guard that
outlet to the north, partly because of the incompetency of some
of the commanders, but chiefly because of interference from
Washington.

It seemed to be the policy of General Halleck and Secretary
Stanton to keep any force sent there, in pursuit of the invading
army, moving right and left so as to keep between the enemy and
our capital; and, generally speaking, they pursued this policy
until all knowledge of the whereabouts of the enemy was lost.
They were left, therefore, free to supply themselves with
horses, beef cattle, and such provisions as they could carry
away from Western Maryland and Pennsylvania. I determined to
put a stop to this. I started Sheridan at once for that field
of operation, and on the following day sent another division of
his cavalry.

I had previously asked to have Sheridan assigned to that
command, but Mr. Stanton objected, on the ground that he was too
young for so important a command. On the 1st of August when I
sent reinforcements for the protection of Washington, I sent the
following orders:

CITY POINT, VA.,

August 1, 1864, 11.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
Washington D. C.

I am sending General Sheridan for temporary duty whilst the
enemy is being expelled from the border. Unless General Hunter
is in the field in person, I want Sheridan put in command of all
the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south
of the enemy and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy
goes let our troops go also. Once started up the valley they
ought to be followed until we get possession of the Virginia
Central Railroad. If General Hunter is in the field, give
Sheridan direct command of the 6th corps and cavalry division.
All the cavalry, I presume, will reach Washington in the course
of to-morrow.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

The President in some way or other got to see this dispatch of
mine directing certain instructions to be given to the
commanders in the field, operating against Early, and sent me
the following very characteristic dispatch:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY TELEGRAPH,
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D. C., August 3, 1864.

Cypher. 6 P.M.,

LT. GENERAL GRANT,
City Point, Va.

I have seen your despatch in which you say, “I want Sheridan put
in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to
put himself south of the enemy, and follow him to the death.
Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also.” This, I
think, is exactly right, as to how our forces should move. But
please look over the despatches you may have received from here,
even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that
there is any idea in the head of any one here, of “putting our
army south of the enemy,” or of “following him to the death” in
any direction. I repeat to you it will neither be done nor
attempted unless you watch it every day, and hour, and force it.

A. LINCOLN.

I replied to this that “I would start in two hours for
Washington,” and soon got off, going directly to the Monocacy
without stopping at Washington on my way. I found General
Hunter’s army encamped there, scattered over the fields along
the banks of the Monocacy, with many hundreds of cars and
locomotives, belonging to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, which
he had taken the precaution to bring back and collect at that
point. I asked the general where the enemy was. He replied
that he did not know. He said the fact was, that he was so
embarrassed with orders from Washington moving him first to the
right and then to the left that he had lost all trace of the
enemy.

I then told the general that I would find out where the enemy
was, and at once ordered steam got up and trains made up, giving
directions to push for Halltown, some four miles above Harper’s
Ferry, in the Shenandoah Valley. The cavalry and the wagon
trains were to march, but all the troops that could be
transported by the cars were to go in that way. I knew that the
valley was of such importance to the enemy that, no matter how
much he was scattered at that time, he would in a very short
time be found in front of our troops moving south.

I then wrote out General Hunter’s instructions. (*39) I told
him that Sheridan was in Washington, and still another division
was on its way; and suggested that he establish the headquarters
of the department at any point that would suit him best,
Cumberland, Baltimore, or elsewhere, and give Sheridan command
of the troops in the field. The general replied to this, that
he thought he had better be relieved entirely. He said that
General Halleck seemed so much to distrust his fitness for the
position he was in that he thought somebody else ought to be
there. He did not want, in any way, to embarrass the cause;
thus showing a patriotism that was none too common in the
army. There were not many major-generals who would voluntarily
have asked to have the command of a department taken from them
on the supposition that for some particular reason, or for any
reason, the service would be better performed. I told him,
“very well then,” and telegraphed at once for Sheridan to come
to the Monocacy, and suggested that I would wait and meet him
there.

Sheridan came at once by special train, but reached there after
the troops were all off. I went to the station and remained
there until he arrived. Myself and one or two of my staff were
about all the Union people, except General Hunter and his staff,
who were left at the Monocacy when Sheridan arrived. I hastily
told Sheridan what had been done and what I wanted him to do,
giving him, at the same time, the written instructions which had
been prepared for General Hunter and directed to that officer.

Sheridan now had about 30,000 men to move with, 8,000 of them
being cavalry. Early had about the same number, but the
superior ability of the National commander over the Confederate
commander was so great that all the latter’s advantage of being
on the defensive was more than counterbalanced by this
circumstance. As I had predicted, Early was soon found in front
of Sheridan in the valley, and Pennsylvania and Maryland were
speedily freed from the invaders. The importance of the valley
was so great to the Confederates that Lee reinforced Early, but
not to the extent that we thought and feared he would.

To prevent as much as possible these reinforcements from being
sent out from Richmond, I had to do something to compel Lee to
retain his forces about his capital. I therefore gave orders
for another move to the north side of the James River, to
threaten Richmond. Hancock’s corps, part of the 10th corps
under Birney, and Gregg’s division of cavalry were crossed to
the north side of the James during the night of the 13th-14th of
August. A threatening position was maintained for a number of
days, with more or less skirmishing, and some tolerably hard
fighting; although it was my object and my instructions that
anything like a battle should be avoided, unless opportunities
should present themselves which would insure great success.
General Meade was left in command of the few troops around
Petersburg, strongly intrenched; and was instructed to keep a
close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, and himself to take
advantage of any weakening that might occur through an effort on
the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side. There was no
particular victory gained on either side; but during that time
no more reinforcements were sent to the valley.

I informed Sheridan of what had been done to prevent
reinforcements being sent from Richmond against him, and also
that the efforts we had made had proven that one of the
divisions which we supposed had gone to the valley was still at
Richmond, because we had captured six or seven hundred prisoners
from that division, each of its four brigades having contributed
to our list of captures. I also informed him that but one
division had gone, and it was possible that I should be able to
prevent the going of any more.

To add to my embarrassment at this time Sherman, who was now
near Atlanta, wanted reinforcements. He was perfectly willing
to take the raw troops then being raised in the North-west,
saying that he could teach them more soldiering in one day among
his troops than they would learn in a week in a camp of
instruction. I therefore asked that all troops in camps of
instruction in the North-west be sent to him. Sherman also
wanted to be assured that no Eastern troops were moving out
against him. I informed him of what I had done and assured him
that I would hold all the troops there that it was possible for
me to hold, and that up to that time none had gone. I also
informed him that his real danger was from Kirby Smith, who
commanded the trans-Mississippi Department. If Smith should
escape Steele, and get across the Mississippi River, he might
move against him. I had, therefore, asked to have an expedition
ready to move from New Orleans against Mobile in case Kirby Smith
should get across. This would have a tendency to draw him to the
defence of that place, instead of going against Sherman.

Right in the midst of all these embarrassments Halleck informed
me that there was an organized scheme on foot in the North to
resist the draft, and suggested that it might become necessary
to draw troops from the field to put it down. He also advised
taking in sail, and not going too fast.

The troops were withdrawn from the north side of the James River
on the night of the 20th. Before they were withdrawn, however,
and while most of Lee’s force was on that side of the river,
Warren had been sent with most of the 5th corps to capture the
Weldon Railroad. He took up his line of march well back to the
rear, south of the enemy, while the troops remaining in the
trenches extended so as to cover that part of the line which he
had vacated by moving out. From our left, near the old line, it
was about three miles to the Weldon Railroad. A division was
ordered from the right of the Petersburg line to reinforce
Warren, while a division was brought back from the north side of
the James River to take its place.

This road was very important to the enemy. The limits from
which his supplies had been drawn were already very much
contracted, and I knew that he must fight desperately to protect
it. Warren carried the road, though with heavy loss on both
sides. He fortified his new position, and our trenches were
then extended from the left of our main line to connect with his
new one. Lee made repeated attempts to dislodge Warren’s corps,
but without success, and with heavy loss.

As soon as Warren was fortified and reinforcements reached him,
troops were sent south to destroy the bridges on the Weldon
Railroad; and with such success that the enemy had to draw in
wagons, for a distance of about thirty miles, all the supplies
they got thereafter from that source. It was on the 21st that
Lee seemed to have given up the Weldon Railroad as having been
lost to him; but along about the 24th or 25th he made renewed
attempts to recapture it; again he failed and with very heavy
losses to him as compared with ours.

On the night of the 20th our troops on the north side of the
James were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg were sent south to
destroy the Weldon Railroad. They were attacked on the 25th at
Reams’s Station, and after desperate fighting a part of our line
gave way, losing five pieces of artillery. But the Weldon
Railroad never went out of our possession from the 18th of
August to the close of the war.

CHAPTER LVIII.

SHERIDAN’S ADVANCE–VISIT TO SHERIDAN–SHERIDAN’S VICTORY IN THE
SHENANDOAH–SHERIDAN’S RIDE TO WINCHESTER–CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN
FOR THE WINTER.

We had our troops on the Weldon Railroad contending against a
large force that regarded this road of so much importance that
they could afford to expend many lives in retaking it; Sherman
just getting through to Atlanta with great losses of men from
casualties, discharges and detachments left along as guards to
occupy and hold the road in rear of him; Washington threatened
but a short time before, and now Early being strengthened in the
valley so as, probably, to renew that attempt. It kept me pretty
active in looking after all these points.

On the 10th of August Sheridan had advanced on Early up the
Shenandoah Valley, Early falling back to Strasburg. On the 12th
I learned that Lee had sent twenty pieces of artillery, two
divisions of infantry and a considerable cavalry force to
strengthen Early. It was important that Sheridan should be
informed of this, so I sent the information to Washington by
telegraph, and directed a courier to be sent from there to get
the message to Sheridan at all hazards, giving him the
information. The messenger, an officer of the army, pushed
through with great energy and reached Sheridan just in time. The
officer went through by way of Snicker’s Gap, escorted by some
cavalry. He found Sheridan just making his preparations to
attack Early in his chosen position. Now, however, he was
thrown back on the defensive.

On the 15th of September I started to visit General Sheridan in
the Shenandoah Valley. My purpose was to have him attack Early,
or drive him out of the valley and destroy that source of
supplies for Lee’s army. I knew it was impossible for me to get
orders through Washington to Sheridan to make a move, because
they would be stopped there and such orders as Halleck’s caution
(and that of the Secretary of War) would suggest would be given
instead, and would, no doubt, be contradictory to mine. I
therefore, without stopping at Washington, went directly through
to Charlestown, some ten miles above Harper’s Ferry, and waited
there to see General Sheridan, having sent a courier in advance
to inform him where to meet me.

When Sheridan arrived I asked him if he had a map showing the
positions of his army and that of the enemy. He at once drew
one out of his side pocket, showing all roads and streams, and
the camps of the two armies. He said that if he had permission
he would move so and so (pointing out how) against the
Confederates, and that he could “whip them.” Before starting I
had drawn up a plan of campaign for Sheridan, which I had
brought with me; but, seeing that he was so clear and so
positive in his views and so confident of success, I said
nothing about this and did not take it out of my pocket.

Sheridan’s wagon trains were kept at Harper’s Ferry, where all
of his stores were. By keeping the teams at that place, their
forage did not have to be hauled to them. As supplies of
ammunition, provisions and rations for the men were wanted,
trains would be made up to deliver the stores to the
commissaries and quartermasters encamped at Winchester. Know
that he, in making preparations to move at a given day, would
have to bring up wagons trains from Harper’s Ferry, I asked him
if he could be ready to get off by the following Tuesday. This
was on Friday. “O Yes,” he said, he “could be off before
daylight on Monday.” I told him then to make the attack at that
time and according to his own plan; and I immediately started to
return to the army about Richmond. After visiting Baltimore and
Burlington, New Jersey, I arrived at City Point on the 19th.

On the way out to Harper’s Ferry I had met Mr. Robert Garrett,
President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. He seemed very
anxious to know when workmen might be put upon the road again so
as to make repairs and put it in shape for running. It was a
large piece of property to have standing idle. I told him I
could not answer then positively but would try and inform him
before a great while. On Mr. Garrett met me again with the same
and I told him I thought that by the Wednesday he might send his
workmen out on his road. I gave him no further information
however, and he had no suspicion of how expected to have the
road cleared for his workmen.

Sheridan moved at the time he had fixed upon. Early at the
crossing of Opequon Creek, a most decisive victory–one which
the country. Early had invited this attack himself by his bad
generalship and made the victory easy. He had sent G. T.
Anderson’s division east Blue Ridge before I went to Harper’s
Ferry; and about the time I arrived there he started other
divisions (leaving but two in their camps) to march to
Martinsburg for the purpose destroying the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad at that point. Early here learned that I had been with
Sheridan and, supposing there was some movement on foot, started
back as soon as he got the information. But his forces were
separated and, as I have said, he was very badly defeated. He
fell back to Fisher’s Hill, Sheridan following.

The valley is narrow at that point, and Early made another stand
there, behind works which extended across. But Sheridan turned
both his flanks and again sent him speeding up the valley,
following in hot pursuit. The pursuit was continued up the
valley to Mount Jackson and New Market. Sheridan captured about
eleven hundred prisoners and sixteen guns. The houses which he
passed all along the route were found to be filled with Early’s
wounded, and the country swarmed with his deserters. Finally,
on the 25th, Early turned from the valley eastward, leaving
Sheridan at Harrisonburg in undisputed possession.

Now one of the main objects of the expedition began to be
accomplished. Sheridan went to work with his command, gathering
in the crops, cattle, and everything in the upper part of the
valley required by our troops; and especially taking what might
be of use to the enemy. What he could not take away he
destroyed, so that the enemy would not be invited to come back
there. I congratulated Sheridan upon his recent great victory
and had a salute of a hundred guns fired in honor of it, the
guns being aimed at the enemy around Petersburg. I also
notified the other commanders throughout the country, who also
fired salutes in honor of his victory.

I had reason to believe that the administration was a little
afraid to have a decisive battle at that time, for fear it might
go against us and have a bad effect on the November elections.
The convention which had met and made its nomination of the
Democratic candidate for the presidency had declared the war a
failure. Treason was talked as boldly in Chicago at that
convention as ever been in Charleston. It was a question
whether the government would then have had the power to make
arrests and punish those who talked treason. But this decisive
victory was effective campaign argument made in the most
effective campaign argument made in the canvass.

Sheridan, in his pursuit, got beyond where could hear from him
in Washington, and the President became very much frightened
about him. He was afraid that the hot pursuit had been a little
like that of General Cass was said to have been, in one of our
Indian wars, when he was an officer of army. Cass was pursuing
the Indians so closely that the first thing he knew he found
himself in front, and the Indians pursuing him. The President
was afraid that Sheridan had got on the other side of Early and
that Early was in behind him. He was afraid that Sheridan was
getting so far away that reinforcements would be sent out from
Richmond to enable Early to beat him. I replied to the
President that I had taken steps to prevent Lee from sending
reinforcements to Early, by attacking the former where he was.

On the 28th of September, to retain Lee in his position, I sent
Ord with the 18th corps and Birney with the 10th corps to make
an advance on Richmond, to threaten it. Ord moved with the left
wing up to Chaffin’s Bluff; Birney with the 10th corps took a
road farther north; while Kautz with the cavalry took the Darby
road, still farther to the north. They got across the river by
the next morning, and made an effort to surprise the enemy. In
that, however, they were unsuccessful.

The enemy’s lines were very strong and very intricate.
Stannard’s division of the 18th corps with General Burnham’s
brigade leading, tried an assault against Fort Harrison and
captured it with sixteen guns and a good many prisoners. Burnham
was killed in the assault. Colonel Stevens who succeeded him was
badly wounded; and his successor also fell in the same way. Some
works to the right and left were also carried with the guns in
them–six in number–and a few more prisoners. Birney’s troops
to the right captured the enemy’s intrenched picket-lines, but
were unsuccessful in their efforts upon the main line.

Our troops fortified their new position, bringing Fort Harrison
into the new line and extending it to the river. This brought
us pretty close to the enemy on the north side of the James, and
the two opposing lines maintained their relative positions to the
close of the siege.

In the afternoon a further attempt was made to advance, but it
failed. Ord fell badly wounded, and had to be relieved ; the
command devolved upon General Heckman, and later General Weitzel
was assigned to the command of the 18th corps. During the night
Lee reinforced his troops about Fort Gilmer, which was at the
right of Fort Harrison, by eight additional brigades from
Petersburg, and attempted to retake the works which we had
captured by concentrating ten brigades against them. All their
efforts failed, their attacks being all repulsed with very heavy
loss. In one of these assaults upon us General Stannard, a
gallant officer who was defending Fort Harrison, lost an arm.
Our casualties during these operations amounted to 394 killed,
I,554 wounded and 324 missing.

Whilst this was going on General Meade was instructed to keep up
an appearance of moving troops to our extreme left. Parke and
Warren were kept with two divisions, each under arms, ready to
move leaving their enclosed batteries manned, with a scattering
line on the other intrenchments. The object of this was to
prevent reinforcements from going to the north side of the
river. Meade was instructed to watch the enemy closely and, if
Lee weakened his lines, to make an attack.

On the 30th these troops moved out, under Warren, and captured
an advanced intrenched camp at Peeble’s farm, driving the enemy
back to the main line. Our troops followed and made an attack
in the hope of carrying the enemy’s main line; but in this they
were unsuccessful and lost a large number of men, mostly
captured. The number of killed and wounded was not large. The
next day our troops advanced again and established themselves,
intrenching a new line about a mile in front of the enemy. This
advanced Warren’s position on the Weldon Railroad very
considerably.

Sheridan having driven the enemy out of the valley, and taken
the productions of the valley so that instead of going there for
supplies the enemy would have to bring his provisions with him if
he again entered it, recommended a reduction of his own force,
the surplus to be sent where it could be of more use. I
approved of his suggestion, and ordered him to send Wright’s
corps back to the James River. I further directed him to repair
the railroad up the Shenandoah Valley towards the advanced
position which we would hold with a small force. The troops
were to be sent to Washington by the way of Culpeper, in order
to watch the east side of the Blue Ridge, and prevent the enemy
from getting into the rear of Sheridan while he was still doing
his work of destruction.

The valley was so very important, however, to the Confederate
army that, contrary to our expectations, they determined to make
one more strike, and save it if possible before the supplies
should be all destroyed. Reinforcements were sent therefore to
Early, and this before any of our troops had been withdrawn.
Early prepared to strike Sheridan at Harrisonburg; but the
latter had not remained there.

On the 6th of October Sheridan commenced retiring down the
valley, taking or destroying all the food and forage and driving
the cattle before him, Early following. At Fisher’s Hill
Sheridan turned his cavalry back on that of Early, which, under
the lead of Rosser, was pursuing closely, and routed it most
completely, capturing eleven guns and a large number of
prisoners. Sheridan lost only about sixty men. His cavalry
pursued the enemy back some twenty-five miles. On the 10th of
October the march down the valley was again resumed, Early again
following.

I now ordered Sheridan to halt, and to improve the opportunity
if afforded by the enemy’s having been sufficiently weakened, to
move back again and cut the James River Canal and Virginia
Central Railroad. But this order had to go through Washington
where it was intercepted; and when Sheridan received what
purported to be a statement of what I wanted him to do it was
something entirely different. Halleck informed Sheridan that it
was my wish for him to hold a forward position as a base from
which to act against Charlottesville and Gordonsville; that he
should fortify this position and provision it.

Sheridan objected to this most decidedly; and I was impelled to
telegraph him, on the 14th, as follows:

CITY POINT, VA.,
October 14, 1864.–12.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN,
Cedar Creek, Va.

What I want is for you to threaten the Virginia Central Railroad
and canal in the manner your judgment tells you is best, holding
yourself ready to advance, if the enemy draw off their forces.
If you make the enemy hold a force equal to your own for the
protection of those thoroughfares, it will accomplish nearly as
much as their destruction. If you cannot do this, then the next
best thing to do is to send here all the force you can. I deem a
good cavalry force necessary for your offensive, as well as
defensive operations. You need not therefore send here more
than one division of cavalry.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

Sheridan having been summoned to Washington City, started on the
15th leaving Wright in command. His army was then at Cedar
Creek, some twenty miles south of Winchester. The next morning
while at Front Royal, Sheridan received a dispatch from Wright,
saying that a dispatch from Longstreet to Early had been
intercepted. It directed the latter to be ready to move and to
crush Sheridan as soon as he, Longstreet, arrived. On the
receipt of this news Sheridan ordered the cavalry up the valley
to join Wright.

On the 18th of October Early was ready to move, and during the
night succeeded in getting his troops in the rear of our left
flank, which fled precipitately and in great confusion down the
valley, losing eighteen pieces of artillery and a thousand or
more prisoners. The right under General Getty maintained a firm
and steady front, falling back to Middletown where it took a
position and made a stand. The cavalry went to the rear, seized
the roads leading to Winchester and held them for the use of our
troops in falling back, General Wright having ordered a retreat
back to that place.

Sheridan having left Washington on the 18th, reached Winchester
that night. The following morning he started to join his
command. He had scarcely got out of town, when he met his men
returning in panic from the front and also heard heavy firing to
the south. He immediately ordered the cavalry at Winchester to
be deployed across the valley to stop the stragglers. Leaving
members of his staff to take care of Winchester and the public
property there, he set out with a small escort directly for the
scene of battle. As he met the fugitives he ordered them to
turn back, reminding them that they were going the wrong way.
His presence soon restored confidence. Finding themselves worse
frightened than hurt the men did halt and turn back. Many of
those who had run ten miles got back in time to redeem their
reputation as gallant soldiers before night.

When Sheridan got to the front he found Getty and Custer still
holding their ground firmly between the Confederates and our
retreating troops. Everything in the rear was now ordered up.
Sheridan at once proceeded to intrench his position; and he
awaited an assault from the enemy. This was made with vigor,
and was directed principally against Emory’s corps, which had
sustained the principal loss in the first attack. By one
o’clock the attack was repulsed. Early was so badly damaged
that he seemed disinclined to make another attack, but went to
work to intrench himself with a view to holding the position he
had already gained. He thought, no doubt, that Sheridan would
be glad enough to leave him unmolested; but in this he was
mistaken.

About the middle of the afternoon Sheridan advanced. He sent
his cavalry by both flanks, and they penetrated to the enemy’s
rear. The contest was close for a time, but at length the left
of the enemy broke, and disintegration along the whole line soon
followed. Early tried to rally his men, but they were followed
so closely that they had to give way very quickly every time
they attempted to make a stand. Our cavalry, having pushed on
and got in the rear of the Confederates, captured twenty-four
pieces of artillery, besides retaking what had been lost in the
morning. This victory pretty much closed the campaigning in the
Valley of Virginia. All the Confederate troops were sent back to
Richmond with the exception of one division of infantry and a
little cavalry. Wright’s corps was ordered back to the Army of
the Potomac, and two other divisions were withdrawn from the
valley. Early had lost more men in killed, wounded and captured
in the valley than Sheridan had commanded from first to last.

On more than one occasion in these engagements General R. B.
Hayes, who succeeded me as President of the United States, bore
a very honorable part. His conduct on the field was marked by
conspicuous gallantry as well as the display of qualities of a
higher order than that of mere personal daring. This might well
have been expected of one who could write at the time he is said
to have done so: “Any officer fit for duty who at this crisis
would abandon his post to electioneer for a seat in Congress,
ought to be scalped.” Having entered the army as a Major of
Volunteers at the beginning of the war, General Hayes attained
by meritorious service the rank of Brevet Major-General before
its close.

On the north side of the James River the enemy attacked Kautz’s
cavalry on the 7th of October, and drove it back with heavy loss
in killed, wounded and prisoners, and the loss of all the
artillery. This was followed up by an attack on our intrenched
infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter. On the
13th a reconnoissance was sent out by General Butler, with a
view to drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing,
which resulted in heavy loss to us.

On the 24th I ordered General Meade to attempt to get possession
of the South Side Railroad, and for that purpose to advance on
the 27th. The attempt proved a failure, however, the most
advanced of our troops not getting nearer than within six miles
of the point aimed for. Seeing the impossibility of its
accomplishment I ordered the troops to withdraw, and they were
all back in their former positions the next day.

Butler, by my directions, also made a demonstration on the north
side of the James River in order to support this move, by
detaining there the Confederate troops who were on that side. He
succeeded in this, but failed of further results by not marching
past the enemy’s left before turning in on the Darby road and by
reason of simply coming up against their lines in place.

This closed active operations around Richmond for the winter. Of
course there was frequent skirmishing between pickets, but no
serious battle was fought near either Petersburg or Richmond.
It would prolong this work to give a detailed account of all
that took place from day to day around Petersburg and at other
parts of my command, and it would not interest the general
reader if given. All these details can be found by the military
student in a series of books published by the Scribners, Badeau’s
history of my campaigns, and also in the publications of the War
Department, including both the National and Confederate reports.

In the latter part of November General Hancock was relieved from
the command of the 2d corps by the Secretary of War and ordered
to Washington, to organize and command a corps of veteran troops
to be designated the 1st corps. It was expected that this would
give him a large command to co-operate with in the spring. It
was my expectation, at the time, that in the final operations
Hancock should move either up the valley, or else east of the
Blue Ridge to Lynchburg; the idea being to make the spring
campaign the close of the war. I expected, with Sherman coming
up from the South, Meade south of Petersburg and around
Richmond, and Thomas’s command in Tennessee with depots of
supplies established in the eastern part of that State, to move
from the direction of Washington or the valley towards
Lynchburg. We would then have Lee so surrounded that his
supplies would be cut off entirely, making it impossible for him
to support his army.

General Humphreys, chief-of-staff of the Army of the Potomac,
was assigned to the command of the 2d corps, to succeed Hancock.

CHAPTER LIX.

THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA–SHERMAN’S MARCH TO THE SEA–WAR
ANECDOTES–THE MARCH ON SAVANNAH–INVESTMENT OF
SAVANNAH–CAPTURE OF SAVANNAH.

Let us now return to the operations in the military division of
the Mississippi, and accompany Sherman in his march to the sea.

The possession of Atlanta by us narrowed the territory of the
enemy very materially and cut off one of his two remaining lines
of roads from east to west.

A short time after the fall of Atlanta Mr. Davis visited
Palmetto and Macon and made speeches at each place. He spoke at
Palmetto on the 20th of September, and at Macon on the 22d.
Inasmuch as he had relieved Johnston and appointed Hood, and
Hood had immediately taken the initiative, it is natural to
suppose that Mr. Davis was disappointed with General Johnston’s
policy. My own judgment is that Johnston acted very wisely: he
husbanded his men and saved as much of his territory as he could,
without fighting decisive battles in which all might be lost. As
Sherman advanced, as I have show, his army became spread out,
until, if this had been continued, it would have been easy to
destroy it in detail. I know that both Sherman and I were
rejoiced when we heard of the change. Hood was unquestionably a
brave, gallant soldier and not destitute of ability; but
unfortunately his policy was to fight the enemy wherever he saw
him, without thinking much of the consequences of defeat.

In his speeches Mr. Davis denounced Governor Brown, of Georgia,
and General Johnston in unmeasured terms, even insinuating that
their loyalty to the Southern cause was doubtful. So far as
General Johnston is concerned, I think Davis did him a great
injustice in this particular. I had know the general before the
war and strongly believed it would be impossible for him to
accept a high commission for the purpose of betraying the cause
he had espoused. There, as I have said, I think that his policy
was the best one that could have been pursued by the whole
South– protract the war, which was all that was necessary to
enable them to gain recognition in the end. The North was
already growing weary, as the South evidently was also, but with
this difference. In the North the people governed, and could
stop hostilities whenever they chose to stop supplies. The
South was a military camp, controlled absolutely by the
government with soldiers to back it, and the war could have been
protracted, no matter to what extent the discontent reached, up
to the point of open mutiny of the soldiers themselves. Mr.
Davis’s speeches were frank appeals to the people of Georgia and
that portion of the South to come to their relief. He tried to
assure his frightened hearers that the Yankees were rapidly
digging their own graves; that measures were already being taken
to cut them off from supplies from the North; and that with a
force in front, and cut off from the rear, they must soon starve
in the midst of a hostile people. Papers containing reports of
these speeches immediately reached the Northern States, and they
were republished. Of course, that caused no alarm so long as
telegraphic communication was kept up with Sherman.

When Hood was forced to retreat from Atlanta he moved to the
south-west and was followed by a portion of Sherman’s army. He
soon appeared upon the railroad in Sherman’s rear, and with his
whole army began destroying the road. At the same time also the
work was begun in Tennessee and Kentucky which Mr. Davis had
assured his hearers at Palmetto and Macon would take place. He
ordered Forrest (about the ablest cavalry general in the South)
north for this purpose; and Forrest and Wheeler carried out
their orders with more or less destruction, occasionally picking
up a garrison. Forrest indeed performed the very remarkable feat
of capturing, with cavalry, two gunboats and a number of
transports, something the accomplishment of which is very hard
to account for. Hood’s army had been weakened by Governor
Brown’s withdrawing the Georgia State troops for the purpose of
gathering in the season’s crops for the use of the people and
for the use of the army. This not only depleted Hood’s forces
but it served a most excellent purpose in gathering in supplies
of food and forage for the use of our army in its subsequent
march. Sherman was obliged to push on with his force and go
himself with portions of it hither and thither, until it was
clearly demonstrated to him that with the army he then had it
would be impossible to hold the line from Atlanta back and leave
him any force whatever with which to take the offensive. Had
that plan been adhered to, very large reinforcements would have
been necessary; and Mr. Davis’s prediction of the destruction of
the army would have been realized, or else Sherman would have
been obliged to make a successful retreat, which Mr. Davis said
in his speeches would prove more disastrous than Napoleon’s
retreat from Moscow.

These speeches of Mr. Davis were not long in reaching Sherman.
He took advantage of the information they gave, and made all the
preparation possible for him to make to meet what now became
expected, attempts to break his communications. Something else
had to be done: and to Sherman’s sensible and soldierly mind
the idea was not long in dawning upon him, not only that
something else had to be done, but what that something else
should be.

On September 10th I telegraphed Sherman as follows:

CITY POINT, VA., Sept. 10, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN,
Atlanta, Georgia.

So soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations
can be made, it is desirable that another campaign should be
commenced. We want to keep the enemy constantly pressed to the
end of the war. If we give him no peace whilst the war lasts,
the end cannot be distant. Now that we have all of Mobile Bay
that is valuable, I do not know but it will be the best move to
transfer Canby’s troops to act upon Savannah, whilst you move on
Augusta. I should like to hear from you, however, in this matter.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

Sherman replied promptly:

“If I could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at
Augusta, or Columbus, Georgia, I can march to Milledgeville, and
compel Hood to give up Augusta or Macon, and then turn on the
other. * * * If you can manage to take the Savannah River as
high up as Augusta, or the Chattahoochee as far up as Columbus,
I can sweep the whole State of Georgia.”

On the 12th I sent a special messenger, one of my own staff,
with a letter inviting Sherman’s views about the next campaign.

CITY POINT, VA., Sept. 12, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Mill Division of the Mississippi.

I send Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, of my staff, with this.
Colonel Porter will explain to you the exact condition of
affairs here better than I can do in the limits of a letter.
Although I feel myself strong enough for offensive operations, I
am holding on quietly to get advantage of recruits and
convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. My lines
are necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom north of
the James across the peninsula formed by the Appomattox and the
James, and south of the Appomattox to the Weldon Road. This
line is very strongly fortified, and can be held with
comparatively few men, but from its great length takes many in
the aggregate. I propose, when I do move, to extend my left so
as to control what is known as the South Side, or Lynchburg and
Petersburg Road, then if possible to keep the Danville Road
cut. At the same time this move is made, I want to send a force
of from six to ten thousand men against Wilmington.

The way I propose to do this is to land the men north of Fort
Fisher, and hold that point. At the same time a large naval
fleet will be assembled there, and the iron-clads will run the
batteries as they did at Mobile. This will give us the same
control of the harbor of Wilmington that we now have of the
harbor of Mobile. What you are to do with the forces at your
command, I do not see. The difficulties of supplying your army,
except when you are constantly moving, beyond where you are, I
plainly see. If it had not been for Price’s movements Canby
would have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile. From your
command on the Mississippi an equal number could have been
taken. With these forces my idea would have been to divide
them, sending one half to Mobile and the other half to
Savannah. You could then move as proposed in your telegram, so
as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally. Whichever was
abandoned by the enemy you could take and open up a new base of
supplies. My object now in sending a staff officer is not so
much to suggest operations for you, as to get your views and
have plans matured by the time everything can be got ready. It
will probably be the 5th of October before any of the plans
herein indicated will be executed.

If you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forward
and I will approve them. * * *

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

This reached Sherman on September 20th.

On the 25th of September Sherman reported to Washington that
Hood’s troops were in his rear. He had provided against this by
sending a division to Chattanooga and a division to Rome,
Georgia, which was in the rear of Hood, supposing that Hood
would fall back in the direction from which he had come to reach
the railroad. At the same time Sherman and Hood kept up a
correspondence relative to the exchange of prisoners, the
treatment of citizens, and other matters suitable to be arranged
between hostile commanders in the field. On the 27th of
September I telegraphed Sherman as follows:

CITY POINT, VA.,
September 27, 1864–10.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN:

I have directed all recruits and new troops from the Western
States to be sent to Nashville, to receive their further orders
from you. * * *

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

On the 29th Sherman sent Thomas back to Chattanooga, and
afterwards to Nashville, with another division (Morgan’s) of the
advanced army. Sherman then suggested that, when he was
prepared, his movements should take place against Milledgeville
and then to Savannah. His expectation at that time was, to make
this movement as soon as he could get up his supplies. Hood was
moving in his own country, and was moving light so that he could
make two miles to Sherman’s one. He depended upon the country to
gather his supplies, and so was not affected by delays.

As I have said, until this unexpected state of affairs happened,
Mobile had been looked upon as the objective point of Sherman’s
army. It had been a favorite move of mine from 1862, when I
first suggested to the then commander-in-chief that the troops
in Louisiana, instead of frittering away their time in the
trans- Mississippi, should move against Mobile. I recommended
this from time to time until I came into command of the army,
the last of March 1864. Having the power in my own hands, I now
ordered the concentration of supplies, stores and troops, in the
department of the Gulf about New Orleans, with a view to a move
against Mobile, in support of, and in conjunction with, the
other armies operating in the field. Before I came into
command, these troops had been scattered over the
trans-Mississippi department in such a way that they could not
be, or were not, gotten back in time to take any part in the
original movement; hence the consideration, which had caused
Mobile to be selected as the objective point for Sherman’s army
to find his next base of supplies after having cut loose from
Atlanta, no longer existed.

General G. M. Dodge, an exceedingly efficient officer, having
been badly wounded, had to leave the army about the first of
October. He was in command of two divisions of the 16th corps,
consolidated into one. Sherman then divided his army into the
right and left wings the right commanded by General O. O. Howard
and the left by General Slocum. General Dodge’s two divisions
were assigned, one to each of these wings. Howard’s command
embraced the 15th and 17th corps, and Slocum’s the 14th and 20th
corps, commanded by Generals Jeff. C. Davis and A. S. Williams.
Generals Logan and Blair commanded the two corps composing the
right wing. About this time they left to take part in the
presidential election, which took place that year, leaving their
corps to Osterhaus and Ransom. I have no doubt that their
leaving was at the earnest solicitation of the War Department.
General Blair got back in time to resume his command and to
proceed with it throughout the march to the sea and back to the
grand review at Washington. General Logan did not return to his
command until after it reached Savannah.

Logan felt very much aggrieved at the transfer of General Howard
from that portion of the Army of the Potomac which was then with
the Western Army, to the command of the Army of the Tennessee,
with which army General Logan had served from the battle of
Belmont to the fall of Atlanta–having passed successively
through all grades from colonel commanding a regiment to general
commanding a brigade, division and army corps, until upon the
death of McPherson the command of the entire Army of the
Tennessee devolved upon him in the midst of a hotly contested
battle. He conceived that he had done his full duty as
commander in that engagement; and I can bear testimony, from
personal observation, that he had proved himself fully equal to
all the lower positions which he had occupied as a soldier. I
will not pretend to question the motive which actuated Sherman
in taking an officer from another army to supersede General
Logan. I have no doubt, whatever, that he did this for what he
considered would be to the good of the service, which was more
important than that the personal feelings of any individual
should not be aggrieved; though I doubt whether he had an
officer with him who could have filled the place as Logan would
have done. Differences of opinion must exist between the best
of friends as to policies in war, and of judgment as to men’s
fitness. The officer who has the command, however, should be
allowed to judge of the fitness of the officers under him,
unless he is very manifestly wrong.

Sherman’s army, after all the depletions, numbered about sixty
thousand effective men. All weak men had been left to hold the
rear, and those remaining were not only well men, but strong and
hardy, so that he had sixty thousand as good soldiers as ever
trod the earth; better than any European soldiers, because they
not only worked like a machine but the machine thought.
European armies know very little what they are fighting for, and
care less. Included in these sixty thousand troops, there were
two small divisions of cavalry, numbering altogether about four
thousand men. Hood had about thirty-five to forty thousand men,
independent of Forrest, whose forces were operating in Tennessee
and Kentucky, as Mr. Davis had promised they should. This part
of Mr. Davis’s military plan was admirable, and promised the
best results of anything he could have done, according to my
judgment. I say this because I have criticised his military
judgment in the removal of Johnston, and also in the appointment
of Hood. I am aware, however, that there was high feeling
existing at that time between Davis and his subordinate, whom I
regarded as one of his ablest lieutenants.

On the 5th of October the railroad back from Atlanta was again
very badly broken, Hood having got on the track with his army.
Sherman saw after night, from a high point, the road burning for
miles. The defence of the railroad by our troops was very
gallant, but they could not hold points between their intrenched
positions against Hood’s whole army; in fact they made no attempt
to do so; but generally the intrenched positions were held, as
well as important bridges, and store located at them.
Allatoona, for instance, was defended by a small force of men
under the command of General Corse, one of the very able and
efficient volunteer officers produced by the war. He, with a
small force, was cut off from the remainder of the National army
and was attacked with great vigor by many times his own number.
Sherman from his high position could see the battle raging, with
the Confederate troops between him and his subordinate. He sent
men, of course, to raise the temporary siege, but the time that
would be necessarily consumed in reaching Corse, would be so
great that all occupying the intrenchments might be dead. Corse
was a man who would never surrender. From a high position some
of Sherman’s signal corps discovered a signal flag waving from a
hole in the block house at Allatoona. It was from Corse. He had
been shot through the face, but he signalled to his chief a
message which left no doubt of his determination to hold his
post at all hazards. It was at this point probably, that
Sherman first realized that with the forces at his disposal, the
keeping open of his line of communication with the North would be
impossible if he expected to retain any force with which to
operate offensively beyond Atlanta. He proposed, therefore, to
destroy the roads back to Chattanooga, when all ready to move,
and leave the latter place garrisoned. Yet, before abandoning
the railroad, it was necessary that he should repair damages
already done, and hold the road until he could get forward such
supplies, ordnance stores and small rations, as he wanted to
carry with him on his proposed march, and to return to the north
his surplus artillery; his object being to move light and to have
no more artillery than could be used to advantage on the field.

Sherman thought Hood would follow him, though he proposed to
prepare for the contingency of the latter moving the other way
while he was moving south, by making Thomas strong enough to
hold Tennessee and Kentucky. I, myself, was thoroughly
satisfied that Hood would go north, as he did. On the 2d of
November I telegraphed Sherman authorizing him definitely to
move according to the plan he had proposed: that is, cutting
loose from his base, giving up Atlanta and the railroad back to
Chattanooga. To strengthen Thomas he sent Stanley (4th corps)
back, and also ordered Schofield, commanding the Army of the
Ohio, twelve thousand strong, to report to him. In addition to
this, A. J. Smith, who, with two divisions of Sherman’s army,
was in Missouri aiding Rosecrans in driving the enemy from that
State, was under orders to return to Thomas and, under the most
unfavorable circumstances, might be expected to arrive there
long before Hood could reach Nashville.

In addition to this, the new levies of troops that were being
raised in the North-west went to Thomas as rapidly as enrolled
and equipped. Thomas, without any of these additions spoken of,
had a garrison at Chattanooga which had been strengthened by one
division and garrisons at Bridgeport, Stevenson, Decatur,
Murfreesboro, and Florence. There were already with him in
Nashville ten thousand soldiers in round numbers, and many
thousands of employees in the quartermaster’s and other
departments who could be put in the intrench meets in front of
Nashville, for its defence. Also, Wilson was there with ten
thousand dismounted cavalrymen, who were being equipped for the
field. Thomas had at this time about forty-five thousand men
without any of the reinforcements here above enumerated. These
reinforcements gave him altogether about seventy thousand men,
without counting what might be added by the new levies already
spoken of.

About this time Beauregard arrived upon the field, not to
supersede Hood in command, but to take general charge over the
entire district in which Hood and Sherman were, or might be,
operating. He made the most frantic appeals to the citizens for
assistance to be rendered in every way: by sending
reinforcements, by destroying supplies on the line of march of
the invaders, by destroying the bridges over which they would
have to cross, and by, in every way, obstructing the roads to
their front. But it was hard to convince the people of the
propriety of destroying supplies which were so much needed by
themselves, and each one hoped that his own possessions might
escape.

Hood soon started north, and went into camp near Decatur,
Alabama, where he remained until the 29th of October, but
without making an attack on the garrison of that place.

The Tennessee River was patrolled by gunboats, from Muscle
Shoals east; and, also, below the second shoals out to the Ohio
River. These, with the troops that might be concentrated from
the garrisons along the river at any point where Hood might
choose to attempt to cross, made it impossible for him to cross
the Tennessee at any place where it was navigable. But Muscle
Shoals is not navigable, and below them again is another shoal
which also obstructs navigation. Hood therefore moved down to a
point nearly opposite Florence, Alabama, crossed over and
remained there for some time, collecting supplies of food,
forage and ammunition. All of these had to come from a
considerable distance south, because the region in which he was
then situated was mountainous, with small valleys which produced
but little, and what they had produced had long since been
exhausted. On the 1st of November I suggested to Sherman, and
also asked his views thereon, the propriety of destroying Hood
before he started on his campaign.

On the 2d of November, as stated, I approved definitely his
making his proposed campaign through Georgia, leaving Hood
behind to the tender mercy of Thomas and the troops in his
command. Sherman fixed the 10th of November as the day of
starting.

Sherman started on that day to get back to Atlanta, and on the
15th the real march to the sea commenced. The right wing, under
Howard, and the cavalry went to Jonesboro, Milledgeville, then
the capital of Georgia, being Sherman’s objective or stopping
place on the way to Savannah. The left wing moved to Stone
Mountain, along roads much farther east than those taken by the
right wing. Slocum was in command, and threatened Augusta as the
point to which he was moving, but he was to turn off and meet the
right wing at Milledgeville.

Atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it worthless for
military purposes before starting, Sherman himself remaining
over a day to superintend the work, and see that it was well
done. Sherman’s orders for this campaign were perfect. Before
starting, he had sent back all sick, disabled and weak men,
retaining nothing but the hardy, well-inured soldiers to
accompany him on his long march in prospect. His artillery was
reduced to sixty-five guns. The ammunition carried with them was
two hundred rounds for musket and gun. Small rations were taken
in a small wagon train, which was loaded to its capacity for
rapid movement. The army was expected to live on the country,
and to always keep the wagons full of forage and provisions
against a possible delay of a few days.

The troops, both of the right and left wings, made most of their
advance along the line of railroads, which they destroyed. The
method adopted to perform this work, was to burn and destroy all
the bridges and culverts, and for a long distance, at places, to
tear up the track and bend the rails. Soldiers to do this
rapidly would form a line along one side of the road with
crowbars and poles, place these under the rails and, hoisting
all at once, turn over many rods of road at one time. The ties
would then be placed in piles, and the rails, as they were
loosened, would be carried and put across these log heaps. When
a sufficient number of rails were placed upon a pile of ties it
would be set on fire. This would heat the rails very much more
in the middle, that being over the main part of the fire, than
at the ends, so that they would naturally bend of their own
weight; but the soldiers, to increase the damage, would take
tongs and, one or two men at each end of the rail, carry it with
force against the nearest tree and twist it around, thus leaving
rails forming bands to ornament the forest trees of Georgia.
All this work was going on at the same time, there being a
sufficient number of men detailed for that purpose. Some piled
the logs and built the fire; some put the rails upon the fire;
while others would bend those that were sufficiently heated: so
that, by the time the last bit of road was torn up, that it was
designed to destroy at a certain place, the rails previously
taken up were already destroyed.

The organization for supplying the army was very complete. Each
brigade furnished a company to gather supplies of forage and
provisions for the command to which they belonged. Strict
injunctions were issued against pillaging, or otherwise
unnecessarily annoying the people; but everything in shape of
food for man and forage for beast was taken. The supplies were
turned over to the brigade commissary and quartermaster, and
were issued by them to their respective commands precisely the
same as if they had been purchased. The captures consisted
largely of cattle, sheep, poultry, some bacon, cornmeal, often
molasses, and occasionally coffee or other small rations.

The skill of these men, called by themselves and the army
“bummers,” in collecting their loads and getting back to their
respective commands, was marvellous. When they started out in
the morning, they were always on foot; but scarcely one of them
returned in the evening without being mounted on a horse or
mule. These would be turned in for the general use of the army,
and the next day these men would start out afoot and return
again in the evening mounted.

Many of the exploits of these men would fall under the head of
romance; indeed, I am afraid that in telling some of their
experiences, the romance got the better of the truth upon which
the story was founded, and that, in the way many of these
anecdotes are told, very little of the foundation is left. I
suspect that most of them consist chiefly of the fiction added
to make the stories better. In one instance it was reported
that a few men of Sherman’s army passed a house where they
discovered some chickens under the dwelling. They immediately
proceeded to capture them, to add to the army’s supplies. The
lady of the house, who happened to be at home, made piteous
appeals to have these spared, saying they were a few she had put
away to save by permission of other parties who had preceded and
who had taken all the others that she had. The soldiers seemed
moved at her appeal; but looking at the chickens again they were
tempted and one of them replied: “The rebellion must be
suppressed if it takes the last chicken in the Confederacy,” and
proceeded to appropriate the last one.

Another anecdote characteristic of these times has been told.
The South, prior to the rebellion, kept bloodhounds to pursue
runaway slaves who took refuge in the neighboring swamps, and
also to hunt convicts. Orders were issued to kill all these
animals as they were met with. On one occasion a soldier picked
up a poodle, the favorite pet of its mistress, and was carrying
it off to execution when the lady made a strong appeal to him to
spare it. The soldier replied, “Madam, our orders are to kill
every bloodhound.” “But this is not a bloodhound,” said the
lady. “Well, madam, we cannot tell what it will grow into if we
leave it behind,” said the soldier as he went off with it.

Notwithstanding these anecdotes, and the necessary hardship they
would seem to imply, I do not believe there was much
unwarrantable pillaging considering that we were in the enemy’s
territory and without any supplies except such as the country
afforded.

On the 23d Sherman, with the left wing, reached Milledgeville.
The right wing was not far off: but proceeded on its way
towards Savannah destroying the road as it went. The troops at
Milledgeville remained over a day to destroy factories,
buildings used for military purposes, etc., before resuming its
march.

The governor, who had been almost defying Mr. Davis before this,
now fled precipitately, as did the legislature of the State and
all the State officers. The governor, Sherman says, was careful
to carry away even his garden vegetables, while he left the
archives of the State to fall into our hands. The only military
force that was opposed to Sherman’s forward march was the Georgia
militia, a division under the command of General G. W. Smith, and
a battalion under Harry Wayne. Neither the quality of the forces
nor their numbers was sufficient to even retard the progress of
Sherman’s army.

The people at the South became so frantic at this time at the
successful invasion of Georgia that they took the cadets from
the military college and added them to the ranks of the
militia. They even liberated the State convicts under promise
from them that they would serve in the army. I have but little
doubt that the worst acts that were attributed to Sherman’s army
were committed by these convicts, and by other Southern people
who ought to have been under sentence such people as could be
found in every community, North and South who took advantage of
their country being invaded to commit crime. They were in but
little danger of detection, or of arrest even if detected.

The Southern papers in commenting upon Sherman’s movements
pictured him as in the most deplorable condition: stating that
his men were starving, that they were demoralized and wandering
about almost without object, aiming only to reach the sea coast
and get under the protection of our navy. These papers got to
the North and had more or less effect upon the minds of the
people, causing much distress to all loyal persons particularly
to those who had husbands, sons or brothers with Sherman. Mr.
Lincoln seeing these accounts, had a letter written asking me if
I could give him anything that he could say to the loyal people
that would comfort them. I told him there was not the slightest
occasion for alarm; that with 60,000 such men as Sherman had with
him, such a commanding officer as he was could not be cut off in
the open country. He might possibly be prevented from reaching
the point he had started out to reach, but he would get through
somewhere and would finally get to his chosen destination: and
even if worst came to worst he could return North. I heard
afterwards of Mr. Lincoln’s saying, to those who would inquire
of him as to what he thought about the safety of Sherman’s army,
that Sherman was all right: “Grant says they are safe with such
a general, and that if they cannot get out where they want to,
they can crawl back by the hole they went in at.”

While at Milledgeville the soldiers met at the State House,
organized a legislature, and proceeded to business precisely as
if they were the legislative body belonging to the State of
Georgia. The debates were exciting, and were upon the subject of
the situation the South was in at that time, particularly the
State of Georgia. They went so far as to repeal, after a
spirited and acrimonious debate, the ordinance of secession.

The next day (24th) Sherman continued his march, going by the
way of Waynesboro and Louisville, Millen being the next
objective and where the two columns (the right and left wings)
were to meet. The left wing moved to the left of the direct
road, and the cavalry still farther off so as to make it look as
though Augusta was the point they were aiming for. They moved on
all the roads they could find leading in that direction. The
cavalry was sent to make a rapid march in hope of surprising
Millen before the Union prisoners could be carried away; but
they failed in this.

The distance from Milledgeville to Millen was about one hundred
miles. At this point Wheeler, who had been ordered from
Tennessee, arrived and swelled the numbers and efficiency of the
troops confronting Sherman. Hardee, a native of Georgia, also
came, but brought no troops with him. It was intended that he
should raise as large an army as possible with which to
intercept Sherman’s march. He did succeed in raising some
troops, and with these and those under the command of Wheeler
and Wayne, had an army sufficient to cause some annoyance but no
great detention. Our cavalry and Wheeler’s had a pretty severe
engagement, in which Wheeler was driven towards Augusta, thus
giving the idea that Sherman was probably making for that point.

Millen was reached on the 3d of December, and the march was
resumed the following day for Savannah, the final objective.
Bragg had now been sent to Augusta with some troops. Wade
Hampton was there also trying to raise cavalry sufficient to
destroy Sherman’s army. If he ever raised a force it was too
late to do the work expected of it. Hardee’s whole force
probably numbered less than ten thousand men.

From Millen to Savannah the country is sandy and poor, and
affords but very little forage other than rice straw, which was
then growing. This answered a very good purpose as forage, and
the rice grain was an addition to the soldier’s rations. No
further resistance worthy of note was met with, until within a
few miles of Savannah. This place was found to be intrenched
and garrisoned. Sherman proceeded at once on his arrival to
invest the place, and found that the enemy had placed torpedoes
in the ground, which were to explode when stepped on by man or
beast. One of these exploded under an officer’s horse, blowing
the animal to pieces and tearing one of the legs of the officer
so badly that it had to be amputated. Sherman at once ordered
his prisoners to the front, moving them in a compact body in
advance, to either explode the torpedoes or dig them up. No
further explosion took place.

On the 10th of December the siege of Savannah commenced. Sherman
then, before proceeding any further with operations for the
capture of the place, started with some troops to open
communication with our fleet, which he expected to find in the
lower harbor or as near by as the forts of the enemy would
permit. In marching to the coast he encountered Fort McAllister,
which it was necessary to reduce before the supplies he might
find on shipboard could be made available. Fort McAllister was
soon captured by an assault made by General Hazen’s division.
Communication was then established with the fleet. The capture
of Savannah then only occupied a few days, and involved no great
loss of life. The garrison, however, as we shall see, was
enabled to escape by crossing the river and moving eastward.

When Sherman had opened communication with the fleet he found
there a steamer, which I had forwarded to him, carrying the
accumulated mails for his army, also supplies which I supposed
he would be in need of. General J. G. Foster, who commanded all
the troops south of North Carolina on the Atlantic sea-board,
visited General Sherman before he had opened communication with
the fleet, with the view of ascertaining what assistance he
could be to him. Foster returned immediately to his own
headquarters at Hilton Head, for the purpose of sending Sherman
siege guns, and also if he should find he had them to spare,
supplies of clothing, hard bread, etc., thinking that these
articles might not be found outside. The mail on the steamer
which I sent down, had been collected by Colonel A. H. Markland
of the Post Office Department, who went in charge of it. On
this same vessel I sent an officer of my staff (Lieutenant Dunn)
with the following letter to General Sherman:

CITY POINT, VA., Dec. 3, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Armies near Savannah, Ga.

The little information gleaned from the Southern press,
indicating no great obstacle to your progress, I have directed
your mails (which had been previously collected at Baltimore by
Colonel Markland, Special Agent of the Post Office Department)
to be sent as far as the blockading squadron off Savannah, to be
forwarded to you as soon as heard from on the coast.

Not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain
from congratulating you and those under your command, until
bottom has been struck. I have never had a fear, however, for
the result.

Since you left Atlanta, no very great progress has been made
here. The enemy has been closely watched though, and prevented
from detaching against you. I think not one man has gone from
here, except some twelve or fifteen hundred dismounted
cavalry. Bragg has gone from Wilmington. I am trying to take
advantage of his absence to get possession of that place. Owing
to some preparations Admiral Porter and General Butler are making
to blow up Fort Fisher (which, while hoping for the best, I do
not believe a particle in), there is a delay in getting this
expedition off. I hope they will be ready to start by the 7th,
and that Bragg will not have started back by that time.

In this letter I do not intend to give you anything like
directions for future action, but will state a general idea I
have, and will get your views after you have established
yourself on the sea-coast. With your veteran army I hope to get
control of the only two through routes from east to west
possessed by the enemy before the fall of Atlanta. The
condition will be filled by holding Savannah and Augusta, or by
holding any other port to the east of Savannah and
Branchville. If Wilmington falls, a force from there can
co-operate with you.

Thomas has got back into the defences of Nashville, with Hood
close upon him. Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the
roads except the main one leading to Chattanooga. Part of this
falling back was undoubtedly necessary and all of it may have
been. It did not look so, however, to me. In my opinion,
Thomas far outnumbers Hood in infantry. In cavalry, Hood has
the advantage in morale and numbers. I hope yet that Hood will
be badly crippled if not destroyed. The general news you will
learn from the papers better than I could give it.

After all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that
there is likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, I
will run down the coast to see you. If you desire it, I will
ask Mrs. Sherman to go with me.

Yours truly,
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General

I quote this letter because it gives the reader a full knowledge
of the events of that period.

Sherman now (the 15th) returned to Savannah to complete its
investment and insure the surrender of the garrison. The
country about Savannah is low and marshy, and the city was well
intrenched from the river above to the river below; and assaults
could not be made except along a comparatively narrow causeway.
For this reason assaults must have resulted in serious
destruction of life to the Union troops, with the chance of
failing altogether. Sherman therefore decided upon a complete
investment of the place. When he believed this investment
completed, he summoned the garrison to surrender. General
Hardee, who was in command, replied in substance that the
condition of affairs was not such as Sherman had described. He
said he was in full communication with his department and was
receiving supplies constantly.

Hardee, however, was cut off entirely from all communication
with the west side of the river, and by the river itself to the
north and south. On the South Carolina side the country was all
rice fields, through which it would have been impossible to bring
supplies so that Hardee had no possible communication with the
outside world except by a dilapidated plank road starting from
the west bank of the river. Sherman, receiving this reply,
proceeded in person to a point on the coast, where General
Foster had troops stationed under General Hatch, for the purpose
of making arrangements with the latter officer to go through by
one of the numerous channels running inland along that part of
the coast of South Carolina, to the plank road which General
Hardee still possessed, and thus to cut him off from the last
means he had of getting supplies, if not of communication.

While arranging for this movement, and before the attempt to
execute the plan had been commenced, Sherman received
information through one of his staff officers that the enemy had
evacuated Savannah the night before. This was the night of the
21st of December. Before evacuating the place Hardee had blown
up the navy yard. Some iron-clads had been destroyed, as well
as other property that might have been valuable to us; but he
left an immense amount of stores untouched, consisting of
cotton, railroad cars, workshops, numerous pieces of artillery,
and several thousand stands of small arms.

A little incident occurred, soon after the fall of Savannah,
which Sherman relates in his Memoirs, and which is worthy of
repetition. Savannah was one of the points where blockade
runners entered. Shortly after the city fell into our
possession, a blockade runner came sailing up serenely, not
doubting but the Confederates were still in possession. It was
not molested, and the captain did not find out his mistake until
he had tied up and gone to the Custom House, where he found a new
occupant of the building, and made a less profitable disposition
of his vessel and cargo than he had expected.

As there was some discussion as to the authorship of Sherman’s
march to the sea, by critics of his book when it appeared before
the public, I want to state here that no question upon that
subject was ever raised between General Sherman and myself.
Circumstances made the plan on which Sherman expected to act
impracticable, as as commander of the forces he necessarily had
to devise a new on which would give more promise of success”
consequently he recommended the destruction of the railroad back
to Chattanooga, and that he should be authorized then to move, as
he did, from Atlanta forward. His suggestions were finally
approved, although they did not immediately find favor in
Washington. Even when it came to the time of starting, the
greatest apprehension, as to the propriety of the campaign he
was about commence, filled the mind of the President, induced no
doubt by his advisers. This went so far as to move the
President to ask me to suspend Sherman’s march for a day or two
until I could think the matter over. My recollection is, though
I find no record to show it, that out of deference to the
President’s wish I did send a dispatch to Sherman asking him to
wait a day or two, or else the connections between us were
already cut so that I could not do so. However this may be, the
question of who devised the plan of march from Atlanta to
Savannah is easily answered: it was clearly Sherman, and to him
also belongs the credit of its brilliant execution. It was
hardly possible that any one else than those on the spot could
have devised a new plan of campaign to supersede one that did
not promise success. (*40)

I was in favor of Sherman’s plan from the time it was first
submitted to me. My chief of staff, however, was very bitterly
opposed to it and, as I learned subsequently, finding that he
could not move me, he appealed to the authorities at Washington
to stop it.

CHAPTER LX.

THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN–THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.

As we have seen, Hood succeeded in crossing the Tennessee River
between Muscle Shoals and the lower shoals at the end of
October, 1864. Thomas sent Schofield with the 4th and 23d
corps, together with three brigades of Wilson’s cavalry to
Pulaski to watch him. On the 17th of November Hood started and
moved in such a manner as to avoid Schofield, thereby turning
his position. Hood had with him three infantry corps, commanded
respectively by Stephen D. Lee, Stewart and Cheatham. These,
with his cavalry, numbered about forty-five thousand men.
Schofield had, of all arms, about thirty thousand. Thomas’s
orders were, therefore, for Schofield to watch the movements of
the enemy, but not to fight a battle if he could avoid it; but
to fall back in case of an advance on Nashville, and to fight
the enemy, as he fell back, so as to retard the enemy’s
movements until he could be reinforced by Thomas himself. As
soon as Schofield saw this movement of Hood’s, he sent his
trains to the rear, but did not fall back himself until the
21st, and then only to Columbia. At Columbia there was a slight
skirmish but no battle. From this place Schofield then retreated
to Franklin. He had sent his wagons in advance, and Stanley had
gone with them with two divisions to protect them. Cheatham’s
corps of Hood’s army pursued the wagon train and went into camp
at Spring Hill, for the night of the 29th.

Schofield retreating from Columbia on the 29th, passed Spring
Hill, where Cheatham was bivouacked, during the night without
molestation, though within half a mile of where the Confederates
were encamped. On the morning of the 30th he had arrived at
Franklin.

Hood followed closely and reached Franklin in time to make an
attack the same day. The fight was very desperate and
sanguinary. The Confederate generals led their men in the
repeated charges, and the loss among them was of unusual
proportions. This fighting continued with great severity until
long after the night closed in, when the Confederates drew
off. General Stanley, who commanded two divisions of the Union
troops, and whose troops bore the brunt of the battle, was
wounded in the fight, but maintained his position.

The enemy’s loss at Franklin, according to Thomas’s report, was
1,750 buried upon the field by our troops, 3,800 in the
hospital, and 702 prisoners besides. Schofield’s loss, as
officially reported, was 189 killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104
captured and missing.

Thomas made no effort to reinforce Schofield at Franklin, as it
seemed to me at the time he should have done, and fight out the
battle there. He simply ordered Schofield to continue his
retreat to Nashville, which the latter did during that night and
the next day.

Thomas, in the meantime, was making his preparations to receive
Hood. The road to Chattanooga was still well guarded with
strong garrisons at Murfreesboro, Stevenson, Bridgeport and
Chattanooga. Thomas had previously given up Decatur and had
been reinforced by A. J. Smith’s two divisions just returned
from Missouri. He also had Steedman’s division and R. S.
Granger’s, which he had drawn from the front. His
quartermaster’s men, about ten thousand in number, had been
organized and armed under the command of the chief
quartermaster, General J. L. Donaldson, and placed in the
fortifications under the general supervision of General Z. B.
Tower, of the United States Engineers.

Hood was allowed to move upon Nashville, and to invest that
place almost without interference. Thomas was strongly
fortified in his position, so that he would have been safe
against the attack of Hood. He had troops enough even to
annihilate him in the open field. To me his delay was
unaccountable–sitting there and permitting himself to be
invested, so that, in the end, to raise the siege he would have
to fight the enemy strongly posted behind fortifications. It is
true the weather was very bad. The rain was falling and freezing
as it fell, so that the ground was covered with a sheet of ice,
that made it very difficult to move. But I was afraid that the
enemy would find means of moving, elude Thomas and manage to get
north of the Cumberland River. If he did this, I apprehended
most serious results from the campaign in the North, and was
afraid we might even have to send troops from the East to head
him off if he got there, General Thomas’s movements being always
so deliberate and so slow, though effective in defence.

I consequently urged Thomas in frequent dispatches sent from
City Point(*41) to make the attack at once. The country was
alarmed, the administration was alarmed, and I was alarmed lest
the very thing would take place which I have just described that
is, Hood would get north. It was all without avail further than
to elicit dispatches from Thomas saying that he was getting
ready to move as soon as he could, that he was making
preparations, etc. At last I had to say to General Thomas that
I should be obliged to remove him unless he acted promptly. He
replied that he was very sorry, but he would move as soon as he
could.

General Logan happening to visit City Point about that time, and
knowing him as a prompt, gallant and efficient officer, I gave
him an order to proceed to Nashville to relieve Thomas. I
directed him, however, not to deliver the order or publish it
until he reached there, and if Thomas had moved, then not to
deliver it at all, but communicate with me by telegraph. After
Logan started, in thinking over the situation, I became
restless, and concluded to go myself. I went as far as
Washington City, when a dispatch was received from General
Thomas announcing his readiness at last to move, and designating
the time of his movement. I concluded to wait until that time.
He did move, and was successful from the start. This was on the
15th of December. General Logan was at Louisville at the time
this movement was made, and telegraphed the fact to Washington,
and proceeded no farther himself.

The battle during the 15th was severe, but favorable to the
Union troops, and continued until night closed in upon the
combat. The next day the battle was renewed. After a
successful assault upon Hood’s men in their intrenchments the
enemy fled in disorder, routed and broken, leaving their dead,
their artillery and small arms in great numbers on the field,
besides the wounded that were captured. Our cavalry had fought
on foot as infantry, and had not their horses with them; so that
they were not ready to join in the pursuit the moment the enemy
retreated. They sent back, however, for their horses, and
endeavored to get to Franklin ahead of Hood’s broken army by the
Granny White Road, but too much time was consumed in getting
started. They had got but a few miles beyond the scene of the
battle when they found the enemy’s cavalry dismounted and behind
intrenchments covering the road on which they were advancing.
Here another battle ensued, our men dismounting and fighting on
foot, in which the Confederates were again routed and driven in
great disorder. Our cavalry then went into bivouac, and renewed
the pursuit on the following morning. They were too late. The
enemy already had possession of Franklin, and was beyond them.
It now became a chase in which the Confederates had the lead.

Our troops continued the pursuit to within a few miles of
Columbia, where they found the rebels had destroyed the railroad
bridge as well as all other bridges over Duck River. The heavy
rains of a few days before had swelled the stream into a mad
torrent, impassable except on bridges. Unfortunately, either
through a mistake in the wording of the order or otherwise, the
pontoon bridge which was to have been sent by rail out to
Franklin, to be taken thence with the pursuing column, had gone
toward Chattanooga. There was, consequently, a delay of some
four days in building bridges out of the remains of the old
railroad bridge. Of course Hood got such a start in this time
that farther pursuit was useless, although it was continued for
some distance, but without coming upon him again.

CHAPTER LXI.

EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER–ATTACK ON THE FORT–FAILURE OF
THE EXPEDITION–SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FORT– CAPTURE OF
FORT FISHER.

Up to January, 1865, the enemy occupied Fort Fisher, at the
mouth of Cape Fear River and below the City of Wilmington. This
port was of immense importance to the Confederates, because it
formed their principal inlet for blockade runners by means of
which they brought in from abroad such supplies and munitions of
war as they could not produce at home. It was equally important
to us to get possession of it, not only because it was desirable
to cut off their supplies so as to insure a speedy termination of
the war, but also because foreign governments, particularly the
British Government, were constantly threatening that unless ours
could maintain the blockade of that coast they should cease to
recognize any blockade. For these reasons I determined, with
the concurrence of the Navy Department, in December, to send an
expedition against Fort Fisher for the purpose of capturing it.

To show the difficulty experienced in maintaining the blockade,
I will mention a circumstance that took place at Fort Fisher
after its fall. Two English blockade runners came in at
night. Their commanders, not supposing the fort had fallen,
worked their way through all our fleet and got into the river
unobserved. They then signalled the fort, announcing their
arrival. There was a colored man in the fort who had been there
before and who understood these signals. He informed General
Terry what reply he should make to have them come in, and Terry
did as he advised. The vessels came in, their officers entirely
unconscious that they were falling into the hands of the Union
forces. Even after they were brought in to the fort they were
entertained in conversation for some little time before
suspecting that the Union troops were occupying the fort. They
were finally informed that their vessels and cargoes were prizes.

I selected General Weitzel, of the Army of the James, to go with
the expedition, but gave instructions through General Butler. He
commanded the department within whose geographical limits Fort
Fisher was situated, as well as Beaufort and other points on
that coast held by our troops; he was, therefore, entitled to
the right of fitting out the expedition against Fort Fisher.

General Butler conceived the idea that if a steamer loaded
heavily with powder could be run up to near the shore under the
fort and exploded, it would create great havoc and make the
capture an easy matter. Admiral Porter, who was to command the
naval squadron, seemed to fall in with the idea, and it was not
disapproved of in Washington; the navy was therefore given the
task of preparing the steamer for this purpose. I had no
confidence in the success of the scheme, and so expressed
myself; but as no serious harm could come of the experiment, and
the authorities at Washington seemed desirous to have it tried, I
permitted it. The steamer was sent to Beaufort, North Carolina,
and was there loaded with powder and prepared for the part she
was to play in the reduction of Fort Fisher.

General Butler chose to go in command of the expedition himself,
and was all ready to sail by the 9th of December (1864). Very
heavy storms prevailed, however, at that time along that part of
the sea-coast, and prevented him from getting off until the 13th
or 14th. His advance arrived off Fort Fisher on the 15th. The
naval force had been already assembled, or was assembling, but
they were obliged to run into Beaufort for munitions, coal,
etc.; then, too, the powder-boat was not yet fully prepared. The
fleet was ready to proceed on the 18th; but Butler, who had
remained outside from the 15th up to that time, now found
himself out of coal, fresh water, etc., and had to put into
Beaufort to replenish. Another storm overtook him, and several
days more were lost before the army and navy were both ready at
the same time to co-operate.

On the night of the 23d the powder-boat was towed in by a
gunboat as near to the fort as it was safe to run. She was then
propelled by her own machinery to within about five hundred yards
of the shore. There the clockwork, which was to explode her
within a certain length of time, was set and she was
abandoned. Everybody left, and even the vessels put out to sea
to prevent the effect of the explosion upon them. At two
o’clock in the morning the explosion took place–and produced no
more effect on the fort, or anything else on land, than the
bursting of a boiler anywhere on the Atlantic Ocean would have
done. Indeed when the troops in Fort Fisher heard the explosion
they supposed it was the bursting of a boiler in one of the
Yankee gunboats.

Fort Fisher was situated upon a low, flat peninsula north of
Cape Fear River. The soil is sandy. Back a little the
peninsula is very heavily wooded, and covered with fresh-water
swamps. The fort ran across this peninsula, about five hundred
yards in width, and extended along the sea coast about thirteen
hundred yards. The fort had an armament of 21 guns and 3
mortars on the land side, and 24 guns on the sea front. At that
time it was only garrisoned by four companies of infantry, one
light battery and the gunners at the heavy guns less than seven
hundred men with a reserve of less than a thousand men five
miles up the peninsula. General Whiting of the Confederate army
was in command, and General Bragg was in command of the force at
Wilmington. Both commenced calling for reinforcements the
moment they saw our troops landing. The Governor of North
Carolina called for everybody who could stand behind a parapet
and shoot a gun, to join them. In this way they got two or
three hundred additional men into Fort Fisher; and Hoke’s
division, five or six thousand strong, was sent down from
Richmond. A few of these troops arrived the very day that
Butler was ready to advance.

On the 24th the fleet formed for an attack in arcs of concentric
circles, their heavy iron-clads going in very close range, being
nearest the shore, and leaving intervals or spaces so that the
outer vessels could fire between them. Porter was thus enabled
to throw one hundred and fifteen shells per minute. The damage
done to the fort by these shells was very slight, only two or
three cannon being disabled in the fort. But the firing
silenced all the guns by making it too hot for the men to
maintain their positions about them and compelling them to seek
shelter in the bomb-proofs.

On the next day part of Butler’s troops under General Adelbert
Ames effected a landing out of range of the fort without
difficulty. This was accomplished under the protection of
gunboats sent for the purpose, and under cover of a renewed
attack upon the fort by the fleet. They formed a line across
the peninsula and advanced, part going north and part toward the
fort, covering themselves as they did so. Curtis pushed forward
and came near to Fort Fisher, capturing the small garrison at
what was called the Flag Pond Battery. Weitzel accompanied him
to within a half a mile of the works. Here he saw that the fort
had not been injured, and so reported to Butler, advising against
an assault. Ames, who had gone north in his advance, captured
228 of the reserves. These prisoners reported to Butler that
sixteen hundred of Hoke’s division of six thousand from Richmond
had already arrived and the rest would soon be in his rear.

Upon these reports Butler determined to withdraw his troops from
the peninsula and return to the fleet. At that time there had
not been a man on our side injured except by one of the shells
from the fleet. Curtis had got within a few yards of the
works. Some of his men had snatched a flag from the parapet of
the fort, and others had taken a horse from the inside of the
stockade. At night Butler informed Porter of his withdrawal,
giving the reasons above stated, and announced his purpose as
soon as his men could embark to start for Hampton Roads. Porter
represented to him that he had sent to Beaufort for more
ammunition. He could fire much faster than he had been doing,
and would keep the enemy from showing himself until our men were
within twenty yards of the fort, and he begged that Butler would
leave some brave fellows like those who had snatched the flag
from the parapet and taken the horse from the fort.

Butler was unchangeable. He got all his troops aboard, except
Curtis’s brigade, and started back. In doing this, Butler made
a fearful mistake. My instructions to him, or to the officer
who went in command of the expedition, were explicit in the
statement that to effect a landing would be of itself a great
victory, and if one should be effected, the foothold must not be
relinquished; on the contrary, a regular siege of the fort must
be commenced and, to guard against interference by reason of
storms, supplies of provisions must be laid in as soon as they
could be got on shore. But General Butler seems to have lost
sight of this part of his instructions, and was back at Fort
Monroe on the 28th.

I telegraphed to the President as follows:

CITY POINT, VA.,
Dec. 28, 1864.–8.30 P.M.

The Wilmington expedition has proven a gross and culpable
failure. Many of the troops are back here. Delays and free
talk of the object of the expedition enabled the enemy to move
troops to Wilmington to defeat it. After the expedition sailed
from Fort Monroe, three days of fine weather were squandered,
during which the enemy was without a force to protect himself.
Who is to blame will, I hope, be known.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

Porter sent dispatches to the Navy Department in which he
complained bitterly of having been abandoned by the army just
when the fort was nearly in our possession, and begged that our
troops might be sent back again to cooperate, but with a
different commander. As soon as I heard this I sent a messenger
to Porter with a letter asking him to hold on. I assured him
that I fully sympathized with him in his disappointment, and
that I would send the same troops back with a different
commander, with some reinforcements to offset those which the
enemy had received. I told him it would take some little time
to get transportation for the additional troops; but as soon as
it could be had the men should be on their way to him, and there
would be no delay on my part. I selected A. H. Terry to command.

It was the 6th of January before the transports could be got
ready and the troops aboard. They sailed from Fortress Monroe
on that day. The object and destination of the second
expedition were at the time kept a secret to all except a few in
the Navy Department and in the army to whom it was necessary to
impart the information. General Terry had not the slightest
idea of where he was going or what he was to do. He simply knew
that he was going to sea and that he had his orders with him,
which were to be opened when out at sea.

He was instructed to communicate freely with Porter and have
entire harmony between army and navy, because the work before
them would require the best efforts of both arms of service.
They arrived off Beaufort on the 8th. A heavy storm, however,
prevented a landing at Forth Fisher until the 13th. The navy
prepared itself for attack about as before, and the same time
assisted the army in landing, this time five miles away. Only
iron-clads fired at first; the object being to draw the fire of
the enemy? guns so as to ascertain their positions. This object
being accomplished, they then let in their shots thick and
fast. Very soon the guns were all silenced, and the fort showed
evident signs of being much injured.

Terry deployed his men across the peninsula as had been done
before, and at two o?lock on the following morning was up
within two miles of the fort with a respectable abatis in front
of his line. His artillery was all landed on that day, the
14th. Again Curtis? brigade of Ame’s division had the lead. By
noon they had carried an unfinished work less than a half mile
from the fort, and turned it so as to face the other way.

Terry now saw Porter and arranged for an assault on the
following day. The two commanders arranged their signals so
that they could communicate with each other from time to time as
they might have occasion. At day light the fleet commenced its
firing. The time agreed upon for the assault was the middle of
the afternoon, and Ames who commanded the assaulting column
moved at 3.30. Porter landed a force of sailors and marines to
move against the sea-front in co-operation with Ames’s
assault. They were under Commander Breese of the nay. These
sailors and marines had worked their way up to within a couple
of hundred yards of the fort before the assault. The signal was
given and the assault was made; but the poor sailors and marines
were repulsed and very badly handled by the enemy, losing 280
killed and wounded out of their number.

Curtis’s brigade charged successfully though met by a heavy
fire, some of the men having to wade through the swamp up to
their waists to reach the fort. Many were wounded, of course,
and some killed; but they soon reached the palisades. These
they cut away, and pushed on through. The other troops then
came up, Pennypacker’s following Curtis, and Bell, who commanded
the 3d brigade of Ames’s division, following Pennypacker. But
the fort was not yet captured though the parapet was gained.

The works were very extensive. The large parapet around the
work would have been but very little protection to those inside
except when they were close up under it. Traverses had,
therefore, been run until really the work was a succession of
small forts enclosed by a large one. The rebels made a
desperate effort to hold the fort, and had to be driven from
these traverses one by one. The fight continued till long after
night. Our troops gained first one traverse and then another,
and by 10 o’clock at night the place was carried. During this
engagement the sailors, who had been repulsed in their assault
on the bastion, rendered the best service they could by
reinforcing Terry’s northern line–thus enabling him to send a
detachment to the assistance of Ames. The fleet kept up a
continuous fire upon that part of the fort which was still
occupied by the enemy. By means of signals they could be
informed where to direct their shots.

During the succeeding nights the enemy blew up Fort Caswell on
the opposite side of Cape Fear River, and abandoned two
extensive works on Smith’s Island in the river.

Our captures in all amounted to 169 guns, besides small-arms,
with full supplies of ammunition, and 2,083 prisoners. In
addition to these, there were about 700 dead and wounded left
there. We had lost 110 killed and 536 wounded.

In this assault on Fort Fisher, Bell, one of the brigade
commanders, was killed, and two, Curtis and Pennypacker, were
badly wounded.

Secretary Stanton, who was on his way back from Savannah,
arrived off Fort Fisher soon after it fell. When he heard the
good news he promoted all the officers of any considerable rank
for their conspicuous gallantry. Terry had been nominated for
major-general, but had not been confirmed. This confirmed him;
and soon after I recommended him for a brigadier-generalcy in
the regular army, and it was given to him for this victory.

CHAPTER LXII.

SHERMAN’S MARCH NORTH–SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG–CANBY
ORDERED TO MOVE AGAINST MOBILE–MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND
THOMAS–CAPTURE OF COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA SHERMAN IN THE
CAROLINAS.

When news of Sherman being in possession of Savannah reached the
North, distinguished statesmen and visitors began to pour in to
see him. Among others who went was the Secretary of War, who
seemed much pleased at the result of his campaign. Mr. Draper,
the collector of customs of New York, who was with Mr. Stanton’s
party, was put in charge of the public property that had been
abandoned and captured. Savannah was then turned over to
General Foster’s command to hold, so that Sherman might have his
own entire army free to operate as might be decided upon in the
future. I sent the chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac
(General Barnard) with letters to General Sherman. He remained
some time with the general, and when he returned brought back
letters, one of which contained suggestions from Sherman as to
what ought to be done in co-operation with him, when he should
have started upon his march northward.

I must not neglect to state here the fact that I had no idea
originally of having Sherman march from Savannah to Richmond, or
even to North Carolina. The season was bad, the roads impassable
for anything except such an army as he had, and I should not have
thought of ordering such a move. I had, therefore, made
preparations to collect transports to carry Sherman and his army
around to the James River by water, and so informed him. On
receiving this letter he went to work immediately to prepare for
the move, but seeing that it would require a long time to collect
the transports, he suggested the idea then of marching up north
through the Carolinas. I was only too happy to approve this;
for if successful, it promised every advantage. His march
through Georgia had thoroughly destroyed all lines of
transportation in that State, and had completely cut the enemy
off from all sources of supply to the west of it. If North and
South Carolina were rendered helpless so far as capacity for
feeding Lee’s army was concerned, the Confederate garrison at
Richmond would be reduced in territory, from which to draw
supplies, to very narrow limits in the State of Virginia; and,
although that section of the country was fertile, it was already
well exhausted of both forage and food. I approved Sherman’s
suggestion therefore at once.

The work of preparation was tedious, because supplies, to load
the wagons for the march, had to be brought from a long
distance. Sherman would now have to march through a country
furnishing fewer provisions than that he had previously been
operating in during his march to the sea. Besides, he was
confronting, or marching toward, a force of the enemy vastly
superior to any his troops had encountered on their previous
march; and the territory through which he had to pass had now
become of such vast importance to the very existence of the
Confederate army, that the most desperate efforts were to be
expected in order to save it.

Sherman, therefore, while collecting the necessary supplies to
start with, made arrangements with Admiral Dahlgren, who
commanded that part of the navy on the South Carolina and
Georgia coast, and General Foster, commanding the troops, to
take positions, and hold a few points on the sea coast, which he
(Sherman) designated, in the neighborhood of Charleston.

This provision was made to enable him to fall back upon the sea
coast, in case he should encounter a force sufficient to stop
his onward progress. He also wrote me a letter, making
suggestions as to what he would like to have done in support of
his movement farther north. This letter was brought to City
Point by General Barnard at a time when I happened to be going
to Washington City, where I arrived on the 21st of January. I
cannot tell the provision I had already made to co-operate with
Sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement, better than
by giving my reply to this letter.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
Jan. 21, 1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Mill Div. of the Mississippi.

GENERAL:–Your letters brought by General Barnard were received
at City Point, and read with interest. Not having them with me,
however, I cannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you
on all points of recommendation. As I arrived here at one P.M.,
and must leave at six P.M., having in the meantime spent over
three hours with the Secretary and General Halleck, I must be
brief. Before your last request to have Thomas make a campaign
into the heart of Alabama, I had ordered Schofield to Annapolis,
Md., with his corps. The advance (six thousand) will reach the
seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly as
railroad transportation can be procured from Cincinnati. The
corps numbers over twenty-one thousand men. I was induced to do
this because I did not believe Thomas could possibly be got off
before spring. His pursuit of Hood indicated a sluggishness
that satisfied me that he would never do to conduct one of your
campaigns. The command of the advance of the pursuit was left
to subordinates, whilst Thomas followed far behind. When Hood
had crossed the Tennessee, and those in pursuit had reached it,
Thomas had not much more than half crossed the State, from
whence he returned to Nashville to take steamer for Eastport. He
is possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty,
but he is not good on a pursuit. He also reported his troops
fagged, and that it was necessary to equip up. This report and
a determination to give the enemy no rest determined me to use
his surplus troops elsewhere.

Thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to
Selma under an energetic leader. He has been telegraphed to, to
know whether he could go, and, if so, which of the several routes
he would select. No reply is yet received. Canby has been
ordered to act offensively from the sea-coast to the interior,
towards Montgomery and Selma. Thomas’s forces will move from
the north at an early day, or some of his troops will be sent to
Canby. Without further reinforcements Canby will have a moving
column of twenty thousand men.

Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured. We have a force
there of eight thousand effective. At New Bern about half the
number. It is rumored, through deserters, that Wilmington also
has fallen. I am inclined to believe the rumor, because on the
17th we knew the enemy were blowing up their works about Fort
Caswell, and that on the 18th Terry moved on Wilmington.

If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there. If not, he
will be sent to New Bern. In either event, all the surplus
forces at the two points will move to the interior toward
Goldsboro’ in co-operation with your movements. From either
point, railroad communications can be run out, there being here
abundance of rolling-stock suited to the gauge of those roads.

There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee’s army
south. Of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you,
if Wilmington is not held by the enemy, casualties at Fort
Fisher having overtaken about two thousand.

All these troops are subject to your orders as you come in
communication with them. They will be so instructed. From
about Richmond I will watch Lee closely, and if he detaches much
more, or attempts to evacuate, will pitch in. In the meantime,
should you be brought to a halt anywhere, I can send two corps
of thirty thousand effective men to your support, from the
troops about Richmond.

To resume: Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the
Gulf. A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it
doubtful. A force of twenty-eight or thirty thousand will
co-operate with you from New Bern or Wilmington, or both. You
can call for reinforcements.

This will be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who will
return with any message you may have for me. If there is
anything I can do for you in the way of having supplies on
ship-board, at any point on the sea-coast, ready for you, let me
know it.

Yours truly,
U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

I had written on the 18th of January to General Sherman, giving
him the news of the battle of Nashville. He was much pleased at
the result, although, like myself, he had been very much
disappointed at Thomas for permitting Hood to cross the
Tennessee River and nearly the whole State of Tennessee, and
come to Nashville to be attacked there. He, however, as I had
done, sent Thomas a warm congratulatory letter.

On the 10th of January, 1865, the resolutions of thanks to
Sherman and his army passed by Congress were approved.

Sherman, after the capture, at once had the debris cleared up,
commencing the work by removing the piling and torpedoes from
the river, and taking up all obstructions. He had then
intrenched the city, so that it could be held by a small
garrison. By the middle of January all his work was done,
except the accumulation of supplies to commence his movement
with.

He proposed to move in two columns, one from Savannah, going
along by the river of the same name, and the other by roads
farther east, threatening Charleston. He commenced the advance
by moving his right wing to Beaufort, South Carolina, then to
Pocotaligo by water. This column, in moving north, threatened
Charleston, and, indeed, it was not determined at first what
they would have a force visit Charleston. South Carolina had
done so much to prepare the public mind of the South for
secession, and had been so active in precipitating the decision
of the question before the South was fully prepared to meet it,
that there was, at that time, a feeling throughout the North and
also largely entertained by people of the South, that the State
of South Carolina, and Charleston, the hot-bed of secession in
particular, ought to have a heavy hand laid upon them. In fact,
nothing but the decisive results that followed, deterred the
radical portion of the people from condemning the movement,
because Charleston had been left out. To pass into the interior
would, however, be to insure the evacuation of the city, and its
possession by the navy and Foster’s troops. It is so situated
between two formidable rivers that a small garrison could have
held it against all odds as long as their supplies would hold
out. Sherman therefore passed it by.

By the first of February all preparations were completed for the
final march, Columbia, South Carolina, being the first objective;
Fayetteville, North Carolina, the second; and Goldsboro, or
neighborhood, the final one, unless something further should be
determined upon. The right wind went from Pocotaligo, and the
left from about Hardeeville on the Savannah River, both columns
taking a pretty direct route for Columbia. The cavalry,
however, were to threaten Charleston on the right, and Augusta
on the left.

On the 15th of January Fort Fisher had fallen, news of which
Sherman had received before starting out on his march. We
already had New Bern and had soon Wilmington, whose fall
followed that of Fort Fisher; as did other points on the sea
coast, where the National troops were now in readiness to
co-operated with Sherman’s advance when he had passed
Fayetteville.

On the 18th of January I ordered Canby, in command at New
Orleans, to move against Mobile, Montgomery and Selma, Alabama,
for the purpose of destroying roads, machine shops, etc. On the
8th of February I ordered Sheridan, who was in the Valley of
Virginia, to push forward as soon as the weather would permit
and strike the canal west of Richmond at or about Lynchburg; and
on the 20th I made the order to go to Lynchburg as soon as the
roads would permit, saying: “As soon as it is possible to
travel, I think you will have no difficulty about reaching
Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. From there you could
destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be
of no further use to the rebellion. * * * This additional raid,
with one starting from East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering
about four or five thousand cavalry; one from Eastport,
Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry; Canby, from Mobile Bay, with
about eighteen thousand mixed troops–these three latter pushing
for Tuscaloosa, Selma and Montgomery; and Sherman with a large
army eating out the vitals of South Carolina–is all that will
be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I
would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish
this. Charleston was evacuated on Tuesday last.”

On the 27th of February, more than a month after Canby had
received his orders, I again wrote to him, saying that I was
extremely anxious to hear of his being in Alabama. I notified
him, also, that I had sent Grierson to take command of his
cavalry, he being a very efficient officer. I further suggested
that Forrest was probably in Mississippi, and if he was there, he
would find him an officer of great courage and capacity whom it
would be difficult to get by. I still further informed him that
Thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force into Mississippi
on the 20th of February, or as soon as possible thereafter. This
force did not get off however.

All these movements were designed to be in support of Sherman’s
march, the object being to keep the Confederate troops in the
West from leaving there. But neither Canby nor Thomas could be
got off in time. I had some time before depleted Thomas’s army
to reinforce Canby, for the reason that Thomas had failed to
start an expedition which he had been ordered to send out, and
to have the troops where they might do something. Canby seemed
to be equally deliberate in all of his movements. I ordered him
to go in person; but he prepared to send a detachment under
another officer. General Granger had got down to New Orleans,
in some way or other, and I wrote Canby that he must not put him
in command of troops. In spite of this he asked the War
Department to assign Granger to the command of a corps.

Almost in despair of having adequate service rendered to the
cause in that quarter, I said to Canby: “I am in receipt of a
dispatch * * * informing me that you have made requisitions for
a construction corps and material to build seventy miles of
railroad. I have directed that none be sent. Thomas’s army has
been depleted to send a force to you that they might be where
they could act in winter, and at least detain the force the
enemy had in the West. If there had been any idea of repairing
railroads, it could have been done much better from the North,
where we already had the troops. I expected your movements to
be co-operative with Sherman’s last. This has now entirely
failed. I wrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly
and to live upon the country, and destroy railroads, machine
shops, etc., not to build them. Take Mobile and hold it, and
push your forces to the interior–to Montgomery and to Selma.
Destroy railroads, rolling stock, and everything useful for
carrying on war, and, when you have done this, take such
positions as can be supplied by water. By this means alone you
can occupy positions from which the enemy’s roads in the
interior can be kept broken.”

Most of these expeditions got off finally, but too late to
render any service in the direction for which they were designed.

The enemy, ready to intercept his advance, consisted of Hardee’s
troops and Wheeler’s cavalry, perhaps less than fifteen thousand
men in all; but frantic efforts were being made in Richmond, as
I was sure would be the case, to retard Sherman’s movements.
Everything possible was being done to raise troops in the
South. Lee dispatched against Sherman the troops which had been
sent to relieve Fort Fisher, which, including those of the other
defences of the harbor and its neighborhood, amounted, after
deducting the two thousand killed, wounded and captured, to
fourteen thousand men. After Thomas’s victory at Nashville what
remained, of Hood’s army were gathered together and forwarded as
rapidly as possible to the east to co-operate with these forces;
and, finally, General Joseph E. Johnston, one of the ablest
commanders of the South though not in favor with the
administration (or at least with Mr. Davis), was put in command
of all the troops in North and South Carolina.

Schofield arrived at Annapolis in the latter part of January,
but before sending his troops to North Carolina I went with him
down the coast to see the situation of affairs, as I could give
fuller directions after being on the ground than I could very
well have given without. We soon returned, and the troops were
sent by sea to Cape Fear River. Both New Bern and Wilmington
are connected with Raleigh by railroads which unite at
Goldsboro. Schofield was to land troops at Smithville, near the
mouth of the Cape Fear River on the west side, and move up to
secure the Wilmington and Charlotteville Railroad. This column
took their pontoon bridges with them, to enable them to cross
over to the island south of the city of Wilmington. A large
body was sent by the north side to co-operate with them. They
succeeded in taking the city on the 22d of February. I took the
precaution to provide for Sherman’s army, in case he should be
forced to turn in toward the sea coast before reaching North
Carolina, by forwarding supplies to every place where he was
liable to have to make such a deflection from his projected
march. I also sent railroad rolling stock, of which we had a
great abundance, now that we were not operating the roads in
Virginia. The gauge of the North Carolina railroads being the
same as the Virginia railroads had been altered too; these cars
and locomotives were ready for use there without any change.

On the 31st of January I countermanded the orders given to
Thomas to move south to Alabama and Georgia. (I had previously
reduced his force by sending a portion of it to Terry.) I
directed in lieu of this movement, that he should send Stoneman
through East Tennessee, and push him well down toward Columbia,
South Carolina, in support of Sherman. Thomas did not get
Stoneman off in time, but, on the contrary, when I had supposed
he was on his march in support of Sherman I heard of his being
in Louisville, Kentucky. I immediately changed the order, and
directed Thomas to send him toward Lynchburg. Finally, however,
on the 12th of March, he did push down through the north-western
end of South Carolina, creating some consternation. I also
ordered Thomas to send the 4th corps (Stanley’s) to Bull Gap and
to destroy no more roads east of that. I also directed him to
concentrate supplies at Knoxville, with a view to a probable
movement of his army through that way toward Lynchburg.

Goldsboro is four hundred and twenty-five miles from Savannah.
Sherman’s march was without much incident until he entered
Columbia, on the 17th of February. He was detained in his
progress by having to repair and corduroy the roads, and rebuild
the bridges. There was constant skirmishing and fighting between
the cavalry of the two armies, but this did not retard the
advance of the infantry. Four days, also, were lost in making
complete the destruction of the most important railroads south
of Columbia; there was also some delay caused by the high water,
and the destruction of the bridges on the line of the road. A
formidable river had to be crossed near Columbia, and that in
the face of a small garrison under General Wade Hampton. There
was but little delay, however, further than that caused by high
water in the stream. Hampton left as Sherman approached, and
the city was found to be on fire.

There has since been a great deal of acrimony displayed in
discussions of the question as to who set Columbia on fire.
Sherman denies it on the part of his troops, and Hampton denies
it on the part of the Confederates. One thing is certain: as
soon as our troops took possession, they at once proceeded to
extinguish the flames to the best of their ability with the
limited means at hand. In any case, the example set by the
Confederates in burning the village of Chambersburg, Pa., a town
which was not garrisoned, would seem to make a defence of the act
of firing the seat of government of the State most responsible
for the conflict then raging, not imperative.

The Confederate troops having vacated the city, the mayor took
possession, and sallied forth to meet the commander of the
National forces for the purpose of surrendering the town, making
terms for the protection of property, etc. Sherman paid no
attention at all to the overture, but pushed forward and took
the town without making any conditions whatever with its
citizens. He then, however, co-operated with the mayor in
extinguishing the flames and providing for the people who were
rendered destitute by this destruction of their homes. When he
left there he even gave the mayor five hundred head of cattle to
be distributed among the citizens, to tide them over until some
arrangement could be made for their future supplies. He
remained in Columbia until the roads, public buildings,
workshops and everything that could be useful to the enemy were
destroyed. While at Columbia, Sherman learned for the first
time that what remained of Hood’s army was confronting him,
under the command of General Beauregard.

Charleston was evacuated on the 18th of February, and Foster
garrisoned the place. Wilmington was captured on the 22d.
Columbia and Cheraw farther north, were regarded as so secure
from invasion that the wealthy people of Charleston and Augusta
had sent much of their valuable property to these two points to
be stored. Among the goods sent there were valuable carpets,
tons of old Madeira, silverware, and furniture. I am afraid
much of these goods fell into the hands of our troops. There
was found at Columbia a large amount of powder, some artillery,
small-arms and fixed ammunition. These, of course were among
the articles destroyed. While here, Sherman also learned of
Johnston’s restoration to command. The latter was given, as
already stated, all troops in North and South Carolina. After
the completion of the destruction of public property about
Columbia, Sherman proceeded on his march and reached Cheraw
without any special opposition and without incident to relate.
The railroads, of course, were thoroughly destroyed on the
way. Sherman remained a day or two at Cheraw; and, finally, on
the 6th of March crossed his troops over the Pedee and advanced
straight for Fayetteville. Hardee and Hampton were there, and
barely escaped. Sherman reached Fayetteville on the 11th of
March. He had dispatched scouts from Cheraw with letters to
General Terry, at Wilmington, asking him to send a steamer with
some supplies of bread, clothing and other articles which he
enumerated. The scouts got through successfully, and a boat was
sent with the mail and such articles for which Sherman had asked
as were in store at Wilmington; unfortunately, however, those
stores did not contain clothing.

Four days later, on the 15th, Sherman left Fayetteville for
Goldsboro. The march, now, had to be made with great caution,
for he was approaching Lee’s army and nearing the country that
still remained open to the enemy. Besides, he was confronting
all that he had had to confront in his previous march up to that
point, reinforced by the garrisons along the road and by what
remained of Hood’s army. Frantic appeals were made to the
people to come in voluntarily and swell the ranks of our foe. I
presume, however, that Johnston did not have in all over 35,000
or 40,000 men. The people had grown tired of the war, and
desertions from the Confederate army were much more numerous
than the voluntary accessions.

There was some fighting at Averysboro on the 16th between
Johnston’s troops and Sherman’s, with some loss; and at
Bentonville on the 19th and 21st of March, but Johnston withdrew
from the contest before the morning of the 22d. Sherman’s loss
in these last engagements in killed, wounded, and missing, was
about sixteen hundred. Sherman’s troops at last reached
Goldsboro on the 23d of the month and went into bivouac; and
there his men were destined to have a long rest. Schofield was
there to meet him with the troops which had been sent to
Wilmington.

Sherman was no longer in danger. He had Johnston confronting
him; but with an army much inferior to his own, both in numbers
and morale. He had Lee to the north of him with a force largely
superior; but I was holding Lee with a still greater force, and
had he made his escape and gotten down to reinforce Johnston,
Sherman, with the reinforcements he now had from Schofield and
Terry, would have been able to hold the Confederates at bay for
an indefinite period. He was near the sea-shore with his back
to it, and our navy occupied the harbors. He had a railroad to
both Wilmington and New Bern, and his flanks were thoroughly
protected by streams, which intersect that part of the country
and deepen as they approach the sea. Then, too, Sherman knew
that if Lee should escape me I would be on his heels, and he and
Johnson together would be crushed in one blow if they attempted
to make a stand. With the loss of their capital, it is doubtful
whether Lee’s army would have amounted to much as an army when it
reached North Carolina. Johnston? army was demoralized by
constant defeat and would hardly have made an offensive
movement, even if they could have been induced to remain on
duty. The men of both Lee’s and Johnston’s armies were, like
their brethren of the North, as brave as men can be; but no man
is so brave that he may not meet such defeats and disasters as
to discourage him and dampen his ardor for any cause, no matter
how just he deems it.

CHAPTER LXIII.

ARRIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS–LINCOLN AND THE PEACE
COMMISSIONERS–AN ANECDOTE OF LINCOLN–THE WINTER BEFORE
PETERSBURG–SHERIDAN DESTROYS THE RAILROAD–GORDON CARRIES THE
PICKET LINE–PARKE RECAPTURES THE LINE–THE LINE OF BATTLE OF
WHITE OAK ROAD.

On the last of January, 1895, peace commissioners from the
so-called Confederate States presented themselves on our lines
around Petersburg, and were immediately conducted to my
headquarters at City Point. They proved to be Alexander H.
Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy, Judge Campbell,
Assistant-Secretary of War, and R. M. T. Hunt, formerly United
States Senator and then a member of the Confederate Senate.

It was about dark when they reached my headquarters, and I at
once conducted them to the steam Mary Martin, a Hudson River
boat which was very comfortably fitted up for the use of
passengers. I at once communicated by telegraph with Washington
and informed the Secretary of War and the President of the
arrival of these commissioners and that their object was to
negotiate terms of peace between he United States and, as they
termed it, the Confederate Government. It was instructed to
retain them at City Point, until the President, or some one whom
he would designate, should come to meet them. They remained
several days as guests on board the boat. I saw them quite
frequently, though I have no recollection of having had any
conversation whatever with them on the subject of their
mission. It was something I had nothing to do with, and I
therefore did not wish to express any views on the subject. For
my own part I never had admitted, and never was ready to admit,
that they were the representatives of a GOVERNMENT. There had
been too great a waste of blood and treasure to concede anything
of the kind. As long as they remained there, however, our
relations were pleasant and I found them all very agreeable
gentlemen. I directed the captain to furnish them with the best
the boat afforded, and to administer to their comfort in every
way possible. No guard was placed over them and no restriction
was put upon their movements; nor was there any pledge asked
that they would not abuse the privileges extended to them. They
were permitted to leave the boat when they felt like it, and did
so, coming up on the bank and visiting me at my headquarters.

I had never met either of these gentlemen before the war, but
knew them well by reputation and through their public services,
and I had been a particular admirer of Mr. Stephens. I had
always supposed that he was a very small man, but when I saw him
in the dusk of the evening I was very much surprised to find so
large a man as he seemed to be. When he got down on to the boat
I found that he was wearing a coarse gray woollen overcoat, a
manufacture that had been introduced into the South during the
rebellion. The cloth was thicker than anything of the kind I
had ever seen, even in Canada. The overcoat extended nearly to
his feet, and was so large that it gave him the appearance of
being an average-sized man. He took this off when he reached
the cabin of the boat, and I was struck with the apparent change
in size, in the coat and out of it.

After a few days, about the 2d of February, I received a
dispatch from Washington, directing me to send the commissioners
to Hampton Roads to meet the President and a member of the
cabinet. Mr. Lincoln met them there and had an interview of
short duration. It was not a great while after they met that
the President visited me at City Point. He spoke of his having
met the commissioners, and said he had told them that there
would be no use in entering into any negotiations unless they
would recognize, first: that the Union as a whole must be
forever preserved, and second: that slavery must be abolished.
If they were willing to concede these two points, then he was
ready to enter into negotiations and was almost willing to hand
them a blank sheet of paper with his signature attached for them
to fill in the terms upon which they were willing to live with us
in the Union and be one people. He always showed a generous and
kindly spirit toward the Southern people, and I never heard him
abuse an enemy. Some of the cruel things said about President
Lincoln, particularly in the North, used to pierce him to the
heart; but never in my presence did he evince a revengeful
disposition and I saw a great deal of him at City Point, for he
seemed glad to get away from the cares and anxieties of the
capital.

Right here I might relate an anecdote of Mr. Lincoln. It was on
the occasion of his visit to me just after he had talked with the
peace commissioners at Hampton Roads. After a little
conversation, he asked me if I had seen that overcoat of
Stephens’s. I replied that I had. “Well,” said he, “did you
see him take it off?” I said yes. “Well,” said he, “didn’t you
think it was the biggest shuck and the littlest ear that ever you
did see?” Long afterwards I told this story to the Confederate
General J. B. Gordon, at the time a member of the Senate. He
repeated it to Stephens, and, as I heard afterwards, Stephens
laughed immoderately at the simile of Mr. Lincoln.

The rest of the winter, after the departure of the peace
commissioners, passed off quietly and uneventfully, except for
two or three little incidents. On one occasion during this
period, while I was visiting Washington City for the purpose of
conferring with the administration, the enemy’s cavalry under
General Wade Hampton, passing our extreme left and then going to
the south, got in east of us. Before their presence was known,
they had driven off a large number of beef cattle that were
grazing in that section. It was a fair capture, and they were
sufficiently needed by the Confederates. It was only
retaliating for what we had done, sometimes for many weeks at a
time, when out of supplies taking what the Confederate army
otherwise would have gotten. As appears in this book, on one
single occasion we captured five thousand head of cattle which
were crossing the Mississippi River near Port Hudson on their
way from Texas to supply the Confederate army in the East.

One of the most anxious periods of my experience during the
rebellion was the last few weeks before Petersburg. I felt that
the situation of the Confederate army was such that they would
try to make an escape at the earliest practicable moment, and I
was afraid, every morning, that I would awake from my sleep to
hear that Lee had gone, and that nothing was left but a picket
line. He had his railroad by the way of Danville south, and I
was afraid that he was running off his men and all stores and
ordnance except such as it would be necessary to carry with him
for his immediate defence. I knew he could move much more
lightly and more rapidly than I, and that, if he got the start,
he would leave me behind so that we would have the same army to
fight again farther south and the war might be prolonged another
year.

I was led to this fear by the fact that I could not see how it
was possible for the Confederates to hold out much longer where
they were. There is no doubt that Richmond would have been
evacuated much sooner than it was, if it had not been that it
was the capital of the so-called Confederacy, and the fact of
evacuating the capital would, of course, have had a very
demoralizing effect upon the Confederate army. When it was
evacuated (as we shall see further on), the Confederacy at once
began to crumble and fade away. Then, too, desertions were
taking place, not only among those who were with General Lee in
the neighborhood of their capital, but throughout the whole
Confederacy. I remember that in a conversation with me on one
occasion long prior to this, General Butler remarked that the
Confederates would find great difficulty in getting more men for
their army; possibly adding, though I am not certain as to this,
“unless they should arm the slave.”

The South, as we all knew, were conscripting every able-bodied
man between the ages of eighteen and forty-five; and now they
had passed a law for the further conscription of boys from
fourteen to eighteen, calling them the junior reserves, and men
from forty-five to sixty to be called the senior reserves. The
latter were to hold the necessary points not in immediate
danger, and especially those in the rear. General Butler, in
alluding to this conscription, remarked that they were thus
“robbing both the cradle and the grave,” an expression which I
afterwards used in writing a letter to Mr. Washburn.

It was my belief that while the enemy could get no more recruits
they were losing at least a regiment a day, taking it throughout
the entire army, by desertions alone. Then by casualties of
war, sickness, and other natural causes, their losses were much
heavier. It was a mere question of arithmetic to calculate how
long they could hold out while that rate of depletion was going
on. Of course long before their army would be thus reduced to
nothing the army which we had in the field would have been able
to capture theirs. Then too I knew from the great number of
desertions, that the men who had fought so bravely, so gallantly
and so long for the cause which they believed in–and as
earnestly, I take it, as our men believed in the cause for which
they were fighting–had lost hope and become despondent. Many of
them were making application to be sent North where they might
get employment until the war was over, when they could return to
their Southern homes.

For these and other reasons I was naturally very impatient for
the time to come when I could commence the spring campaign,
which I thoroughly believed would close the war.

There were two considerations I had to observe, however, and
which detained me. One was the fact that the winter had been
one of heavy rains, and the roads were impassable for artillery
and teams. It was necessary to wait until they had dried
sufficiently to enable us to move the wagon trains and artillery
necessary to the efficiency of an army operating in the enemy’s
country. The other consideration was that General Sheridan with
the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac was operating on the north
side of the James River, having come down from the Shenandoah. It
was necessary that I should have his cavalry with me, and I was
therefore obliged to wait until he could join me south of the
James River.

Let us now take account of what he was doing.

On the 5th of March I had heard from Sheridan. He had met Early
between Staunton and Charlottesville and defeated him, capturing
nearly his entire command. Early and some of his officers
escaped by finding refuge in the neighboring houses or in the
woods.

On the 12th I heard from him again. He had turned east, to come
to White House. He could not go to Lynchburg as ordered, because
the rains had been so very heavy and the streams were so very
much swollen. He had a pontoon train with him, but it would not
reach half way across some of the streams, at their then stage of
water, which he would have to get over in going south as first
ordered.

I had supplies sent around to White House for him, and kept the
depot there open until he arrived. We had intended to abandon
it because the James River had now become our base of supplies.

Sheridan had about ten thousand cavalry with him, divided into
two divisions commanded respectively by Custer and Devin.
General Merritt was acting as chief of cavalry. Sheridan moved
very light, carrying only four days’ provisions with him, with a
larger supply of coffee, salt and other small rations, and a very
little else besides ammunition. They stopped at Charlottesville
and commenced tearing up the railroad back toward Lynchburg. He
also sent a division along the James River Canal to destroy
locks, culverts etc. All mills and factories along the lines of
march of his troops were destroyed also.

Sheridan had in this way consumed so much time that his making a
march to White House was now somewhat hazardous. He determined
therefore to fight his way along the railroad and canal till he
was as near to Richmond as it was possible to get, or until
attacked. He did this, destroying the canal as far as
Goochland, and the railroad to a point as near Richmond as he
could get. On the 10th he was at Columbia. Negroes had joined
his column to the number of two thousand or more, and they
assisted considerably in the work of destroying the railroads
and the canal. His cavalry was in as fine a condition as when
he started, because he had been able to find plenty of forage.
He had captured most of Early’s horses and picked up a good many
others on the road. When he reached Ashland he was assailed by
the enemy in force. He resisted their assault with part of his
command, moved quickly across the South and North Anna, going
north, and reached White House safely on the 19th.

The time for Sherman to move had to be fixed with reference to
the time he could get away from Goldsboro where he then was.
Supplies had to be got up to him which would last him through a
long march, as there would probably not be much to be obtained
in the country through which he would pass. I had to arrange,
therefore, that he should start from where he was, in the
neighborhood of Goldsboro on the 18th of April, the earliest day
at which he supposed he could be ready.

Sherman was anxious that I should wait where I was until he,
could come up, and make a sure thing of it; but I had determined
to move as soon as the roads and weather would admit of my doing
so. I had been tied down somewhat in the matter of fixing any
time at my pleasure for starting, until Sheridan, who was on his
way from the Shenandoah Valley to join me, should arrive, as both
his presence and that of his cavalry were necessary to, the
execution of the plans which I had in mind. However, having
arrived at White House on the 19th of March, I was enabled to
make my plans.

Prompted by my anxiety lest Lee should get away some night
before I was aware of it, and having the lead of me, push into
North Carolina to join with Johnston in attempting to crush out
Sherman, I had, as early as the 1st of the month of March, given
instructions to the troops around Petersburg to keep a sharp
lookout to see that such a movement should not escape their
notice, and to be ready strike at once if it was undertaken.

It is now known that early in the month of March Mr. Davis and
General Lee had a consultation about the situation of affairs in
and about and Petersburg, and they both agreed places were no
longer tenable for them, and that they must get away as soon as
possible. They, too, were waiting for dry roads, or a condition
of the roads which would make it possible to move.

General Lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and to secure a wider
opening to enable them to reach the Danville Road with greater
security than he would have in the way the two armies were
situated, determined upon an assault upon the right of our lines
around Petersburg. The night of the 24th of March was fixed upon
for this assault, and General Gordon was assigned to the
execution of the plan. The point between Fort Stedman and
Battery No. 10, where our lines were closest together, was
selected as the point of his attack. The attack was to be made
at night, and the troops were to get possession of the higher
ground in the rear where they supposed we had intrenchments,
then sweep to the right and left, create a panic in the lines of
our army, and force me to contract my lines. Lee hoped this
would detain me a few days longer and give him an opportunity of
escape. The plan was well conceived and the execution of it very
well done indeed, up to the point of carrying a portion of our
line.

Gordon assembled his troops under the cover of night, at the
point at which they were to make their charge, and got
possession of our picket-line, entirely without the knowledge of
the troops inside of our main line of intrenchments; this reduced
the distance he would have to charge over to not much more than
fifty yards. For some time before the deserters had been coming
in with great frequency, often bringing their arms with them, and
this the Confederate general knew. Taking advantage of this
knowledge he sent his pickets, with their arms, creeping through
to ours as if to desert. When they got to our lines they at once
took possession and sent our pickets to the rear as prisoners. In
the main line our men were sleeping serenely, as if in great
security. This plan was to have been executed and much damage
done before daylight; but the troops that were to reinforce
Gordon had to be brought from the north side of the James River
and, by some accident on the railroad on their way over, they
were detained for a considerable time; so that it got to be
nearly daylight before they were ready to make the charge.

The charge, however, was successful and almost without loss, the
enemy passing through our lines between Fort Stedman and Battery
No. 10. Then turning to the right and left they captured the
fort and the battery, with all the arms and troops in them.
Continuing the charge, they also carried batteries Eleven and
Twelve to our left, which they turned toward City Point.

Meade happened to be at City Point that night, and this break in
his line cut him off from all communication with his
headquarters. Parke, however, commanding the 9th corps when
this breach took place, telegraphed the facts to Meade’s
headquarters, and learning that the general was away, assumed
command himself and with commendable promptitude made all
preparations to drive the enemy back. General Tidball gathered
a large number of pieces of artillery and planted them in rear
of the captured works so as to sweep the narrow space of ground
between the lines very thoroughly. Hartranft was soon out with
his division, as also was Willcox. Hartranft to the right of
the breach headed the rebels off in that direction and rapidly
drove them back into Fort Stedman. On the other side they were
driven back into the intrenchments which they had captured, and
batteries eleven and twelve were retaken by Willcox early in the
morning.

Parke then threw a line around outside of the captured fort and
batteries, and communication was once more established. The
artillery fire was kept up so continuously that it was
impossible for the Confederates to retreat, and equally
impossible for reinforcements to join them. They all,
therefore, fell captives into our hands. This effort of Lee’s
cost him about four thousand men, and resulted in their killing,
wounding and capturing about two thousand of ours.

After the recapture of the batteries taken by the Confederates,
our troops made a charge and carried the enemy’s intrenched
picket line, which they strengthened and held. This, in turn,
gave us but a short distance to charge over when our attack came
to be made a few days later.

The day that Gordon was making dispositions for this attack
(24th of March) I issued my orders for the movement to commence
on the 29th. Ord, with three divisions of infantry and
Mackenzie’s cavalry, was to move in advance on the night of the
27th, from the north side of the James River and take his place
on our extreme left, thirty miles away. He left Weitzel with
the rest of the Army of the James to hold Bermuda Hundred and
the north of the James River. The engineer brigade was to be
left at City Point, and Parke’s corps in the lines about
Petersburg. (*42)

Ord was at his place promptly. Humphreys and Warren were then
on our extreme left with the 2d and 5th corps. They were
directed on the arrival of Ord, and on his getting into position
in their places, to cross Hatcher’s Run and extend out west
toward Five Forks, the object being to get into a position from
which we could strike the South Side Railroad and ultimately the
Danville Railroad. There was considerable fighting in taking up
these new positions for the 2d and 5th corps, in which the Army
of the James had also to participate somewhat, and the losses
were quite severe.

This was what was known as the Battle of White Oak Road.

CHAPTER LXIV.

INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN–GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE
POTOMAC–SHERIDAN’S ADVANCE ON FIVE FORKS–BATTLE OF FIVE
FORKS–PARKE AND WRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY’S LINE–BATTLES BEFORE
PETERSBURG.

Sheridan reached City Point on the 26th day of March. His
horses, of course, were jaded and many of them had lost their
shoes. A few days of rest were necessary to recuperate the
animals and also to have them shod and put in condition for
moving. Immediately on General Sheridan’s arrival at City Point
I prepared his instructions for the move which I had decided
upon. The movement was to commence on the 29th of the month.

After reading the instructions I had given him, Sheridan walked
out of my tent, and I followed to have some conversation with
him by himself–not in the presence of anybody else, even of a
member of my staff. In preparing his instructions I
contemplated just what took place; that is to say, capturing
Five Forks, driving the enemy from Petersburg and Richmond and
terminating the contest before separating from the enemy. But
the Nation had already become restless and discouraged at the
prolongation of the war, and many believed that it would never
terminate except by compromise. Knowing that unless my plan
proved an entire success it would be interpreted as a disastrous
defeat, I provided in these instructions that in a certain event
he was to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac and his base of
supplies, and living upon the country proceed south by the way of
the Danville Railroad, or near it, across the Roanoke, get in the
rear of Johnston, who was guarding that road, and cooperate with
Sherman in destroying Johnston; then with these combined forces
to help carry out the instructions which Sherman already had
received, to act in cooperation with the armies around
Petersburg and Richmond.

I saw that after Sheridan had read his instructions he seemed
somewhat disappointed at the idea, possibly, of having to cut
loose again from the Army of the Potomac, and place himself
between the two main armies of the enemy. I said to him:
“General, this portion of your instructions I have put in merely
as a blind;” and gave him the reason for doing so, heretofore
described. I told him that, as a matter of fact, I intended to
close the war right here, with this movement, and that he should
go no farther. His face at once brightened up, and slapping his
hand on his leg he said: “I am glad to hear it, and we can do
it.”

Sheridan was not however to make his movement against Five Forks
until he got further instructions from me.

One day, after the movement I am about to describe had
commenced, and when his cavalry was on our extreme left and far
to the rear, south, Sheridan rode up to where my headquarters
were then established, at Dabney’s Mills. He met some of my
staff officers outside, and was highly jubilant over the
prospects of success, giving reasons why he believed this would
prove the final and successful effort. Although my
chief-of-staff had urged very strongly that we return to our
position about City Point and in the lines around Petersburg, he
asked Sheridan to come in to see me and say to me what he had
been saying to them. Sheridan felt a little modest about giving
his advice where it had not been asked; so one of my staff came
in and told me that Sheridan had what they considered important
news, and suggested that I send for him. I did so, and was glad
to see the spirit of confidence with which he was imbued. Knowing
as I did from experience, of what great value that feeling of
confidence by a commander was, I determined to make a movement
at once, although on account of the rains which had fallen after
I had started out the roads were still very heavy. Orders were
given accordingly.

Finally the 29th of March came, and fortunately there having
been a few days free from rain, the surface of the ground was
dry, giving indications that the time had come when we could
move. On that date I moved out with all the army available
after leaving sufficient force to hold the line about
Petersburg. It soon set in raining again however, and in a very
short time the roads became practically impassable for teams, and
almost so for cavalry. Sometimes a horse or mule would be
standing apparently on firm ground, when all at once one foot
would sink, and as he commenced scrambling to catch himself all
his feet would sink and he would have to be drawn by hand out of
the quicksands so common in that part of Virginia and other
southern States. It became necessary therefore to build
corduroy roads every foot of the way as we advanced, to move our
artillery upon. The army had become so accustomed to this kind
of work, and were so well prepared for it, that it was done very
rapidly. The next day, March 30th, we had made sufficient
progress to the south-west to warrant me in starting Sheridan
with his cavalry over by Dinwiddie with instructions to then
come up by the road leading north-west to Five Forks, thus
menacing the right of Lee’s line.

This movement was made for the purpose of extending our lines to
the west as far as practicable towards the enemy’s extreme right,
or Five Forks. The column moving detached from the army still in
the trenches was, excluding the cavalry, very small. The forces
in the trenches were themselves extending to the left flank.
Warren was on the extreme left when the extension began, but
Humphreys was marched around later and thrown into line between
him and Five Forks.

My hope was that Sheridan would be able to carry Five Forks, get
on the enemy’s right flank and rear, and force them to weaken
their centre to protect their right so that an assault in the
centre might be successfully made. General Wright’s corps had
been designated to make this assault, which I intended to order
as soon as information reached me of Sheridan’s success. He was
to move under cover as close to the enemy as he could get.

It is natural to suppose that Lee would understand my design to
be to get up to the South Side and ultimately to the Danville
Railroad, as soon as he had heard of the movement commenced on
the 29th. These roads were so important to his very existence
while he remained in Richmond and Petersburg, and of such vital
importance to him even in case of retreat, that naturally he
would make most strenuous efforts to defend them. He did on the
30th send Pickett with five brigades to reinforce Five Forks. He
also sent around to the right of his army some two or three other
divisions, besides directing that other troops be held in
readiness on the north side of the James River to come over on
call. He came over himself to superintend in person the defence
of his right flank.

Sheridan moved back to Dinwiddie Court-House on the night of the
30th, and then took a road leading north-west to Five Forks. He
had only his cavalry with him. Soon encountering the rebel
cavalry he met with a very stout resistance. He gradually drove
them back however until in the neighborhood of Five Forks. Here
he had to encounter other troops besides those he had been
contending with, and was forced to give way.

In this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken
place and stated that he was falling back toward Dinwiddie
gradually and slowly, and asked me to send Wright’s corps to his
assistance. I replied to him that it was impossible to send
Wright’s corps because that corps was already in line close up
to the enemy, where we should want to assault when the proper
time came, and was besides a long distance from him; but the 2d
(Humphreys’s) and 5th (Warren’s) corps were on our extreme left
and a little to the rear of it in a position to threaten the
left flank of the enemy at Five Forks, and that I would send
Warren.

Accordingly orders were sent to Warren to move at once that
night (the 31st) to Dinwiddie Court House and put himself in
communication with Sheridan as soon as possible, and report to
him. He was very slow in moving, some of his troops not
starting until after 5 o’clock next morning. When he did move
it was done very deliberately, and on arriving at Gravelly Run
he found the stream swollen from the recent rains so that he
regarded it as not fordable. Sheridan of course knew of his
coming, and being impatient to get the troops up as soon as
possible, sent orders to him to hasten. He was also hastened or
at least ordered to move up rapidly by General Meade. He now
felt that he could not cross that creek without bridges, and his
orders were changed to move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in
flank or get in their rear; but he was so late in getting up that
Sheridan determined to move forward without him. However,
Ayres’s division of Warren’s corps reached him in time to be in
the fight all day, most of the time separated from the remainder
of the 5th corps and fighting directly under Sheridan.

Warren reported to Sheridan about 11 o’clock on the 1st, but the
whole of his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until
late in the afternoon. Griffin’s division in backing to get out
of the way of a severe cross fire of the enemy was found marching
away from the fighting. This did not continue long, however; the
division was brought back and with Ayres’s division did most
excellent service during the day. Crawford’s division of the
same corps had backed still farther off, and although orders
were sent repeatedly to bring it up, it was late before it
finally got to where it could be of material assistance. Once
there it did very excellent service.

Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little
later, in advancing up to the point from which to make his
designed assault upon Five Forks itself. He was very impatient
to make the assault and have it all over before night, because
the ground he occupied would be untenable for him in bivouac
during the night. Unless the assault was made and was
successful, he would be obliged to return to Dinwiddie
Court-House, or even further than that for the night.

It was at this junction of affairs that Sheridan wanted to get
Crawford’s division in hand, and he also wanted Warren. He sent
staff officer after staff officer in search of Warren, directing
that general to report to him, but they were unable to find
him. At all events Sheridan was unable to get that officer to
him. Finally he went himself. He issued an order relieving
Warren and assigning Griffin to the command of the 5th corps.
The troops were then brought up and the assault successfully
made.

I was so much dissatisfied with Warren’s dilatory movements in
the battle of White Oak Road and in his failure to reach
Sheridan in time, that I was very much afraid that at the last
moment he would fail Sheridan. He was a man of fine
intelligence, great earnestness, quick perception, and could
make his dispositions as quickly as any officer, under
difficulties where he was forced to act. But I had before
discovered a defect which was beyond his control, that was very
prejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies like the one just
before us. He could see every danger at a glance before he had
encountered it. He would not only make preparations to meet the
danger which might occur, but he would inform his commanding
officer what others should do while he was executing his move.

I had sent a staff officer to General Sheridan to call his
attention to these defects, and to say that as much as I liked
General Warren, now was not a time when we could let our
personal feelings for any one stand in the way of success; and
if his removal was necessary to success, not to hesitate. It
was upon that authorization that Sheridan removed Warren. I was
very sorry that it had been done, and regretted still more that I
had not long before taken occasion to assign him to another field
of duty.

It was dusk when our troops under Sheridan went over the
parapets of the enemy. The two armies were mingled together
there for a time in such manner that it was almost a question
which one was going to demand the surrender of the other. Soon,
however, the enemy broke and ran in every direction; some six
thousand prisoners, besides artillery and small-arms in large
quantities, falling into our hands. The flying troops were
pursued in different directions, the cavalry and 5th corps under
Sheridan pursuing the larger body which moved north-west.

This pursuit continued until about nine o’clock at night, when
Sheridan halted his troops, and knowing the importance to him of
the part of the enemy’s line which had been captured, returned,
sending the 5th corps across Hatcher’s Run to just south-west of
Petersburg, and facing them toward it. Merritt, with the
cavalry, stopped and bivouacked west of Five Forks.

This was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the
1st of April. I then issued orders for an assault by Wright and
Parke at four o’clock on the morning of the 2d. I also ordered
the 2d corps, General Humphreys, and General Ord with the Army
of the James, on the left, to hold themselves in readiness to
take any advantage that could be taken from weakening in their
front.

I notified Mr. Lincoln at City Point of the success of the day;
in fact I had reported to him during the day and evening as I
got news, because he was so much interested in the movements
taking place that I wanted to relieve his mind as much as I
could. I notified Weitzel on the north side of the James River,
directing him, also, to keep close up to the enemy, and take
advantage of the withdrawal of troops from there to promptly
enter the city of Richmond.

I was afraid that Lee would regard the possession of Five Forks
as of so much importance that he would make a last desperate
effort to retake it, risking everything upon the cast of a
single die. It was for this reason that I had ordered the
assault to take place at once, as soon as I had received the
news of the capture of Five Forks. The corps commanders,
however, reported that it was so dark that the men could not see
to move, and it would be impossible to make the assault then. But
we kept up a continuous artillery fire upon the enemy around the
whole line including that north of the James River, until it was
light enough to move, which was about a quarter to five in the
morning.

At that hour Parke’s and Wright’s corps moved out as directed,
brushed the abatis from their front as they advanced under a
heavy fire of musketry and artillery, and went without flinching
directly on till they mounted the parapets and threw themselves
inside of the enemy’s line. Parke, who was on the right, swept
down to the right and captured a very considerable length of
line in that direction, but at that point the outer was so near
the inner line which closely enveloped the city of Petersburg
that he could make no advance forward and, in fact, had a very
serious task to turn the lines which he had captured to the
defence of his own troops and to hold them; but he succeeded in
this.

Wright swung around to his left and moved to Hatcher’s Run,
sweeping everything before him. The enemy had traverses in rear
of his captured line, under cover of which he made something of a
stand, from one to another, as Wright moved on; but the latter
met no serious obstacle. As you proceed to the left the outer
line becomes gradually much farther from the inner one, and
along about Hatcher’s Run they must be nearly two miles apart.
Both Parke and Wright captured a considerable amount of
artillery and some prisoners–Wright about three thousand of
them.

In the meantime Ord and Humphreys, in obedience to the
instructions they had received, had succeeded by daylight, or
very early in the morning, in capturing the intrenched
picket-lines in their front; and before Wright got up to that
point, Ord had also succeeded in getting inside of the enemy’s
intrenchments. The second corps soon followed; and the outer
works of Petersburg were in the hands of the National troops,
never to be wrenched from them again. When Wright reached
Hatcher’s Run, he sent a regiment to destroy the South Side
Railroad just outside of the city.

My headquarters were still at Dabney’s saw-mills. As soon as I
received the news of Wright’s success, I sent dispatches
announcing the fact to all points around the line, including the
troops at Bermuda Hundred and those on the north side of the
James, and to the President at City Point. Further dispatches
kept coming in, and as they did I sent the additional news to
these points. Finding at length that they were all in, I
mounted my horse to join the troops who were inside the works.
When I arrived there I rode my horse over the parapet just as
Wright’s three thousand prisoners were coming out. I was soon
joined inside by General Meade and his staff.

Lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part of the lost
ground. Parke on our right was repeatedly assaulted, but
repulsed every effort. Before noon Longstreet was ordered up
from the north side of the James River thus bringing the bulk of
Lee’s army around to the support of his extreme right. As soon
as I learned this I notified Weitzel and directed him to keep up
close to the enemy and to have Hartsuff, commanding the Bermuda
Hundred front, to do the same thing, and if they found any break
to go in; Hartsuff especially should do so, for this would
separate Richmond and Petersburg.

Sheridan, after he had returned to Five Forks, swept down to
Petersburg, coming in on our left. This gave us a continuous
line from the Appomattox River below the city to the same river
above. At eleven o’clock, not having heard from Sheridan, I
reinforced Parke with two brigades from City Point. With this
additional force he completed his captured works for better
defence, and built back from his right, so as to protect his
flank. He also carried in and made an abatis between himself
and the enemy. Lee brought additional troops and artillery
against Parke even after this was done, and made several
assaults with very heavy losses.

The enemy had in addition to their intrenched line close up to
Petersburg, two enclosed works outside of it, Fort Gregg and
Fort Whitworth. We thought it had now become necessary to carry
them by assault. About one o’clock in the day, Fort Gregg was
assaulted by Foster’s division of the 24th corps (Gibbon’s),
supported by two brigades from Ord’s command. The battle was
desperate and the National troops were repulsed several times;
but it was finally carried, and immediately the troops in Fort
Whitworth evacuated the place. The guns of Fort Gregg were
turned upon the retreating enemy, and the commanding officer
with some sixty of the men of Fort Whitworth surrendered.

I had ordered Miles in the morning to report to Sheridan. In
moving to execute this order he came upon the enemy at the
intersection of the White Oak Road and the Claiborne Road. The
enemy fell back to Sutherland Station on the South Side Road and
were followed by Miles. This position, naturally a strong and
defensible one, was also strongly intrenched. Sheridan now came
up and Miles asked permission from him to make the assault, which
Sheridan gave. By this time Humphreys had got through the outer
works in his front, and came up also and assumed command over
Miles, who commanded a division in his corps. I had sent an
order to Humphreys to turn to his right and move towards
Petersburg. This order he now got, and started off, thus
leaving Miles alone. The latter made two assaults, both of
which failed, and he had to fall back a few hundred yards.

Hearing that Miles had been left in this position, I directed
Humphreys to send a division back to his relief. He went
himself.

Sheridan before starting to sweep down to Petersburg had sent
Merritt with his cavalry to the west to attack some Confederate
cavalry that had assembled there. Merritt drove them north to
the Appomattox River. Sheridan then took the enemy at
Sutherland Station on the reverse side from where Miles was, and
the two together captured the place, with a large number of
prisoners and some pieces of artillery, and put the remainder,
portions of three Confederate corps, to flight. Sheridan
followed, and drove them until night, when further pursuit was
stopped. Miles bivouacked for the night on the ground which he
with Sheridan had carried so handsomely by assault. I cannot
explain the situation here better than by giving my dispatch to
City Point that evening:

BOYDTON ROAD, NEAR PETERSBURG,
April 2, 1865.–4.40 P.M.

COLONEL T. S. BOWERS,
City Point.

We are now up and have a continuous line of troops, and in a few
hours will be intrenched from the Appomattox below Petersburg to
the river above. Heth’s and Wilcox’s divisions, such part of
them as were not captured, were cut off from town, either
designedly on their part or because they could not help it.
Sheridan with the cavalry and 5th corps is above them. Miles’s
division, 2d corps, was sent from the White Oak Road to
Sutherland Station on the South Side Railroad, where he met
them, and at last accounts was engaged with them. Not knowing
whether Sheridan would get up in time, General Humphreys was
sent with another division from here. The whole captures since
the army started out gunning will amount to not less than twelve
thousand men, and probably fifty pieces of artillery. I do not
know the number of men and guns accurately however. * * * I
think the President might come out and pay us a visit tomorrow.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

During the night of April 2d our line was intrenched from the
river above to the river below. I ordered a bombardment to be
commenced the next morning at five A.M., to be followed by an
assault at six o’clock; but the enemy evacuated Petersburg early
in the morning.

CHAPTER LXV.

THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG–MEETING PRESIDENT LINCOLN IN
PETERSBURG–THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND–PURSUING THE ENEMY– VISIT
TO SHERIDAN AND MEADE.

General Meade and I entered Petersburg on the morning of the 3d
and took a position under cover of a house which protected us
from the enemies musketry which was flying thick and fast
there. As we would occasionally look around the corner we could
see the streets and the Appomattox bottom, presumably near the
bridge, packed with the Confederate army. I did not have
artillery brought up, because I was sure Lee was trying to make
his escape, and I wanted to push immediately in pursuit. At all
events I had not the heart to turn the artillery upon such a mass
of defeated and fleeing men, and I hoped to capture them soon.

Soon after the enemy had entirely evacuated Petersburg, a man
came in who represented himself to be an engineer of the Army of
Northern Virginia. He said that Lee had for some time been at
work preparing a strong enclosed intrenchment, into which he
would throw himself when forced out of Petersburg, and fight his
final battle there; that he was actually at that time drawing his
troops from Richmond, and falling back into this prepared work.
This statement was made to General Meade and myself when we were
together. I had already given orders for the movement up the
south side of the Appomattox for the purpose of heading off Lee;
but Meade was so much impressed by this man’s story that he
thought we ought to cross the Appomattox there at once and move
against Lee in his new position. I knew that Lee was no fool,
as he would have been to have put himself and his army between
two formidable streams like the James and Appomattox rivers, and
between two such armies as those of the Potomac and the James.
Then these streams coming together as they did to the east of
him, it would be only necessary to close up in the west to have
him thoroughly cut off from all supplies or possibility of
reinforcement. It would only have been a question of days, and
not many of them, if he had taken the position assigned to him
by the so-called engineer, when he would have been obliged to
surrender his army. Such is one of the ruses resorted to in war
to deceive your antagonist. My judgment was that Lee would
necessarily have to evacuate Richmond, and that the only course
for him to pursue would be to follow the Danville Road.
Accordingly my object was to secure a point on that road south
of Lee, and I told Meade this. He suggested that if Lee was
going that way we would follow him. My reply was that we did
not want to follow him; we wanted to get ahead of him and cut
him off, and if he would only stay in the position he (Meade)
believed him to be in at that time, I wanted nothing better;
that when we got in possession of the Danville Railroad, at its
crossing of the Appomattox River, if we still found him between
the two rivers, all we had to do was to move eastward and close
him up. That we would then have all the advantage we could
possibly have by moving directly against him from Petersburg,
even if he remained in the position assigned him by the engineer
officer.

I had held most of the command aloof from the intrenchments, so
as to start them out on the Danville Road early in the morning,
supposing that Lee would be gone during the night. During the
night I strengthened Sheridan by sending him Humphreys’s corps.

Lee, as we now know, had advised the authorities at Richmond,
during the day, of the condition of affairs, and told them it
would be impossible for him to hold out longer than night, if he
could hold out that long. Davis was at church when he received
Lee’s dispatch. The congregation was dismissed with the notice
that there would be no evening service. The rebel government
left Richmond about two o’clock in the afternoon of the 2d.

At night Lee ordered his troops to assemble at Amelia Court
House, his object being to get away, join Johnston if possible,
and to try to crush Sherman before I could get there. As soon
as I was sure of this I notified Sheridan and directed him to
move out on the Danville Railroad to the south side of the
Appomattox River as speedily as possible. He replied that he
already had some of his command nine miles out. I then ordered
the rest of the Army of the Potomac under Meade to follow the
same road in the morning. Parke’s corps followed by the same
road, and the Army of the James was directed to follow the road
which ran alongside of the South Side Railroad to Burke’s
Station, and to repair the railroad and telegraph as they
proceeded. That road was a 5 feet gauge, while our rolling
stock was all of the 4 feet 8 1/2 inches gauge; consequently the
rail on one side of the track had to be taken up throughout the
whole length and relaid so as to conform to the gauge of our
cars and locomotives.

Mr. Lincoln was at City Point at the time, and had been for some
days. I would have let him know what I contemplated doing, only
while I felt a strong conviction that the move was going to be
successful, yet it might not prove so; and then I would have
only added another to the many disappointments he had been
suffering for the past three years. But when we started out he
saw that we were moving for a purpose, and bidding us Godspeed,
remained there to hear the result.

The next morning after the capture of Petersburg, I telegraphed
Mr. Lincoln asking him to ride out there and see me, while I
would await his arrival. I had started all the troops out early
in the morning, so that after the National army left Petersburg
there was not a soul to be seen, not even an animal in the
streets. There was absolutely no one there, except my staff
officers and, possibly, a small escort of cavalry. We had
selected the piazza of a deserted house, and occupied it until
the President arrived.

About the first thing that Mr. Lincoln said to me, after warm
congratulations for the victory, and thanks both to myself and
to the army which had accomplished it, was: “Do you know,
general, that I have had a sort of a sneaking idea for some days
that you intended to do something like this.” Our movements
having been successful up to this point, I no longer had any
object in concealing from the President all my movements, and
the objects I had in view. He remained for some days near City
Point, and I communicated with him frequently and fully by
telegraph.

Mr. Lincoln knew that it had been arranged for Sherman to join
me at a fixed time, to co-operate in the destruction of Lee’s
army. I told him that I had been very anxious to have the
Eastern armies vanquish their old enemy who had so long resisted
all their repeated and gallant attempts to subdue them or drive
them from their capital. The Western armies had been in the
main successful until they had conquered all the territory from
the Mississippi River to the State of North Carolina, and were
now almost ready to knock at the back door of Richmond, asking
admittance. I said to him that if the Western armies should be
even upon the field, operating against Richmond and Lee, the
credit would be given to them for the capture, by politicians
and non-combatants from the section of country which those
troops hailed from. It might lead to disagreeable bickerings
between members of Congress of the East and those of the West in
some of their debates. Western members might be throwing it up
to the members of the East that in the suppression of the
rebellion they were not able to capture an army, or to
accomplish much in the way of contributing toward that end, but
had to wait until the Western armies had conquered all the
territory south and west of them, and then come on to help them
capture the only army they had been engaged with.

Mr. Lincoln said he saw that now, but had never thought of it
before, because his anxiety was so great that he did not care
where the aid came from so the work was done.

The Army of the Potomac has every reason to be proud of its four
years’ record in the suppression of the rebellion. The army it
had to fight was the protection to the capital of a people which
was attempting to found a nation upon the territory of the United
States. Its loss would be the loss of the cause. Every energy,
therefore, was put forth by the Confederacy to protect and
maintain their capital. Everything else would go if it went.
Lee’s army had to be strengthened to enable it to maintain its
position, no matter what territory was wrested from the South in
another quarter.

I never expected any such bickering as I have indicated, between
the soldiers of the two sections; and, fortunately, there has
been none between the politicians. Possibly I am the only one
who thought of the liability of such a state of things in
advance.

When our conversation was at an end Mr. Lincoln mounted his
horse and started on his return to City Point, while I and my
staff started to join the army, now a good many miles in
advance. Up to this time I had not received the report of the
capture of Richmond.

Soon after I left President Lincoln I received a dispatch from
General Weitzel which notified me that he had taken possession
of Richmond at about 8.15 o’clock in the morning of that day,
the 3d, and that he had found the city on fire in two places.
The city was in the most utter confusion. The authorities had
taken the precaution to empty all the liquor into the gutter,
and to throw out the provisions which the Confederate government
had left, for the people to gather up. The city had been
deserted by the authorities, civil and military, without any
notice whatever that they were about to leave. In fact, up to
the very hour of the evacuation the people had been led to
believe that Lee had gained an important victory somewhere
around Petersburg.

Weitzel’s command found evidence of great demoralization in
Lee’s army, there being still a great many men and even officers
in the town. The city was on fire. Our troops were directed to
extinguish the flames, which they finally succeeded in doing.
The fire had been started by some one connected with the
retreating army. All authorities deny that it was authorized,
and I presume it was the work of excited men who were leaving
what they regarded as their capital and may have felt that it
was better to destroy it than have it fall into the hands of
their enemy. Be that as it may, the National troops found the
city in flames, and used every effort to extinguish them.

The troops that had formed Lee’s right, a great many of them,
were cut off from getting back into Petersburg, and were pursued
by our cavalry so hotly and closely that they threw away
caissons, ammunition, clothing, and almost everything to lighten
their loads, and pushed along up the Appomattox River until
finally they took water and crossed over.

I left Mr. Lincoln and started, as I have already said, to join
the command, which halted at Sutherland Station, about nine
miles out. We had still time to march as much farther, and time
was an object; but the roads were bad and the trains belonging to
the advance corps had blocked up the road so that it was
impossible to get on. Then, again, our cavalry had struck some
of the enemy and were pursuing them; and the orders were that
the roads should be given up to the cavalry whenever they
appeared. This caused further delay.

General Wright, who was in command of one of the corps which
were left back, thought to gain time by letting his men go into
bivouac and trying to get up some rations for them, and clearing
out the road, so that when they did start they would be
uninterrupted. Humphreys, who was far ahead, was also out of
rations. They did not succeed in getting them up through the
night; but the Army of the Potomac, officers and men, were so
elated by the reflection that at last they were following up a
victory to its end, that they preferred marching without rations
to running a possible risk of letting the enemy elude them. So
the march was resumed at three o’clock in the morning.

Merritt’s cavalry had struck the enemy at Deep Creek, and driven
them north to the Appomattox, where, I presume, most of them were
forced to cross.

On the morning of the 4th I learned that Lee had ordered rations
up from Danville for his famishing army, and that they were to
meet him at Farmville. This showed that Lee had already
abandoned the idea of following the railroad down to Danville,
but had determined to go farther west, by the way of
Farmville. I notified Sheridan of this and directed him to get
possession of the road before the supplies could reach Lee. He
responded that he had already sent Crook’s division to get upon
the road between Burkesville and Jetersville, then to face north
and march along the road upon the latter place; and he thought
Crook must be there now. The bulk of the army moved directly
for Jetersville by two roads.

After I had received the dispatch from Sheridan saying that
Crook was on the Danville Road, I immediately ordered Meade to
make a forced march with the Army of the Potomac, and to send
Parke’s corps across from the road they were on to the South
Side Railroad, to fall in the rear of the Army of the James and
to protect the railroad which that army was repairing as it went
along.

Our troops took possession of Jetersville and in the telegraph
office, they found a dispatch from Lee, ordering two hundred
thousand rations from Danville. The dispatch had not been sent,
but Sheridan sent a special messenger with it to Burkesville and
had it forwarded from there. In the meantime, however,
dispatches from other sources had reached Danville, and they
knew there that our army was on the line of the road; so that
they sent no further supplies from that quarter.

At this time Merritt and Mackenzie, with the cavalry, were off
between the road which the Army of the Potomac was marching on
and the Appomattox River, and were attacking the enemy in
flank. They picked up a great many prisoners and forced the
abandonment of some property.

Lee intrenched himself at Amelia Court House, and also his
advance north of Jetersville, and sent his troops out to collect
forage. The country was very poor and afforded but very
little. His foragers scattered a great deal; many of them were
picked up by our men, and many others never returned to the Army
of Northern Virginia.

Griffin’s corps was intrenched across the railroad south of
Jetersville, and Sheridan notified me of the situation. I again
ordered Meade up with all dispatch, Sheridan having but the one
corps of infantry with a little cavalry confronting Lee’s entire
army. Meade, always prompt in obeying orders, now pushed forward
with great energy, although he was himself sick and hardly able
to be out of bed. Humphreys moved at two, and Wright at three
o’clock in the morning, without rations, as I have said, the
wagons being far in the rear.

I stayed that night at Wilson’s Station on the South Side
Railroad. On the morning of the 5th I sent word to Sheridan of
the progress Meade was making, and suggested that he might now
attack Lee. We had now no other objective than the Confederate
armies, and I was anxious to close the thing up at once.

On the 5th I marched again with Ord’s command until within about
ten miles of Burkesville, where I stopped to let his army pass. I
then received from Sheridan the following dispatch:

“The whole of Lee’s army is at or near Amelia Court House, and
on this side of it. General Davies, whom I sent out to
Painesville on their right flank, has just captured six pieces
of artillery and some wagons. We can capture the Army of
Northern Virginia if force enough can be thrown to this point,
and then advance upon it. My cavalry was at Burkesville
yesterday, and six miles beyond, on the Danville Road, last
night. General Lee is at Amelia Court House in person. They
are out of rations, or nearly so. They were advancing up the
railroad towards Burkesville yesterday, when we intercepted them
at this point.”

It now became a life and death struggle with Lee to get south to
his provisions.

Sheridan, thinking the enemy might turn off immediately towards
Farmville, moved Davies’s brigade of cavalry out to watch him.
Davies found the movement had already commenced. He attacked
and drove away their cavalry which was escorting wagons to the
west, capturing and burning 180 wagons. He also captured five
pieces of artillery. The Confederate infantry then moved
against him and probably would have handled him very roughly,
but Sheridan had sent two more brigades of cavalry to follow
Davies, and they came to his relief in time. A sharp engagement
took place between these three brigades of cavalry and the
enemy’s infantry, but the latter was repulsed.

Meade himself reached Jetersville about two o’clock in the
afternoon, but in advance of all his troops. The head of
Humphreys’s corps followed in about an hour afterwards. Sheridan
stationed the troops as they came up, at Meade’s request, the
latter still being very sick. He extended two divisions of this
corps off to the west of the road to the left of Griffin’s corps,
and one division to the right. The cavalry by this time had also
come up, and they were put still farther off to the left,
Sheridan feeling certain that there lay the route by which the
enemy intended to escape. He wanted to attack, feeling that if
time was given, the enemy would get away; but Meade prevented
this, preferring to wait till his troops were all up.

At this juncture Sheridan sent me a letter which had been handed
to him by a colored man, with a note from himself saying that he
wished I was there myself. The letter was dated Amelia Court
House, April 5th, and signed by Colonel Taylor. It was to his
mother, and showed the demoralization of the Confederate army.
Sheridan’s note also gave me the information as here related of
the movements of that day. I received a second message from
Sheridan on the 5th, in which he urged more emphatically the
importance of my presence. This was brought to me by a scout in
gray uniform. It was written on tissue paper, and wrapped up in
tin-foil such as chewing tobacco is folded in. This was a
precaution taken so that if the scout should be captured he
could take this tin-foil out of his pocket and putting it into
his mouth, chew it. It would cause no surprise at all to see a
Confederate soldier chewing tobacco. It was nearly night when
this letter was received. I gave Ord directions to continue his
march to Burkesville and there intrench himself for the night,
and in the morning to move west to cut off all the roads between
there and Farmville.

I then started with a few of my staff and a very small escort of
cavalry, going directly through the woods, to join Meade’s
army. The distance was about sixteen miles; but the night being
dark our progress was slow through the woods in the absence of
direct roads. However, we got to the outposts about ten o’clock
in the evening, and after some little parley convinced the
sentinels of our identity and were conducted in to where
Sheridan was bivouacked. We talked over the situation for some
little time, Sheridan explaining to me what he thought Lee was
trying to do, and that Meade’s orders, if carried out, moving to
the right flank, would give him the coveted opportunity of
escaping us and putting us in rear of him.

We then together visited Meade, reaching his headquarters about
midnight. I explained to Meade that we did not want to follow
the enemy; we wanted to get ahead of him, and that his orders
would allow the enemy to escape, and besides that, I had no
doubt that Lee was moving right then. Meade changed his orders
at once. They were now given for an advance on Amelia Court
House, at an early hour in the morning, as the army then lay;
that is, the infantry being across the railroad, most of it to
the west of the road, with the cavalry swung out still farther
to the left.

CHAPTER LXVI.

BATTLE OF SAILOR’S CREEK–ENGAGEMENT AT FARMVILLE
–CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL LEE–SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY.

The Appomattox, going westward, takes a long sweep to the
south-west from the neighborhood of the Richmond and Danville
Railroad bridge, and then trends north-westerly. Sailor’s
Creek, an insignificant stream, running northward, empties into
the Appomattox between the High Bridge and Jetersville. Near
the High Bridge the stage road from Petersburg to Lynchburg
crosses the Appomattox River, also on a bridge. The railroad
runs on the north side of the river to Farmville, a few miles
west, and from there, recrossing, continues on the south side of
it. The roads coming up from the south-east to Farmville cross
the Appomattox River there on a bridge and run on the north
side, leaving the Lynchburg and Petersburg Railroad well to the
left.

Lee, in pushing out from Amelia Court House, availed himself of
all the roads between the Danville Road and Appomattox River to
move upon, and never permitted the head of his columns to stop
because of any fighting that might be going on in his rear. In
this way he came very near succeeding in getting to his
provision trains and eluding us with at least part of his army.

As expected, Lee’s troops had moved during the night before, and
our army in moving upon Amelia Court House soon encountered
them. There was a good deal of fighting before Sailor’s Creek
was reached. Our cavalry charged in upon a body of theirs which
was escorting a wagon train in order to get it past our left. A
severe engagement ensued, in which we captured many prisoners,
and many men also were killed and wounded. There was as much
gallantry displayed by some of the Confederates in these little
engagements as was displayed at any time during the war,
notwithstanding the sad defeats of the past week.

The armies finally met on Sailor’s Creek, when a heavy
engagement took place, in which infantry, artillery and cavalry
were all brought into action. Our men on the right, as they
were brought in against the enemy, came in on higher ground, and
upon his flank, giving us every advantage to be derived from the
lay of the country. Our firing was also very much more rapid,
because the enemy commenced his retreat westward and in firing
as he retreated had to turn around every time he fired. The
enemy’s loss was very heavy, as well in killed and wounded as in
captures. Some six general officers fell into our hands in this
engagement, and seven thousand men were made prisoners. This
engagement was commenced in the middle of the afternoon of the
6th, and the retreat and pursuit were continued until nightfall,
when the armies bivouacked upon the ground where the night had
overtaken them.

When the move towards Amelia Court House had commenced that
morning, I ordered Wright’s corps, which was on the extreme
right, to be moved to the left past the whole army, to take the
place of Griffin’s, and ordered the latter at the same time to
move by and place itself on the right. The object of this
movement was to get the 6th corps, Wright’s, next to the
cavalry, with which they had formerly served so harmoniously and
so efficiently in the valley of Virginia.

The 6th corps now remained with the cavalry and under Sheridan’s
direct command until after the surrender.

Ord had been directed to take possession of all the roads
southward between Burkesville and the High Bridge. On the
morning of the 6th he sent Colonel Washburn with two infantry
regiments with instructions to destroy High Bridge and to return
rapidly to Burkesville Station; and he prepared himself to resist
the enemy there. Soon after Washburn had started Ord became a
little alarmed as to his safety and sent Colonel Read, of his
staff, with about eighty cavalrymen, to overtake him and bring
him back. Very shortly after this he heard that the head of
Lee’s column had got up to the road between him and where
Washburn now was, and attempted to send reinforcements, but the
reinforcements could not get through. Read, however, had got
through ahead of the enemy. He rode on to Farmville and was on
his way back again when he found his return cut off, and
Washburn confronting apparently the advance of Lee’s army. Read
drew his men up into line of battle, his force now consisting of
less than six hundred men, infantry and cavalry, and rode along
their front, making a speech to his men to inspire them with the
same enthusiasm that he himself felt. He then gave the order to
charge. This little band made several charges, of course
unsuccessful ones, but inflicted a loss upon the enemy more than
equal to their own entire number. Colonel Read fell mortally
wounded, and then Washburn; and at the close of the conflict
nearly every officer of the command and most of the rank and
file had been either killed or wounded. The remainder then
surrendered. The Confederates took this to be only the advance
of a larger column which had headed them off, and so stopped to
intrench; so that this gallant band of six hundred had checked
the progress of a strong detachment of the Confederate army.

This stoppage of Lee’s column no doubt saved to us the trains
following. Lee himself pushed on and crossed the wagon road
bridge near the High Bridge, and attempted to destroy it. He
did set fire to it, but the flames had made but little headway
when Humphreys came up with his corps and drove away the
rear-guard which had been left to protect it while it was being
burned up. Humphreys forced his way across with some loss, and
followed Lee to the intersection of the road crossing at
Farmville with the one from Petersburg. Here Lee held a
position which was very strong, naturally, besides being
intrenched. Humphreys was alone, confronting him all through
the day, and in a very hazardous position. He put on a bold
face, however, and assaulted with some loss, but was not
assaulted in return.

Our cavalry had gone farther south by the way of Prince Edward’s
Court House, along with the 5th corps (Griffin’s), Ord falling in
between Griffin and the Appomattox. Crook’s division of cavalry
and Wright’s corps pushed on west of Farmville. When the
cavalry reached Farmville they found that some of the
Confederates were in ahead of them, and had already got their
trains of provisions back to that point; but our troops were in
time to prevent them from securing anything to eat, although
they succeeded in again running the trains off, so that we did
not get them for some time. These troops retreated to the north
side of the Appomattox to join Lee, and succeeded in destroying
the bridge after them. Considerable fighting ensued there
between Wright’s corps and a portion of our cavalry and the
Confederates, but finally the cavalry forded the stream and
drove them away. Wright built a foot-bridge for his men to
march over on and then marched out to the junction of the roads
to relieve Humphreys, arriving there that night. I had stopped
the night before at Burkesville Junction. Our troops were then
pretty much all out of the place, but we had a field hospital
there, and Ord’s command was extended from that point towards
Farmville.

Here I met Dr. Smith, a Virginian and an officer of the regular
army, who told me that in a conversation with General Ewell, one
of the prisoners and a relative of his, Ewell had said that when
we had got across the James River he knew their cause was lost,
and it was the duty of their authorities to make the best terms
they could while they still had a right to claim concessions.
The authorities thought differently, however. Now the cause was
lost and they had no right to claim anything. He said further,
that for every man that was killed after this in the war
somebody is responsible, and it would be but very little better
than murder. He was not sure that Lee would consent to
surrender his army without being able to consult with the
President, but he hoped he would.

I rode in to Farmville on the 7th, arriving there early in the
day. Sheridan and Ord were pushing through, away to the
south. Meade was back towards the High Bridge, and Humphreys
confronting Lee as before stated. After having gone into
bivouac at Prince Edward’s Court House, Sheridan learned that
seven trains of provisions and forage were at Appomattox, and
determined to start at once and capture them; and a forced march
was necessary in order to get there before Lee’s army could
secure them. He wrote me a note telling me this. This fact,
together with the incident related the night before by Dr.
Smith, gave me the idea of opening correspondence with General
Lee on the subject of the surrender of his army. I therefore
wrote to him on this day, as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S.,
5 P.M., April 7, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE
Commanding C. S. A.

The result of the last week must convince you of the
hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of
Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and
regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of
any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of
that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of
Northern Virginia.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

Lee replied on the evening of the same day as follows:

April 7, 1865.

GENERAL: I have received your note of this day. Though not
entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of
further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia,
I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and
therefore before considering your proposition, ask the terms you
will offer on condition of its surrender.

R. E. LEE,
General.

LIEUT.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT,
Commanding Armies of the U. S.

This was not satisfactory, but I regarded it as deserving
another letter and wrote him as follows:

April 8, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE,
Commanding C. S. A.

Your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date, asking
the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army
of Northern Virginia is just received. In reply I would say
that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I
would insist upon, namely: that the men and officers
surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again
against the Government of the United States until properly
exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet
any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point
agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the
terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia
will be received.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

Lee’s army was rapidly crumbling. Many of his soldiers had
enlisted from that part of the State where they now were, and
were continually dropping out of the ranks and going to their
homes. I know that I occupied a hotel almost destitute of
furniture at Farmville, which had probably been used as a
Confederate hospital. The next morning when I came out I found
a Confederate colonel there, who reported to me and said that he
was the proprietor of that house, and that he was a colonel of a
regiment that had been raised in that neighborhood. He said
that when he came along past home, he found that he was the only
man of the regiment remaining with Lee’s army, so he just dropped
out, and now wanted to surrender himself. I told him to stay
there and he would not be molested. That was one regiment which
had been eliminated from Lee’s force by this crumbling process.

Although Sheridan had been marching all day, his troops moved
with alacrity and without any straggling. They began to see the
end of what they had been fighting four years for. Nothing
seemed to fatigue them. They were ready to move without rations
and travel without rest until the end. Straggling had entirely
ceased, and every man was now a rival for the front. The
infantry marched about as rapidly as the cavalry could.

Sheridan sent Custer with his division to move south of
Appomattox Station, which is about five miles south-west of the
Court House, to get west of the trains and destroy the roads to
the rear. They got there the night of the 8th, and succeeded
partially; but some of the train men had just discovered the
movement of our troops and succeeded in running off three of the
trains. The other four were held by Custer.

The head of Lee’s column came marching up there on the morning
of the 9th, not dreaming, I suppose, that there were any Union
soldiers near. The Confederates were surprised to find our
cavalry had possession of the trains. However, they were
desperate and at once assaulted, hoping to recover them. In the
melee that ensued they succeeded in burning one of the trains,
but not in getting anything from it. Custer then ordered the
other trains run back on the road towards Farmville, and the
fight continued.

So far, only our cavalry and the advance of Lee’s army were
engaged. Soon, however, Lee’s men were brought up from the
rear, no doubt expecting they had nothing to meet but our
cavalry. But our infantry had pushed forward so rapidly that by
the time the enemy got up they found Griffin’s corps and the Army
of the James confronting them. A sharp engagement ensued, but
Lee quickly set up a white flag.

CHAPTER LXVII.

NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX–INTERVIEW WITH LEE AT MCLEAN’S
HOUSE–THE TERMS OF SURRENDER–LEE’S SURRENDER–INTERVIEW WITH
LEE AFTER THE SURRENDER.

On the 8th I had followed the Army of the Potomac in rear of
Lee. I was suffering very severely with a sick headache, and
stopped at a farmhouse on the road some distance in rear of the
main body of the army. I spent the night in bathing my feet in
hot water and mustard, and putting mustard plasters on my wrists
and the back part of my neck, hoping to be cured by morning.
During the night I received Lee’s answer to my letter of the
8th, inviting an interview between the lines on the following
morning. (*43) But it was for a different purpose from that of
surrendering his army, and I answered him as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S.,
April 9, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE,
Commanding C. S. A.

Your note of yesterday is received. As I have no authority to
treat on the subject of peace, the meeting proposed for ten A.M.
to-day could lead to no good. I will state, however, General,
that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole
North entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace
can be had are well understood. By the South laying down their
arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands
of human lives and hundreds of millions of property not yet
destroyed. Sincerely hoping that all our difficulties may be
settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself,
etc.,

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

I proceeded at an early hour in the morning, still suffering
with the headache, to get to the head of the column. I was not
more than two or three miles from Appomattox Court House at the
time, but to go direct I would have to pass through Lee’s army,
or a portion of it. I had therefore to move south in order to
get upon a road coming up from another direction.

When the white flag was put out by Lee, as already described, I
was in this way moving towards Appomattox Court House, and
consequently could not be communicated with immediately, and be
informed of what Lee had done. Lee, therefore, sent a flag to
the rear to advise Meade and one to the front to Sheridan,
saying that he had sent a message to me for the purpose of
having a meeting to consult about the surrender of his army, and
asked for a suspension of hostilities until I could be
communicated with. As they had heard nothing of this until the
fighting had got to be severe and all going against Lee, both of
these commanders hesitated very considerably about suspending
hostilities at all. They were afraid it was not in good faith,
and we had the Army of Northern Virginia where it could not
escape except by some deception. They, however, finally
consented to a suspension of hostilities for two hours to give
an opportunity of communicating with me in that time, if
possible. It was found that, from the route I had taken, they
would probably not be able to communicate with me and get an
answer back within the time fixed unless the messenger should
pass through the rebel lines.

Lee, therefore, sent an escort with the officer bearing this
message through his lines to me.

April 9, 1865.

GENERAL: I received your note of this morning on the
picket-line whither I had come to meet you and ascertain
definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of
yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. I now
request an interview in accordance with the offer contained in
your letter of yesterday for that purpose.

R. E. LEE, General.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT
Commanding U. S. Armies.

When the officer reached me I was still suffering with the sick
headache, but the instant I saw the contents of the note I was
cured. I wrote the following note in reply and hastened on:

April 9, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE,
Commanding C. S. Armies.

Your note of this date is but this moment (11.50 A.M.) received,
in consequence of my having passed from the Richmond and
Lynchburg road to the Farmville and Lynchburg road. I am at
this writing about four miles west of Walker’s Church and will
push forward to the front for the purpose of meeting you. Notice
sent to me on this road where you wish the interview to take
place will meet me.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

I was conducted at once to where Sheridan was located with his
troops drawn up in line of battle facing the Confederate army
near by. They were very much excited, and expressed their view
that this was all a ruse employed to enable the Confederates to
get away. They said they believed that Johnston was marching up
from North Carolina now, and Lee was moving to join him; and they
would whip the rebels where they now were in five minutes if I
would only let them go in. But I had no doubt about the good
faith of Lee, and pretty soon was conducted to where he was. I
found him at the house of a Mr. McLean, at Appomattox Court
House, with Colonel Marshall, one of his staff officers,
awaiting my arrival. The head of his column was occupying a
hill, on a portion of which was an apple orchard, beyond a
little valley which separated it from that on the crest of which
Sheridan’s forces were drawn up in line of battle to the south.

Before stating what took place between General Lee and myself, I
will give all there is of the story of the famous apple tree.

Wars produce many stories of fiction, some of which are told
until they are believed to be true. The war of the rebellion
was no exception to this rule, and the story of the apple tree
is one of those fictions based on a slight foundation of fact.
As I have said, there was an apple orchard on the side of the
hill occupied by the Confederate forces. Running diagonally up
the hill was a wagon road, which, at one point, ran very near
one of the trees, so that the wheels of vehicles had, on that
side, cut off the roots of this tree, leaving a little
embankment. General Babcock, of my staff, reported to me that
when he first met General Lee he was sitting upon this
embankment with his feet in the road below and his back resting
against the tree. The story had no other foundation than
that. Like many other stories, it would be very good if it was
only true.

I had known General Lee in the old army, and had served with him
in the Mexican War; but did not suppose, owing to the difference
in our age and rank, that he would remember me, while I would
more naturally remember him distinctly, because he was the chief
of staff of General Scott in the Mexican War.

When I had left camp that morning I had not expected so soon the
result that was then taking place, and consequently was in rough
garb. I was without a sword, as I usually was when on horseback
on the field, and wore a soldier’s blouse for a coat, with the
shoulder straps of my rank to indicate to the army who I was.
When I went into the house I found General Lee. We greeted each
other, and after shaking hands took our seats. I had my staff
with me, a good portion of whom were in the room during the
whole of the interview.

What General Lee’s feelings were I do not know. As he was a man
of much dignity, with an impassible face, it was impossible to
say whether he felt inwardly glad that the end had finally come,
or felt sad over the result, and was too manly to show it.
Whatever his feelings, they were entirely concealed from my
observation; but my own feelings, which had been quite jubilant
on the receipt of his letter, were sad and depressed. I felt
like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who
had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much for a
cause, though that cause was, I believe, one of the worst for
which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the
least excuse. I do not question, however, the sincerity of the
great mass of those who were opposed to us.

General Lee was dressed in a full uniform which was entirely
new, and was wearing a sword of considerable value, very likely
the sword which had been presented by the State of Virginia; at
all events, it was an entirely different sword from the one that
would ordinarily be worn in the field. In my rough traveling
suit, the uniform of a private with the straps of a
lieutenant-general, I must have contrasted very strangely with a
man so handsomely dressed, six feet high and of faultless form.
But this was not a matter that I thought of until afterwards.

We soon fell into a conversation about old army times. He
remarked that he remembered me very well in the old army; and I
told him that as a matter of course I remembered him perfectly,
but from the difference in our rank and years (there being about
sixteen years’ difference in our ages), I had thought it very
likely that I had not attracted his attention sufficiently to be
remembered by him after such a long interval. Our conversation
grew so pleasant that I almost forgot the object of our
meeting. After the conversation had run on in this style for
some time, General Lee called my attention to the object of our
meeting, and said that he had asked for this interview for the
purpose of getting from me the terms I proposed to give his
army. I said that I meant merely that his army should lay down
their arms, not to take them up again during the continuance of
the war unless duly and properly exchanged. He said that he had
so understood my letter.

Then we gradually fell off again into conversation about matters
foreign to the subject which had brought us together. This
continued for some little time, when General Lee again
interrupted the course of the conversation by suggesting that
the terms I proposed to give his army ought to be written out. I
called to General Parker, secretary on my staff, for writing
materials, and commenced writing out the following terms:

APPOMATTOX C. H., VA.,

Ap 19th, 1865.

GEN. R. E. LEE,
Comd’g C. S. A.

GEN: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of
the 8th inst., I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of
N. Va. on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers
and men to be made in duplicate. One copy to be given to an
officer designated by me, the other to be retained by such
officer or officers as you may designate. The officers to give
their individual paroles not to take up arms against the
Government of the United States until properly exchanged, and
each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the
men of their commands. The arms, artillery and public property
to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officer
appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the
side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or
baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to
return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United States
authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in
force where they may reside.

Very respectfully,
U. S. GRANT,
Lt. Gen.

When I put my pen to the paper I did not know the first word
that I should make use of in writing the terms. I only knew
what was in my mind, and I wished to express it clearly, so that
there could be no mistaking it. As I wrote on, the thought
occurred to me that the officers had their own private horses
and effects, which were important to them, but of no value to
us; also that it would be an unnecessary humiliation to call
upon them to deliver their side arms.

No conversation, not one word, passed between General Lee and
myself, either about private property, side arms, or kindred
subjects. He appeared to have no objections to the terms first
proposed; or if he had a point to make against them he wished to
wait until they were in writing to make it. When he read over
that part of the terms about side arms, horses and private
property of the officers, he remarked, with some feeling, I
thought, that this would have a happy effect upon his army.

Then, after a little further conversation, General Lee remarked
to me again that their army was organized a little differently
from the army of the United States (still maintaining by
implication that we were two countries); that in their army the
cavalrymen and artillerists owned their own horses; and he asked
if he was to understand that the men who so owned their horses
were to be permitted to retain them. I told him that as the
terms were written they would not; that only the officers were
permitted to take their private property. He then, after
reading over the terms a second time, remarked that that was
clear.

I then said to him that I thought this would be about the last
battle of the war–I sincerely hoped so; and I said further I
took it that most of the men in the ranks were small farmers.
The whole country had been so raided by the two armies that it
was doubtful whether they would be able to put in a crop to
carry themselves and their families through the next winter
without the aid of the horses they were then riding. The United
States did not want them and I would, therefore, instruct the
officers I left behind to receive the paroles of his troops to
let every man of the Confederate army who claimed to own a horse
or mule take the animal to his home. Lee remarked again that
this would have a happy effect.

He then sat down and wrote out the following letter:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
April 9, 1865.

GENERAL:–I received your letter of this date containing the
terms of the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as
proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those
expressed in your letter of the 8th inst., they are accepted. I
will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the
stipulations into effect.

R. E. LEE, General.
LIEUT.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.

While duplicates of the two letters were being made, the Union
generals present were severally present to General Lee.

The much talked of surrendering of Lee’s sword and my handing it
back, this and much more that has been said about it is the
purest romance. The word sword or side arms was not mentioned
by either of us until I wrote it in the terms. There was no
premeditation, and it did not occur to me until the moment I
wrote it down. If I had happened to omit it, and General Lee
had called my attention to it, I should have put it in the terms
precisely as I acceded to the provision about the soldiers
retaining their horses.

General Lee, after all was completed and before taking his
leave, remarked that his army was in a very bad condition for
want of food, and that they were without forage; that his men
had been living for some days on parched corn exclusively, and
that he would have to ask me for rations and forage. I told him
“certainly,” and asked for how many men he wanted rations. His
answer was “about twenty-five thousand;” and I authorized him to
send his own commissary and quartermaster to Appomattox Station,
two or three miles away, where he could have, out of the trains
we had stopped, all the provisions wanted. As for forage, we
had ourselves depended almost entirely upon the country for that.

Generals Gibbon, Griffin and Merritt were designated by me to
carry into effect the paroling of Lee’s troops before they
should start for their homes–General Lee leaving Generals
Longstreet, Gordon and Pendleton for them to confer with in
order to facilitate this work. Lee and I then separated as
cordially as we had met, he returning to his own lines, and all
went into bivouac for the night at Appomattox.

Soon after Lee’s departure I telegraphed to Washington as
follows:

HEADQUARTERS APPOMATTOX C. H., VA.,
April 9th, 1865, 4.30 P.M.

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War,
Washington.

General Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia this
afternoon on terms proposed by myself. The accompanying
additional correspondence will show the conditions fully.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

When news of the surrender first reached our lines our men
commenced firing a salute of a hundred guns in honor of the
victory. I at once sent word, however, to have it stopped. The
Confederates were now our prisoners, and we did not want to exult
over their downfall.

I determined to return to Washington at once, with a view to
putting a stop to the purchase of supplies, and what I now
deemed other useless outlay of money. Before leaving, however,
I thought I (*44) would like to see General Lee again; so next
morning I rode out beyond our lines towards his headquarters,
preceded by a bugler and a staff-officer carrying a white flag.

Lee soon mounted his horse, seeing who it was, and met me. We
had there between the lines, sitting on horseback, a very
pleasant conversation of over half an hour, in the course of
which Lee said to me that the South was a big country and that
we might have to march over it three or four times before the
war entirely ended, but that we would now be able to do it as
they could no longer resist us. He expressed it as his earnest
hope, however, that we would not be called upon to cause more
loss and sacrifice of life; but he could not foretell the
result. I then suggested to General Lee that there was not a
man in the Confederacy whose influence with the soldiery and the
whole people was as great as his, and that if he would now advise
the surrender of all the armies I had no doubt his advice would
be followed with alacrity. But Lee said, that he could not do
that without consulting the President first. I knew there was
no use to urge him to do anything against his ideas of what was
right.

I was accompanied by my staff and other officers, some of whom
seemed to have a great desire to go inside the Confederate
lines. They finally asked permission of Lee to do so for the
purpose of seeing some of their old army friends, and the
permission was granted. They went over, had a very pleasant
time with their old friends, and brought some of them back with
them when they returned.

When Lee and I separated he went back to his lines and I
returned to the house of Mr. McLean. Here the officers of both
armies came in great numbers, and seemed to enjoy the meeting as
much as though they had been friends separated for a long time
while fighting battles under the same flag. For the time being
it looked very much as if all thought of the war had escaped
their minds. After an hour pleasantly passed in this way I set
out on horseback, accompanied by my staff and a small escort,
for Burkesville Junction, up to which point the railroad had by
this time been repaired.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

MORALE OF THE TWO ARMIES–RELATIVE CONDITIONS OF THE NORTH AND
SOUTH–PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND–ARRIVAL AT
WASHINGTON–PRESIDENT LINCOLN’S ASSASSINATION–PRESIDENT
JOHNSON’S POLICY.

After the fall of Petersburg, and when the armies of the Potomac
and the James were in motion to head off Lee’s army, the morale
of the National troops had greatly improved. There was no more
straggling, no more rear guards. The men who in former times
had been falling back, were now, as I have already stated,
striving to get to the front. For the first time in four weary
years they felt that they were now nearing the time when they
could return to their homes with their country saved. On the
other hand, the Confederates were more than correspondingly
depressed. Their despondency increased with each returning day,
and especially after the battle of Sailor’s Creek. They threw
away their arms in constantly increasing numbers, dropping out
of the ranks and betaking themselves to the woods in the hope of
reaching their homes. I have already instanced the case of the
entire disintegration of a regiment whose colonel I met at
Farmville. As a result of these and other influences, when Lee
finally surrendered at Appomattox, there were only 28,356
officers and men left to be paroled, and many of these were
without arms. It was probably this latter fact which gave rise
to the statement sometimes made, North and South, that Lee
surrendered a smaller number of men than what the official
figures show. As a matter of official record, and in addition
to the number paroled as given above, we captured between March
29th and the date of surrender 19,132 Confederates, to say
nothing of Lee’s other losses, killed, wounded and missing,
during the series of desperate conflicts which marked his
headlong and determined flight. The same record shows the
number of cannon, including those at Appomattox, to have been
689 between the dates named.

There has always been a great conflict of opinion as to the
number of troops engaged in every battle, or all important
battles, fought between the sections, the South magnifying the
number of Union troops engaged and belittling their own.
Northern writers have fallen, in many instances, into the same
error. I have often heard gentlemen, who were thoroughly loyal
to the Union, speak of what a splendid fight the South had made
and successfully continued for four years before yielding, with
their twelve million of people against our twenty, and of the
twelve four being colored slaves, non-combatants. I will add to
their argument. We had many regiments of brave and loyal men who
volunteered under great difficulty from the twelve million
belonging to the South.

But the South had rebelled against the National government. It
was not bound by any constitutional restrictions. The whole
South was a military camp. The occupation of the colored people
was to furnish supplies for the army. Conscription was resorted
to early, and embraced every male from the age of eighteen to
forty-five, excluding only those physically unfit to serve in
the field, and the necessary number of civil officers of State
and intended National government. The old and physically
disabled furnished a good portion of these. The slaves, the
non-combatants, one-third of the whole, were required to work in
the field without regard to sex, and almost without regard to
age. Children from the age of eight years could and did handle
the hoe; they were not much older when they began to hold the
plough. The four million of colored non-combatants were equal
to more than three times their number in the North, age for age
and sex for sex, in supplying food from the soil to support
armies. Women did not work in the fields in the North, and
children attended school.

The arts of peace were carried on in the North. Towns and
cities grew during the war. Inventions were made in all kinds
of machinery to increase the products of a day’s labor in the
shop, and in the field. In the South no opposition was allowed
to the government which had been set up and which would have
become real and respected if the rebellion had been
successful. No rear had to be protected. All the troops in
service could be brought to the front to contest every inch of
ground threatened with invasion. The press of the South, like
the people who remained at home, were loyal to the Southern
cause.

In the North, the country, the towns and the cities presented
about the same appearance they do in time of peace. The furnace
was in blast, the shops were filled with workmen, the fields were
cultivated, not only to supply the population of the North and
the troops invading the South, but to ship abroad to pay a part
of the expense of the war. In the North the press was free up
to the point of open treason. The citizen could entertain his
views and express them. Troops were necessary in the Northern
States to prevent prisoners from the Southern army being
released by outside force, armed and set at large to destroy by
fire our Northern cities. Plans were formed by Northern and
Southern citizens to burn our cities, to poison the water
supplying them, to spread infection by importing clothing from
infected regions, to blow up our river and lake steamers
–regardless of the destruction of innocent lives. The
copperhead disreputable portion of the press magnified rebel
successes, and belittled those of the Union army. It was, with
a large following, an auxiliary to the Confederate army. The
North would have been much stronger with a hundred thousand of
these men in the Confederate ranks and the rest of their kind
thoroughly subdued, as the Union sentiment was in the South,
than we were as the battle was fought.

As I have said, the whole South was a military camp. The
colored people, four million in number, were submissive, and
worked in the field and took care of the families while the
able-bodied white men were at the front fighting for a cause
destined to defeat. The cause was popular, and was
enthusiastically supported by the young men. The conscription
took all of them. Before the war was over, further
conscriptions took those between fourteen and eighteen years of
age as junior reserves, and those between forty-five and sixty
as senior reserves. It would have been an offence, directly
after the war, and perhaps it would be now, to ask any
able-bodied man in the South, who was between the ages of
fourteen and sixty at any time during the war, whether he had
been in the Confederate army. He would assert that he had, or
account for his absence from the ranks. Under such
circumstances it is hard to conceive how the North showed such a
superiority of force in every battle fought. I know they did
not.

During 1862 and ‘3, John H. Morgan, a partisan officer, of no
military education, but possessed of courage and endurance,
operated in the rear of the Army of the Ohio in Kentucky and
Tennessee. He had no base of supplies to protect, but was at
home wherever he went. The army operating against the South, on
the contrary, had to protect its lines of communication with the
North, from which all supplies had to come to the front. Every
foot of road had to be guarded by troops stationed at convenient
distances apart. These guards could not render assistance beyond
the points where stationed. Morgan Was foot-loose and could
operate where, his information–always correct–led him to
believe he could do the greatest damage. During the time he was
operating in this way he killed, wounded and captured several
times the number he ever had under his command at any one
time. He destroyed many millions of property in addition.
Places he did not attack had to be guarded as if threatened by
him. Forrest, an abler soldier, operated farther west, and held
from the National front quite as many men as could be spared for
offensive operations. It is safe to say that more than half the
National army was engaged in guarding lines of supplies, or were
on leave, sick in hospital or on detail which prevented their
bearing arms. Then, again, large forces were employed where no
Confederate army confronted them. I deem it safe to say that
there were no large engagements where the National numbers
compensated for the advantage of position and intrenchment
occupied by the enemy.

While I was in pursuit of General Lee, the President went to
Richmond in company with Admiral Porter, and on board his
flagship. He found the people of that city in great
consternation. The leading citizens among the people who had
remained at home surrounded him, anxious that something should
be done to relieve them from suspense. General Weitzel was not
then in the city, having taken offices in one of the neighboring
villages after his troops had succeeded in subduing the
conflagration which they had found in progress on entering the
Confederate capital. The President sent for him, and, on his
arrival, a short interview was had on board the vessel, Admiral
Porter and a leading citizen of Virginia being also present.
After this interview the President wrote an order in about these
words, which I quote from memory: “General Weitzel is authorized
to permit the body calling itself the Legislature of Virginia to
meet for the purpose of recalling the Virginia troops from the
Confederate armies.”

Immediately some of the gentlemen composing that body wrote out
a call for a meeting and had it published in their papers. This
call, however, went very much further than Mr. Lincoln had
contemplated, as he did not say the “Legislature of Virginia”
but “the body which called itself the Legislature of Virginia.”
Mr. Stanton saw the call as published in the Northern papers the
very next issue and took the liberty of countermanding the order
authorizing any meeting of the Legislature, or any other body,
and this notwithstanding the fact that the President was nearer
the spot than he was.

This was characteristic of Mr. Stanton. He was a man who never
questioned his own authority, and who always did in war time
what he wanted to do. He was an able constitutional lawyer and
jurist; but the Constitution was not an impediment to him while
the war lasted. In this latter particular I entirely agree with
the view he evidently held. The Constitution was not framed with
a view to any such rebellion as that of 1861-5. While it did not
authorize rebellion it made no provision against it. Yet the
right to resist or suppress rebellion is as inherent as the
right of self-defence, and as natural as the right of an
individual to preserve his life when in jeopardy. The
Constitution was therefore in abeyance for the time being, so
far as it in any way affected the progress and termination of
the war.

Those in rebellion against the government of the United States
were not restricted by constitutional provisions, or any other,
except the acts of their Congress, which was loyal and devoted
to the cause for which the South was then fighting. It would be
a hard case when one-third of a nation, united in rebellion
against the national authority, is entirely untrammeled, that
the other two-thirds, in their efforts to maintain the Union
intact, should be restrained by a Constitution prepared by our
ancestors for the express purpose of insuring the permanency of
the confederation of the States.

After I left General Lee at Appomattox Station, I went with my
staff and a few others directly to Burkesville Station on my way
to Washington. The road from Burkesville back having been newly
repaired and the ground being soft, the train got off the track
frequently, and, as a result, it was after midnight of the
second day when I reached City Point. As soon as possible I
took a dispatch-boat thence to Washington City.

While in Washington I was very busy for a time in preparing the
necessary orders for the new state of affairs ; communicating
with my different commanders of separate departments, bodies of
troops, etc. But by the 14th I was pretty well through with
this work, so as to be able to visit my children, who were then
in Burlington, New Jersey, attending school. Mrs. Grant was
with me in Washington at the time, and we were invited by
President and Mrs. Lincoln to accompany them to the theatre on
the evening of that day. I replied to the President’s verbal
invitation to the effect, that if we were in the city we would
take great pleasure in accompanying them; but that I was very
anxious to get away and visit my children, and if I could get
through my work during the day I should do so. I did get
through and started by the evening train on the 14th, sending
Mr. Lincoln word, of course, that I would not be at the theatre.

At that time the railroad to New York entered Philadelphia on
Broad Street; passengers were conveyed in ambulances to the
Delaware River, and then ferried to Camden, at which point they
took the cars again. When I reached the ferry, on the east side
of the City of Philadelphia, I found people awaiting my arrival
there; and also dispatches informing me of the assassination of
the President and Mr. Seward, and of the probable assassination
of the Vice President, Mr. Johnson, and requesting my immediate
return.

It would be impossible for me to describe the feeling that
overcame me at the news of these assassinations, more especially
the assassination of the President. I knew his goodness of
heart, his generosity, his yielding disposition, his desire to
have everybody happy, and above all his desire to see all the
people of the United States enter again upon the full privileges
of citizenship with equality among all. I knew also the feeling
that Mr. Johnson had expressed in speeches and conversation
against the Southern people, and I feared that his course
towards them would be such as to repel, and make them unwilling
citizens; and if they became such they would remain so for a
long while. I felt that reconstruction had been set back, no
telling how far.

I immediately arranged for getting a train to take me back to
Washington City; but Mrs. Grant was with me; it was after
midnight and Burlington was but an hour away. Finding that I
could accompany her to our house and return about as soon as
they would be ready to take me from the Philadelphia station, I
went up with her and returned immediately by the same special
train. The joy that I had witnessed among the people in the
street and in public places in Washington when I left there, had
been turned to grief; the city was in reality a city of
mourning. I have stated what I believed then the effect of this
would be, and my judgment now is that I was right. I believe the
South would have been saved from very much of the hardness of
feeling that was engendered by Mr. Johnson’s course towards them
during the first few months of his administration. Be this as it
may, Mr. Lincoln’s assassination was particularly unfortunate for
the entire nation.

Mr. Johnson’s course towards the South did engender bitterness
of feeling. His denunciations of treason and his ever-ready
remark, “Treason is a crime and must be made odious,” was
repeated to all those men of the South who came to him to get
some assurances of safety so that they might go to work at
something with the feeling that what they obtained would be
secure to them. He uttered his denunciations with great
vehemence, and as they were accompanied with no assurances of
safety, many Southerners were driven to a point almost beyond
endurance.

The President of the United States is, in a large degree, or
ought to be, a representative of the feeling, wishes and
judgment of those over whom he presides; and the Southerners who
read the denunciations of themselves and their people must have
come to the conclusion that he uttered the sentiments of the
Northern people; whereas, as a matter of fact, but for the
assassination of Mr. Lincoln, I believe the great majority of
the Northern people, and the soldiers unanimously, would have
been in favor of a speedy reconstruction on terms that would be
the least humiliating to the people who had rebelled against
their government. They believed, I have no doubt, as I did,
that besides being the mildest, it was also the wisest, policy.

The people who had been in rebellion must necessarily come back
into the Union, and be incorporated as an integral part of the
nation. Naturally the nearer they were placed to an equality
with the people who had not rebelled, the more reconciled they
would feel with their old antagonists, and the better citizens
they would be from the beginning. They surely would not make
good citizens if they felt that they had a yoke around their
necks.

I do not believe that the majority of the Northern people at
that time were in favor of negro suffrage. They supposed that
it would naturally follow the freedom of the negro, but that
there would be a time of probation, in which the ex-slaves could
prepare themselves for the privileges of citizenship before the
full right would be conferred; but Mr. Johnson, after a complete
revolution of sentiment, seemed to regard the South not only as
an oppressed people, but as the people best entitled to
consideration of any of our citizens. This was more than the
people who had secured to us the perpetuation of the Union were
prepared for, and they became more radical in their views. The
Southerners had the most power in the executive branch, Mr.
Johnson having gone to their side; and with a compact South, and
such sympathy and support as they could get from the North, they
felt that they would be able to control the nation at once, and
already many of them acted as if they thought they were entitled
to do so.

Thus Mr. Johnson, fighting Congress on the one hand, and
receiving the support of the South on the other, drove Congress,
which was overwhelmingly republican, to the passing of first one
measure and then another to restrict his power. There being a
solid South on one side that was in accord with the political
party in the North which had sympathized with the rebellion, it
finally, in the judgment of Congress and of the majority of the
legislatures of the States, became necessary to enfranchise the
negro, in all his ignorance. In this work, I shall not discuss
the question of how far the policy of Congress in this
particular proved a wise one. It became an absolute necessity,
however, because of the foolhardiness of the President and the
blindness of the Southern people to their own interest. As to
myself, while strongly favoring the course that would be the
least humiliating to the people who had been in rebellion, I
gradually worked up to the point where, with the majority of the
people, I favored immediate enfranchisement.

CHAPTER LXIX.

SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON–JOHNSTON’S SURRENDER TO SHERMAN– CAPTURE
OF MOBILE–WILSON’S EXPEDITION–CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON
DAVIS–GENERAL THOMAS’S QUALITIES–ESTIMATE OF GENERAL CANBY.

When I left Appomattox I ordered General Meade to proceed
leisurely back to Burkesville Station with the Army of the
Potomac and the Army of the James, and to go into camp there
until further orders from me. General Johnston, as has been
stated before, was in North Carolina confronting General
Sherman. It could not be known positively, of course, whether
Johnston would surrender on the news of Lee’s surrender, though
I supposed he would; and if he did not, Burkesville Station was
the natural point from which to move to attack him. The army
which I could have sent against him was superior to his, and
that with which Sherman confronted him was also superior; and
between the two he would necessarily have been crushed, or
driven away. With the loss of their capital and the Army of
Northern Virginia it was doubtful whether Johnston’s men would
have the spirit to stand. My belief was that he would make no
such attempt; but I adopted this course as a precaution against
what might happen, however improbable.

Simultaneously with my starting from City Point, I sent a
messenger to North Carolina by boat with dispatches to General
Sherman, informing him of the surrender of Lee and his army;
also of the terms which I had given him; and I authorized
Sherman to give the same terms to Johnston if the latter chose
to accept them. The country is familiar with the terms that
Sherman agreed to CONDITIONALLY, because they embraced a
political question as well as a military one and he would
therefore have to confer with the government before agreeing to
them definitely.

General Sherman had met Mr. Lincoln at City Point while visiting
there to confer with me about our final movement, and knew what
Mr. Lincoln had said to the peace commissioners when he met them
at Hampton Roads, viz.: that before he could enter into
negotiations with them they would have to agree to two points:
one being that the Union should be preserved, and the other that
slavery should be abolished; and if they were ready to concede
these two points he was almost ready to sign his name to a blank
piece of paper and permit them to fill out the balance of the
terms upon which we would live together. He had also seen
notices in the newspapers of Mr. Lincoln’s visit to Richmond,
and had read in the same papers that while there he had
authorized the convening of the Legislature of Virginia.

Sherman thought, no doubt, in adding to the terms that I had
made with general Lee, that he was but carrying out the wishes
of the President of the United States. But seeing that he was
going beyond his authority, he made it a point that the terms
were only conditional. They signed them with this
understanding, and agreed to a truce until the terms could be
sent to Washington for approval; if approved by the proper
authorities there, they would then be final; if not approved,
then he would give due notice, before resuming hostilities. As
the world knows, Sherman, from being one of the most popular
generals of the land (Congress having even gone so far as to
propose a bill providing for a second lieutenant-general for the
purpose of advancing him to that grade), was denounced by the
President and Secretary of War in very bitter terms. Some
people went so far as to denounce him as a traitor–a most
preposterous term to apply to a man who had rendered so much
service as he had, even supposing he had made a mistake in
granting such terms as he did to Johnston and his army. If
Sherman had taken authority to send Johnston with his army home,
with their arms to be put in the arsenals of their own States,
without submitting the question to the authorities at
Washington, the suspicions against him might have some
foundation. But the feeling against Sherman died out very
rapidly, and it was not many weeks before he was restored to the
fullest confidence of the American people.

When, some days after my return to Washington, President Johnson
and the Secretary of war received the terms which General Sherman
had forwarded for approval, a cabinet meeting was immediately
called and I was sent for. There seemed to be the greatest
consternation, lest Sherman would commit the government to terms
which they were not willing to accede to and which he had no
right to grant. A message went out directing the troops in the
South not to obey General Sherman. I was ordered to proceed at
once to North Carolina and take charge of matter there myself.
Of course I started without delay, and reached there as soon as
possible. I repaired to Raleigh, where Sherman was, as quietly
as possible, hoping to see him without even his army learning of
my presence.

When I arrived I went to Sherman’s headquarters, and we were at
once closeted together. I showed him the instruction and orders
under which I visited him. I told him that I wanted him to
notify General Johnston that the terms which they had
conditionally agreed upon had not been approved in Washington,
and that he was authorized to offer the same terms I had given
General Lee. I sent Sherman to do this himself. I did not wish
the knowledge of my presence to be know to the army generally; so
I left it to Sherman to negotiate the terms of the surrender
solely by himself, and without the enemy knowing that I was
anywhere near the field. As soon as possible I started to get
away, to leave Sherman quite free and untrammelled.

At Goldsboro’, on my way back, I met a mail, containing the last
newspapers, and I found in them indications of great excitement
in the North over the terms Sherman had given Johnston; and
harsh orders that had been promulgated by the President and
Secretary of War. I knew that Sherman must see these papers,
and I fully realized what great indignation they would cause
him, though I do not think his feelings could have been more
excited than were my own. But like the true and loyal soldier
that he was, he carried out the instructions I had given him,
obtained the surrender of Johnston’s army, and settled down in
his camp about Raleigh, to await final orders.

There were still a few expeditions out in the South that could
not be communicated with, and had to be left to act according to
the judgment of their respective commanders. With these it was
impossible to tell how the news of the surrender of Lee and
Johnston, of which they must have heard, might affect their
judgment as to what was best to do.

The three expeditions which I had tried so hard to get off from
the commands of Thomas and Canby did finally get off: one under
Canby himself, against Mobile, late in March; that under Stoneman
from East Tennessee on the 20th; and the one under Wilson,
starting from Eastport, Mississippi, on the 22d of March. They
were all eminently successful, but without any good result.
Indeed much valuable property was destroyed and many lives lost
at a time when we would have liked to spare them. The war was
practically over before their victories were gained. They were
so late in commencing operations, that they did not hold any
troops away that otherwise would have been operating against the
armies which were gradually forcing the Confederate armies to a
surrender. The only possible good that we may have experienced
from these raids was by Stoneman’s getting near Lynchburg about
the time the armies of the Potomac and the James were closing in
on Lee at Appomattox.

Stoneman entered North Carolina and then pushed north to strike
the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. He got upon that road,
destroyed its bridges at different places and rendered the road
useless to the enemy up to within a few miles of Lynchburg. His
approach caused the evacuation of that city about the time we
were at Appomattox, and was the cause of a commotion we heard of
there. He then pushed south, and was operating in the rear of
Johnston’s army about the time the negotiations were going on
between Sherman and Johnston for the latter’s surrender. In
this raid Stoneman captured and destroyed a large amount of
stores, while fourteen guns and nearly two thousand prisoners
were the trophies of his success.

Canby appeared before Mobile on the 27th of March. The city of
Mobile was protected by two forts, besides other
intrenchments–Spanish Fort, on the east side of the bay, and
Fort Blakely, north of the city. These forts were invested. On
the night of the 8th of April, the National troops having carried
the enemy’s works at one point, Spanish Fort was evacuated; and
on the 9th, the very day of Lee’s surrender, Blakely was carried
by assault, with a considerable loss to us. On the 11th the city
was evacuated.

I had tried for more than two years to have an expedition sent
against Mobile when its possession by us would have been of
great advantage. It finally cost lives to take it when its
possession was of no importance, and when, if left alone, it
would within a few days have fallen into our hands without any
bloodshed whatever.

Wilson moved out with full 12,000 men, well equipped and well
armed. He was an energetic officer and accomplished his work
rapidly. Forrest was in his front, but with neither his
old-time army nor his old-time prestige. He now had principally
conscripts. His conscripts were generally old men and boys. He
had a few thousand regular cavalry left, but not enough to even
retard materially the progress of Wilson’s cavalry. Selma fell
on the 2d of April, with a large number of prisoners and a large
quantity of war material, machine shops, etc., to be disposed of
by the victors. Tuscaloosa, Montgomery and West Point fell in
quick succession. These were all important points to the enemy
by reason of their railroad connections, as depots of supplies,
and because of their manufactories of war material. They were
fortified or intrenched, and there was considerable fighting
before they were captured. Macon surrendered on the 21st of
April. Here news was received of the negotiations for the
surrender of Johnston’s army. Wilson belonged to the military
division commanded by Sherman, and of course was bound by his
terms. This stopped all fighting.

General Richard Taylor had now become the senior Confederate
officer still at liberty east of the Mississippi River, and on
the 4th of May he surrendered everything within the limits of
this extensive command. General E. Kirby Smith surrendered the
trans-Mississippi department on the 26th of May, leaving no
other Confederate army at liberty to continue the war.

Wilson’s raid resulted in the capture of the fugitive president
of the defunct confederacy before he got out of the country.
This occurred at Irwinsville, Georgia, on the 11th of May. For
myself, and I believe Mr. Lincoln shared the feeling, I would
have been very glad to have seen Mr. Davis succeed in escaping,
but for one reason: I feared that if not captured, he might get
into the trans-Mississippi region and there set up a more
contracted confederacy. The young men now out of homes and out
of employment might have rallied under his standard and
protracted the war yet another year. The Northern people were
tired of the war, they were tired of piling up a debt which
would be a further mortgage upon their homes.

Mr. Lincoln, I believe, wanted Mr. Davis to escape, because he
did not wish to deal with the matter of his punishment. He knew
there would be people clamoring for the punishment of the
ex-Confederate president, for high treason. He thought blood
enough had already been spilled to atone for our wickedness as a
nation. At all events he did not wish to be the judge to decide
whether more should be shed or not. But his own life was
sacrificed at the hands of an assassin before the ex-president
of the Confederacy was a prisoner in the hands of the government
which he had lent all his talent and all his energies to destroy.

All things are said to be wisely directed, and for the best
interest of all concerned. This reflection does not, however,
abate in the slightest our sense of bereavement in the untimely
loss of so good and great a man as Abraham Lincoln.

He would have proven the best friend the South could have had,
and saved much of the wrangling and bitterness of feeling
brought out by reconstruction under a President who at first
wished to revenge himself upon Southern men of better social
standing than himself, but who still sought their recognition,
and in a short time conceived the idea and advanced the
proposition to become their Moses to lead them triumphantly out
of all their difficulties.

The story of the legislation enacted during the reconstruction
period to stay the hands of the President is too fresh in the
minds of the people to be told now. Much of it, no doubt, was
unconstitutional; but it was hoped that the laws enacted would
serve their purpose before the question of constitutionality
could be submitted to the judiciary and a decision obtained.
These laws did serve their purpose, and now remain “a dead
letter” upon the statute books of the United States, no one
taking interest enough in them to give them a passing thought.

Much was said at the time about the garb Mr. Davis was wearing
when he was captured. I cannot settle this question from
personal knowledge of the facts; but I have been under the
belief, from information given to me by General Wilson shortly
after the event, that when Mr. Davis learned that he was
surrounded by our cavalry he was in his tent dressed in a
gentleman’s dressing gown. Naturally enough, Mr. Davis wanted
to escape, and would not reflect much how this should be
accomplished provided it might be done successfully. If
captured, he would be no ordinary prisoner. He represented all
there was of that hostility to the government which had caused
four years of the bloodiest war–and the most costly in other
respects of which history makes any record. Every one supposed
he would be tried for treason if captured, and that he would be
executed. Had he succeeded in making his escape in any disguise
it would have been adjudged a good thing afterwards by his
admirers.

As my official letters on file in the War Department, as well as
my remarks in this book, reflect upon General Thomas by dwelling
somewhat upon his tardiness, it is due to myself, as well as to
him, that I give my estimate of him as a soldier. The same
remark will apply also in the case of General Canby. I had been
at West Point with Thomas one year, and had known him later in
the old army. He was a man of commanding appearance, slow and
deliberate in speech and action; sensible, honest and brave. He
possessed valuable soldierly qualities in an eminent degree. He
gained the confidence of all who served under him, and almost
their love. This implies a very valuable quality. It is a
quality which calls out the most efficient services of the
troops serving under the commander possessing it.

Thomas’s dispositions were deliberately made, and always good.
He could not be driven from a point he was given to hold. He
was not as good, however, in pursuit as he was in action. I do
not believe that he could ever have conducted Sherman’s army
from Chattanooga to Atlanta against the defences and the
commander guarding that line in 1864. On the other hand, if it
had been given him to hold the line which Johnston tried to
hold, neither that general nor Sherman, nor any other officer
could have done it better.

Thomas was a valuable officer, who richly deserved, as he has
received, the plaudits of his countrymen for the part he played
in the great tragedy of 1861-5.

General Canby was an officer of great merit. He was naturally
studious, and inclined to the law. There have been in the army
but very few, if any, officers who took as much interest in
reading and digesting every act of Congress and every regulation
for the government of the army as he. His knowledge gained in
this way made him a most valuable staff officer, a capacity in
which almost all his army services were rendered up to the time
of his being assigned to the Military Division of the Gulf. He
was an exceedingly modest officer, though of great talent and
learning. I presume his feelings when first called upon to
command a large army against a fortified city, were somewhat
like my own when marching a regiment against General Thomas
Harris in Missouri in 1861. Neither of us would have felt the
slightest trepidation in going into battle with some one else
commanding. Had Canby been in other engagements afterwards, he
would, I have no doubt, have advanced without any fear arising
from a sense of the responsibility. He was afterwards killed in
the lava beds of Southern Oregon, while in pursuit of the hostile
Modoc Indians. His character was as pure as his talent and
learning were great. His services were valuable during the war,
but principally as a bureau officer. I have no idea that it was
from choice that his services were rendered in an office, but
because of his superior efficiency there.

CHAPTER LXX.

THE END OF THE WAR–THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON–ONE OF LINCOLN’S
ANECDOTES–GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON–CHARACTERISTICS OF
LINCOLN AND STANTON–ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS.

Things began to quiet down, and as the certainty that there
would be no more armed resistance became clearer, the troops in
North Carolina and Virginia were ordered to march immediately to
the capital, and go into camp there until mustered out. Suitable
garrisons were left at the prominent places throughout the South
to insure obedience to the laws that might be enacted for the
government of the several States, and to insure security to the
lives and property of all classes. I do not know how far this
was necessary, but I deemed it necessary, at that time, that
such a course should be pursued. I think now that these
garrisons were continued after they ceased to be absolutely
required; but it is not to be expected that such a rebellion as
was fought between the sections from 1861 to 1865 could
terminate without leaving many serious apprehensions in the mind
of the people as to what should be done.

Sherman marched his troops from Goldsboro, up to Manchester, on
the south side of the James River, opposite Richmond, and there
put them in camp, while he went back to Savannah to see what the
situation was there.

It was during this trip that the last outrage was committed upon
him. Halleck had been sent to Richmond to command Virginia, and
had issued orders prohibiting even Sherman’s own troops from
obeying his, Sherman’s, orders. Sherman met the papers on his
return, containing this order of Halleck, and very justly felt
indignant at the outrage. On his arrival at Fortress Monroe
returning from Savannah, Sherman received an invitation from
Halleck to come to Richmond and be his guest. This he
indignantly refused, and informed Halleck, furthermore, that he
had seen his order. He also stated that he was coming up to
take command of his troops, and as he marched through it would
probably be as well for Halleck not to show himself, because he
(Sherman) would not be responsible for what some rash person
might do through indignation for the treatment he had
received. Very soon after that, Sherman received orders from me
to proceed to Washington City, and to go into camp on the south
side of the city pending the mustering-out of the troops.

There was no incident worth noting in the march northward from
Goldsboro, to Richmond, or in that from Richmond to Washington
City. The army, however, commanded by Sherman, which had been
engaged in all the battles of the West and had marched from the
Mississippi through the Southern States to the sea, from there
to Goldsboro, and thence to Washington City, had passed over
many of the battle-fields of the Army of the Potomac, thus
having seen, to a greater extent than any other body of troops,
the entire theatre of the four years’ war for the preservation
of the Union.

The march of Sherman’s army from Atlanta to the sea and north to
Goldsboro, while it was not accompanied with the danger that was
anticipated, yet was magnificent in its results, and equally
magnificent in the way it was conducted. It had an important
bearing, in various ways, upon the great object we had in view,
that of closing the war. All the States east of the Mississippi
River up to the State of Georgia, had felt the hardships of the
war. Georgia, and South Carolina, and almost all of North
Carolina, up to this time, had been exempt from invasion by the
Northern armies, except upon their immediate sea coasts. Their
newspapers had given such an account of Confederate success,
that the people who remained at home had been convinced that the
Yankees had been whipped from first to last, and driven from
pillar to post, and that now they could hardly be holding out
for any other purpose than to find a way out of the war with
honor to themselves.

Even during this march of Sherman’s the newspapers in his front
were proclaiming daily that his army was nothing better than a
mob of men who were frightened out of their wits and hastening,
panic-stricken, to try to get under the cover of our navy for
protection against the Southern people. As the army was seen
marching on triumphantly, however, the minds of the people
became disabused and they saw the true state of affairs. In
turn they became disheartened, and would have been glad to
submit without compromise.

Another great advantage resulting from this march, and which was
calculated to hasten the end, was the fact that the great
storehouse of Georgia was entirely cut off from the Confederate
armies. As the troops advanced north from Savannah, the
destruction of the railroads in South Carolina and the southern
part of North Carolina, further cut off their resources and left
the armies still in Virginia and North Carolina dependent for
supplies upon a very small area of country, already very much
exhausted of food and forage.

In due time the two armies, one from Burkesville Junction and
the other from the neighborhood of Raleigh, North Carolina,
arrived and went into camp near the Capital, as directed. The
troops were hardy, being inured to fatigue, and they appeared in
their respective camps as ready and fit for duty as they had ever
been in their lives. I doubt whether an equal body of men of any
nation, take them man for man, officer for officer, was ever
gotten together that would have proved their equal in a great
battle.

The armies of Europe are machines; the men are brave and the
officers capable; but the majority of the soldiers in most of
the nations of Europe are taken from a class of people who are
not very intelligent and who have very little interest in the
contest in which they are called upon to take part. Our armies
were composed of men who were able to read, men who knew what
they were fighting for, and could not be induced to serve as
soldiers, except in an emergency when the safety of the nation
was involved, and so necessarily must have been more than equal
to men who fought merely because they were brave and because
they were thoroughly drilled and inured to hardships.

There was nothing of particular importance occurred during the
time these troops were in camp before starting North.

I remember one little incident which I will relate as an
anecdote characteristic of Mr. Lincoln. It occurred a day after
I reached Washington, and about the time General Meade reached
Burkesville with the army. Governor Smith of Virginia had left
Richmond with the Confederate States government, and had gone to
Danville. Supposing I was necessarily with the army at
Burkesville, he addressed a letter to me there informing me
that, as governor of the Commonwealth of the State of Virginia,
he had temporarily removed the State capital from Richmond to
Danville, and asking if he would be permitted to perform the
functions of his office there without molestation by the Federal
authorities. I give this letter only in substance. He also
inquired of me whether in case he was not allowed to perform the
duties of his office, he with a few others might not be permitted
to leave the country and go abroad without interference. General
Meade being informed that a flag of truce was outside his pickets
with a letter to me, at once sent out and had the letter brought
in without informing the officer who brought it that I was not
present. He read the letter and telegraphed me its contents.
Meeting Mr. Lincoln shortly after receiving this dispatch, I
repeated its contents to him. Mr. Lincoln, supposing I was
asking for instructions, said, in reply to that part of Governor
Smith’s letter which inquired whether he with a few friends would
be permitted to leave the country unmolested, that his position
was like that of a certain Irishman (giving the name) he knew in
Springfield who was very popular with the people, a man of
considerable promise, and very much liked. Unfortunately he had
acquired the habit of drinking, and his friends could see that
the habit was growing on him. These friends determined to make
an effort to save him, and to do this they drew up a pledge to
abstain from all alcoholic drinks. They asked Pat to join them
in signing the pledge, and he consented. He had been so long
out of the habit of using plain water as a beverage that he
resorted to soda-water as a substitute. After a few days this
began to grow distasteful to him. So holding the glass behind
him, he said: “Doctor, couldn’t you drop a bit of brandy in
that unbeknownst to myself.”

I do not remember what the instructions were the President gave
me, but I know that Governor Smith was not permitted to perform
the duties of his office. I also know that it Mr. Lincoln had
been spared, there would have been no efforts made to prevent
any one from leaving the country who desired to do so. He would
have been equally willing to permit the return of the same
expatriated citizens after they had time to repent of their
choice.

On the 18th of May orders were issued by the adjutant-general
for a grand review by the President and his cabinet of Sherman’s
and Meade’s armies. The review commenced on the 23d and lasted
two days. Meade’s army occupied over six hours of the first day
in passing the grand stand which had been erected in front of the
President’s house. Sherman witnessed this review from the grand
stand which was occupied by the President and his cabinet. Here
he showed his resentment for the cruel and harsh treatment that
had unnecessarily been inflicted upon him by the Secretary of
War, by refusing to take his extended hand.

Sherman’s troops had been in camp on the south side of the
Potomac. During the night of the 23d he crossed over and
bivouacked not far from the Capitol. Promptly at ten o’clock on
the morning of the 24th, his troops commenced to pass in
review. Sherman’s army made a different appearance from that of
the Army of the Potomac. The latter had been operating where
they received directly from the North full supplies of food and
clothing regularly: the review of this army therefore was the
review of a body of 65,000 well-drilled, well-disciplined and
orderly soldiers inured to hardship and fit for any duty, but
without the experience of gathering their own food and supplies
in an enemy’s country, and of being ever on the watch. Sherman’s
army was not so well-dressed as the Army of the Potomac, but
their marching could not be excelled; they gave the appearance
of men who had been thoroughly drilled to endure hardships,
either by long and continuous marches or through exposure to any
climate, without the ordinary shelter of a camp. They exhibited
also some of the order of march through Georgia where the “sweet
potatoes sprung up from the ground” as Sherman’s army went
marching through. In the rear of a company there would be a
captured horse or mule loaded with small cooking utensils,
captured chickens and other food picked up for the use of the
men. Negro families who had followed the army would sometimes
come along in the rear of a company, with three or four children
packed upon a single mule, and the mother leading it.

The sight was varied and grand: nearly all day for two
successive days, from the Capitol to the Treasury Building,
could be seen a mass of orderly soldiers marching in columns of
companies. The National flag was flying from almost every house
and store; the windows were filled with spectators; the
door-steps and side-walks were crowded with colored people and
poor whites who did not succeed in securing better quarters from
which to get a view of the grand armies. The city was about as
full of strangers who had come to see the sights as it usually
is on inauguration day when a new President takes his seat.

It may not be out of place to again allude to President Lincoln
and the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, who were the great
conspicuous figures in the executive branch of the government.
There is no great difference of opinion now, in the public mind,
as to the characteristics of the President. With Mr. Stanton the
case is different. They were the very opposite of each other in
almost every particular, except that each possessed great
ability. Mr. Lincoln gained influence over men by making them
feel that it was a pleasure to serve him. He preferred yielding
his own wish to gratify others, rather than to insist upon having
his own way. It distressed him to disappoint others. In matters
of public duty, however, he had what he wished, but in the least
offensive way. Mr. Stanton never questioned his own authority
to command, unless resisted. He cared nothing for the feeling
of others. In fact it seemed to be pleasanter to him to
disappoint than to gratify. He felt no hesitation in assuming
the functions of the executive, or in acting without advising
with him. If his act was not sustained, he would change it–if
he saw the matter would be followed up until he did so.

It was generally supposed that these two officials formed the
complement of each other. The Secretary was required to prevent
the President’s being imposed upon. The President was required
in the more responsible place of seeing that injustice was not
done to others. I do not know that this view of these two men
is still entertained by the majority of the people. It is not a
correct view, however, in my estimation. Mr. Lincoln did not
require a guardian to aid him in the fulfilment of a public
trust.

Mr. Lincoln was not timid, and he was willing to trust his
generals in making and executing their plans. The Secretary was
very timid, and it was impossible for him to avoid interfering
with the armies covering the capital when it was sought to
defend it by an offensive movement against the army guarding the
Confederate capital. He could see our weakness, but he could not
see that the enemy was in danger. The enemy would not have been
in danger if Mr. Stanton had been in the field. These
characteristics of the two officials were clearly shown shortly
after Early came so near getting into the capital.

Among the army and corps commanders who served with me during
the war between the States, and who attracted much public
attention, but of whose ability as soldiers I have not yet given
any estimate, are Meade, Hancock, Sedgwick, Burnside, Terry and
Hooker. There were others of great merit, such as Griffin,
Humphreys, Wright and Mackenzie. Of those first named, Burnside
at one time had command of the Army of the Potomac, and later of
the Army of the Ohio. Hooker also commanded the Army of the
Potomac for a short time.

General Meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to
his usefulness that were beyond his control. He had been an
officer of the engineer corps before the war, and consequently
had never served with troops until he was over forty-six years
of age. He never had, I believe, a command of less than a
brigade. He saw clearly and distinctly the position of the
enemy, and the topography of the country in front of his own
position. His first idea was to take advantage of the lay of
the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction we
wanted to move afterwards. He was subordinate to his superiors
in rank to the extent that he could execute an order which
changed his own plans with the same zeal he would have displayed
if the plan had been his own. He was brave and conscientious,
and commanded the respect of all who knew him. He was
unfortunately of a temper that would get beyond his control, at
times, and make him speak to officers of high rank in the most
offensive manner. No one saw this fault more plainly than he
himself, and no one regretted it more. This made it unpleasant
at times, even in battle, for those around him to approach him
even with information. In spite of this defect he was a most
valuable officer and deserves a high place in the annals of his
country.

General Burnside was an officer who was generally liked and
respected. He was not, however, fitted to command an army. No
one knew this better than himself. He always admitted his
blunders, and extenuated those of officers under him beyond what
they were entitled to. It was hardly his fault that he was ever
assigned to a separate command.

Of Hooker I saw but little during the war. I had known him very
well before, however. Where I did see him, at Chattanooga, his
achievement in bringing his command around the point of Lookout
Mountain and into Chattanooga Valley was brilliant. I
nevertheless regarded him as a dangerous man. He was not
subordinate to his superiors. He was ambitious to the extent of
caring nothing for the rights of others. His disposition was,
when engaged in battle, to get detached from the main body of
the army and exercise a separate command, gathering to his
standard all he could of his juniors.

Hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of all the general
officers who did not exercise a separate command. He commanded
a corps longer than any other one, and his name was never
mentioned as having committed in battle a blunder for which he
was responsible. He was a man of very conspicuous personal
appearance. Tall, well-formed and, at the time of which I now
write, young and fresh-looking, he presented an appearance that
would attract the attention of an army as he passed. His genial
disposition made him friends, and his personal courage and his
presence with his command in the thickest of the fight won for
him the confidence of troops serving under him. No matter how
hard the fight, the 2d corps always felt that their commander
was looking after them.

Sedgwick was killed at Spottsylvania before I had an opportunity
of forming an estimate of his qualifications as a soldier from
personal observation. I had known him in Mexico when both of us
were lieutenants, and when our service gave no indication that
either of us would ever be equal to the command of a brigade. He
stood very high in the army, however, as an officer and a man.
He was brave and conscientious. His ambition was not great, and
he seemed to dread responsibility. He was willing to do any
amount of battling, but always wanted some one else to direct.
He declined the command of the Army of the Potomac once, if not
oftener.

General Alfred H. Terry came into the army as a volunteer
without a military education. His way was won without political
influence up to an important separate command–the expedition
against Fort Fisher, in January, 1865. His success there was
most brilliant, and won for him the rank of brigadier-general in
the regular army and of major-general of volunteers. He is a man
who makes friends of those under him by his consideration of
their wants and their dues. As a commander, he won their
confidence by his coolness in action and by his clearness of
perception in taking in the situation under which he was placed
at any given time.

Griffin, Humphreys, and Mackenzie were good corps commanders,
but came into that position so near to the close of the war as
not to attract public attention. All three served as such, in
the last campaign of the armies of the Potomac and the James,
which culminated at Appomattox Court House, on the 9th of April,
1865. The sudden collapse of the rebellion monopolized attention
to the exclusion of almost everything else. I regarded Mackenzie
as the most promising young officer in the army. Graduating at
West Point, as he did, during the second year of the war, he had
won his way up to the command of a corps before its close. This
he did upon his own merit and without influence.

CONCLUSION.

The cause of the great War of the Rebellion against the United
Status will have to be attributed to slavery. For some years
before the war began it was a trite saying among some
politicians that “A state half slave and half free cannot
exist.” All must become slave or all free, or the state will go
down. I took no part myself in any such view of the case at the
time, but since the war is over, reviewing the whole question, I
have come to the conclusion that the saying is quite true.

Slavery was an institution that required unusual guarantees for
its security wherever it existed; and in a country like ours
where the larger portion of it was free territory inhabited by
an intelligent and well-to-do population, the people would
naturally have but little sympathy with demands upon them for
its protection. Hence the people of the South were dependent
upon keeping control of the general government to secure the
perpetuation of their favorite restitution. They were enabled
to maintain this control long after the States where slavery
existed had ceased to have the controlling power, through the
assistance they received from odd men here and there throughout
the Northern States. They saw their power waning, and this led
them to encroach upon the prerogatives and independence of the
Northern States by enacting such laws as the Fugitive Slave
Law. By this law every Northern man was obliged, when properly
summoned, to turn out and help apprehend the runaway slave of a
Southern man. Northern marshals became slave-catchers, and
Northern courts had to contribute to the support and protection
of the institution.

This was a degradation which the North would not permit any
longer than until they could get the power to expunge such laws
from the statute books. Prior to the time of these
encroachments the great majority of the people of the North had
no particular quarrel with slavery, so long as they were not
forced to have it themselves. But they were not willing to play
the role of police for the South in the protection of this
particular institution.

In the early days of the country, before we had railroads,
telegraphs and steamboats–in a word, rapid transit of any
sort–the States were each almost a separate nationality. At
that time the subject of slavery caused but little or no
disturbance to the public mind. But the country grew, rapid
transit was established, and trade and commerce between the
States got to be so much greater than before, that the power of
the National government became more felt and recognized and,
therefore, had to be enlisted in the cause of this institution.

It is probably well that we had the war when we did. We are
better off now than we would have been without it, and have made
more rapid progress than we otherwise should have made. The
civilized nations of Europe have been stimulated into unusual
activity, so that commerce, trade, travel, and thorough
acquaintance among people of different nationalities, has become
common; whereas, before, it was but the few who had ever had the
privilege of going beyond the limits of their own country or who
knew anything about other people. Then, too, our republican
institutions were regarded as experiments up to the breaking out
of the rebellion, and monarchical Europe generally believed that
our republic was a rope of sand that would part the moment the
slightest strain was brought upon it. Now it has shown itself
capable of dealing with one of the greatest wars that was ever
made, and our people have proven themselves to be the most
formidable in war of any nationality.

But this war was a fearful lesson, and should teach us the
necessity of avoiding wars in the future.

The conduct of some of the European states during our troubles
shows the lack of conscience of communities where the
responsibility does not come upon a single individual. Seeing a
nation that extended from ocean to ocean, embracing the better
part of a continent, growing as we were growing in population,
wealth and intelligence, the European nations thought it would
be well to give us a check. We might, possibly, after a while
threaten their peace, or, at least, the perpetuity of their
institutions. Hence, England was constantly finding fault with
the administration at Washington because we were not able to
keep up an effective blockade. She also joined, at first, with
France and Spain in setting up an Austrian prince upon the
throne in Mexico, totally disregarding any rights or claims that
Mexico had of being treated as an independent power. It is true
they trumped up grievances as a pretext, but they were only
pretexts which can always be found when wanted.

Mexico, in her various revolutions, had been unable to give that
protection to the subjects of foreign nations which she would
have liked to give, and some of her revolutionary leaders had
forced loans from them. Under pretence of protecting their
citizens, these nations seized upon Mexico as a foothold for
establishing a European monarchy upon our continent, thus
threatening our peace at home. I, myself, regarded this as a
direct act of war against the United States by the powers
engaged, and supposed as a matter of course that the United
States would treat it as such when their hands were free to
strike. I often spoke of the matter to Mr. Lincoln and the
Secretary of War, but never heard any special views from them to
enable me to judge what they thought or felt about it. I
inferred that they felt a good deal as I did, but were unwilling
to commit themselves while we had our own troubles upon our
hands.

All of the powers except France very soon withdrew from the
armed intervention for the establishment of an Austrian prince
upon the throne of Mexico; but the governing people of these
countries continued to the close of the war to throw obstacles
in our way. After the surrender of Lee, therefore, entertaining
the opinion here expressed, I sent Sheridan with a corps to the
Rio Grande to have him where he might aid Juarez in expelling
the French from Mexican. These troops got off before they could
be stopped; and went to the Rio Grande, where Sheridan
distributed them up and down the river, much to the
consternation of the troops in the quarter of Mexico bordering
on that stream. This soon led to a request from France that we
should withdraw our troops from the Rio Grande and to
negotiations for the withdrawal of theirs. Finally Bazaine was
withdrawn from Mexico by order of the French Government. From
that day the empire began to totter. Mexico was then able to
maintain her independence without aid from us.

France is the traditional ally and friend of the United
States. I did not blame France for her part in the scheme to
erect a monarchy upon the ruins of the Mexican Republic. That
was the scheme of one man, an imitator without genius or
merit. He had succeeded in stealing the government of his
country, and made a change in its form against the wishes and
instincts of his people. He tried to play the part of the first
Napoleon, without the ability to sustain that role. He sought by
new conquests to add to his empire and his glory; but the signal
failure of his scheme of conquest was the precursor of his own
overthrow.

Like our own war between the States, the Franco-Prussian war was
an expensive one; but it was worth to France all it cost her
people. It was the completion of the downfall of Napoleon
III. The beginning was when he landed troops on this
continent. Failing here, the prestige of his name–all the
prestige he ever had–was gone. He must achieve a success or
fall. He tried to strike down his neighbor, Prussia–and fell.

I never admired the character of the first Napoleon; but I
recognize his great genius. His work, too, has left its impress
for good on the face of Europe. The third Napoleon could have no
claim to having done a good or just act.

To maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared
for war. There can scarcely be a possible chance of a conflict,
such as the last one, occurring among our own people again; but,
growing as we are, in population, wealth and military power, we
may become the envy of nations which led us in all these
particulars only a few years ago; and unless we are prepared for
it we may be in danger of a combined movement being some day made
to crush us out. Now, scarcely twenty years after the war, we
seem to have forgotten the lessons it taught, and are going on
as if in the greatest security, without the power to resist an
invasion by the fleets of fourth-rate European powers for a time
until we could prepare for them.

We should have a good navy, and our sea-coast defences should be
put in the finest possible condition. Neither of these cost much
when it is considered where the money goes, and what we get in
return. Money expended in a fine navy, not only adds to our
security and tends to prevent war in the future, but is very
material aid to our commerce with foreign nations in the
meantime. Money spent upon sea-coast defences is spent among
our own people, and all goes back again among the people. The
work accomplished, too, like that of the navy, gives us a
feeling of security.

England’s course towards the United States during the rebellion
exasperated the people of this country very much against the
mother country. I regretted it. England and the United States
are natural allies, and should be the best of friends. They
speak one language, and are related by blood and other ties. We
together, or even either separately, are better qualified than
any other people to establish commerce between all the
nationalities of the world.

England governs her own colonies, and particularly those
embracing the people of different races from her own, better
than any other nation. She is just to the conquered, but
rigid. She makes them self-supporting, but gives the benefit of
labor to the laborer. She does not seem to look upon the
colonies as outside possessions which she is at liberty to work
for the support and aggrandizement of the home government.

The hostility of England to the United States during our
rebellion was not so much real as it was apparent. It was the
hostility of the leaders of one political party. I am told that
there was no time during the civil war when they were able to get
up in England a demonstration in favor of secession, while these
were constantly being gotten up in favor of the Union, or, as
they called it, in favor of the North. Even in Manchester,
which suffered so fearfully by having the cotton cut off from
her mills, they had a monster demonstration in favor of the
North at the very time when their workmen were almost famishing.

It is possible that the question of a conflict between races may
come up in the future, as did that between freedom and slavery
before. The condition of the colored man within our borders may
become a source of anxiety, to say the least. But he was brought
to our shores by compulsion, and he now should be considered as
having as good a right to remain here as any other class of our
citizens. It was looking to a settlement of this question that
led me to urge the annexation of Santo Domingo during the time I
was President of the United States.

Santo Domingo was freely offered to us, not only by the
administration, but by all the people, almost without price. The
island is upon our shores, is very fertile, and is capable of
supporting fifteen millions of people. The products of the soil
are so valuable that labor in her fields would be so compensated
as to enable those who wished to go there to quickly repay the
cost of their passage. I took it that the colored people would
go there in great numbers, so as to have independent states
governed by their own race. They would still be States of the
Union, and under the protection of the General Government; but
the citizens would be almost wholly colored.

By the war with Mexico, we had acquired, as we have seen,
territory almost equal in extent to that we already possessed.
It was seen that the volunteers of the Mexican war largely
composed the pioneers to settle up the Pacific coast country.
Their numbers, however, were scarcely sufficient to be a nucleus
for the population of the important points of the territory
acquired by that war. After our rebellion, when so many young
men were at liberty to return to their homes, they found they
were not satisfied with the farm, the store, or the work-shop of
the villages, but wanted larger fields. The mines of the
mountains first attracted them; but afterwards they found that
rich valleys and productive grazing and farming lands were
there. This territory, the geography of which was not known to
us at the close of the rebellion, is now as well mapped as any
portion of our country. Railroads traverse it in every
direction, north, south, east, and west. The mines are
worked. The high lands are used for grazing purposes, and rich
agricultural lands are found in many of the valleys. This is
the work of the volunteer. It is probable that the Indians
would have had control of these lands for a century yet but for
the war. We must conclude, therefore, that wars are not always
evils unmixed with some good.

Prior to the rebellion the great mass of the people were
satisfied to remain near the scenes of their birth. In fact an
immense majority of the whole people did not feel secure against
coming to want should they move among entire strangers. So much
was the country divided into small communities that localized
idioms had grown up, so that you could almost tell what section
a person was from by hearing him speak. Before, new territories
were settled by a “class”; people who shunned contact with
others; people who, when the country began to settle up around
them, would push out farther from civilization. Their guns
furnished meat, and the cultivation of a very limited amount of
the soil, their bread and vegetables. All the streams abounded
with fish. Trapping would furnish pelts to be brought into the
States once a year, to pay for necessary articles which they
could not raise–powder, lead, whiskey, tobacco and some store
goods. Occasionally some little articles of luxury would enter
into these purchases–a quarter of a pound of tea, two or three
pounds of coffee, more of sugar, some playing cards, and if
anything was left over of the proceeds of the sale, more whiskey.

Little was known of the topography of the country beyond the
settlements of these frontiersmen. This is all changed now. The
war begot a spirit of independence and enterprise. The feeling
now is, that a youth must cut loose from his old surroundings to
enable him to get up in the world. There is now such a
commingling of the people that particular idioms and
pronunciation are no longer localized to any great extent; the
country has filled up “from the centre all around to the sea”;
railroads connect the two oceans and all parts of the interior;
maps, nearly perfect, of every part of the country are now
furnished the student of geography.

The war has made us a nation of great power and intelligence. We
have but little to do to preserve peace, happiness and prosperity
at home, and the respect of other nations. Our experience ought
to teach us the necessity of the first; our power secures the
latter.

I feel that we are on the eve of a new era, when there is to be
great harmony between the Federal and Confederate. I cannot
stay to be a living witness to the correctness of this prophecy;
but I feel it within me that it is to be so. The universally
kind feeling expressed for me at a time when it was supposed
that each day would prove my last, seemed to me the beginning of
the answer to “Let us have peace.”

The expression of these kindly feelings were not restricted to a
section of the country, nor to a division of the people. They
came from individual citizens of all nationalities; from all
denominations–the Protestant, the Catholic, and the Jew; and
from the various societies of the land–scientific, educational,
religious or otherwise. Politics did not enter into the matter
at all.

I am not egotist enough to suppose all this significance should
be given because I was the object of it. But the war between
the States was a very bloody and a very costly war. One side or
the other had to yield principles they deemed dearer than life
before it could be brought to an end. I commanded the whole of
the mighty host engaged on the victorious side. I was, no
matter whether deservedly so or not, a representative of that
side of the controversy. It is a significant and gratifying
fact that Confederates should have joined heartily in this
spontaneous move. I hope the good feeling inaugurated may
continue to the end.

APPENDIX.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, OF THE UNITED STATES
ARMIES 1864-65.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
July 22, 1865.

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the
operations of the Armies of the United States from the date of
my appointment to command the same.

From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with
the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops
that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and
weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. The
resources of the enemy and his numerical strength were far
inferior to ours; but as an offset to this, we had a vast
territory, with a population hostile to the government, to
garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to
protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.

The armies in the East and West acted independently and without
concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together,
enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines
of communication for transporting troops from East to West,
reinforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough
large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go
to their homes and do the work of producing, for the support of
their armies. It was a question whether our numerical strength
and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages
and the enemy’s superior position.

From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could
be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the
people, both North and South, until the military power of the
rebellion was entirely broken.

I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of
troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy;
preventing him from using the same force at different seasons
against first one and then another of our armies, and the
possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary
supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to hammer
continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his
resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there
should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the
loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws
of the land.

These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given
and campaigns made to carry them out. Whether they might have
been better in conception and execution is for the people, who
mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the
pecuniary cost, to say. All I can say is, that what I have done
has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in
what I conceived to be for the best interests of the whole
country.

At the date when this report begins, the situation of the
contending forces was about as follows: The Mississippi River
was strongly garrisoned by Federal troops, from St. Louis,
Missouri, to its mouth. The line of the Arkansas was also held,
thus giving us armed possession of all west of the Mississippi,
north of that stream. A few points in Southern Louisiana, not
remote from the river, were held by us, together with a small
garrison at and near the mouth of the Rio Grande. All the
balance of the vast territory of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas
was in the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an
army of probably not less than eighty thousand effective men,
that could have been brought into the field had there been
sufficient opposition to have brought them out. The let-alone
policy had demoralized this force so that probably but little
more than one-half of it was ever present in garrison at any one
time. But the one-half, or forty thousand men, with the bands of
guerillas scattered through Missouri, Arkansas, and along the
Mississippi River, and the disloyal character of much of the
population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to
keep navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal
people to the west of it. To the east of the Mississippi we
held substantially with the line of the Tennessee and Holston
rivers, running eastward to include nearly all of the State of
Tennessee. South of Chattanooga, a small foothold had been
obtained in Georgia, sufficient to protect East Tennessee from
incursions from the enemy’s force at Dalton, Georgia. West
Virginia was substantially within our lines. Virginia, with the
exception of the northern border, the Potomac River, a small area
about the mouth of James River, covered by the troops at Norfolk
and Fort Monroe, and the territory covered by the Army of the
Potomac lying along the Rapidan, was in the possession of the
enemy. Along the sea-coast footholds had been obtained at
Plymouth, Washington, and New Bern, in North Carolina; Beaufort,
Folly and Morris Islands, Hilton Head, Fort Pulaski, and Port
Royal, in South Carolina; Fernandina and St. Augustine, in
Florida. Key West and Pensacola were also in our possession,
while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy. The
accompanying map , a copy of which was sent to General Sherman
and other commanders in March, 1864, shows by red lines the
territory occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion, and
at the opening of the campaign of 1864, while those in blue are
the lines which it was proposed to occupy.

Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerillas and a
large population disloyal to the government, making it necessary
to guard every foot of road or river used in supplying our
armies. In the South, a reign of military despotism prevailed,
which made every man and boy capable of bearing arms a soldier;
and those who could not bear arms in the field acted as provosts
for collecting deserters and returning them. This enabled the
enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the field.

The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the
Mississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and
J. E. Johnston, his ablest and best generals. The army commanded
by Lee occupied the south bank of the Rapidan, extending from
Mine Run westward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending
Richmond, the rebel capital, against the Army of the Potomac.
The army under Johnston occupied a strongly intrenched position
at Dalton, Georgia, covering and defending Atlanta, Georgia, a
place of great importance as a railroad centre, against the
armies under Major-General W. T. Sherman. In addition to these
armies he had a large cavalry force under Forrest, in North-east
Mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in the Shenandoah
Valley, and in the western part of Virginia and extreme eastern
part of Tennessee; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons,
and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land.

These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them,
were the main objective points of the campaign.

Major-General W. T. Sherman, who was appointed to the command of
the Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing all the
armies and territory east of the Mississippi River to the
Alleghanies and the Department of Arkansas, west of the
Mississippi, had the immediate command of the armies operating
against Johnston.

Major-General George G. Meade had the immediate command of the
Army of the Potomac, from where I exercised general supervision
of the movements of all our armies.

General Sherman was instructed to move against Johnston’s army,
to break it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy’s
country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could
upon their war resources. If the enemy in his front showed
signs of joining Lee, to follow him up to the full extent of his
ability, while I would prevent the concentration of Lee upon him,
if it was in the power of the Army of the Potomac to do so. More
specific written instructions were not given, for the reason that
I had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was
satisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the
fullest extent possible.

Major-General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up Red River
against Shreveport, Louisiana (which had been organized previous
to my appointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of
March, of the importance it was that Shreveport should be taken
at the earliest possible day, and that if he found that the
taking of it would occupy from ten to fifteen days’ more time
than General Sherman had given his troops to be absent from
their command, he would send them back at the time specified by
General Sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of the main
object of the Red River expedition, for this force was necessary
to movements east of the Mississippi; that should his expedition
prove successful, he would hold Shreveport and the Red River
with such force as he might deem necessary, and return the
balance of his troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans,
commencing no move for the further acquisition of territory,
unless it was to make that then held by him more easily held;
that it might be a part of the spring campaign to move against
Mobile; that it certainly would be, if troops enough could be
obtained to make it without embarrassing other movements; that
New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an
expedition; also, that I had directed General Steele to make a
real move from Arkansas, as suggested by him (General Banks),
instead of a demonstration, as Steele thought advisable.

On the 31st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification
and directions, he was instructed as follows:

“1st. If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that
you turn over the defence of the Red River to General Steele and
the navy.

“2d. That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of
your hold upon the Rio Grande. This can be held with four
thousand men, if they will turn their attention immediately to
fortifying their positions. At least one-half of the force
required for this service might be taken from the colored troops.

“3d. By properly fortifying on the Mississippi River, the force
to guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten
thousand men, if not to a less number. Six thousand more would
then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until
active operations can again be resumed west of the river.
According to your last return, this would give you a force of
over thirty thousand effective men with which to move against
Mobile. To this I expect to add five thousand men from
Missouri. If however, you think the force here stated too small
to hold the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession
of, I would say concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of
your present command for operations against Mobile. With these
and such additions as I can give you from elsewhere, lose no
time in making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon
Mobile. Two or more iron-clads will be ordered to report to
Admiral Farragut. This gives him a strong naval fleet with
which to co-operate. You can make your own arrangements with
the admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of
approach. My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should
be your base; but, from your long service in the Gulf
Department, you will know best about the matter. It is intended
that your movements shall be co-operative with movements
elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. All I would now
add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at
once. Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and
start at the earliest possible moment.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“MAJOR-GENERAL N. P. BANKS.”

Major-General Meade was instructed that Lee’s army would be his
objective point; that wherever Lee went he would go also. For
his movement two plans presented themselves: One to cross the
Rapidan below Lee, moving by his right flank; the other above,
moving by his left. Each presented advantages over the other,
with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee would be
cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond or going north on a
raid. But if we took this route, all we did would have to be
done whilst the rations we started with held out; besides, it
separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directed how
to cooperate. If we took the other route, Brandy Station could
be used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the
York or James rivers. Of these, however, it was decided to take
the lower route.

The following letter of instruction was addressed to
Major-General B. F. Butler:

“FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA, April 2, 1864.

“GENERAL:-In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall
commence at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to
have cooperative action of all the armies in the field, as far
as this object can be accomplished.

“It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three
large ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute
necessity of holding on to the territory already taken from the
enemy. But, generally speaking, concentration can be
practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the
enemy’s country from the territory they have to guard. By such
movement, they interpose themselves between the enemy and the
country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to
guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a
part of the enemy’s force, if no greater object is gained. Lee’s
army and Richmond being the greater objects towards which our
attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable
to unite all the force we can against them. The necessity of
covering Washington with the Army of the Potomac, and of
covering your department with your army, makes it impossible to
unite these forces at the beginning of any move. I propose,
therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems
practicable: The Army of the Potomac will act from its present
base, Lee’s army being the objective point. You will collect
all the forces from your command that can be spared from
garrison duty–I should say not less than twenty thousand
effective men–to operate on the south side of James River,
Richmond being your objective point. To the force you already
have will be added about ten thousand men from South Carolina,
under Major-General Gillmore, who will command them in person.
Major-General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to
command the troops sent into the field from your own department.

“General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress
Monroe, with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant,
or as soon thereafter as practicable. Should you not receive
notice by that time to move, you will make such disposition of
them and your other forces as you may deem best calculated to
deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made.

“When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much
force as possible. Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and
concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapidly as
you can. From City Point directions cannot be given at this
time for your further movements.

“The fact that has already been stated–that is, that Richmond
is to be your objective point, and that there is to be
co-operation between your force and the Army of the
Potomac–must be your guide. This indicates the necessity of
your holding close to the south bank of the James River as you
advance. Then, should the enemy be forced into his
intrenchments in Richmond, the Army of the Potomac would follow,
and by means of transports the two armies would become a unit.

“All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your
direction. If, however, you think it practicable to use your
cavalry south of you, so as to cut the railroad about Hicksford,
about the time of the general advance, it would be of immense
advantage.

“You will please forward for my information, at the earliest
practicable day, all orders, details, and instructions you may
give for the execution of this order.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER.”

On the 16th these instructions were substantially reiterated. On
the 19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army
and that of General Meade, he was informed that I expected him
to move from Fort Monroe the same day that General Meade moved
from Culpeper. The exact time I was to telegraph him as soon as
it was fixed, and that it would not be earlier than the 27th of
April; that it was my intention to fight Lee between Culpeper
and Richmond, if he would stand. Should he, however, fall back
into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junction with his
(General Butler’s) army on the James River; that, could I be
certain he would be able to invest Richmond on the south side,
so as to have his left resting on the James, above the city, I
would form the junction there; that circumstances might make
this course advisable anyhow; that he should use every exertion
to secure footing as far up the south side of the river as he
could, and as soon as possible after the receipt of orders to
move; that if he could not carry the city, he should at least
detain as large a force there as possible.

In co-operation with the main movements against Lee and
Johnston, I was desirous of using all other troops necessarily
kept in departments remote from the fields of immediate
operations, and also those kept in the background for the
protection of our extended lines between the loyal States and
the armies operating against them.

A very considerable force, under command of Major-General Sigel,
was so held for the protection of West Virginia, and the
frontiers of Maryland and Pennsylvania. Whilst these troops
could not be withdrawn to distant fields without exposing the
North to invasion by comparatively small bodies of the enemy,
they could act directly to their front, and give better
protection than if lying idle in garrison. By such a movement
they would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the
protection of his supplies and lines of communication, or he
would lose them. General Sigel was therefore directed to
organize all his available force into two expeditions, to move
from Beverly and Charleston, under command of Generals Ord and
Crook, against the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad.
Subsequently, General Ord having been relieved at his own
request, General Sigel was instructed at his own suggestion, to
give up the expedition by Beverly, and to form two columns, one
under General Crook, on the Kanawha, numbering about ten
thousand men, and one on the Shenandoah, numbering about seven
thousand men. The one on the Shenandoah to assemble between
Cumberland and the Shenandoah, and the infantry and artillery
advanced to Cedar Creek with such cavalry as could be made
available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in the Shenandoah
Valley, and advance as far as possible; while General Crook would
take possession of Lewisburg with part of his force and move down
the Tennessee Railroad, doing as much damage as he could,
destroying the New River Bridge and the salt-works, at
Saltville, Va.

Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations
were delayed until the 1st of May, when, everything being in
readiness and the roads favorable, orders were given for a
general movement of all the armies not later than the 4th of May.

My first object being to break the military power of the
rebellion, and capture the enemy’s important strongholds, made
me desirous that General Butler should succeed in his movement
against Richmond, as that would tend more than anything else,
unless it were the capture of Lee’s army, to accomplish this
desired result in the East. If he failed, it was my
determination, by hard fighting, either to compel Lee to
retreat, or to so cripple him that he could not detach a large
force to go north, and still retain enough for the defence of
Richmond. It was well understood, by both Generals Butler and
Meade, before starting en the campaign, that it was my intention
to put both their armies south of the James River, in case of
failure to destroy Lee without it.

Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at
Fort Monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent
importance of getting possession of Petersburg, and destroying
railroad communication as far south as possible. Believing,
however, in the practicability of capturing Richmond unless it
was reinforced, I made that the objective point of his
operations. As the Army of the Potomac was to move
simultaneously with him, Lee could not detach from his army with
safety, and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to
the defence of the city in time to meet a rapid movement from
the north of James River.

I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I
tried, as far as possible, to leave General Meade in independent
command of the Army of the Potomac. My instructions for that
army were all through him, and were general in their nature,
leaving all the details and the execution to him. The campaigns
that followed proved him to be the right man in the right
place. His commanding always in the presence of an officer
superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that public
attention that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he
would otherwise have received.

The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on the
morning of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and
orders of Major-General Meade, pursuant to instructions. Before
night, the whole army was across the Rapidan (the fifth and sixth
corps crossing at Germania Ford, and the second corps at Ely’s
Ford, the cavalry, under Major-General Sheridan, moving in
advance,) with the greater part of its trains, numbering about
four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight opposition. The
average distance travelled by the troops that day was about
twelve miles. This I regarded as a great success, and it
removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had
entertained, that of crossing the river in the face of an
active, large, well-appointed, and ably commanded army, and how
so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country,
and protected. Early on the 5th, the advance corps (the fifth,
Major-General G. K. Warren commanding) met and engaged the enemy
outside his intrenchments near Mine Run. The battle raged
furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight
as fast as the corps could be got upon the field, which,
considering the density of the forest and narrowness of the
roads, was done with commendable promptness.

General Burnside, with the ninth corps, was, at the time the
Army of the Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at
the crossing of the Rappahannock River and Alexandria Railroad,
holding the road back to Bull Run, with instructions not to move
until he received notice that a crossing of the Rapidan was
secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was
received. This crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of
the 4th. By six o’clock of the morning of the 6th he was
leading his corps into action near the Wilderness Tavern, some
of his troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles,
crossing both the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers. Considering
that a large proportion, probably two-thirds of his command, was
composed of new troops, unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the
accoutrements of a soldier, this was a remarkable march.

The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at five o’clock
on the morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury
until darkness set in, each army holding substantially the same
position that they had on the evening of the 5th. After dark,
the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank,
capturing several hundred prisoners and creating considerable
confusion. But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who was
personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon
reformed it and restored order. On the morning of the 7th,
reconnoissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his
intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of
the battle-field. From this it was evident to my mind that the
two days’ fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further
maintain the contest in the open field, notwithstanding his
advantage of position, and that he would wait an attack behind
his works. I therefore determined to push on and put my whole
force between him and Richmond; and orders were at once issued
for a movement by his right flank. On the night of the 7th, the
march was commenced towards Spottsylvania Court House, the fifth
corps moving on the most direct road. But the enemy having
become apprised of our movement, and having the shorter line,
was enabled to reach there first. On the 8th, General Warren
met a force of the enemy, which had been sent out to oppose and
delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line taken up at
Spottsylvania. This force was steadily driven back on the main
force, within the recently constructed works, after considerable
fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides. On the morning
of the 9th, General Sheridan started on a raid against the
enemy’s lines of communication with Richmond. The 9th, 10th,
and 11th were spent in manoeuvring and fighting, without
decisive results. Among the killed on the 9th was that able and
distinguished soldier Major-General John Sedgwick, commanding the
sixth army corps. Major-General H. G. Wright succeeded him in
command. Early on the morning of the 12th a general attack was
made on the enemy in position. The second corps, Major-General
Hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line, capturing
most of Johnson’s division of Ewell’s corps and twenty pieces of
artillery. But the resistance was so obstinate that the
advantage gained did not prove decisive. The 13th, 14th, 15th,
16th, 17th, and 18th, were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting
the arrival of reinforcements from Washington. Deeming it
impracticable to make any further attack upon the enemy at
Spottsylvania Court House, orders were issued on the 15th with a
view to a movement to the North Anna, to commence at twelve
o’clock on the night of the 19th. Late in the afternoon of the
19th, Ewell’s corps came out of its works on our extreme right
flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy loss.
This delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of
the 21st, when it was commenced. But the enemy again, having
the shorter line, and being in possession of the main roads, was
enabled to reach the North Anna in advance of us, and took
position behind it. The fifth corps reached the North Anna on
the afternoon of the 23d, closely followed by the sixth corps.
The second and ninth corps got up about the same time, the
second holding the railroad bridge, and the ninth lying between
that and Jericho Ford. General Warren effected a crossing the
same afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. Soon
after getting into position he was violently attacked, but
repulsed the enemy with great slaughter. On the 25th, General
Sheridan rejoined the Army of the Potomac from the raid on which
he started from Spottsylvania, having destroyed the depots at
Beaver Dam and Ashland stations, four trains of cars, large
supplies of rations, and many miles of railroad-track;
recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way to
Richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy’s
cavalry at Yellow Tavern; carried the first line of works around
Richmond (but finding the second line too strong to be carried by
assault), recrossed to the north bank of the Chickahominy at
Meadow Bridge under heavy fire, and moved by a detour to
Haxall’s Landing, on the James River, where he communicated with
General Butler. This raid had the effect of drawing off the
whole of the enemy’s cavalry force, making it comparatively easy
to guard our trains.

General Butler moved his main force up the James River, in
pursuance of instructions, on the 4th of May, General Gillmore
having joined him with the tenth corps. At the same time he
sent a force of one thousand eight hundred cavalry, by way of
West Point, to form a junction with him wherever he might get a
foothold, and a force of three thousand cavalry, under General
Kautz, from Suffolk, to operate against the road south of
Petersburg and Richmond. On the 5th, he occupied, without
opposition, both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement
being a complete surprise. On the 6th, he was in position with
his main army, and commenced intrenching. On the 7th he made a
reconnoissance against the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad,
destroying a portion of it after some fighting. On the 9th he
telegraphed as follows:

“HEADQUARTERS, NEAR BERMUDA LANDING,
May 9, 1864.

“HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

“Our operations may be summed up in a few words. With one
thousand seven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the
Peninsula, forced the Chickahominy, and have safely, brought
them to their present position. These were colored cavalry, and
are now holding our advance pickets towards Richmond.

“General Kautz, with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the
same day with our movement up James River, forced the Black
Water, burned the railroad bridge at Stony Creek, below
Petersburg, cutting into Beauregard’s force at that point.

“We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles
of railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we
can hold out against the whole of Lee’s army. I have ordered up
the supplies.

“Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south
by the cutting of the railroads by Kautz. That portion which
reached Petersburg under Hill I have whipped to-day, killing and
wounding many, and taking many prisoners, after a severe and
well-contested fight.

“General Grant will not be troubled with any further
reinforcements to Lee from Beauregard’s force.

“BENJ. F. BUTLER, Major-General.”

On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a
portion of the enemy’s first line of defences at Drury’s Bluff,
or Fort Darling, with small loss. The time thus consumed from
the 6th lost to us the benefit of the surprise and capture of
Richmond and Petersburg, enabling, as it did, Beauregard to
collect his loose forces in North and South Carolina, and bring
them to the defence of those places. On the 16th, the enemy
attacked General Butler in his position in front of Drury’s
Bluff. He was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchments
between the forks of the James and Appomattox rivers, the enemy
intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads,
the city, and all that was valuable to him. His army,
therefore, though in a position of great security, was as
completely shut off from further operations directly against
Richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked. It
required but a comparatively small force of the enemy to hold it
there.

On the 12th, General Kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a
raid against the Danville Railroad, which he struck at
Coalfield, Powhatan, and Chula Stations, destroying them, the
railroad-track, two freight trains, and one locomotive, together
with large quantities of commissary and other stores; thence,
crossing to the South Side Road, struck it at Wilson’s,
Wellsville, and Black’s and White’s Stations, destroying the
road and station-houses; thence he proceeded to City Point,
which he reached on the 18th.

On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of General
Butler, the enemy, with a land force under General Hoke and an
iron-clad ram, attacked Plymouth, N. C., commanded by General H.
W. Wessells, and our gunboats there, and, after severe fighting,
the place was carried by assault, and the entire garrison and
armament captured. The gunboat Smithfield was sunk, and the
Miami disabled.

The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically
sealed itself up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to
bring the most, if not all, the reinforcements brought from the
south by Beauregard against the Army of the Potomac. In addition
to this reinforcement, a very considerable one, probably not less
than fifteen thousand men, was obtained by calling in the
scattered troops under Breckinridge from the western part of
Virginia.

The position of Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was
difficult to operate from against the enemy. I determined,
therefore, to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough
only to secure what had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d,
I directed that they be sent forward, under command of
Major-General W. F. Smith, to join the Army of the Potomac.

On the 24th of May, the 9th army corps, commanded by
Major-General A. E. Burnside, was assigned to the Army of the
Potomac, and from this time forward constituted a portion of
Major-General Meade’s command.

Finding the enemy’s position on the North Anna stronger than
either of his previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26th
to the north bank of the North Anna, and moved via Hanover Town
to turn the enemy’s position by his right.

Generals Torbert’s and Merritt’s divisions of cavalry, under
Sheridan, and the 6th corps, led the advance, crossed the
Pamunkey River at Hanover Town, after considerable fighting, and
on the 28th the two divisions of cavalry had a severe, but
successful engagement with the enemy at Hawes’s Shop. On the
29th and 30th we advanced, with heavy skirmishing, to the
Hanover Court House and Cold Harbor Road, and developed the
enemy’s position north of the Chickahominy. Late on the evening
of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but was
repulsed with very considerable loss. An attack was immediately
ordered by General Meade, along his whole line, which resulted
in driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line.

On the 31st, General Wilson’s division of cavalry destroyed the
railroad bridges over the South Anna River, after defeating the
enemy’s cavalry. General Sheridan, on the same day, reached
Cold Harbor, and held it until relieved by the 6th corps and
General Smith’s command, which had just arrived, via White
House, from General Butler’s army.

On the 1st day of June an attack was made at five P.M. by the
6th corps and the troops under General Smith, the other corps
being held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders.
This resulted in our carrying and holding the enemy’s first line
of works in front of the right of the 6th corps, and in front of
General Smith. During the attack the enemy made repeated
assaults on each of the corps not engaged in the main attack,
but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance. That night
he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the day,
but failed. The 2d was spent in getting troops into position
for an attack on the 3d. On the 3d of June we again assaulted
the enemy’s works, in the hope of driving him from his
position. In this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the
enemy, I have reason to believe, was comparatively light. It was
the only general attack made from the Rapidan to the James which
did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own
losses. I would not be understood as saying that all previous
attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as
much as I had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy
severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete
overthrow of the rebellion.

From the proximity of the enemy to his defences around Richmond,
it was impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between
him and the city. I was still in a condition to either move by
his left flank, and invest Richmond from the north side, or
continue my move by his right flank to the south side of the
James. While the former might have been better as a covering
for Washington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me
that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and east of
Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad, a long,
vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to
guard, and that would have to be protected to supply the army,
and would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication
on the south side of the James. My idea, from the start, had
been to beat Lee’s army north of Richmond, if possible. Then,
after destroying his lines of communication north of the James
River, to transfer the army to the south side, and besiege Lee
in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. After
the battle of the Wilderness, it was evident that the enemy
deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the army
he then had. He acted purely on the defensive, behind
breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of
them, and where, in case of repulse, he could easily retire
behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of life than I was
willing to make, all could not be accomplished that I had
designed north of Richmond. I therefore determined to continue
to hold substantially the ground we then occupied, taking
advantage of any favorable circumstances that might present
themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to Charlottesville
and Gordonsville to effectually break up the railroad connection
between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley and Lynchburg; and
when the cavalry got well off, to move the army to the south
side of the James River, by the enemy’s right flank, where I
felt I could cut off all his sources of supply, except by the
canal.

On the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan,
got off on the expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad,
with instructions to Hunter, whom I hoped he would meet near
Charlottesville, to join his forces to Sheridan’s, and after the
work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the Army of
the Potomac by the route laid down in Sheridan’s instructions.

On the 10th of June, General Butler sent a force of infantry,
under General Gillmore, and of cavalry under General Kautz, to
capture Petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and
common bridges across the Appomattox. The cavalry carried the
works on the south side, and penetrated well in towards the
town, but were forced to retire. General Gillmore, finding the
works which he approached very strong, and deeming an assault
impracticable, returned to Bermuda Hundred without attempting
one.

Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, I
sent back to Bermuda Hundred and City Point, General Smith’s
command by water, via the White House, to reach there in advance
of the Army of the Potomac. This was for the express purpose of
securing Petersburg before the enemy, becoming aware of our
intention, could reinforce the place.

The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the
evening of the 12th. One division of cavalry, under General
Wilson, and the 5th corps, crossed the Chickahominy at Long
Bridge, and moved out to White Oak Swamp, to cover the crossings
of the other corps. The advance corps reached James River, at
Wilcox’s Landing and Charles City Court House, on the night of
the 13th.

During three long years the Armies of the Potomac and Northern
Virginia had been confronting each other. In that time they had
fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell
to the lot of two armies to fight, without materially changing
the vantage ground of either. The Southern press and people,
with more shrewdness than was displayed in the North, finding
that they had failed to capture Washington and march on to New
York, as they had boasted they would do, assumed that they only
defended their Capital and Southern territory. Hence, Antietam,
Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been fought, were
by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for
them. Their army believed this. It produced a morale which
could only be overcome by desperate and continuous hard
fighting. The battles of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North
Anna and Cold Harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our
side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him
as to make him wary ever after of taking the offensive. His
losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the fact that
we were, save in the Wilderness, almost invariably the attacking
party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field. The
details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the
part of the soldiery, have rarely been surpassed, are given in
the report of Major-General Meade, and the subordinate reports
accompanying it.

During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to the
James River, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting
base, by wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded
country, with a lack of wharves at each new base from which to
conveniently discharge vessels. Too much credit cannot,
therefore, be awarded to the quartermaster and commissary
departments for the zeal and efficiency displayed by them. Under
the general supervision of the chief quartermaster,
Brigadier-General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to occupy all
the available roads between the army and our water-base, and but
little difficulty was experienced in protecting them.

The movement in the Kanawha and Shenandoah valleys, under
General Sigel, commenced on the 1st of May. General Crook, who
had the immediate command of the Kanawha expedition, divided his
forces into two columns, giving one, composed of cavalry, to
General Averell. They crossed the mountains by separate routes.
Averell struck the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, near
Wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to New River and
Christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges
and depots, including New River Bridge, forming a junction with
Crook at Union on the 15th. General Sigel moved up the
Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy at New Market on the 15th, and,
after a severe engagement, was defeated with heavy loss, and
retired behind Cedar Creek. Not regarding the operations of
General Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removal from command,
and Major-General Hunter appointed to supersede him. His
instructions were embraced in the following dispatches to
Major-General H. W. Halleck, chief of staff of the army:

“NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, VA.
May 20, 1864.

* * * * * * *
“The enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as
are brought over the branch road running through Staunton. On
the whole, therefore, I think it would be better for General
Hunter to move in that direction; reach Staunton and
Gordonsville or Charlottesville, if he does not meet too much
opposition. If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he
will be doing good service. * * *

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.”

JERICHO FORD, VA., May 25, 1864.

“If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he
should do so, living on the country. The railroads and canal
should be destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks.
Completing this, he could find his way back to his original
base, or from about Gordonsville join this army.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.”

General Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up
the Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at
Piedmont, and, after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated
him, capturing on the field of battle one thousand five hundred
men, three pieces of artillery, and three hundred stand of small
arms. On the 8th of the same month he formed a junction with
Crook and Averell at Staunton, from which place he moved direct
on Lynchburg, via Lexington, which place he reached and invested
on the 16th day of June. Up to this time he was very successful;
and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance
stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would,
no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy important, point. The
destruction of the enemy’s supplies and manufactories was very
great. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee
sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached
Lynchburg a short time before Hunter. After some skirmishing on
the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition
to give battle, retired from before the place. Unfortunately,
this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his
return but by way of Kanawha. This lost to us the use of his
troops for several weeks from the defence of the North.

Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville, instead of
Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been
in a position to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against the
enemy, should the force he met have seemed to endanger it. If
it did not, he would have been within easy distance of the James
River Canal, on the main line of communication between Lynchburg
and the force sent for its defence. I have never taken
exception to the operations of General Hunter, and am not now
disposed to find fault with him, for I have no doubt he acted
within what he conceived to be the spirit of his instructions
and the interests of the service. The promptitude of his
movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the
commendation of his country.

To return to the Army of the Potomac: The 2d corps commenced
crossing the James River on the morning of the 14th by
ferry-boats at Wilcox’s Landing. The laying of the pontoon-
bridge was completed about midnight of the 14th, and the
crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly pushed forward
by both bridge and ferry.

After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by steamer to
Bermuda Hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate
capture of Petersburg.

The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him
to send General Smith immediately, that night, with all the
troops he could give him without sacrificing the position he
then held. I told him that I would return at once to the Army
of the Potomac, hasten its crossing and throw it forward to
Petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be done, that we
could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than the enemy
could bring troops against us. General Smith got off as
directed, and confronted the enemy’s pickets near Petersburg
before daylight next morning, but for some reason that I have
never been able to satisfactorily understand, did not get ready
to assault his main lines until near sundown. Then, with a part
of his command only, he made the assault, and carried the lines
north-east of Petersburg from the Appomattox River, for a
distance of over two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces
of artillery and three hundred prisoners. This was about seven
P.M. Between the line thus captured and Petersburg there were no
other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had
reinforced Petersburg with a single brigade from any source. The
night was clear the moon shining brightly and favorable to
further operations. General Hancock, with two divisions of the
2d corps, reached General Smith just after dark, and offered the
service of these troops as he (Smith) might wish, waiving rank to
the named commander, who he naturally supposed knew best the
position of affairs, and what to do with the troops. But
instead of taking these troops and pushing at once into
Petersburg, he requested General Hancock to relieve a part of
his line in the captured works, which was done before midnight.

By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force.
An attack was ordered to be made at six o’clock that evening by
the troops under Smith and the 2d and 9th corps. It required
until that time for the 9th corps to get up and into position.
The attack was made as ordered, and the fighting continued with
but little intermission until six o’clock the next morning, and
resulted in our carrying the advance and some of the main works
of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously
captured by General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and over
four hundred prisoners.

The 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and
persisted in with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only
resulted in forcing the enemy into an interior line, from which
he could not be dislodged. The advantages of position gained by
us were very great. The army then proceeded to envelop
Petersburg towards the South Side Railroad as far as possible
without attacking fortifications.

On the 16th the enemy, to reinforce Petersburg, withdrew from a
part of his intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expecting,
no doubt, to get troops from north of the James to take the place
of those withdrawn before we could discover it. General Butler,
taking advantage of this, at once moved a force on the railroad
between Petersburg and Richmond. As soon as I was apprised of
the advantage thus gained, to retain it I ordered two divisions
of the 6th corps, General Wright commanding, that were embarking
at Wilcox’s Landing, under orders for City Point, to report to
General Butler at Bermuda Hundred, of which General Butler was
notified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of
his present line urged upon him.

About two o’clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced
back to the line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning.
General Wright, with his two divisions, joined General Butler on
the forenoon of the 17th, the latter still holding with a strong
picket-line the enemy’s works. But instead of putting these
divisions into the enemy’s works to hold them, he permitted them
to halt and rest some distance in the rear of his own line.
Between four and five o’clock in the afternoon the enemy
attacked and drove in his pickets and re-occupied his old line.

On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was
effected by General Butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the
north bank of the James, at Deep Bottom, and connected by
pontoon-bridge with Bermuda Hundred.

On the 19th, General Sheridan, on his return from his expedition
against the Virginia Central Railroad, arrived at the White House
just as the enemy’s cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled
it to retire. The result of this expedition was, that General
Sheridan met the enemy’s cavalry near Trevilian Station, on the
morning of the 11th of June, whom he attacked, and after an
obstinate contest drove from the field in complete rout. He
left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our hands, and about
four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses. On the 12th
he destroyed the railroad from Trevilian Station to Louisa Court
House. This occupied until three o’clock P.M., when he advanced
in the direction of Gordonsville. He found the enemy reinforced
by infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles
from the latter place and too strong to successfully assault. On
the extreme right, however, his reserve brigade carried the
enemy’s works twice, and was twice driven therefrom by
infantry. Night closed the contest. Not having sufficient
ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animals being
without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing),
and hearing nothing from General Hunter, he withdrew his command
to the north side of the North Anna, and commenced his return
march, reaching White House at the time before stated. After
breaking up the depot at that place, he moved to the James
River, which he reached safely after heavy fighting. He
commenced crossing on the 25th, near Fort Powhatan, without
further molestation, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac.

On the 22d, General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of
the Army of the Potomac, and General Kautz’s division of cavalry
of the Army of the James moved against the enemy’s railroads
south of Richmond. Striking the Weldon Railroad at Reams’s
Station, destroying the depot and several miles of the road, and
the South Side road about fifteen miles from Petersburg, to near
Nottoway Station, where he met and defeated a force of the
enemy’s cavalry. He reached Burkesville Station on the
afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the Danville
Railroad to Roanoke Bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles,
where he found the enemy in force, and in a position from which
he could not dislodge him. He then commenced his return march,
and on the 28th met the enemy’s cavalry in force at the Weldon
Railroad crossing of Stony Creek, where he had a severe but not
decisive engagement. Thence he made a detour from his left with
a view of reaching Reams’s Station (supposing it to be in our
possession). At this place he was met by the enemy’s cavalry,
supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the loss of
his artillery and trains. In this last encounter, General
Kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made
his way into our lines. General Wilson, with the remainder of
his force, succeeded in crossing the Nottoway River and coming
in safely on our left and rear. The damage to the enemy in this
expedition more than compensated for the losses we sustained. It
severed all connection by railroad with Richmond for several
weeks.

With a view of cutting the enemy’s railroad from near Richmond
to the Anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his
army in the Shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to
take advantage of his necessary withdrawal of troops from
Petersburg, to explode a mine that had been prepared in front of
the 9th corps and assault the enemy’s lines at that place, on the
night of the 26th of July the 2d corps and two divisions of the
cavalry corps and Kautz’s cavalry were crossed to the north bank
of the James River and joined the force General Butler had
there. On the 27th the enemy was driven from his intrenched
position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. On the
28th our lines were extended from Deep Bottom to New Market
Road, but in getting this position were attacked by the enemy in
heavy force. The fighting lasted for several hours, resulting in
considerable loss to both sides. The first object of this move
having failed, by reason of the very large force thrown there by
the enemy, I determined to take advantage of the diversion made,
by assaulting Petersburg before he could get his force back
there. One division of the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night
of the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the 18th
corps, to relieve that corps in the line, that it might be
foot-loose in the assault to be made. The other two divisions
of the 2d corps and Sheridan’s cavalry were crossed over on the
night of the 29th and moved in front of Petersburg. On the
morning of the 30th, between four and five o’clock, the mine was
sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a regiment, and the
advance of the assaulting column, formed of the 9th corps,
immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion,
and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a
detached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to
advance promptly to the ridge beyond. Had they done this, I
have every reason to believe that Petersburg would have
fallen. Other troops were immediately pushed forward, but the
time consumed in getting them up enabled the enemy to rally from
his surprise (which had been complete), and get forces to this
point for its defence. The captured line thus held being
untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops were withdrawn,
but not without heavy loss. Thus terminated in disaster what
promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign.

Immediately upon the enemy’s ascertaining that General Hunter
was retreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha River, thus
laying the Shenandoah Valley open for raid into Maryland and
Pennsylvania, he returned northward and moved down that
valley. As soon as this movement of the enemy was ascertained,
General Hunter, who had reached the Kanawha River, was directed
to move his troops without delay, by river and railroad, to
Harper’s Ferry; but owing to the difficulty of navigation by
reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great delay was
experienced in getting there. It became necessary, therefore,
to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. For
this purpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating
against Richmond, to which was added the 19th corps, then
fortunately beginning to arrive in Hampton Roads from the Gulf
Department, under orders issued immediately after the
ascertainment of the result of the Red River expedition. The
garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this time made up
of heavy-artillery regiments, hundred days’ men, and detachments
from the invalid corps. One division under command of General
Ricketts, of the 6th corps, was sent to Baltimore, and the
remaining two divisions of the 6th corps, under General Wright,
were subsequently sent to Washington. On the 3d of July the
enemy approached Martinsburg. General Sigel, who was in command
of our forces there, retreated across the Potomac at
Shepherdtown; and General Weber, commanding at Harper’s Ferry,
crossed the occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column towards
Frederick City. General Wallace, with Rickett’s division and
his own command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops,
pushed out from Baltimore with great promptness, and met the
enemy in force on the Monocacy, near the crossing of the
railroad bridge. His force was not sufficient to insure
success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although it
resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy, and
thereby served to enable General Wright to reach Washington with
two division of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th
corps, before him. From Monocacy the enemy moved on Washington,
his cavalry advance reaching Rockville on the evening of the
10th. On the 12th a reconnoissance was thrown out in front of
Fort Stevens, to ascertain the enemy’s position and force. A
severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost about two hundred and
eighty in killed and wounded. The enemy’s loss was probably
greater. He commenced retreating during the night. Learning
the exact condition of affairs at Washington, I requested by
telegraph, at forty-five minutes past eleven P.M., on the 12th,
the assignment of Major-General H. G. Wright to the command of
all the troops that could be made available to operate in the
field against the enemy, and directed that he should get outside
of the trenches with all the force he could, and push Early to
the last moment. General Wright commenced the pursuit on the
13th; on the 18th the enemy was overtaken at Snicker’s Ferry, on
the Shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred; and on the 20th,
General Averell encountered and defeated a portion of the rebel
army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and
several hundred prisoners.

Learning that Early was retreating south towards Lynchburg or
Richmond, I directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to
the armies operating against Richmond, so that they might be
used in a movement against Lee before the return of the troops
sent by him into the valley; and that Hunter should remain in
the Shenandoah Valley, keeping between any force of the enemy
and Washington, acting on the defensive as much as possible. I
felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the fact
would be developed before the 6th and 19th corps could leave
Washington. Subsequently, the 19th corps was excepted form the
order to return to the James.

About the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again
advancing upon Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the 6th corps,
then at Washington, was ordered back to the vicinity of Harper’s
Ferry. The rebel force moved down the valley, and sent a raiding
party into Pennsylvania which on the 30th burned Chambersburg,
and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards
Cumberland. They were met and defeated by General Kelley, and
with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of West
Virginia. From the time of the first raid the telegraph wires
were frequently down between Washington and City Point, making
it necessary to transmit messages a part of the way by boat. It
took from twenty-four to thirty-six hours to get dispatches
through and return answers would be received showing a
difference state of facts from those on which they were based,
causing confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that must
have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and
rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they
otherwise would have been. To remedy this evil, it was evident
to my mind that some person should have the supreme command of
all the forces in the Department of West Virginia, Washington,
Susquehanna, and the Middle Department, and I so recommended.

On the 2d of August, I ordered General Sheridan to report in
person to Major-General Halleck, chief of staff, at Washington,
with a view to his assignment to the command of all the forces
against Early. At this time the enemy was concentrated in the
neighborhood of Winchester, while our forces, under General
Hunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at the crossing of
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, leaving open to the enemy
Western Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania. From where I was, I
hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces
at Monocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington.
Therefore, on the 4th, I left City Point to visit Hunter’s
command, and determine for myself what was best to be done. On
arrival there, and after consultation with General Hunter, I
issued to him the following instructions:

“MONOCACY BRIDGE, MARYLAND,
August 5, 1864–8 P.M.

“GENERAL:–Concentrate all your available force without delay in
the vicinity of Harper’s Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards
and garrisons for public property as may be necessary. Use, in
this concentrating, the railroad, if by so doing time can be
saved. From Harper’s Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has
moved north of the Potomac in large force, push north, following
him and attacking him wherever found; follow him, if driven south
of the Potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. If it is
ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the
Potomac, then push south with the main force, detaching under a
competent commander, a sufficient force to look after the
raiders, and drive them to their homes. In detaching such a
force,the brigade of the cavalry now en route from Washington
via Rockville may be taken into account.

“There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of
the best cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and
horses. These will be instructed, in the absence of further
orders, to join you by the south side of the Potomac. One
brigade will probably start to-morrow. In pushing up the
Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to go
first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to
invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and
stock wanted for the use of your command; such as cannot be
consumed, destroy. It is not desirable that the buildings
should be destroyed–they should rather be protected; but the
people should be informed that, so long as an army can subsist
among them, recurrence of theses raids must be expected, and we
are determined to stop them at all hazards.

“Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do
this you want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your
course by the course he takes.

“Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving
regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in
the country through which you march.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER.”

The troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance
reached Halltown that night.

General Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a
willingness to be relieved from command, I telegraphed to have
General Sheridan, then at Washington, sent to Harper’s Ferry by
the morning train, with orders to take general command of all
the troops in the field, and to call on General Hunter at
Monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of
instructions. I remained at Monocacy until General Sheridan
arrived, on the morning of the 6th, and, after a conference with
him in relation to military affairs in that vicinity, I returned
to City Point by way of Washington.

On the 7th of August, the Middle Department, and the Departments
of West Virginia, Washington, and Susquehanna, were constituted
into the “Middle Military Division,” and Major-General Sheridan
was assigned to temporary command of the same.

Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and
Wilson, were sent to Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac. The
first reached him at Harper’s Ferry about the 11th of August.

His operations during the month of August and the fore part of
September were both of an offensive and defensive character,
resulting in many severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry,
in which we were generally successful, but no general engagement
took place. The two armies lay in such a position–the enemy on
the west bank of the Opequon Creek covering Winchester, and our
forces in front of Berryville–that either could bring on a
battle at any time. Defeat to us would lay open to the enemy
the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distances
before another army could be interposed to check him. Under
these circumstances I hesitated about allowing the initiative to
be taken. Finally, the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad,
and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which were both obstructed by
the enemy, became so indispensably necessary to us, and the
importance of relieving Pennsylvania and Maryland from
continuously threatened invasion so great, that I determined the
risk should be taken. But fearing to telegraph the order for an
attack without knowing more than I did of General Sheridan’s
feelings as to what would be the probable result, I left City
Point on the 15th of September to visit him at his headquarters,
to decide, after conference with him, what should be done. I met
him at Charlestown, and he pointed out so distinctly how each
army lay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and
expressed such confidence of success, that I saw there were but
two words of instructions necessary–Go in! For the
conveniences of forage, the teams for supplying the army were
kept at Harper’s Ferry. I asked him if he could get out his
teams and supplies in time to make an attack on the ensuing
Tuesday morning. His reply was, that he could before daylight
on Monday. He was off promptly to time, and I may here add,
that the result was such that I have never since deemed it
necessary to visit General Sheridan before giving him orders.

Early on the morning of the 19th, General Sheridan attacked
General Early at the crossing on the Opequon Creek, and after a
most sanguinary and bloody battle, lasting until five o’clock in
the evening, defeated him with heavy loss, carrying his entire
position from Opequon Creek to Winchester, capturing several
thousand prisoners and five pieces of artillery. The enemy
rallied, and made a stand in a strong position at Fisher’s Hill,
where he was attacked, and again defeated with heavy loss on the
20th [22d]. Sheridan pursued him with great energy through
Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge. After
stripping the upper valley of most of the supplies and
provisions for the rebel army, he returned to Strasburg, and
took position on the north side of Cedar Creek.

Having received considerable reinforcements, General Early again
returned to the valley, and, on the 9th of October, his cavalry
encountered ours near Strasburg, where the rebels were defeated,
with the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three hundred and
fifty prisoners. On the night of the 18th, the enemy crossed the
mountains which separate the branches of the Shenandoah, forded
the North Fork, and early on the morning of the 19th, under
cover of the darkness and the fog, surprised and turned our left
flank, and captured the batteries which enfiladed our whole
line. Our troops fell back with heavy loss and in much
confusion, but were finally rallied between Middletown and
Newtown. At this juncture, General Sheridan, who was at
Winchester when the battle commenced arrived on the field,
arranged his lines just in time to repulse a heavy attack of the
enemy, and immediately assuming the offensive, he attacked in
turn with great vigor. The enemy was defeated with great
slaughter, and the loss of most of his artillery and trains, and
the trophies he had captured in the morning. The wreck of his
army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of
Staunton and Lynchburg. Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson. Thus
ended this, the enemy’s last attempt to invade the North via the
Shenandoah Valley. I was now enabled to return the 6th corps to
the Army of the Potomac, and to send one division from Sheridan’s
army to the Army of the James, and another to Savannah, Georgia,
to hold Sherman’s new acquisitions on the sea-coast, and thus
enable him to move without detaching from his force for that
purpose.

Reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy
had detached three divisions from Petersburg to reinforce Early
in the Shenandoah Valley. I therefore sent the 2d corps and
Gregg’s division of cavalry, of the Army of the Potomac, and a
force of General Butler’s army, on the night of the 13th of
August, to threaten Richmond from the north side of the James,
to prevent him from sending troops away, and, if possible, to
draw back those sent. In this move we captured six pieces of
artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops that
were under marching orders, and ascertained that but one
division (Kershaw’s), of the three reputed detached, had gone.

The enemy having withdrawn heavily from Petersburg to resist
this movement, the 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was
moved out on the 18th, and took possession of the Weldon
Railroad. During the day he had considerable fighting. To
regain possession of the road, the enemy made repeated and
desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with great
loss. On the night of the 20th, the troops on the north side of
the James were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg returned to the
front at Petersburg. On the 25th, the 2d corps and Gregg’s
division of cavalry, while at Reams’s Station destroying the
railroad, were attacked, and after desperate fighting, a part of
our line gave way, and five pieces of artillery fell into the
hands of the enemy.

By the 12th of September, a branch railroad was completed from
the City Point and Petersburg Railroad to the Weldon Railroad,
enabling us to supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the
army in front of Petersburg.

The extension of our lines across the Weldon Railroad compelled
the enemy to so extend his, that it seemed he could have but few
troops north of the James for the defence of Richmond. On the
night of the 28th, the 10th corps, Major-General Birney, and the
18th corps, Major-General Ord commanding, of General Butler’s
army, were crossed to the north side of the James, and advanced
on the morning of the 29th, carrying the very strong
fortifications and intrenchments below Chaffin’s Farm, known as
Fort Harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery, and the
New Market Road and intrenchments. This success was followed up
by a gallant assault upon Fort Gilmer, immediately in front of
the Chaffin Farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with
heavy loss. Kautz’s cavalry was pushed forward on the road to
the right of this, supported by infantry, and reached the
enemy’s inner line, but was unable to get further. The position
captured from the enemy was so threatening to Richmond, that I
determined to hold it. The enemy made several desperate
attempts to dislodge us, all of which were unsuccessful, and for
which he paid dearly. On the morning of the 30th, General Meade
sent out a reconnoissance with a view to attacking the enemy’s
line, if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of
troops to the north side. In this reconnoissance we captured
and held the enemy’s works near Poplar Spring Church. In the
afternoon, troops moving to get to the left of the point gained
were attacked by the enemy in heavy force, and compelled to fall
back until supported by the forces holding the captured works.
Our cavalry under Gregg was also attacked, but repulsed the
enemy with great loss.

On the 7th of October, the enemy attacked Kautz’s cavalry north
of the James, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed,
wounded, and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery eight
or nine pieces. This he followed up by an attack on our
intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe
slaughter. On the 13th, a reconnoissance was sent out by
General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new
works he was constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to
us.

On the 27th, the Army of the Potomac, leaving only sufficient
men to hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy’s right
flank. The 2d corps, followed by two divisions of the 5th
corps, with the cavalry in advance and covering our left flank,
forced a passage of Hatcher’s Run, and moved up the south side
of it towards the South Side Railroad, until the 2d corps and
part of the cavalry reached the Boydton Plank Road where it
crosses Hatcher’s Run. At this point we were six miles distant
from the South Side Railroad, which I had hoped by this movement
to reach and hold. But finding that we had not reached the end
of the enemy’s fortifications, and no place presenting itself
for a successful assault by which he might be doubled up and
shortened, I determined to withdraw to within our fortified
line. Orders were given accordingly. Immediately upon
receiving a report that General Warren had connected with
General Hancock, I returned to my headquarters. Soon after I
left the enemy moved out across Hatcher’s Run, in the gap
between Generals Hancock and Warren, which was not closed as
reported, and made a desperate attack on General Hancock’s right
and rear. General Hancock immediately faced his corps to meet
it, and after a bloody combat drove the enemy within his works,
and withdrew that night to his old position.

In support of this movement, General Butler made a demonstration
on the north side of the James, and attacked the enemy on the
Williamsburg Road, and also on the York River Railroad. In the
former he was unsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in
carrying a work which was afterwards abandoned, and his forces
withdrawn to their former positions.

From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg and
Richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the
defence and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements
for crippling the enemy’s lines of communication, and to prevent
his detaching any considerable force to send south. By the 7th
of February, our lines were extended to Hatcher’s Run, and the
Weldon Railroad had been destroyed to Hicksford.

General Sherman moved from Chattanooga on the 6th of May, with
the Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, commanded,
respectively, by Generals Thomas McPherson, and Schofield, upon
Johnston’s army at Dalton; but finding the enemy’s position at
Buzzard’s Roost, covering Dalton, too strong to be assaulted,
General McPherson was sent through Snake Gap to turn it, while
Generals Thomas and Schofield threatened it in front and on the
north. This movement was successful. Johnston, finding his
retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortified
position at Resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of
May 15th. A heavy battle ensued. During the night the enemy
retreated south. Late on the 17th, his rear-guard was overtaken
near Adairsville, and heavy skirmishing followed. The next
morning, however, he had again disappeared. He was vigorously
pursued, and was overtaken at Cassville on the 19th, but during
the ensuing night retreated across the Etowah. While these
operations were going on, General Jefferson C. Davis’s division
of Thomas’s army was sent to Rome, capturing it with its forts
and artillery, and its valuable mills and foundries. General
Sherman, having give his army a few days’ rest at this point,
again put it in motion on the 23d, for Dallas, with a view of
turning the difficult pass at Allatoona. On the afternoon of
the 25th, the advance, under General Hooker, had a severe battle
with the enemy, driving him back to New Hope Church, near
Dallas. Several sharp encounters occurred at this point. The
most important was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted General
McPherson at Dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse.

On the 4th of June, Johnston abandoned his intrenched position
at New Hope Church, and retreated to the strong positions of
Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost mountains. He was forced to yield the
two last-named places, and concentrate his army on Kenesaw,
where, on the 27th, Generals Thomas and McPherson made a
determined but unsuccessful assault. On the night of the 2d of
July, Sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank, and
on the morning of the 3d, found that the enemy, in consequence
of this movement, had abandoned Kenesaw and retreated across the
Chattahoochee.

General Sherman remained on the Chattahoochee to give his men
rest and get up stores until the 17th of July, when he resumed
his operations, crossed the Chattahoochee, destroyed a large
portion of the railroad to Augusta, and drove the enemy back to
Atlanta. At this place General Hood succeeded General Johnston
in command of the rebel army, and assuming the
offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon
Sherman in the vicinity of Atlanta, the most desperate and
determined of which was on the 22d of July. About one P.M. of
this day the brave, accomplished, and noble-hearted McPherson
was killed. General Logan succeeded him, and commanded the Army
of the Tennessee through this desperate battle, and until he was
superseded by Major-General Howard, on the 26th, with the same
success and ability that had characterized him in the command of
a corps or division.

In all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss.
Finding it impossible to entirely invest the place, General
Sherman, after securing his line of communications across the
Chattahoochee, moved his main force round by the enemy’s left
flank upon the Montgomery and Macon roads, to draw the enemy
from his fortifications. In this he succeeded, and after
defeating the enemy near Rough-and-Ready, Jonesboro, and
Lovejoy’s, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of
September occupied Atlanta, the objective point of his campaign.

About the time of this move, the rebel cavalry, under Wheeler,
attempted to cut his communications in the rear, but was
repulsed at Dalton, and driven into East Tennessee, whence it
proceeded west to McMinnville, Murfreesboro’, and Franklin, and
was finally driven south of the Tennessee. The damage done by
this raid was repaired in a few days.

During the partial investment of Atlanta, General Rousseau
joined General Sherman with a force of cavalry from Decatur,
having made a successful raid upon the Atlanta and Montgomery
Railroad, and its branches near Opelika. Cavalry raids were also
made by Generals McCook, Garrard, and Stoneman, to cut the
remaining Railroad communication with Atlanta. The first two
were successful the latter, disastrous.

General Sherman’s movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta was
prompt, skilful, and brilliant. The history of his flank
movements and battles during that memorable campaign will ever
be read with an interest unsurpassed by anything in history.

His own report, and those of his subordinate commanders,
accompanying it, give the details of that most successful
campaign.

He was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a
single-track railroad from Nashville to the point where he was
operating. This passed the entire distance through a hostile
country, and every foot of it had to be protected by troops. The
cavalry force of the enemy under Forrest, in Northern
Mississippi, was evidently waiting for Sherman to advance far
enough into the mountains of Georgia, to make a retreat
disastrous, to get upon this line and destroy it beyond the
possibility of further use. To guard against this danger,
Sherman left what he supposed to be a sufficient force to
operate against Forrest in West Tennessee. He directed General
Washburn, who commanded there, to send Brigadier-General S. D.
Sturgis in command of this force to attack him. On the morning
of the 10th of June, General Sturgis met the enemy near Guntown,
Mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout and
confusion to Memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles,
hotly pursued by the enemy. By this, however, the enemy was
defeated in his designs upon Sherman’s line of communications.
The persistency with which he followed up this success exhausted
him, and made a season for rest and repairs necessary. In the
meantime, Major-General A. J. Smith, with the troops of the Army
of the Tennessee that had been sent by General Sherman to General
Banks, arrived at Memphis on their return from Red River, where
they had done most excellent service. He was directed by
General Sherman to immediately take the offensive against
Forrest. This he did with the promptness and effect which has
characterized his whole military career. On the 14th of July,
he met the enemy at Tupelo, Mississippi, and whipped him
badly. The fighting continued through three days. Our loss was
small compared with that of the enemy. Having accomplished the
object of his expedition, General Smith returned to Memphis.

During the months of March and April this same force under
Forrest annoyed us considerably. On the 24th of March it
captured Union City, Kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th
attacked Paducah, commanded by Colonel S. G. Hicks, 40th Illinois
Volunteers. Colonel H., having but a small force, withdrew to
the forts near the river, from where he repulsed the enemy and
drove him from the place.

On the 13th of April, part of this force, under the rebel
General Buford, summoned the garrison of Columbus, Kentucky, to
surrender, but received for reply from Colonel Lawrence, 34th
New Jersey Volunteers, that being placed there by his Government
with adequate force to hold his post and repel all enemies from
it, surrender was out of the question.

On the morning of the same day Forrest attacked Fort Pillow,
Tennessee, garrisoned by a detachment of Tennessee cavalry and
the 1st Regiment Alabama colored troops, commanded by Major
Booth. The garrison fought bravely until about three o’clock in
the afternoon, when the enemy carried the works by assault; and,
after our men threw down their arms, proceeded to an inhuman and
merciless massacre of the garrison.

On the 14th, General Buford, having failed at Columbus, appeared
before Paducah, but was again driven off.

Guerillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by Forrest’s
operations, were also very active in Kentucky. The most noted
of these was Morgan. With a force of from two to three thousand
cavalry, he entered the State through Pound Gap in the latter
part of May. On the 11th of June they attacked and captured
Cynthiana, with its entire garrison. On the 12th he was
overtaken by General Burbridge, and completely routed with heavy
loss, and was finally driven out of the State. This notorious
guerilla was afterwards surprised and killed near Greenville,
Tennessee, and his command captured and dispersed by General
Gillem.

In the absence of official reports of the commencement of the
Red River expedition, except so far as relates to the movements
of the troops sent by General Sherman under General A. J. Smith,
I am unable to give the date of its starting. The troops under
General Smith, comprising two divisions of the 16th and a
detachment of the 17th army corps, left Vicksburg on the 10th of
March, and reached the designated point on Red River one day
earlier than that appointed by General Banks. The rebel forces
at Fort de Russy, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the
14th to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying
the enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, Smith pushed
forward to Fort de Russy, which had been left with a weak
garrison, and captured it with its garrison about three hundred
and fifty men, eleven pieces of artillery, and many
small-arms. Our loss was but slight. On the 15th he pushed
forward to Alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th. On
the 21st he had an engagement with the enemy at Henderson’s
Hill, in which he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten
prisoners and four pieces of artillery.

On the 28th, he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the
rebel General Taylor, at Cane River. By the 26th, General Banks
had assembled his whole army at Alexandria, and pushed forward to
Grand Ecore. On the morning of April 6th he moved from Grand
Ecore. On the afternoon of the 7th, he advanced and met the
enemy near Pleasant Hill, and drove him from the field. On the
same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight miles beyond
Pleasant Hill, but was again compelled to retreat. On the 8th,
at Sabine Cross Roads and Peach Hill, the enemy attacked and
defeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and
an immense amount of transportation and stores. During the
night, General Banks fell back to Pleasant Hill, where another
battle was fought on the 9th, and the enemy repulsed with great
loss. During the night, General Banks continued his retrograde
movement to Grand Ecore, and thence to Alexandria, which he
reached on the 27th of April. Here a serious difficulty arose
in getting Admiral Porter’s fleet which accompanied the
expedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much
since they passed up as to prevent their return. At the
suggestion of Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Bailey, and under
his superintendence, wing-dams were constructed, by which the
channel was contracted so that the fleet passed down the rapids
in safety.

The army evacuated Alexandria on the 14th of May, after
considerable skirmishing with the enemy’s advance, and reached
Morganzia and Point Coupee near the end of the month. The
disastrous termination of this expedition, and the lateness of
the season, rendered impracticable the carrying out of my plans
of a movement in force sufficient to insure the capture of
Mobile.

On the 23d of March, Major-General Steele left Little Rock with
the 7th army corps, to cooperate with General Banks’s
expedition on the Red River, and reached Arkadelphia on the
28th. On the 16th of April, after driving the enemy before him,
he was joined, near Elkin’s Ferry, in Washita County, by General
Thayer, who had marched from Fort Smith. After several severe
skirmishes, in which the enemy was defeated, General Steele
reached Camden, which he occupied about the middle of April.

On learning the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks
on Red River, and the loss of one of his own trains at Mark’s
Mill, in Dallas County, General Steele determined to fall back
to the Arkansas River. He left Camden on the 26th of April, and
reached Little Rock on the 2d of May. On the 30th of April, the
enemy attacked him while crossing Saline River at Jenkins’s
Ferry, but was repulsed with considerable loss. Our loss was
about six hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners.

Major-General Canby, who had been assigned to the command of the
“Military Division of the West Mississippi,” was therefore
directed to send the 19th army corps to join the armies
operating against Richmond, and to limit the remainder of his
command to such operations as might be necessary to hold the
positions and lines of communications he then occupied.

Before starting General A. J. Smith’s troops back to Sherman,
General Canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy
that was collecting near the Mississippi River. General Smith
met and defeated this force near Lake Chicot on the 5th of
June. Our loss was about forty killed and seventy wounded.

In the latter part of July, General Canby sent Major-General
Gordon Granger, with such forces as he could collect, to
co-operate with Admiral Farragut against the defences of Mobile
Bay. On the 8th of August, Fort Gaines surrendered to the
combined naval and land forces. Fort Powell was blown up and
abandoned.

On the 9th, Fort Morgan was invested, and, after a severe
bombardment, surrendered on the 23d. The total captures
amounted to one thousand four hundred and sixty-four prisoners,
and one hundred and four pieces of artillery.

About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel
General Price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had
reached Jacksonport, on his way to invade Missouri, General A.
J. Smith’s command, then en route from Memphis to join Sherman,
was ordered to Missouri. A cavalry force was also, at the same
time, sent from Memphis, under command of Colonel Winslow. This
made General Rosecrans’s forces superior to those of Price, and
no doubt was entertained he would be able to check Price and
drive him back; while the forces under General Steele, in
Arkansas, would cut off his retreat. On the 26th day of
September, Price attacked Pilot Knob and forced the garrison to
retreat, and thence moved north to the Missouri River, and
continued up that river towards Kansas. General Curtis,
commanding Department of Kansas, immediately collected such
forces as he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while
General Rosecrans’s cavalry was operating in his rear.

The enemy was brought to battle on the Big Blue and defeated,
with the loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large
number of prisoners. He made a precipitate retreat to Northern
Arkansas. The impunity with which Price was enabled to roam
over the State of Missouri for a long time, and the incalculable
mischief done by him, show to how little purpose a superior force
may be used. There is no reason why General Rosecrans should not
have concentrated his forces, and beaten and driven Price before
the latter reached Pilot Knob.

September 20th, the enemy’s cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the
Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d attacked the
garrison at Athens, consisting of six hundred men, which
capitulated on the 24th. Soon after the surrender two regiments
of reinforcements arrived, and after a severe fight were
compelled to surrender. Forrest destroyed the railroad
westward, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle,
skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on the 27th, and on the
same day cut the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad near
Tullahoma and Dechard. On the morning of the 30th, one column
of Forrest’s command, under Buford, appeared before Huntsville,
and summoned the surrender of the garrison. Receiving an answer
in the negative, he remained in the vicinity of the place until
next morning, when he again summoned its surrender, and received
the same reply as on the night before. He withdrew in the
direction of Athens which place had been regarrisoned, and
attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of October, but without
success. On the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but
was handsomely repulsed.

Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on the
morning of the 1st, but did not make an attack. On the morning
of the 3d he moved towards Mount Pleasant. While these
operations were going on, every exertion was made by General
Thomas to destroy the forces under Forrest before he could
recross the Tennessee, but was unable to prevent his escape to
Corinth, Mississippi.

In September, an expedition under General Burbridge was sent to
destroy the saltworks at Saltville, Virginia. He met the enemy
on the 2d of October, about three miles and a half from
Saltville, and drove him into his strongly intrenched position
around the salt-works, from which he was unable to dislodge
him. During the night he withdrew his command and returned to
Kentucky.

General Sherman, immediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his
armies in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations
for refitting and supplying them for future service. The great
length of road from Atlanta to the Cumberland River, however,
which had to be guarded, allowed the troops but little rest.

During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon,
Georgia, which was reported in the papers of the South, and soon
became known to the whole country, disclosing the plans of the
enemy, thus enabling General Sherman to fully meet them. He
exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that had been
beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt at the
defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against
the army that had so often defeated it.

In execution of this plan, Hood, with this army, was soon
reported to the south-west of Atlanta. Moving far to Sherman’s
right, he succeeded in reaching the railroad about Big Shanty,
and moved north on it.

General Sherman, leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the
remainder of his army fell upon him and drove him to Gadsden,
Alabama. Seeing the constant annoyance he would have with the
roads to his rear if he attempted to hold Atlanta, General
Sherman proposed the abandonment and destruction of that place,
with all the railroads leading to it, and telegraphed me as
follows:

“CENTREVILLE, GEORGIA
October 10–noon.

“Dispatch about Wilson just received. Hood is now crossing
Coosa River, twelve miles below Rome, bound west. If he passes
over the Mobile and Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan
of my letter sent by Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas
with the troops now in Tennessee to defend the State? He will
have an ample force when the reinforcements ordered reach
Nashville.

“W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
“LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT.”

For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this
dispatch, I quote from the letter sent by Colonel Porter: “I
will therefore give my opinion, that your army and Canby’s
should be reinforced to the maximum; that after you get
Wilmington, you strike for Savannah and the river; that Canby be
instructed to hold the Mississippi River, and send a force to get
Columbus, Georgia, either by the way of the Alabama or the
Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed and put my army in
final order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, to
be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commerce and the
city of Savannah is in our possession.” This was in reply to a
letter of mine of date September 12th, in answer to a dispatch
of his containing substantially the same proposition, and in
which I informed him of a proposed movement against Wilmington,
and of the situation in Virginia, etc.

“CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,

October 11, 1864–11 A.M.

“Your dispatch of October 10th received. Does it not look as if
Hood was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using
the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply
his base on the Tennessee River, about Florence or Decatur? If
he does this, he ought to be met and prevented from getting
north of the Tennessee River. If you were to cut loose, I do
not believe you would meet Hood’s army, but would be bushwhacked
by all the old men and little boys, and such railroad guards as
are still left at home. Hood would probably strike for
Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater
damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. If
there is any way of getting at Hood’s army, I would prefer that,
but I must trust to your own judgment. I find I shall not be
able to send a force from here to act with you on Savannah. Your
movements, therefore, will be independent of mine; at least until
the fall of Richmond takes place. I am afraid Thomas, with such
lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent Hood from
going north. With Wilson turned loose, with all your cavalry,
you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive than
heretofore.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN.”

KINGSTON, GEORGIA,
October 11–11 A.M.

“Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and
Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome. He
threw one corps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to
follow. I hold Atlanta with the 20th corps, and have strong
detachments along my line. This reduces my active force to a
comparatively small army. We cannot remain here on the
defensive. With the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold
cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads. I would
infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the
country from Chattanooga to Atlanta including the latter city
send back all my wounded and worthless, and with my effective
army, move through Georgia, smashing things, to the sea. Hood
may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be
forced to follow me. Instead of my being on the defensive, I
would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means
to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in
war is full twenty-five per cent. I can make Savannah,
Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoochee.

“Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.

“W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
“LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT.”

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,
October 11,1864–11.30 P.M.

“Your dispatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the
trip to the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the
Tennessee River firmly, you may make it, destroying all the
railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga, as you think best.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN.”

It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting
through to the coast, with a garrison left on the southern
railroads, leading east and west, through Georgia, to
effectually sever the east from the west. In other words, cut
the would-be Confederacy in two again, as it had been cut once
by our gaining possession of the Mississippi River. General
Sherman’s plan virtually effected this object.

General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his
proposed movement, keeping his army in position in the meantime
to watch Hood. Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved westward
from Gadsden across Sand Mountain, General Sherman sent the 4th
corps, Major-General Stanley commanding, and the 23d corps,
Major-General Schofield commanding, back to Chattanooga to
report to Major-General Thomas, at Nashville, whom he had placed
in command of all the troops of his military division, save the
four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move with
through Georgia. With the troops thus left at his disposal,
there was little doubt that General Thomas could hold the line
of the Tennessee, or, in the event Hood should force it, would
be able to concentrate and beat him in battle. It was therefore
readily consented to that Sherman should start for the sea-coast.

Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of
November, he commenced his march, threatening both Augusta and
Macon. His coming-out point could not be definitely fixed.
Having to gather his subsistence as he marched through the
country, it was not impossible that a force inferior to his own
might compel him to head for such point as he could reach,
instead of such as he might prefer. The blindness of the enemy,
however, in ignoring his movement, and sending Hood’s army, the
only considerable force he had west of Richmond and east of the
Mississippi River, northward on an offensive campaign, left the
whole country open, and Sherman’s route to his own choice.

How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met
with, the condition of the country through which the armies
passed, the capture of Fort McAllister, on the Savannah River,
and the occupation of Savannah on the 21st of December, are all
clearly set forth in General Sherman’s admirable report.

Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, two
expeditions, one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from
Vicksburg, Mississippi, were started by General Canby to cut the
enemy’s lines of communication with Mobile and detain troops in
that field. General Foster, commanding Department of the South,
also sent an expedition, via Broad River, to destroy the railroad
between Charleston and Savannah. The expedition from Vicksburg,
under command of Brevet Brigadier-General E. D. Osband (colonel
3d United States colored cavalry), captured, on the 27th of
November, and destroyed the Mississippi Central Railroad bridge
and trestle-work over Big Black River, near Canton, thirty miles
of the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of
stores. The expedition from Baton Rouge was without favorable
results. The expedition from the Department of the South, under
the immediate command of Brigadier-General John P. Hatch,
consisting of about five thousand men of all arms, including a
brigade from the navy, proceeded up Broad River and debarked at
Boyd’s Neck on the 29th of November, from where it moved to
strike the railroad at Grahamsville. At Honey Hill, about three
miles from Grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in a
strongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe
fighting, in our repulse with a loss of seven hundred and
forty-six in killed, wounded, and missing. During the night
General Hatch withdrew. On the 6th of December General Foster
obtained a position covering the Charleston and Savannah
Railroad, between the Coosawhatchie and Tulifinny rivers.

Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move
northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain
doom. At all events, had I had the power to command both
armies, I should not have changed the orders under which he
seemed to be acting. On the 26th of October, the advance of
Hood’s army attacked the garrison at Decatur, Alabama, but
failing to carry the place, withdrew towards Courtland, and
succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment
on the north side of the Tennessee River, near Florence. On the
28th, Forrest reached the Tennessee, at Fort Heiman, and captured
a gunboat and three transports. On the 2d of November he planted
batteries above and below Johnsonville, on the opposite side of
the river, isolating three gunboats and eight transports. On
the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place, and was
replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. The gunboats
becoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports,
to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. About a
million and a half dollars’ worth of store and property on the
levee and in storehouses was consumed by fire. On the 5th the
enemy disappeared and crossed to the north side of the Tennessee
River, above Johnsonville, moving towards Clifton, and
subsequently joined Hood. On the night of the 5th, General
Schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, reached
Johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to
Pulaski, and was put in command of all the troopers there, with
instruction to watch the movements of Hood and retard his
advance, but not to risk a general engagement until the arrival
of General A. J. Smith’s command from Missouri, and until
General Wilson could get his cavalry remounted.

On the 19th, General Hood continued his advance. General
Thomas, retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards
Nashville for the purpose of concentrating his command and
gaining time for the arrival of reinforcements. The enemy
coming up with our main force, commanded by General Schofield,
at Franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works repeatedly during
the afternoon until late at night, but were in every instance
repulsed. His loss in this battle was one thousand seven
hundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and
three thousand eight hundred wounded. Among his losses were six
general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. Our
entire loss was two thousand three hundred. This was the first
serious opposition the enemy met with, and I am satisfied was
the fatal blow to all his expectations. During the night,
General Schofield fell back towards Nashville. This left the
field to the enemy–not lost by battle, but voluntarily
abandoned–so that General Thomas’s whole force might be brought
together. The enemy followed up and commenced the establishment
of his line in front of Nashville on the 2d of December.

As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was crossing the
Tennessee River, and that Price was going out of Missouri,
General Rosecrans was ordered to send to General Thomas the
troops of General A. J. Smith’s command, and such other troops
as he could spare. The advance of this reinforcement reached
Nashville on the 30th of November.

On the morning of the 15th December, General Thomas attacked
Hood in position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated
and drove him from the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in
our hand most of his artillery and many thousand prisoners,
including four general officers.

Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it
appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was
increased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of
cavalry across the Cumberland into Kentucky. I feared Hood
would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there.
After urging upon General Thomas the necessity of immediately
assuming the offensive, I started West to superintend matters
there in person. Reaching Washington City, I received General
Thomas’s dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the
result as far as the battle had progressed. I was delighted.
All fears and apprehensions were dispelled. I am not yet
satisfied but that General Thomas, immediately upon the
appearance of Hood before Nashville, and before he had time to
fortify, should have moved out with his whole force and given
him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which
delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it
impracticable to attack earlier than he did. But his final
defeat of Hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a
vindication of that distinguished officer’s judgment.

After Hood’s defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued
by cavalry and infantry, to the Tennessee River, being forced to
abandon many pieces of artillery and most of his
transportation. On the 28th of December our advanced forces
ascertained that he had made good his escape to the south side
of the river.

About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee
and North Alabama, making it difficult to move army
transportation and artillery, General Thomas stopped the pursuit
by his main force at the Tennessee River. A small force of
cavalry, under Colonel W. J. Palmer, 15th Pennsylvania
Volunteers, continued to follow Hood for some distance,
capturing considerable transportation and all the enemy’s
pontoon-bridge. The details of these operations will be found
clearly set forth in General Thomas’s report.

A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major-General Grierson,
started from Memphis on the 21st of December. On the 25th he
surprised and captured Forrest’s dismounted camp at Verona,
Mississippi, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, destroyed the
railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and pontoons for
Hood’s army, four thousand new English carbines, and large
amounts of public stores. On the morning of the 28th he
attacked and captured a force of the enemy at Egypt, and
destroyed a train of fourteen cars; thence turning to the
south-west, he struck the Mississippi Central Railroad at
Winona, destroyed the factories and large amounts of stores at
Bankston, and the machine-shops and public property at Grenada,
arriving at Vicksburg January 5th.

During the operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with a
force under General Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee. On
the 13th of November he attacked General Gillem, near
Morristown, capturing his artillery and several hundred
prisoners. Gillem, with what was left of his command, retreated
to Knoxville. Following up his success, Breckinridge moved to
near Knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by General
Ammen. Under the directions of General Thomas, General Stoneman
concentrated the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem near
Bean’s Station to operate against Breckinridge, and destroy or
drive him into Virginia–destroy the salt-works at Saltville,
and the railroad into Virginia as far as he could go without
endangering his command. On the 12th of December he commenced
his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy’s forces
wherever he met them. On the 16th he struck the enemy, under
Vaughn, at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to
Wytheville, capturing all his artillery, trains, and one hundred
and ninety-eight prisoners; and destroyed Wytheville, with its
stores and supplies, and the extensive lead-works near there.
Returning to Marion, he met a force under Breckinridge,
consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of Saltville,
that had started in pursuit. He at once made arrangements to
attack it the next morning; but morning found Breckinridge
gone. He then moved directly to Saltville, and destroyed the
extensive salt-works at that place, a large amount of stores,
and captured eight pieces of artillery. Having thus
successfully executed his instructions, he returned General
Burbridge to Lexington and General Gillem to Knoxville.

Wilmington, North Carolina, was the most important sea-coast
port left to the enemy through which to get supplies from
abroad, and send cotton and other products out by
blockade-runners, besides being a place of great strategic
value. The navy had been making strenuous exertions to seal the
harbor of Wilmington, but with only partial effect. The nature
of the outlet of Cape Fear River was such, that it required
watching for so great a distance that, without possession of the
land north of New Inlet, or Fort Fisher, it was impossible for
the navy to entirely close the harbor against the entrance of
blockade-runners.

To secure the possession of this land required the co-operation
of a land force, which I agreed to furnish. Immediately
commenced the assemblage in Hampton Roads, under Admiral D. D.
Porter, of the most formidable armada ever collected for
concentration upon one given point. This necessarily attracted
the attention of the enemy, as well as that of the loyal North;
and through the imprudence of the public press, and very likely
of officers of both branches of service, the exact object of the
expedition became a subject of common discussion in the
newspapers both North and South. The enemy, thus warned,
prepared to meet it. This caused a postponement of the
expedition until the later part of November, when, being again
called upon by Hon. G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
I agreed to furnish the men required at once, and went myself,
in company with Major-General Butler, to Hampton Roads, where we
had a conference with Admiral Porter as to the force required and
the time of starting. A force of six thousand five hundred men
was regarded as sufficient. The time of starting was not
definitely arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by
the 6th of December, if not before. Learning, on the 30th of
November, that Bragg had gone to Georgia, taking with him most
of the forces about Wilmington, I deemed it of the utmost
importance that the expedition should reach its destination
before the return of Bragg, and directed General Butler to make
all arrangements for the departure of Major-General Weitzel, who
had been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy
might not be detained one moment.

On the 6th of December, the following instructions were given:

“CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 6, 1864.

“GENERAL: The first object of the expedition under General
Weitzel is to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington. If
successful in this, the second will be to capture Wilmington
itself. There are reasonable grounds to hope for success, if
advantage can be taken of the absence of the greater part of the
enemy’s forces now looking after Sherman in Georgia. The
directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of the
expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of
where they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be
taken. The object of the expedition will be gained by effecting
a landing on the main land between Cape Fear River and the
Atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river. Should such
landing be effected while the enemy still holds Fort Fisher and
the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then the
troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating with the
navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places. These in
our hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of
Wilmington would be sealed. Should Fort Fisher and the point of
land on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops
immediately on landing, then it will be worth the attempt to
capture Wilmington by a forced march and surprise. If time is
consumed in gaining the first object of the expedition, the
second will become a matter of after consideration.

“The details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer
immediately in command of the troops.

“Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a
landing at or near Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the
armies operating against Richmond without delay.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER.”

General Butler commanding the army from which the troops were
taken for this enterprise, and the territory within which they
were to operate, military courtesy required that all orders and
instructions should go through him. They were so sent, but
General Weitzel has since officially informed me that he never
received the foregoing instructions, nor was he aware of their
existence, until he read General Butler’s published official
report of the Fort Fisher failure, with my indorsement and
papers accompanying it. I had no idea of General Butler’s
accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off
from Bermuda Hundred, and then did not dream but that General
Weitzel had received all the instructions, and would be in
command. I rather formed the idea that General Butler was
actuated by a desire to witness the effect of the explosion of
the powder-boat. The expedition was detained several days at
Hampton Roads, awaiting the loading of the powder-boat.

The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off without
any delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon
General Butler, and he advised to so notify Admiral Porter.

The expedition finally got off on the 13th of December, and
arrived at the place of rendezvous, off New Inlet, near Fort
Fisher, on the evening of the 15th. Admiral Porter arrived on
the evening of the 18th, having put in at Beaufort to get
ammunition for the monitors. The sea becoming rough, making it
difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and coal being
about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to Beaufort to
replenish; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the
return to the place of rendezvous until the 24th. The
powder-boat was exploded on the morning of the 24th, before the
return of General Butler from Beaufort; but it would seem, from
the notice taken of it in the Southern newspapers, that the
enemy were never enlightened as to the object of the explosion
until they were informed by the Northern press.

On the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a
reconnoissance, under Brevet Brigadier-General Curtis, pushed up
towards the fort. But before receiving a full report of the
result of this reconnoissance, General Butler, in direct
violation of the instructions given, ordered the re-embarkation
of the troops and the return of the expedition. The
re-embarkation was accomplished by the morning of the 27th.

On the return of the expedition officers and men among them
Brevet Major-General (then Brevet Brigadier-General) N. M.
Curtis, First-Lieutenant G. W. Ross, 117th Regiment New York
Volunteers, First-Lieutenant William H. Walling, and
Second-Lieutenant George Simpson, 142d New York Volunteers
voluntarily reported to me that when recalled they were nearly
into the fort, and, in their opinion, it could have been taken
without much loss.

Soon after the return of the expedition, I received a dispatch
from the Secretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral
Porter, informing me that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher,
and expressing the conviction that, under a proper leader, the
place could be taken. The natural supposition with me was, that
when the troops abandoned the expedition, the navy would do so
also. Finding it had not, however, I answered on the 30th of
December, advising Admiral Porter to hold on, and that I would
send a force and make another attempt to take the place. This
time I selected Brevet Major-General (now Major-General) A. H.
Terry to command the expedition. The troops composing it
consisted of the same that composed the former, with the
addition of a small brigade, numbering about one thousand five
hundred, and a small siege train. The latter it was never found
necessary to land. I communicated direct to the commander of the
expedition the following instructions:

“CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 3, 1865.

“GENERAL: The expedition intrusted to your command has been
fitted out to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N. C.,
and Wilmington ultimately, if the fort falls. You will then
proceed with as little delay as possible to the naval fleet
lying off Cape Fear River, and report the arrival of yourself
and command to Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding North Atlantic
Blockading Squadron.

“It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete
understanding should exist between yourself and the naval
commander. I suggest, therefore, that you consult with Admiral
Porter freely, and get from him the part to be performed by each
branch of the public service, so that there may be unity of
action. It would be well to have the whole programme laid down
in writing. I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that
you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he
proposes. I would, therefore, defer to him as much as is
consistent with your own responsibilities. The first object to
be attained is to get a firm position on the spit of land on
which Fort Fisher is built, from which you can operate against
that fort. You want to look to the practicability of receiving
your supplies, and to defending yourself against superior forces
sent against you by any of the avenues left open to the enemy. If
such a position can be obtained, the siege of Fort Fisher will
not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, or another
plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters.

“My own views are, that if you effect a landing, the navy ought
to run a portion of their fleet into Cape Fear River, while the
balance of it operates on the outside. Land forces cannot
invest Fort Fisher, or cut it off from supplies or
reinforcements, while the river is in possession of the enemy.

“A siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort
Monroe, in readiness to be sent to you if required. All other
supplies can be drawn from Beaufort as you need them.

“Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is
assured. When you find they can be spared, order them back, or
such of them as you can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for
orders.

“In case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back
to Beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further
instructions. You will not debark at Beaufort until so directed.

“General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops
to Baltimore and place them on sea-going vessels. These troops
will be brought to Fort Monroe and kept there on the vessels
until you are heard from. Should you require them, they will be
sent to you.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL A. H. TERRY.”

Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock, aide-de-camp (now brevet
brigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition, was
assigned, in orders, as chief-engineer to this.

It will be seen that these instructions did not differ
materially from those given for the first expedition, and that
in neither instance was there an order to assault Fort Fisher.
This was a matter left entirely to the discretion of the
commanding officer.

The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the
6th, arriving at the rendezvous, off Beaufort, on the 8th,
where, owing to the difficulties of the weather, it lay until
the morning of the 12th, when it got under way and reached its
destination that evening. Under cover of the fleet, the
disembarkation of the troops commenced on the morning of the
13th, and by three o’clock P.M. was completed without loss. On
the 14th a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundred
yards of Fort Fisher, and a small advance work taken possession
of and turned into a defensive line against any attempt that
might be made from the fort. This reconnoissance disclosed the
fact that the front of the work had been seriously injured by
the navy fire. In the afternoon of the 15th the fort was
assaulted, and after most desperate fighting was captured, with
its entire garrison and armament. Thus was secured, by the
combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most important
successes of the war. Our loss was: killed, one hundred and
ten; wounded, five hundred and thirty-six. On the 16th and the
17th the enemy abandoned and blew up Fort Caswell and the works
on Smith’s Island, which were immediately occupied by us. This
gave us entire control of the mouth of the Cape Fear River.

At my request, Mayor-General B. F. Butler was relieved, and
Major-General E. O. C. Ord assigned to the Department of
Virginia and North Carolina.

The defence of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring the
force which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army now
threatening it, I determined to find other fields of operation
for General Thomas’s surplus troops–fields from which they
would co-operate with other movements. General Thomas was
therefore directed to collect all troops, not essential to hold
his communications at Eastport, in readiness for orders. On the
7th of January, General Thomas was directed, if he was assured of
the departure of Hood south from Corinth, to send General
Schofield with his corps east with as little delay as
possible. This direction was promptly complied with, and the
advance of the corps reached Washington on the 23d of the same
month, whence it was sent to Fort Fisher and New Bern. On the
26th he was directed to send General A. J. Smith’s command and a
division of cavalry to report to General Canby. By the 7th of
February the whole force was en route for its destination.

The State of North Carolina was constituted into a military
department, and General Schofield assigned to command, and
placed under the orders of Major-General Sherman. The following
instructions were given him:

“CITY POINT, VA., January 31, 1865.

“GENERAL:– * * * Your movements are intended as
co-operative with Sherman’s through the States of South and
North Carolina. The first point to be attained is to secure
Wilmington. Goldsboro’ will then be your objective point,
moving either from Wilmington or New Bern, or both, as you deem
best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro’, you will
advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place
with the sea-coast–as near to it as you can, building the road
behind you. The enterprise under you has two objects: the
first is to give General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his
march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on
his line of march. As soon, therefore, as you can determine
which of the two points, Wilmington or New Bern, you can best
use for throwing supplies from, to the interior, you will
commence the accumulation of twenty days’ rations and forage for
sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. You will get of
these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the
interior as you may be able to occupy. I believe General Palmer
has received some instructions direct from General Sherman on the
subject of securing supplies for his army. You will learn what
steps he has taken, and be governed in your requisitions
accordingly. A supply of ordnance stores will also be necessary.

“Make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective
departments in the field with me at City Point. Communicate
with me by every opportunity, and should you deem it necessary
at any time, send a special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which
point you can communicate by telegraph.

“The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of
those required for your own command.

“The movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your
imperative duty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the
interior to aid Sherman. In such case you will act on your own
judgment without waiting for instructions. You will report,
however, what you purpose doing. The details for carrying out
these instructions are necessarily left to you. I would urge,
however, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to
the importance of it, prompt action. Sherman may be looked for
in the neighborhood of Goldsboro’ any time from the 22d to the
28th of February; this limits your time very materially.

“If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington,
it can be supplied from Washington. A large force of railroad
men have already been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will
go to Fort Fisher in a day or two. On this point I have informed
you by telegraph.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“MAJOR-GENERAL J. M. SCHOFIELD.”

Previous to giving these instructions I had visited Fort Fisher,
accompanied by General Schofield, for the purpose of seeing for
myself the condition of things, and personally conferring with
General Terry and Admiral Porter as to what was best to be done.

Anticipating the arrival of General Sherman at Savannah his army
entirely foot-loose, Hood being then before Nashville, Tennessee,
the Southern railroads destroyed, so that it would take several
months to re-establish a through line from west to east, and
regarding the capture of Lee’s army as the most important
operation towards closing the rebellion–I sent orders to
General Sherman on the 6th of December, that after establishing
a base on the sea-coast, with necessary garrison, to include all
his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to City Point with
the balance of his command.

On the 18th of December, having received information of the
defeat and utter rout of Hood’s army by General Thomas, and
that, owing to the great difficulty of procuring ocean
transportation, it would take over two months to transport
Sherman’s army, and doubting whether he might not contribute as
much towards the desired result by operating from where he was,
I wrote to him to that effect, and asked him for his views as to
what would be best to do. A few days after this I received a
communication from General Sherman, of date 16th December,
acknowledging the receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing
me of his preparations to carry it into effect as soon as he
could get transportation. Also that he had expected, upon
reducing Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South
Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to me; but
that this would consume about six weeks’ time after the fall of
Savannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the
middle of January. The confidence he manifested in this letter
of being able to march up and join me pleased me, and, without
waiting for a reply to my letter of the 18th, I directed him, on
the 28th of December, to make preparations to start as he
proposed, without delay, to break up the railroads in North and
South Carolina, and join the armies operating against Richmond
as soon as he could.

On the 21st of January I informed General Sherman that I had
ordered the 23d corps, Major-General Schofield commanding,
east; that it numbered about twenty-one thousand men; that we
had at Fort Fisher, about eight thousand men; at New Bern, about
four thousand; that if Wilmington was captured, General Schofield
would go there; if not, he would be sent to New Bern; that, in
either event, all the surplus force at both points would move to
the interior towards Goldsboro’, in co-operation with his
movement; that from either point railroad communication could be
run out; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders
as he came into communication with them.

In obedience to his instructions, General Schofield proceeded to
reduce Wilmington, North Carolina, in co-operation with the navy
under Admiral Porter, moving his forces up both sides of the
Cape Fear River. Fort Anderson, the enemy’s main defence on the
west bank of the river, was occupied on the morning of the 19th,
the enemy having evacuated it after our appearance before it.

After fighting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered Wilmington
on the morning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated towards
Goldsboro’ during the night. Preparations were at once made for
a movement on Goldsboro’ in two columns–one from Wilmington, and
the other from New Bern–and to repair the railroad leading there
from each place, as well as to supply General Sherman by Cape
Fear River, towards Fayetteville, if it became necessary. The
column from New Bern was attacked on the 8th of March, at Wise’s
Forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundred
prisoners. On the 11th the enemy renewed his attack upon our
intrenched position, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell
back during the night. On the 14th the Neuse River was crossed
and Kinston occupied, and on the 21st Goldsboro’ was entered.
The column from Wilmington reached Cox’s Bridge, on the Neuse
River, ten miles above Goldsboro’, on the 22d.

By the 1st of February, General Sherman’s whole army was in
motion from Savannah. He captured Columbia, South Carolina, on
the 17th; thence moved on Goldsboro’, North Carolina, via
Fayetteville, reaching the latter place on the 12th of March,
opening up communication with General Schofield by way of Cape
Fear River. On the 15th he resumed his march on Goldsboro’. He
met a force of the enemy at Averysboro’, and after a severe fight
defeated and compelled it to retreat. Our loss in this
engagement was about six hundred. The enemy’s loss was much
greater. On the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under
Joe Johnston, attacked his advance at Bentonville, capturing
three guns and driving it back upon the main body. General
Slocum, who was in the advance ascertaining that the whole of
Johnston’s army was in the front, arranged his troops on the
defensive, intrenched himself and awaited reinforcements, which
were pushed forward. On the night of the 21st the enemy
retreated to Smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our
hands. From there Sherman continued to Goldsboro’, which place
had been occupied by General Schofield on the 21st (crossing the
Neuse River ten miles above there, at Cox’s Bridge, where General
Terry had got possession and thrown a pontoon-bridge on the 22d),
thus forming a junction with the columns from New Bern and
Wilmington.

Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of
Charleston, South Carolina. It was evacuated by the enemy on the
night of the 17th of February, and occupied by our forces on the
18th.

On the morning of the 31st of January, General Thomas was
directed to send a cavalry expedition, under General Stoneman,
from East Tennessee, to penetrate South Carolina well down
towards Columbia, to destroy the railroads and military
resources of the country, and return, if he was able, to East
Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, releasing our
prisoners there, if possible. Of the feasibility of this
latter, however, General Stoneman was to judge. Sherman’s
movements, I had no doubt, would attract the attention of all
the force the enemy could collect, and facilitate the execution
of this. General Stoneman was so late in making his start on
this expedition (and Sherman having passed out of the State of
South Carolina), on the 27th of February I directed General
Thomas to change his course, and order him to repeat his raid of
last fall, destroying the railroad towards Lynchburg as far as he
could. This would keep him between our garrisons in East
Tennessee and the enemy. I regarded it not impossible that in
the event of the enemy being driven from Richmond, he might fall
back to Lynchburg and attempt a raid north through East
Tennessee. On the 14th of February the following communication
was sent to General Thomas:

“CITY POINT, VA., February 14, 1865.

“General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against
Mobile and the interior of Alabama. His force will consist of
about twenty thousand men, besides A. J. Smith’s command. The
cavalry you have sent to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg.
It, with the available cavalry already in that section, will
move from there eastward, in co-operation. Hood’s army has been
terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in
Tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by
the withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman. (I take it a
large portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn. It is so
asserted in the Richmond papers, and a member of the rebel
Congress said a few days since in a speech, that one-half of it
had been brought to South Carolina to oppose Sherman.) This
being true, or even if it is not true, Canby’s movement will
attract all the attention of the enemy, and leave the advance
from your standpoint easy. I think it advisable, therefore,
that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare,
and hold it in readiness to go south. The object would be
threefold: first, to attract as much of the enemy’s force as
possible, to insure success to Canby; second, to destroy the
enemy’s line of communications and military resources; third, to
destroy or capture their forces brought into the field.
Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the points to direct the
expedition against. This, however, would not be so important as
the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama. Discretion
should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go
where, according to the information he may receive, he will best
secure the objects named above.

“Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know
what number of men you can put into the field. If not more than
five thousand men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be
sufficient. It is not desirable that you should start this
expedition until the one leaving Vicksburg has been three or
four days out, or even a week. I do not know when it will
start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as I learn. If
you should hear through other sources before hearing from me,
you can act on the information received.

“To insure success your cavalry should go with as little
wagon-train as possible, relying upon the country for
supplies. I would also reduce the number of guns to a battery,
or the number of batteries, and put the extra teams to the guns
taken. No guns or caissons should be taken with less than eight
horses.

“Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force
you think you will be able to send under these directions.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS.”

On the 15th, he was directed to start the expedition as soon
after the 20th as he could get it off.

I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement
of the armies operating against Richmond, that all
communications with the city, north of James River, should be
cut off. The enemy having withdrawn the bulk of his force from
the Shenandoah Valley and sent it south, or replaced troops sent
from Richmond, and desiring to reinforce Sherman, if practicable,
whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the
enemy, I determined to make a move from the Shenandoah, which,
if successful. would accomplish the first at least, and possibly
the latter of the objects. I therefore telegraphed General
Sheridan as follows:

“CITY POINT, VA., February 20, 1865–1 P.M.

“GENERAL:–As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will
have no difficulty about reaching Lychburg with a cavalry force
alone. From there you could destroy the railroad and canal in
every direction, so as to be of no further use to the
rebellion. Sufficient cavalry should be left behind to look
after Mosby’s gang. From Lynchburg, if information you might
get there would justify it, you will strike south, heading the
streams in Virgina to the westward of Danville, and push on and
join General Sherman. This additional raid, with one now about
starting from East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering four or
give thousand cavalry, one from Vicksburg, numbering seven or
eight thousand cavalry, one from Eastport, Mississippi, then
thousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile Bay, with about thirty-eight
thousand mixed troops, these three latter pushing for Tuscaloosa,
Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a large army eating out
the vitals of South Carolina, is all that will be wanted to
leave mothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise
you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston
was evacuated on Tuesday 1st.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN.”

On the 25th I received a dispatch from General Sheridan,
inquiring where Sherman was aiming for, and if I could give him
definite information as to the points he might be expected to
move on, this side of Charlotte, North Carolina. In answer, the
following telegram was sent him:

“CITY POINT, VA., February 25, 1865.

“GENERAL:–Sherman’s movements will depend on the amount of
opposition he meets with from the enemy. If strongly opposed,
he may possibly have to fall back to Georgetown, S. C., and fit
out for a new start. I think, however, all danger for the
necessity of going to that point has passed. I believe he has
passed Charlotte. He may take Fayetteville on his way to
Goldsboro’. If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to be guided
in your after movements by the information you obtain. Before
you could possibly reach Sherman, I think you would find him
moving from Goldsboro’ towards Raleigh, or engaging the enemy
strongly posted at one or the other of these places, with
railroad communications opened from his army to Wilmington or
New Bern.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN.”

General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of February,
with two divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand
each. On the 1st of March he secured the bridge, which the
enemy attempted to destroy, across the middle fork of the
Shenandoah, at Mount Crawford, and entered Staunton on the 2d,
the enemy having retreated to Waynesboro’. Thence he pushed on
to Waynesboro’, where he found the enemy in force in an
intrenched position, under General Early. Without stopping to
make a reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the
position was carried, and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven
pieces of artillery, with horses and caissons complete, two
hundred wagons and teams loaded with subsistence, and seventeen
battle-flags, were captured. The prisoners, under an escort of
fifteen hundred men, were sent back to Winchester. Thence he
marched on Charlottesville, destroying effectually the railroad
and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d. Here
he remained two days, destroying the railroad towards Richmond
and Lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north
and south forks of the Rivanna River and awaited the arrival of
his trains. This necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea
of capturing Lynchburg. On the morning of the 6th, dividing his
force into two columns, he sent one to Scottsville, whence it
marched up the James River Canal to New Market, destroying every
lock, and in many places the bank of the canal. From here a
force was pushed out from this column to Duiguidsville, to
obtain possession of the bridge across the James River at that
place, but failed. The enemy burned it on our approach. The
enemy also burned the bridge across the river at
Hardwicksville. The other column moved down the railroad
towards Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Amherst Court House,
sixteen miles from Lynchburg; thence across the country, uniting
with the column at New Market. The river being very high, his
pontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having
destroyed the bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river
and get on the South Side Railroad about Farmville, and destroy
it to Appomattox Court House, the only thing left for him was to
return to Winchester or strike a base at the White House.
Fortunately, he chose the latter. From New Market he took up
his line of march, following the canal towards Richmond,
destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever
practicable, to a point eight miles east of Goochland,
concentrating the whole force at Columbia on the 10th. Here he
rested one day, and sent through by scouts information of his
whereabouts and purposes, and a request for supplies to meet him
at White House, which reached me on the night of the 12th. An
infantry force was immediately sent to get possession of White
House, and supplies were forwarded. Moving from Columbia in a
direction to threaten Richmond, to near Ashland Station, he
crossed the Annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges
and many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of
the Pamunkey to White House, which place he reached on the 19th.

Previous to this the following communication was sent to General
Thomas:

“CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,
March 7, 1865–9.30 A.M.

“GENERAL:–I think it will be advisable now for you to repair
the railroad in East Tennessee, and throw a good force up to
Bull’s Gap and fortify there. Supplies at Knoxville could
always be got forward as required. With Bull’s Gap fortified,
you can occupy as outposts about all of East Tennessee, and be
prepared, if it should be required of you in the spring, to make
a campaign towards Lynchburg, or into North Carolina. I do not
think Stoneman should break the road until he gets into
Virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-stock that may
be caught west of that.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS.”

Thus it will be seen that in March, 1865, General Canby was
moving an adequate force against Mobile and the army defending
it under General Dick Taylor; Thomas was pushing out two large
and well-appointed cavalry expeditions–one from Middle
Tennessee under Brevet Major-General Wilson against the enemy’s
vital points in Alabama, the other from East Tennessee, under
Major-General Stoneman, towards Lynchburg–and assembling the
remainder of his available forces, preparatory to commence
offensive operations from East Tennessee; General Sheridan’s
cavalry was at White House; the armies of the Potomac and James
were confronting the enemy, under Lee, in his defences of
Richmond and Petersburg; General Sherman with his armies,
reinforced by that of General Schofield, was at Goldsboro’;
General Pope was making preparations for a spring campaign
against the enemy under Kirby Smith and Price, west of the
Mississippi; and General Hancock was concentrating a force in
the vicinity of Winchester, Virginia, to guard against invasion
or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary.

After the long march by General Sheridan’s cavalry over winter
roads, it was necessary to rest and refit at White House. At
this time the greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear
that the enemy would leave his strong lines about Petersburg and
Richmond for the purpose of uniting with Johnston, and before he
was driven from them by battle, or I was prepared to make an
effectual pursuit. On the 24th of March, General Sheridan moved
from White House, crossed the James River at Jones’s Landing, and
formed a junction with the Army of the Potomac in front of
Petersburg on the 27th. During this move, General Ord sent
forces to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy.

On the 24th of March the following instructions for a general
movement of the armies operating against Richmond were issued:

“CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,
March 24, 1865.

“GENERAL: On the 29th instant the armies operating against
Richmond will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of
turning the enemy out of his present position around Petersburg,
and to insure the success of the cavalry under General Sheridan,
which will start at the same time, in its efforts to reach and
destroy the South Side and Danville railroads. Two corps of the
Army of the Potomac will be moved at first in two columns, taking
the two roads crossing Hatcher’s Run, nearest where the present
line held by us strikes that stream, both moving towards
Dinwiddie Court House.

“The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now
under General Davies, will move at the same time by the Weldon
Road and the Jerusalem Plank Road, turning west from the latter
before crossing the Nottoway, and west with the whole column
before reaching Stony Creek. General Sheridan will then move
independently, under other instructions which will be given
him. All dismounted cavalry belonging to the Army of the
Potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the Middle Military
Division not required for guarding property belonging to their
arm of service, will report to Brigadier-General Benham, to be
added to the defences of City Point. Major-General Parke will
be left in command of all the army left for holding the lines
about Petersburg and City Point, subject of course to orders
from the commander of the Army of the Potomac. The 9th army
corps will be left intact, to hold the present line of works so
long as the whole line now occupied by us is held. If, however,
the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then the
left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the
position held by the army prior to the capture of the Weldon
Road. All troops to the left of the 9th corps will be held in
readiness to move at the shortest notice by such route as may be
designated when the order is given.

“General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one
colored, or so much of them as he can, and hold his present
lines, and march for the present left of the Army of the
Potomac. In the absence of further orders, or until further
orders are given, the white divisions will follow the left
column of the Army of the Potomac, and the colored division the
right column. During the movement Major-General Weitzel will be
left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the Army
of the James.

“The movement of troops from the Army of the James will commence
on the night of the 27th instant. General Ord will leave behind
the minimum number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the
absence of the main army. A cavalry expedition, from General
Ord’s command, will also be started from Suffolk, to leave there
on Saturday, the 1st of April, under Colonel Sumner, for the
purpose of cutting the railroad about Hicksford. This, if
accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and therefore from
three to five hundred men will be sufficient. They should,
however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared
from Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry
crosses the Blackwater. The crossing should probably be at
Uniten. Should Colonel Sumner succeed in reaching the Weldon
Road, he will be instructed to do all the damage possible to the
triangle of roads between Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston. The
railroad bridge at Weldon being fitted up for the passage of
carriages, it might be practicable to destroy any accumulation
of supplies the enemy may have collected south of the Roanoke.
All the troops will move with four days’ rations in haversacks
and eight days’ in wagons. To avoid as much hauling as
possible, and to give the Army of the James the same number of
days’ supplies with the Army of the Potomac, General Ord will
direct his commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient
supplies delivered at the terminus of the road to fill up in
passing. Sixty rounds of ammunition per man will be taken in
wagons, and as much grain as the transportation on hand will
carry, after taking the specified amount of other supplies. The
densely wooded country in which the army has to operate making
the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken with
the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division,
at the option of the army commanders.

“All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into
operation may be commenced at once. The reserves of the 9th
corps should be massed as much as possible. While I would not
now order an unconditional attack on the enemy’s line by them,
they should be ready and should make the attack if the enemy
weakens his line in their front, without waiting for orders. In
case they carry the line, then the whole of the 9th corps could
follow up so as to join or co-operate with the balance of the
army. To prepare for this, the 9th corps will have rations
issued to them, same as the balance of the army. General
Weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at
all practicable to break through at any point, he will do so. A
success north of the James should be followed up with great
promptness. An attack will not be feasible unless it is found
that the enemy has detached largely. In that case it may be
regarded as evident that the enemy are relying upon their local
reserves principally for the defence of Richmond. Preparations
may be made for abandoning all the line north of the James,
except inclosed works only to be abandoned, however, after a
break is made in the lines of the enemy.

“By these instructions a large part of the armies operating
against Richmond is left behind. The enemy, knowing this, may,
as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in
the hope of advantage not being taken of it, while they hurl
everything against the moving column, and return. It cannot be
impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in the
trenches not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of
it. The very fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does
so, might be regarded as almost conclusive evidence of such a
weakening of his lines. I would have it particularly enjoined
upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the enemy,
those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding
officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move
promptly, and notify the commander of their action. I would also
enjoin the same action on the part of division commanders when
other parts of their corps are engaged. In like manner, I would
urge the importance of following up a repulse of the enemy.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“MAJOR-GENERALS MEADE, ORD, AND SHERIDAN.”

Early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines
in front of the 9th corps (which held from the Appomattox River
towards our left), and carried Fort Stedman, and a part of the
line to the right and left of it, established themselves and
turned the guns of the fort against us, but our troops on either
flank held their ground until the reserves were brought up, when
the enemy was driven back with a heavy loss in killed and
wounded, and one thousand nine hundred prisoners. Our loss was
sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded, and
five hundred and six missing. General Meade at once ordered the
other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective
fronts. Pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy’s
strongly intrenched picket-line in front of the 2d and 6th
corps, and eight hundred and thirty-four prisoners. The enemy
made desperate attempts to retake this line, but without
success. Our loss in front of these was fifty-two killed, eight
hundred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and seven
missing. The enemy’s loss in killed and wounded was far greater.

General Sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp about
Goldsboro’, and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them
perfected, visited me at City Point on the 27th of March, and
stated that he would be ready to move, as he had previously
written me, by the 10th of April, fully equipped and rationed
for twenty days, if it should become necessary to bring his
command to bear against Lee’s army, in co-operation with our
forces in front of Richmond and Petersburg. General Sherman
proposed in this movement to threaten Raleigh, and then, by
turning suddenly to the right, reach the Roanoke at Gaston or
thereabouts, whence he could move on to the Richmond and
Danville Railroad, striking it in the vicinity of Burkesville,
or join the armies operating against Richmond, as might be
deemed best. This plan he was directed to carry into execution,
if he received no further directions in the meantime. I
explained to him the movement I had ordered to commence on the
29th of March. That if it should not prove as entirely
successful as I hoped, I would cut the cavalry loose to destroy
the Danville and South Side railroads, and thus deprive the
enemy of further supplies, and also to prevent the rapid
concentration of Lee’s and Johnston’s armies.

I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the
report that the enemy had retreated the night before. I was
firmly convinced that Sherman’s crossing the Roanoke would be
the signal for Lee to leave. With Johnston and him combined, a
long, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming most of the
summer, might become necessary. By moving out I would put the
army in better condition for pursuit, and would at least, by the
destruction of the Danville Road, retard the concentration of the
two armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the enemy to abandon
much material that he might otherwise save. I therefore
determined not to delay the movement ordered.

On the night of the 27th, Major-General Ord, with two divisions
of the 24th corps, Major-General Gibbon commanding, and one
division of the 25th corps, Brigadier-General Birney commanding,
and MacKenzie’s cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance
of the foregoing instructions, and reached the position assigned
him near Hatcher’s Run on the morning of the 29th. On the 28th
the following instructions were given to General Sheridan:

“CITY POINT, VA., March 28, 1865.

“GENERAL:–The 5th army corps will move by the Vaughn Road at
three A.M. to-morrow morning. The 2d moves at about nine A.M.,
having but about three miles to march to reach the point
designated for it to take on the right of the 5th corps, after
the latter reaching Dinwiddie Court House. Move your cavalry at
as early an hour as you can, and without being confined to any
particular road or roads. You may go out by the nearest roads
in rear of the 5th corps, pass by its left, and passing near to
or through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as
soon as you can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in
his intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible.
Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be
attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and
with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as
circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field, and will
probably be able to communicate with you. Should I not do so,
and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched
line, you may cut loose and push for the Danville Road. If you
find it practicable, I would like you to cross the South Side
Road, between Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some
extent. I would not advise much detention, however, until you
reach the Danville Road, which I would like you to strike as
near to the Appomattox as possible. Make your destruction on
that road as complete as possible. You can then pass on to the
South Side Road, west of Burkesville, and destroy that in like
manner.

“After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads,
which are now the only avenues of supply to Lee’s army, you may
return to this army, selecting your road further south, or you
may go on into North Carolina and join General Sherman. Should
you select the latter course, get the information to me as early
as possible, so that I may send orders to meet you at Goldsboro’.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN.”

On the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. At night the
cavalry was at Dinwiddie Court House, and the left of our
infantry line extended to the Quaker Road, near its intersection
with the Boydton Plank Road. The position of the troops from
left to right was as follows: Sheridan, Warren, Humphreys, Ord,
Wright, Parke.

Everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the
capture of Petersburg and Richmond, if the proper effort was
made. I therefore addressed the following communication to
General Sheridan, having previously informed him verbally not to
cut loose for the raid contemplated in his orders until he
received notice from me to do so:

“GRAVELLY CREEK, March 29, 1865.

“GENERAL:–Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to
Dinwiddie. We are all ready, however, to give up all, from the
Jerusalem Plank Road to Hatcher’s Run, whenever the forces can
be used advantageously. After getting into line south of
Hatcher’s, we pushed forward to find the enemy’s position.
General Griffin was attacked near where the Quaker Road
intersects the Boydton Road, but repulsed it easily, capturing
about one hundred men. Humphreys reached Dabney’s Mill, and was
pushing on when last heard from.

“I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so,
before going back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose
and go after the enemy’s roads at present. In the morning push
around the enemy, if you can, and get on to his right rear. The
movements of the enemy’s cavalry may, of course, modify your
action. We will act all together as one army here, until it is
seen what can be done with the enemy. The signal-officer at
Cobb’s Hill reported, at half-past eleven A.M., that a cavalry
column had passed that point from Richmond towards Petersburg,
taking forty minutes to pass.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN.”

From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain
fell in such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled
vehicle, except as corduroy roads were laid in front of them.
During the 30th, Sheridan advanced from Dinwiddie Court House
towards Five Forks, where he found the enemy in full force.
General Warren advanced and extended his line across the Boydton
Plank Road to near the White Oak Road, with a view of getting
across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front
and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he
was, and fortify. General Humphreys drove the enemy from his
front into his main line on the Hatcher, near Burgess’s Mills.
Generals Ord, Wright, and Parke made examinations in their
fronts to determine the feasibility of an assault on the enemy’s
lines. The two latter reported favorably. The enemy confronting
us as he did, at every point from Richmond to our extreme left, I
conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be penetrated
if my estimate of his forces was correct. I determined,
therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforce
General Sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him
to cut loose and turn the enemy’s right flank, and with the
other corps assault the enemy’s lines. The result of the
offensive effort of the enemy the week before, when he assaulted
Fort Stedman, particularly favored this. The enemy’s
intrenched picket-line captured by us at that time threw the
lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some
points that it was but a moment’s run from one to the other.
Preparations were at once made to relieve General Humphreys’s
corps, to report to General Sheridan; but the condition of the
roads prevented immediate movement. On the morning of the 31st,
General Warren reported favorably to getting possession of the
White Oak Road, and was directed to do so. To accomplish this,
he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps, which
was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on
the 2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn,
forced back upon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked. A
division of the 2d corps was immediately sent to his support, the
enemy driven back with heavy loss, and possession of the White
Oak Road gained. Sheridan advanced, and with a portion of his
cavalry got possession of the Five Forks; but the enemy, after
the affair with the 5th corps, reinforced the rebel cavalry,
defending that point with infantry, and forced him back towards
Dinwiddie Court House. Here General Sheridan displayed great
generalship. Instead of retreating with his whole command on
the main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered,
he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough
to take charge of the horses. This compelled the enemy to
deploy over a vast extent of wooded and broken country, and made
his progress slow. At this juncture he dispatched to me what had
taken place, and that he was dropping back slowly on Dinwiddie
Court House. General Mackenzie’s cavalry and one division of
the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance. Soon
after receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys could
hold our position on the Boydton Road, and that the other two
divisions of the 5th corps could go to Sheridan, they were so
ordered at once. Thus the operations of the day necessitated
the sending of Warren, because of his accessibility, instead of
Humphreys, as was intended, and precipitated intended
movements. On the morning of the 1st of April, General
Sheridan, reinforced by General Warren, drove the enemy back on
Five Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried
his strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and
between five and six thousand prisoners.

About the close of this battle, Brevet Major-General Charles
Griffin relieved Major-General Warren in command of the 5th
corps. The report of this reached me after nightfall. Some
apprehensions filled my mind lest the enemy might desert his
lines during the night, and by falling upon General Sheridan
before assistance could reach him, drive him from his position
and open the way for retreat. To guard against this, General
Miles’s division of Humphreys’s corps was sent to reinforce him,
and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o’clock in
the morning (April 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy’s
lines. General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps,
sweeping everything before him, and to his left towards Hatcher’s
Run, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners. He was
closely followed by two divisions of General Ord’s command,
until he met the other division of General Ord’s that had
succeeded in forcing the enemy’s lines near Hatcher’s Run.
Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right, and
closed all of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg,
while General Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and
joined General Wright on the left. General Parke succeeded in
carrying the enemy’s main line, capturing guns and prisoners,
but was unable to carry his inner line. General Sheridan being
advised of the condition of affairs, returned General Miles to
his proper command. On reaching the enemy’s lines immediately
surrounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbon’s corps, by
a most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works–the
most salient and commanding south of Petersburg–thus materially
shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the
city. The enemy south of Hatcher’s Run retreated westward to
Sutherland’s Station, where they were overtaken by Miles’s
division. A severe engagement ensued, and lasted until both his
right and left flanks were threatened by the approach of General
Sheridan, who was moving from Ford’s Station towards Petersburg,
and a division sent by General Meade from the front of
Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in
our hands his guns and many prisoners. This force retreated by
the main road along the Appomattox River. During the night of
the 2d the enemy evacuated Petersburg and Richmond, and
retreated towards Danville. On the morning of the 3d pursuit
was commenced. General Sheridan pushed for the Danville Road,
keeping near the Appomattox, followed by General Meade with the
2d and 6th corps, while General Ord moved for Burkesville, along
the South Side Road; the 9th corps stretched along that road
behind him. On the 4th, General Sheridan struck the Danville
Road near Jetersville, where he learned that Lee was at Amelia
Court House. He immediately intrenched himself and awaited the
arrival of General Meade, who reached there the next day.
General Ord reached Burkesville on the evening of the 5th.

On the morning of the 5th, I addressed Major-General Sherman the
following communication:

“WILSON’S STATION, April 5, 1865.

“GENERAL: All indications now are that Lee will attempt to
reach Danville with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was
up with him last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot,
and dragoons, at twenty thousand, much demoralized. We hope to
reduce this number one-half. I shall push on to Burkesville,
and if a stand is made at Danville, will in a very few days go
there. If you can possibly do so, push on from where you are,
and let us see if we cannot finish the job with Lee’s and
Johnston’s armies. Whether it will be better for you to strike
for Greensboro’, or nearer to Danville, you will be better able
to judge when you receive this. Rebel armies now are the only
strategic points to strike at.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN.”

On the morning of the 6th, it was found that General Lee was
moving west of Jetersville, towards Danville. General Sheridan
moved with his cavalry (the 5th corps having been returned to
General Meade on his reaching Jetersville) to strike his flank,
followed by the 6th corps, while the 2d and 5th corps pressed
hard after, forcing him to abandon several hundred wagons and
several pieces of artillery. General Ord advanced from
Burkesville towards Farmville, sending two regiments of infantry
and a squadron of cavalry, under Brevet Brigadier-General
Theodore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges. This advance
met the head of Lee’s column near Farmville, which it heroically
attacked and detained until General Read was killed and his small
force overpowered. This caused a delay in the enemy’s movements,
and enabled General Ord to get well up with the remainder of his
force, on meeting which, the enemy immediately intrenched
himself. In the afternoon, General Sheridan struck the enemy
south of Sailors’ Creek, captured sixteen pieces of artillery
and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the 6th
corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was
made, which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand
prisoners, among whom were many general officers. The movements
of the 2d corps and General Ord’s command contributed greatly to
the day’s success.

On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry,
except one division, and the 5th corps moving by Prince Edward’s
Court House; the 6th corps, General Ord’s command, and one
division of cavalry, on Farmville; and the 2d corps by the High
Bridge Road. It was soon found that the enemy had crossed to
the north side of the Appomattox; but so close was the pursuit,
that the 2d corps got possession of the common bridge at High
Bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately
crossed over. The 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossed
at Farmville to its support.

Feeling now that General Lee’s chance of escape was utterly
hopeless, I addressed him the following communication from
Farmville:

“April 7, 1865.

“GENERAL–The result of the last week must convince you of the
hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of
Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and
regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of
any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of
that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of
Northern Virginia.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“GENERAL R. E. LEE.”

Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received at
Farmville the following:

“April 7, 1865.

“GENERAL: I have received your note of this date. Though not
entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of
further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia,
I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and
therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you
will offer on condition of its surrender.

“R. E. LEE, General.
“LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.”

To this I immediately replied:

“April 8, 1865.

“GENERAL:–Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same
date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender
of the Army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply, I
would say, that peace being my great desire, there is but one
condition I would insist upon–namely, That the men and officers
surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again
against the Government of the United States until properly
exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet
any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point
agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the
terms upon which the surrender of the Army of the Northern
Virginia will be received.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“GENERAL R. E. LEE.”

Early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed. General
Meade followed north of the Appomattox, and General Sheridan,
with all the cavalry, pushed straight ahead for Appomattox
Station, followed by General Ord’s command and the 5th corps.
During the day General Meade’s advance had considerable fighting
with the enemy’s rear-guard, but was unable to bring on a general
engagement. Late in the evening General Sheridan struck the
railroad at Appomattox Station, drove the enemy from there, and
captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train, and
four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee’s army. During
this day I accompanied General Meade’s column, and about midnight
received the following communication from General Lee:

April 8, 1865.

“GENERAL:–I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. In
mine of yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of
the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your
proposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has
arisen to call for the surrender of this army; but as the
restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desired
to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot,
therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the Army of
Northern Virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the
Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the
restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten
A.M. to-morrow on the old stage-road to Richmond, between the
picket-lines of the two armies.

“R. E. LEE, General.
“LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.”

Early on the morning of the 9th I returned him an answer as
follows, and immediately started to join the column south of the
Appomattox:

“April 9, 1865.

“GENERAL:–Your note of yesterday is received. I have no
authority to treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed
for ten A.M. to-day could lead to no good. I will state,
however, general, that I am equally anxious for peace with
yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. The
terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the
South laying down their arms they will hasten that most
desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of
millions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously hoping that
all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another
life, I subscribe myself, etc.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“GENERAL R. E. LEE.”

On this morning of the 9th, General Ord’s command and the 5th
corps reached Appomattox Station just as the enemy was making a
desperate effort to break through our cavalry. The infantry was
at once thrown in. Soon after a white flag was received,
requesting a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for
a surrender.

Before reaching General Sheridan’s headquarters, I received the
following from General Lee:

“April 9, 1865.

“GENERAL:–I received your note of this morning on the
picket-line, whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain
definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of
yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. I now
ask an interview, in accordance with the offer contained in your
letter of yesterday, for that purpose.

“R. E. LEE, General.
“LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.”

The interview was held at Appomattox Court-House, the result of
which is set forth in the following correspondence:

APPOMATTOX COURT-HOUSE, Virginia, April 9, 1865.

“GENERAL: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you
of the 8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the
Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls
of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to
be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be
retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The
officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms
against the Government of the United States until properly
exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like
parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and
public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the
officers appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace
the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or
baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to
return to his home, not to be disturbed by United States
authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in
force where they may reside.

“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“GENERAL R. E. LEE.”

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865.

“GENERAL: I have received your letter of this date containing
the terms of surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as
proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those
expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are
accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to
carry the stipulations into effect.

“R. E. LEE, General.
“LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.”

The command of Major-General Gibbon, the 5th army corps under
Griffin, and Mackenzie’s cavalry, were designated to remain at
Appomattox Court-House until the paroling of the surrendered
army was completed, and to take charge of the public property.
The remainder of the army immediately returned to the vicinity
of Burkesville.

General Lee’s great influence throughout the whole South caused
his example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the
armies lately under his leadership are at their homes, desiring
peace and quiet, and their arms are in the hands of our ordnance
officers.

On the receipt of my letter of the 5th, General Sherman moved
directly against Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on and
through Raleigh, which place General Sherman occupied on the
morning of the 13th. The day preceding, news of the surrender
of General Lee reached him at Smithfield.

On the 14th a correspondence was opened between General Sherman
and General Johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an agreement
for a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for
peace, subject to the approval of the President. This agreement
was disapproved by the President on the 21st, which disapproval,
together with your instructions, was communicated to General
Sherman by me in person on the morning of the 24th, at Raleigh,
North Carolina, in obedience to your orders. Notice was at once
given by him to General Johnston for the termination of the truce
that had been entered into. On the 25th another meeting between
them was agreed upon, to take place on the 26th, which
terminated in the surrender and disbandment of Johnston’s army
upon substantially the same terms as were given to General Lee.

The expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee got
off on the 20th of March, moving by way of Boone, North
Carolina, and struck the railroad at Wytheville, Chambersburg,
and Big Lick. The force striking it at Big Lick pushed on to
within a few miles of Lynchburg, destroying the important
bridges, while with the main force he effectually destroyed it
between New River and Big Lick, and then turned for Greensboro’,
on the North Carolina Railroad; struck that road and destroyed
the bridges between Danville and Greensboro’, and between
Greensboro’ and the Yadkin, together with the depots of supplies
along it, and captured four hundred prisoners. At Salisbury he
attacked and defeated a force of the enemy under General
Gardiner, capturing fourteen pieces of artillery and one
thousand three hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and destroyed
large amounts of army stores. At this place he destroyed
fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges towards Charlotte.
Thence he moved to Slatersville.

General Canby, who had been directed in January to make
preparations for a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and
the interior of Alabama, commenced his movement on the 20th of
March. The 16th corps, Major-General A. J. Smith commanding,
moved from Fort Gaines by water to Fish River; the 13th corps,
under Major-General Gordon Granger, moved from Fort Morgan and
joined the 16th corps on Fish River, both moving thence on
Spanish Fort and investing it on the 27th; while Major-General
Steele’s command moved from Pensacola, cut the railroad leading
from Tensas to Montgomery, effected a junction with them, and
partially invested Fort Blakely. After a severe bombardment of
Spanish Fort, a part of its line was carried on the 8th of
April. During the night the enemy evacuated the fort. Fort
Blakely was carried by assault on the 9th, and many prisoners
captured; our loss was considerable. These successes
practically opened to us the Alabama River, and enabled us to
approach Mobile from the north. On the night of the 11th the
city was evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on
the morning of the 12th.

The expedition under command of Brevet Major-General Wilson,
consisting of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was
delayed by rains until March 22d, when it moved from Chickasaw,
Alabama. On the 1st of April, General Wilson encountered the
enemy in force under Forrest near Ebenezer Church, drove him in
confusion, captured three hundred prisoners and three guns, and
destroyed the central bridge over the Cahawba River. On the 2d
he attacked and captured the fortified city of Selma, defended
by Forrest, with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns,
destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops,
vast quantities of stores, and captured three thousand
prisoners. On the 4th he captured and destroyed Tuscaloosa. On
the 10th he crossed the Alabama River, and after sending
information of his operations to General Canby, marched on
Montgomery, which place he occupied on the 14th, the enemy
having abandoned it. At this place many stores and five
steamboats fell into our hands. Thence a force marched direct
on Columbus, and another on West Point, both of which places
were assaulted and captured on the 16th. At the former place we
got one thousand five hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns,
destroyed two gunboats, the navy yard, foundries, arsenal, many
factories, and much other public property. At the latter place
we got three hundred prisoners, four guns, and destroyed
nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars. On the 20th he
took possession of Macon, Georgia, with sixty field-guns, one
thousand two hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by
General Howell Cobb. General Wilson, hearing that Jeff. Davis
was trying to make his escape, sent forces in pursuit and
succeeded in capturing him on the morning of May 11th.

On the 4th day of May, General Dick Taylor surrendered to
General Canby all the remaining rebel forces east of the
Mississippi.

A force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy
under Kirby Smith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put
in motion for Texas, and Major-General Sheridan designated for
its immediate command; but on the 26th day of May, and before
they reached their destination, General Kirby Smith surrendered
his entire command to Major-General Canby. This surrender did
not take place, however, until after the capture of the rebel
President and Vice-President; and the bad faith was exhibited of
first disbanding most of his army and permitting an
indiscriminate plunder of public property.

Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against
the government had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico,
carrying with them arms rightfully belonging to the United
States, which had been surrendered to us by agreement among them
some of the leaders who had surrendered in person and the
disturbed condition of affairs on the Rio Grande, the orders for
troops to proceed to Texas were not changed.

There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and
movements to defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most
of them reflecting great credit on our arms, and which
contributed greatly to our final triumph, that I have not
mentioned. Many of these will be found clearly set forth in the
reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and brief
dispatches announcing them, and others, I regret to say, have
not as yet been officially reported.

For information touching our Indian difficulties, I would
respectfully refer to the reports of the commanders of
departments in which they have occurred.

It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the West and
the East fight battles, and from what I have seen I know there
is no difference in their fighting qualities. All that it was
possible for men to do in battle they have done. The Western
armies commenced their battles in the Mississippi Valley, and
received the final surrender of the remnant of the principal
army opposed to them in North Carolina. The armies of the East
commenced their battles on the river from which the Army of the
Potomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of
their old antagonists at Appomattox Court House, Virginia. The
splendid achievements of each have nationalized our victories
removed all sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately
experienced too much), and the cause of crimination and
recrimination that might have followed had either section failed
in its duty. All have a proud record, and all sections can well
congratulate themselves and each other for having done their
full share in restoring the supremacy of law over every foot of
territory belonging to the United States. Let them hope for
perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood,
however mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of
valor.

I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

THE END

__________
FOOTNOTES

(*1) Afterwards General Gardner, C.S.A.

(*2) General Garland expressed a wish to get a message back to
General Twiggs, his division commander, or General Taylor, to
the effect that he was nearly out of ammunition and must have
more sent to him, or otherwise be reinforced. Deeming the
return dangerous he did not like to order any one to carry it,
so he called for a volunteer. Lieutenant Grant offered his
services, which were accepted.–PUBLISHERS.

(*3) Mentioned in the reports of Major Lee, Colonel Garland and
General Worth.–PUBLISHERS.

(*4) NOTE.–It had been a favorite idea with General Scott for a
great many years before the Mexican war to have established in
the United States a soldiers’ home, patterned after something of
the kind abroad, particularly, I believe, in France. He
recommended this uniformly, or at least frequently, in his
annual reports to the Secretary of War, but never got any
hearing. Now, as he had conquered the state, he made
assessments upon the different large towns and cities occupied
by our troops, in proportion to their capacity to pay, and
appointed officers to receive the money. In addition to the sum
thus realized he had derived, through capture at Cerro Gordo,
sales of captured government tobacco, etc., sums which swelled
the fund to a total of about $220,000. Portions of this fund
were distributed among the rank and file, given to the wounded
in hospital, or applied in other ways, leaving a balance of some
$118,000 remaining unapplied at the close of the war. After the
war was over and the troops all home, General Scott applied to
have this money, which had never been turned into the Treasury
of the United States, expended in establishing such homes as he
had previously recommended. This fund was the foundation of the
Soldiers’ Home at Washington City, and also one at Harrodsburgh,
Kentucky.

The latter went into disuse many years ago. In fact it never
had many soldiers in it, and was, I believe, finally sold.

(*5) The Mexican war made three presidential candidates, Scott,
Taylor and Pierce–and any number of aspirants for that high
office. It made also governors of States, members of the
cabinet, foreign ministers and other officers of high rank both
in state and nation. The rebellion, which contained more war in
a single day, at some critical periods, than the whole Mexican
war in two years, has not been so fruitful of political results
to those engaged on the Union side. On the other side, the side
of the South, nearly every man who holds office of any sort
whatever, either in the state or in the nation, was a
Confederate soldier, but this is easily accounted for from the
fact that the South was a military camp, and there were very few
people of a suitable age to be in the army who were not in it.

(*6) C. B. Lagow, the others not yet having joined me.

(*7) NOTE.–Since writing this chapter I have received from Mrs.
W. H. L. Wallace, widow of the gallant general who was killed in
the first day’s fight on the field of Shiloh, a letter from
General Lew. Wallace to him dated the morning of the 5th. At
the date of this letter it was well known that the Confederates
had troops out along the Mobile & Ohio railroad west of Crump’s
landing and Pittsburg landing, and were also collecting near
Shiloh. This letter shows that at that time General Lew.
Wallace was making preparations for the emergency that might
happen for the passing of reinforcements between Shiloh and his
position, extending from Crump’s landing westward, and he sends
it over the road running from Adamsville to the Pittsburg
landing and Purdy road. These two roads intersect nearly a mile
west of the crossing of the latter over Owl Creek, where our
right rested. In this letter General Lew. Wallace advises
General W. H. L. Wallace that he will send “to-morrow” (and his
letter also says “April 5th,” which is the same day the letter
was dated and which, therefore, must have been written on the
4th) some cavalry to report to him at his headquarters, and
suggesting the propriety of General W. H. L. Wallace’s sending a
company back with them for the purpose of having the cavalry at
the two landings familiarize themselves with the road so that
they could “act promptly in case of emergency as guides to and
from the different camps.”

This modifies very materially what I have said, and what has
been said by others, of the conduct of General Lew. Wallace at
the battle of Shiloh. It shows that he naturally, with no more
experience than he had at the time in the profession of arms,
would take the particular road that he did start upon in the
absence of orders to move by a different road.

The mistake he made, and which probably caused his apparent
dilatoriness, was that of advancing some distance after he found
that the firing, which would be at first directly to his front
and then off to the left, had fallen back until it had got very
much in rear of the position of his advance. This falling back
had taken place before I sent General Wallace orders to move up
to Pittsburg landing and, naturally, my order was to follow the
road nearest the river. But my order was verbal, and to a staff
officer who was to deliver it to General Wallace, so that I am
not competent to say just what order the General actually
received.

General Wallace’s division was stationed, the First brigade at
Crump’s landing, the Second out two miles, and the Third two and
a half miles out. Hearing the sounds of battle General Wallace
early ordered his First and Third brigades to concentrate on the
Second. If the position of our front had not changed, the road
which Wallace took would have been somewhat shorter to our right
than the River road.

U. S. GRANT.

MOUNT MACGREGOR, NEW YORK, June 21, 1885.

(*8) NOTE: In an article on the battle of Shiloh which I wrote
for the Century Magazine, I stated that General A. McD. McCook,
who commanded a division of Buell’s army, expressed some
unwillingness to pursue the enemy on Monday, April 7th, because
of the condition of his troops. General Badeau, in his history,
also makes the same statement, on my authority. Out of justice
to General McCook and his command, I must say that they left a
point twenty-two miles east of Savannah on the morning of the
6th. From the heavy rains of a few days previous and the
passage of trains and artillery, the roads were necessarily deep
in mud, which made marching slow. The division had not only
marched through this mud the day before, but it had been in the
rain all night without rest. It was engaged in the battle of
the second day and did as good service as its position
allowed. In fact an opportunity occurred for it to perform a
conspicuous act of gallantry which elicited the highest
commendation from division commanders in the Army of the
Tennessee. General Sherman both in his memoirs and report makes
mention of this fact. General McCook himself belongs to a family
which furnished many volunteers to the army. I refer to these
circumstances with minuteness because I did General McCook
injustice in my article in the Century, though not to the extent
one would suppose from the public press. I am not willing to do
any one an injustice, and if convinced that I have done one, I
am always willing to make the fullest admission.

(*9) NOTE.–For gallantry in the various engagements, from the
time I was left in command down to 26th of October and on my
recommendation, Generals McPherson and C. S. Hamilton were
promoted to be Major-Generals, and Colonels C. C. Marsh, 20th
Illinois, M. M. Crocker, 13th Iowa J. A. Mower, 11th Missouri,
M. D. Leggett, 78th Ohio, J. D. Stevenson, 7th Missouri, and
John E. Smith, 45th Illinois, to be Brigadiers.

(*10) Colonel Ellet reported having attacked a Confederate
battery on the Red River two days before with one of his boats,
the De Soto. Running aground, he was obliged to abandon his
vessel. However, he reported that he set fire to her and blew
her up. Twenty of his men fell into the hands of the enemy.
With the balance he escaped on the small captured steamer, the
New Era, and succeeded in passing the batteries at Grand Gulf
and reaching the vicinity of Vicksburg.

(*11) One of Colonel Ellet’s vessels which had run the blockade
on February the 2d and been sunk in the Red River.

(*12) NOTE.–On this occasion Governor Richard Yates, of
Illinois, happened to be on a visit to the army and accompanied
me to Carthage. I furnished an ambulance for his use and that
of some of the State officers who accompanied him.

(*13) NOTE.–When General Sherman first learned of the move I
proposed to make, he called to see me about it. I recollect
that I had transferred my headquarters from a boat in the river
to a house a short distance back from the levee. I was seated
on the piazza engaged in conversation with my staff when Sherman
came up. After a few moments’ conversation he said that he would
like to see me alone. We passed into the house together and shut
the door after us. Sherman then expressed his alarm at the move
I had ordered, saying that I was putting myself in a position
voluntarily which an enemy would be glad to manoeuvre a year–or
a long time–to get me in. I was going into the enemy’s country,
with a large river behind me and the enemy holding points
strongly fortified above and below. He said that it was an
axiom in war that when any great body of troops moved against an
enemy they should do so from a base of supplies, which they would
guard as they would the apple of the eye, etc. He pointed out
all the difficulties that might be encountered in the campaign
proposed, and stated in turn what would be the true campaign to
make. This was, in substance, to go back until high ground
could be reached on the east bank of the river; fortify there
and establish a depot of supplies, and move from there, being
always prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster. I
said this would take us back to Memphis. Sherman then said that
was the very place he would go to, and would move by railroad
from Memphis to Grenada, repairing the road as we advanced. To
this I replied, the country is already disheartened over the
lack of success on the part of our armies; the last election
went against the vigorous prosecution of the war, voluntary
enlistments had ceased throughout most of the North and
conscription was already resorted to, and if we went back so far
as Memphis it would discourage the people so much that bases of
supplies would be of no use: neither men to hold them nor
supplies to put in them would be furnished. The problem for us
was to move forward to a decisive victory, or our cause was
lost. No progress was being made in any other field, and we had
to go on.

Sherman wrote to my adjutant general, Colonel J. A. Rawlins,
embodying his views of the campaign that should be made, and
asking him to advise me to at least get the views of my generals
upon the subject. Colonel Rawlins showed me the letter, but I
did not see any reason for changing my plans. The letter was
not answered and the subect was not subsequently mentioned
between Sherman and myself to the end of the war, that I
remember of. I did not regard the letter as official, and
consequently did not preserve it. General Sherman furnished a
copy himself to General Badeau, who printed it in his history of
my campaigns. I did not regard either the conversation between
us or the letter to my adjutant-general as protests, but simply
friendly advice which the relations between us fully
justified. Sherman gave the same energy to make the campaign a
success that he would or could have done if it had been ordered
by himself. I make this statement here to correct an impression
which was circulated at the close of the war to Sherman’s
prejudice, and for which there was no fair foundation.

(*14) Meant Edward’s Station.

(*15) CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.

MAJ0R-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN:

Enclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to
Major-General Thomas. You having been over the ground in
person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further
instructions will not be necessary for you. It is particularly
desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad
between Cleveland and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from
communication with the South, but being confronted by a large
force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is
to be effected until the result of our first effort is known.

I will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions to
Thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which,
if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the Tennessee above
Chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland or
thereabouts.

U. S. GRANT
Maj.-Gen’l.

CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS,
Chattanooga:

All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy’s
position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday at daylight. Not being
provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the
mountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannot
be given as might be desirable. However, the general plan, you
understand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with him
strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a
crossing of the Tennessee River just below the mouth of
Chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the
heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your
chief of artillery), and to secure the heights on the northern
extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can
concentrate against him. You will co-operate with Sherman. The
troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your
left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend
fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of
one division in readiness to move wherever ordered. This
division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the
most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. Your
effort then will be to form a junction with Sherman, making your
advance well towards the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and
moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. The
junction once formed and the ridge carried, communications will
be at once established between the two armies by roads on the
south bank of the river. Further movements will then depend on
those of the enemy. Lookout Valley, I think, will be easily
held by Geary’s division and what troops you may still have
there belonging to the old Army of the Cumberland. Howard’s
corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at
Chattanooga or with Sherman. It should be marched on Friday
night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower
down than the first pontoon-bridge, and there held in readiness
for such orders as may become necessary. All these troops will
be provided with two days’ cooked rations in haversacks, and one
hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry
soldier. Special care should be taken by all officers to see
that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away. You
will call on the engineer department for such preparations as
you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery
over the creek.

U. S. GRANT,
Major-General.

(*16) In this order authority was given for the troops to reform
after taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carrying
the ridge.

(*17) CHATTANOOGA, November 24,1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL. CEO. H. THOMAS,
Chattanooga

General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel
with only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunnel
and on top of the hill, his left at Chickamauga Creek. I have
instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in
the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will
be in cooperation. Your command will either carry the
rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the
left, as the presence of the enemy may require. If Hooker’s
position on the mountain [cannot be maintained] with a small
force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where
he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with
all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable
road.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General.

(*18) WASHINGTON, D. C.,
December 8, 1863, 10.2 A.M.

MAJ.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

Understanding that your lodgment at Knoxville and at Chattanooga
is now secure, I wish to tender you, and all under your command,
my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill,
courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great
difficulties, have effected that important object. God bless you
all,

A. LINCOLN,

President U. S.

(*19) General John G. Foster.

(*20) During this winter the citizens of Jo Davies County, Ill.,
subscribed for and had a diamond-hilled sword made for General
Grant, which was always known as the Chattanooga sword. The
scabbard was of gold, and was ornamented with a scroll running
nearly its entire length, displaying in engraved letters the
names of the battles in which General Grant had participated.

Congress also gave him a vote of thanks for the victories at
Chattanooga, and voted him a gold medal for Vicksburg and
Chattanooga. All such things are now in the possession of the
government at Washington.

(*21) WASHINGTON, D. C.
December 29, 1863.

MAJ.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

General Foster has asked to be relieved from his command on
account of disability from old wounds. Should his request be
granted, who would you like as his successor? It is possible
that Schofield will be sent to your command.

H. W. HALLECK
General-in-Chief.
(OFFICIAL.)

(*22) See letter to Banks, in General Grant’s report, Appendix.

(*23) [PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
April 4, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

GENERAL:–It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me
to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts
of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre. For
your information I now write you my programme, as at present
determined upon.

I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up
his present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to
turn over the defence of Red River to General Steele and the
navy and to return your troops to you and his own to New
Orleans; to abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to
hold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the
number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest number
necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less
than twenty-five thousand men. To this I will add five thousand
men from Missouri. With this force he is to commence operations
against Mobile as soon as he can. It will be impossible for him
to commence too early.

Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate
against Richmond from the south side of the James River. This
will give Butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, W.
F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces and Gillmore
the left wing. I will stay with the Army of the Potomac,
increased by Burnside’s corps of not less than twenty-five
thousand effective men, and operate directly against Lee’s army,
wherever it may be found.

Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one,
under Ord and Averell, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the
other, under Crook, to start from Charleston on the Kanawha, to
move against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.

Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about
Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord. His force will
be all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand
men of all arms.

You I propose to move against Johnston’s army, to break it up
and to get into the interior of the enemy’s country as far as
you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war
resources.

I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but
simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave
you free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however,
as early as you can, your plan of operations.

As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he
can. Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the
18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. Sigel is
concentrating now. None will move from their places of
rendezvous until I direct, except Banks. I want to be ready to
move by the 25th inst., if possible. But all I can now direct
is that you get ready as soon as possible. I know you will have
difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to
where supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplish
it.

From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do
not calculate on very great results; but it is the only way I
can take troops from there. With the long line of railroad
Sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to move
directly to his front. In this way he must get through to
inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from
one of his armies a large force to prevent it. In other words,
if Sigel can’t skin himself he can hold a leg while some one
else skins.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

(*24) See instructions to Butler, in General Grant’s report,
Appendix.

(*25) IN FIELD, CULPEPER C. H., VA.,
April 9, 1864.

MAJ.-GENERAL GEO. G. MEADE
Com’d’g Army of the Potomac.

For information and as instruction to govern your preparations
for the coming campaign, the following is communicated
confidentially for your own perusal alone.

So far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and
towards one common centre. Banks has been instructed to turn
over the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and the
navy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande, and
to concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25,000 men, to
move on Mobile. This he is to do without reference to other
movements. From the scattered condition of his command,
however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleans
before the 1st of May, if so soon. Sherman will move at the same
time you do, or two or three days in advance, Jo. Johnston’s army
being his objective point, and the heart of Georgia his ultimate
aim. If successful he will secure the line from Chattanooga to
Mobile with the aid of Banks.

Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of
the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his
front. This he has been directed to do, and is now making
preparations for it. Two columns of his command will make south
at the same time with the general move; one from Beverly, from
ten to twelve thousand strong, under Major-General Ord; the
other from Charleston, Va., principally cavalry, under
Brig.-General Crook. The former of these will endeavor to reach
the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, about south of Covington,
and if found practicable will work eastward to Lynchburg and
return to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley, or join
you. The other will strike at Saltville, Va., and come eastward
to join Ord. The cavalry from Ord’s command will try tributaries
would furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies to
within easy hauling distance of every position the army could
occupy from the Rapidan to the James River. But Lee could, if
he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather
interior to the one I would have to take in following. A
movement by his left–our right–would obviate this; but all
that was done would have to be done with the supplies and
ammunition we started with. All idea of adopting this latter
plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies
possible to take with us was considered. The country over which
we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that
we would be obliged to carry everything with us.

While these preparations were going on the enemy was not
entirely idle. In the West Forrest made a raid in West
Tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of
four or five hundred men at Union City, and followed it up by an
attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio. While he
was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any
part of the garrison. On the first intelligence of Forrest’s
raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against him,
and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself
into. Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him
before he got my order.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at
Fort Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of
the Mississippi River. The garrison to force a passage
southward, if they are successful in reaching the Virginia and
Tennessee Railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting
Richmond with all the South and South-west.

Gillmore will join Butler with about 10,000 men from South
Carolina. Butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000
men into the field directly to his front. The force will be
commanded by Maj.-General W. F. Smith. With Smith and Gillmore,
Butler will seize City Point, and operate against Richmond from
the south side of the river. His movement will be simultaneous
with yours.

Lee’s army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes,
there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now in
doubt is, whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above
or below him. Each plan presents great advantages over the
other with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee is
cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going north on
a raid. But if we take this route, all we do must be done
whilst the rations we start with hold out. We separate from
Butler so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. By the
other route Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies
until another is secured on the York or James rivers.

These advantages and objections I will talk over with you more
fully than I can write them.

Burnside with a force of probably 25,000 men will reinforce
you. Immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after
the 20th inst., I will give him the defence of the road from
Bull Run as far south as we wish to hold it. This will enable
you to collect all your strength about Brandy Station and to the
front.

There will be naval co-operation on the James River, and
transports and ferries will be provided so that should Lee fall
back into his intrenchments at Richmond, Butler’s force and
yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such.
What I would direct then, is that you commence at once reducing
baggage to the very lowest possible standard. Two wagons to a
regiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that should
be allowed, for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and
ordnance stores. One wagon to brigade and one to division
headquarters is sufficient and about two to corps headquarters.

Should by Lee’s right flank be our route, you will want to make
arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded
to White [louse on the Pamunkey. Your estimates for this
contingency should be made at once. If not wanted there, there
is every probability they will be wanted on the James River or
elsewhere.

If Lee’s left is turned, large provision will have to be made
for ordnance stores. I would say not much short of five hundred
rounds of infantry ammunition would do. By the other, half the
amount would be sufficient.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

(*26) General John A. Logan, upon whom devolved the command of
the Army of the Tennessee during this battle, in his report gave
our total loss in killed, wounded and missing at 3,521; and
estimated that of the enemy to be not less than 10,000: and
General G. M. Dodge, graphically describing to General Sherman
the enemy’s attack, the full weight of which fell first upon and
was broken by his depleted command, remarks: “The disparity of
forces can be seen from the fact that in the charge made by my
two brigades under Fuller and Mersy they took 351 prisoners,
representing forty-nine different regiments, eight brigades and
three divisions; and brought back eight battle flags from the
enemy.”

(*27)
UNION ARMY ON THE RAPIDAN, MAY 5, 1864.

[COMPILED.]

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

MAJ.-GEN. W. S. HANCOCK, commanding Second Army Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow.
First Brigade, Col. Nelson A. Miles.
Second Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Smyth.
Third Brigade, Col. Paul Frank.
Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke.

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alex. S. Webb.
Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joshua T. Owen.
Third Brigade, Col. Samuel S. Carroll.

Third Division, Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. H. H. Ward.
Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Hays.

Fourth Divisin, Brig.-Gen. Gershom Mott.
First Brigade, Col. Robert McAllister.
Second Brigade, Col. Wm. R. Brewster.

Artillery Brigade, Col. John C. Tidball.

MAJ.-GEN. G. K. WARREN, commanding Fifth Army Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffin.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres.
Second Brigade, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer.
Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. J. Bartlett.

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson.
First Brigade, Col. Samuel H. Leonard.
Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry Baxter.
Third Brigade, Col. Andrew W. Denison.

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford.
First Brigade, Col. Wm McCandless.
Third Brigade, Col. Joseph W. Fisher.

Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Lysander Cutler.
Second Brigade Brig.-Gen. James C. Rice.
Third Brigade, Col. Roy Stone

Artillery Brigade, Col. S. S. Wainwright.

MAJ.-GEN. JOHN SEDGWICK, commanding Sixth Army Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. H. G. Wright.
First Brigade, Col. Henry W. Brown.
Second Brigade, Col. Emory Upton.
Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. D. A. Russell.
Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Shaler.

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. George W. Getty.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton.
Second Brigade, Col. Lewis A. Grant.
Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thos. H. Neill.
Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Eustis.

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. James Ricketts.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wm. H. Morris.
Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. T. Seymour.

Artillery Brigade, Col. C. H. Tompkins

MAJ.-GEN. P. H. SHERIDAN, commanding Cavalry Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. A. T. A. Torbert.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. G. A. Custer.
Second Brigade, Col. Thos. C. Devin.
Reserve Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wesley Merritt

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. D. McM. Gregg.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry E. Davies, Jr.
Second Brigade, Col. J. Irvin Gregg.

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Wilson.
First Brigade, Col. T. M. Bryan, Jr.
Second Brigade, Col. Geo. H. Chapman.

MAJ.-GEN. A. E. BURNSIDE, commanding Ninth Army Corps.

First Division, Brig.-Gen. T. G. Stevenson.
First Brigade, Col. Sumner Carruth.
Second Brigade, Col. Daniel Leasure.

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Potter.
First Brigade, Col. Zenas R. Bliss.
Second Brigade, Col. Simon G. Griffin.

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Orlando Willcox.
First Brigade, Col. John F. Hartranft.
Second Brigade, Col. Benj. C. Christ.

Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. Edward Ferrero.
First Brigade, Col. Joshua K. Sigfried.
Second Brigade, Col. Henry G. Thomas.

Provisional Brigade, Col. Elisha G. Marshall.

BRIG.-GEN. HENRY J. HUNT, commanding Artillery.

Reserve, Col. H. S. Burton.
First Brigade, Col. J. H. Kitching.
Second Brigade, Maj. J. A. Tompkins.
First Brig. Horse Art., Capt. J. M. Robertson.
Second Brigade, Horse Art., Capt. D. R. Ransom.
Third Brigade, Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS…….
Provost Guard, Brig.-Gen. M. R. Patrick.
Volunteer Engineers, Brig.-Gen. H. W. Benham.

CONFEDERATE ARMY.

Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, Commanded by
GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, August 31st, 1834.

First Army Corps: LIEUT.-GEN. R. H. ANDERSON, Commanding.

MAJ.-GEN. GEO. E. PICKETT’S Division.
Brig.-Gen. Seth M. Barton’s Brigade. (a)
Brig.-Gen. M. D. Corse’s ”
” Eppa Hunton’s ”
” Wm. R. Terry’s ”

MAJ.-GEN. C. W. FIELD’S Division. (b)
Brig.-Gen. G. T. Anderson’s Brigade
” E. M. Law’s (c) ”
” John Bratton’s ”

MAJ.-GEN. J. B. KERSHAW’S Division. (d)
Brig.-Gen. W. T. Wofford’s Brigade
” B. G. Humphreys’ ”
” Goode Bryan’s ”
” Kershaw’s (Old) ”

Second Army Corps: MAJOR-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY, Commanding

MAJ.-GEN. JOHN B. GORDON’S Division.
Brig.-Gen. H. T. Hays’ Brigade. (e)
” John Pegram ‘s ” (f)
” Gordon’s ” (g)
Brig.-Gen. R. F. Hoke’s ”

MAJ.-GEN. EDWARD JOHNSON’S Division.
Stonewall Brig. (Brig.-Gen. J. A. Walker). (h)
Brig.-Gen. J M Jones’ Brigade. (h)
” Geo H. Stewart’s ” (h)
” L. A. Stafford’s ” (e)

MAJ.-GEN. R. E. RODES’ Division.
Brig.-Gen. J. Daniel’s Brigade. (i)
” Geo. Dole’s ” (k)
” S. D. Ramseur’s Brigade.
” C. A. Battle’s ”
” R. D. Johnston’s ” (f)

Third Army Corps: LIEUT.-GEN. A. P. HILL, Commanding.

MAJ.-GEN. WM. MAHONE’S Division. (l)
Brig.-Gen. J. C. C. Sanders’ Brigade.
Mahone’s ”
Brig.-Gen. N. H. Harris’s ” (m)
” A. R. Wright’s ”
” Joseph Finegan’s ”

MAJ.-GEN. C. M. WILCOX’S Division.
Brig.-Gen. E. L. Thomas’s Brigade (n)
” James H. Lane’s ”
” Sam’l McCowan’s ”
” Alfred M. Scale’s ”

MAJ.-GEN. H. HETH’S Division. (o)
Brig.-Gen. J. R. Davis’s Brigade.
” John R. Cooke’s ”
” D. McRae’s ”
” J. J. Archer’s ”
” H. H. Walker’s ”

_unattached_: 5th Alabama Battalion.

Cavalry Corps: LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WADE HAMPTON, Commanding.(p)

MAJ.-GEN. FITZHUGH LEE’S Division
Brig.-Gen. W. C. Wickham’s Brigade
” L. L. Lomax’s ”

MAJ.-GEN. M. C. BUTLER’S Division.
Brig.-Gen. John Dunovant’s Brigade.
” P. M. B. Young’s ”
” Thomas L. Rosser’s ”

MAJ.-GEN. W. H. F. LEE’S Division.
Brig.-Gen. Rufus Barringer’s Brigade.
” J. R. Chambliss’s ”

Artillery Reserve: BRIG.-GEN. W. N. PENDLETON, Commanding.

BRIG.-GEN. E. P. ALEXANDER’S DIVISION.*
Cabell’s Battalion.
Manly’s Battery.
1st Co. Richmond Howitzers.
Carleton’s Battery.
Calloway’s Battery.

Haskell’s Battalion.
Branch’s Battery.
Nelson’s ”
Garden’s ”
Rowan ”

Huger’s Battalion.
Smith’s Battery.
Moody ”
Woolfolk ”
Parker’s ”
Taylor’s ”
Fickling’s ”
Martin’s ”

Gibb’s Battalion.
Davidson’s Battery.
Dickenson’s ”
Otey’s ”

BRIG.-GEN. A. L. LONG’S DIVISION.

Braxton’s Battalion.
Lee Battery.
1st Md. Artillery.
Stafford ”
Alleghany ”

Cutshaw’s Battalion.
Charlotteville Artillery.
Staunton ”
Courtney ”

Carter’s Battalion.
Morris Artillery.
Orange ”
King William Artillery.
Jeff Davis ”

Nelson’s Battalion.
Amherst Artillery.
Milledge ”
Fluvauna ”

Brown’s Battalion.
Powhatan Artillery.
2d Richmond Howitzers.
3d ” ”
Rockbridge Artillery.
Salem Flying Artillery.

COL R. L.WALKER’S DIVISION.

Cutt’s Battalion.
Ross’s Battery.
Patterson’s Battery.
Irwin Artillery.

Richardson’s Battalion.
Lewis Artillery.
Donaldsonville Artillery.
Norfolk Light ”
Huger ”

Mclntosh ‘s Battalion.
Johnson’s Battery.
Hardaway Artillery.
Danville ”
2d Rockbridge Artillery.

Pegram’s Battalion.
Peedee Artillery.
Fredericksburg Artillery.
Letcher ”
Purcell Battery.
Crenshaw’s Battery.

Poague’s Battalion.
Madison Artillery.
Albemarle ”
Brooke ”
Charlotte ”

NOTE.
(a) COL. W. R. Aylett was in command Aug. 29th, and probably at
above date.
(b) Inspection report of this division shows that it also
contained Benning’s and Gregg’s Brigades. (c) Commanded by
Colonel P. D. Bowles.
(d) Only two brigadier-generals reported for duty; names not
indicated.

Organization of the Army of the Valley District. (e)
Constituting York’s Brigade.
(f) In Ramseur’s Division.
(g) Evan’s Brigade, Colonel E. N. Atkinson commanding, and
containing 12th Georgia Battalion.
(h) The Virginia regiments constituted Terry’s Brigade, Gordon’s
Division.
(i) Grimes’ Brigade.
(k) Cook’s ”

(l) Returns report but one general officer present for duty;
name not indicated.
(m) Colonel Joseph M. Jayne, commanding.
(n) Colonel Thomas J. Simmons, commanding. (o) Four
brigadier-generals reported present for duty; names not
indicated.
(p) On face of returns appears to have consisted of Hampton’s,
Fitz-Lee’s, and W. H. F. Lee’s Division, and Dearing’s Brigade.

*But one general officer reported present for duty in the
artillery, and Alexander’s name not on the original.

(*28) HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S.,
May II, 1864.–3 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5th and
6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps in
a vigorous assault on the enemy at four o’clock A.M. to-morrow.
will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay with
Burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and
vigorous attack. Warren and Wright should hold their corps as
close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any
diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any
opportunity presents itself. There is but little doubt in my
mind that the assault last evening would have proved entirely
successful if it had commenced one hour earlier and had been
heartily entered into by Mott’s division and the 9th corps.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

(*29) HEADQUARTERS, ARMIES U. S.,
May 11, 1864.-4 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE,
Commanding 9th Army Corps.

Major-General Hancock has been ordered to move his corps under
cover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against the
enemy at 4 o’clock A.M. to-morrow. You will move against the
enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible
vigor at precisely 4 o’clock A.M. to-morrow the12th inst. Let
your preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmost
secrecy and veiled entirely from the enemy.

I send two of my staff officers, Colonels Comstock and Babcock,
in whom I have great confidence and who are acquainted with the
direction the attack is to be made from here, to remain with you
and General Hancock with instructions to render you every
assistance in their power. Generals Warren and Wright will hold
their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage
of any diversion caused by yours and Hancock’s attack, and will
push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

(*30) HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S.,
May 12, 1864, 6.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
Washington, D. C.

The eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three and
four thousand prisoners in our hands for the day’s work,
including two general officers, and over thirty pieces of
artillery. The enemy are obstinate, and seem to have found the
last ditch. We have lost no organizations, not even that of a
company, whilst we have destroyed and captured one division
(Johnson’s), one brigade (Doles’), and one regiment entire from
the enemy.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut. -General.

(*31) SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 13, 1864.

HON E. M. STANTON, SECRETARY OF WAR,
Washington, D. C.

I beg leave to recommend the following promotions be made for
gallant and distinguished services in the last eight days’
battles, to wit: Brigadier-General H. G. Wright and
Brigadier-General John Gibbon to be Major-Generals; Colonel S.
S. Carroll, 8th Ohio Volunteers Colonel E. Upton, 121st New York
Volunteers; Colonel William McCandless, 2d Pennsylvania Reserves,
to be Brigadier-Generals. I would also recommend Major-General W.
S. Hancock for Brigadier-General in the regular army. His
services and qualifications are eminently deserving of this
recognition. In making these recommendations I do not wish the
claims of General G. M. Dodge for promotion forgotten, but
recommend his name to be sent in at the same time. I would also
ask to have General Wright assigned to the command of the Sixth
Army Corps. I would further ask the confirmation of General
Humphreys to the rank of Major-General.

General Meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations.
He and Sherman are the fittest officers for large commands I
have come in contact with. If their services can be rewarded by
promotion to the rank of Major-Generals in the regular army the
honor would be worthily bestowed, and I would feel personally
gratified. I would not like to see one of these promotions at
this time without seeing both.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

(*32) QUARLES’ MILLS, VA., May 26, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
Washington, D. C.

The relative position of the two armies is now as follows: Lee’s
right rests on a swamp east of the Richmond and Fredericksburg
road and south of the North Anna, his centre on the river at Ox
Ford, and his left at Little River with the crossings of Little
River guarded as far up as we have gone. Hancock with his corps
and one division of the 9th corps crossed at Chesterfield Ford
and covers the right wing of Lee’s army. One division of the 9th
corps is on the north bank of the Anna at Ox Ford, with bridges
above and below at points nearest to it where both banks are
held by us, so that it could reinforce either wing of our army
with equal facility. The 5th and 6th corps with one division of
the 9th corps run from the south bank of the Anna from a short
distance above Ox Ford to Little River, and parallel with and
near to the enemy.

To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter
of our men that even success would not justify. To turn the
enemy by his right, between the two Annas is impossible on
account of the swamp upon which his right rests. To turn him by
the left leaves Little River, New Found River and South Anna
River, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to
the movement of our army, to be crossed. I have determined
therefore to turn the enemy’s right by crossing at or near
Hanover Town. This crosses all three streams at once, and
leaves us still where we can draw supplies.

During the last night the teams and artillery not in position,
belonging to the right wing of our army, and one division of
that wing were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the river
and moved down to the rear of the left. As soon as it is dark
this division with most of the cavalry will commence a forced
march for Hanover Town to seize and hold the crossings. The
balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour, and
follow as rapidly as possible. The left wing will also withdraw
from the south bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of
the right wing. Lee’s army is really whipped. The prisoners we
now take show it, and the action of his army shows it
unmistakably. A battle with them outside of intrenchments
cannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the MORALE
over the enemy, and attack him with confidence. I may be
mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee’s army is already
assured. The promptness and rapidity with which you have
forwarded reinforcements has contributed largely to the feeling
of confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of the
enemy.

We are destroying all the rails we can on the Central and
Fredericksburg roads. I want to leave a gap on the roads north
of Richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to
import rail from elsewhere. Even if a crossing is not effected
at Hanover Town it will probably be necessary for us to move on
down the Pamunkey until a crossing is effected. I think it
advisable therefore to change our base of supplies from Port
Royal to the White House. I wish you would direct this change
at once, and also direct Smith to put the railroad bridge there
in condition for crossing troops and artillery and leave men to
hold it.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

(*33) NEAR COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864, 7 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding A. P.

The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed,
suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push it
vigorously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful
point from wherever they can be taken. I shall go to where you
are in the course of an hour.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut. -General.

(*34) COLD HARBOR, June 5,1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington,
D. C.

A full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would be
impracticable to hold a line north-east of Richmond that would
protect the Fredericksburg Railroad to enable us to use that
road for supplying the army. To do so would give us a long
vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our
strength to guard it, and would leave open to the enemy all of
his lines of communication on the south side of the James. My
idea from the start has been to beat Lee’s army if possible
north of Richmond; then after destroying his lines of
communication on the north side of the James River to transfer
the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or
follow him south if he should retreat.

I now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it
of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now
have. They act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or
feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where
in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them.
Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to
make all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of
the city. I have therefore resolved upon the following plan:

I will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied by
the Army of the Potomac, taking advantage of any favorable
circumstance that may present itself until the cavalry can be
sent west to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad from about
Beaver Dam for some twenty-five or thirty miles west. When this
is effected I will move the army to the south side of the James
River, either by crossing the Chickahominy and marching near to
City Point, or by going to the mouth of the Chickahominy on
north side and crossing there. To provide for this last and
most possible contingency, several ferry-boats of the largest
class ought to be immediately provided.

Once on the south side of the James River, I can cut off all
sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by the
canal. If Hunter succeeds in reaching Lynchburg, that will be
lost to him also. Should Hunter not succeed, I will still make
the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south
side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they
can.

The feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels
can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our
army is not only confident of protecting itself without
intrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever
and whenever he can be found without this protection.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

(*35) COLD HARBOR, VA., June 6, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER

Commanding Dept. W. Va.

General Sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning, with
instructions to proceed to Charlottesville, Va., and to commence
there the destruction of the Va. Cen. R. R., destroying this way
as much as possible. The complete destruction of this road and
of the canal on James River is of great importance to us.
According to the instructions I sent to General Halleck for your
guidance, you were to proceed to Lynchburg and commence there. It
would be of great value to us to get possession of Lynchburg for
a single day. But that point is of so much importance to the
enemy, that in attempting to get it such resistance may be met
as to defeat your getting onto the road or canal at all. I see,
in looking over the letter to General Halleck on the subject of
your instructions, that it rather indicates that your route
should be from Staunton via Charlottesville. If you have so
understood it, you will be doing just what I want. The
direction I would now give is, that if this letter reaches you
in the valley between Staunton and Lynchburg, you immediately
turn east by the most practicable road. From thence move
eastward along the line of the road, destroying it completely
and thoroughly, until you join General Sheridan. After the work
laid out for General Sheridan and yourself is thoroughly done,
proceed to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid out in
General Sheridan’s instructions.

If any portion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed
back in your Department, you are authorized to send it back.

If on receipt of this you should be near to Lynchburg and deem
it practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy the canal.
Lose no opportunity to destroy the canal.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

(*36) FROM A STATEMENT OF LOSSES COMPILED IN THE
ADJUTANT-GENERAL’S OFFICE.

FIELD OF ACTION AND DATE. | KILLED. | WOUNDED. | MISSING. |
AGGREGATE. |

Wilderness, May 5th to 7th | 2,261 | 8,785 | 2,902 |13,948 |
Spottsylvania, May 8th to 21st | 2,271 | 9,360 | 1,970 | 13,601|
North Anna, May 23d to 27th | 186 | 792 | 165 | 1,143 |
Totopotomoy, May 27th to 31st | 99 | 358 | 52 | 509 | Cold
Harbor, May 31st to June 12th | 1,769 | 6,752 | 1,537 |10,058 |
Total ……………. | 6,586 | 26,047 | 6,626 | 39,259 |

(*37) CITY POINT, VA., June 17, 1864. 11 A.M.

MAJOR-GEN. HALLECK,
Washington, D. C.

* * * * * * *

The enemy in their endeavor to reinforce Petersburg abandoned
their intrenchments in front of Bermuda Hundred. They no doubt
expected troops from north of the James River to take their
place before we discovered it. General Butler took advantage of
this and moved a force at once upon the railroad and plank road
between Richmond and Petersburg, which I hope to retain
possession of.

Too much credit cannot be given to the troops and their
commanders for the energy and fortitude displayed during the
last five days. Day and night has been all the same, no delays
being allowed on any account.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

(*38) CITY POINT, VA., July 24, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding, etc.

The engineer officers who made a survey of the front from
Bermuda Hundred report against the probability of success from
an attack there. The chances they think will be better on
Burnside’s front. If this is attempted it will be necessary to
concentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemy’s
line we expect to penetrate. All officers should be fully
impressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond
the enemy’s present line, if they should succeed in penetrating
it, and of getting back to their present line promptly if they
should not succeed in breaking through.

To the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery
possible should be brought to play upon the enemy in front
during the assault. Their lines would be sufficient for the
support of the artillery, and all the reserves could be brought
on the flanks of their commands nearest to the point of assault,
ready to follow in if successful. The field artillery and
infantry held in the lines during the first assault should be in
readiness to move at a moment’s notice either to their front or
to follow the main assault, as they should receive orders. One
thing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders. If
they see the enemy giving away on their front or moving from it
to reinforce a heavily assaulted portion of their line, they
should take advantage of such knowledge and act promptly without
waiting for orders from army commanders. General Ord can
co-operate with his corps in this movement, and about five
thousand troops from Bermuda Hundred can be sent to reinforce
you or can be used to threaten an assault between the Appomattox
and James rivers, as may be deemed best.

This should be done by Tuesday morning, if done at all. If not
attempted, we will then start at the date indicated to destroy
the railroad as far as Hicksford at least, and to Weldon if
possible.

* * * * * * *

Whether we send an expedition on the road or assault at
Petersburg, Burnside’s mine will be blown up….

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

(*39) See letter, August 5th, Appendix.

(*40) See Appendix, letters of Oct. 11th.

(*41) CITY POINT, VA., December 2,1864.

MAJ0R-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville Tenn.

If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, you will
lose all the road back to Chattanooga and possibly have to
abandon the line of the Tennessee. Should he attack you it is
all well, but if he does not you should attack him before he
fortifies. Arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster
employees, citizens, etc.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 2, 1864.–1.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

With your citizen employees armed, you can move out of Nashville
with all your army and force the enemy to retire or fight upon
ground of your own choosing. After the repulse of Hood at
Franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to
Nashville we should have taken the offensive against the enemy
where he was. At this distance, however, I may err as to the
best method of dealing with the enemy. You will now suffer
incalculable injury upon your railroads if Hood is not speedily
disposed of. Put forth therefore every possible exertion to
attain this end. Should you get him to retreating give him no
peace.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 5, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

Is there not danger of Forrest moving down the Cumberland to
where he can cross it? It seems to me whilst you should be
getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after
Forrest, Hood should be attacked where he is. Time strengthens
him in all possibility as much as it does you.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 6, 1864–4 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

Attack Hood at once and wait no longer for a remnant of your
cavalry. There is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign
back to the Ohio River.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 8, 1864.–8.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

Your dispatch of yesterday received. It looks to me evident the
enemy are trying to cross the Cumberland River, and are
scattered. Why not attack at once? By all means avoid the
contingency of a foot race to see which, you or Hood, can beat
to the Ohio. If you think necessary call on the governors of
States to send a force into Louisville to meet the enemy if he
should cross the river. You clearly never should cross except
in rear of the enemy. Now is one of the finest opportunities
ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the
enemy. If destroyed he never can replace it. Use the means at
your command, and you can do this and cause a rejoicing that
will resound from one end of the land to the other.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 11, 1864.–4 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

If you delay attack longer the mortifying spectacle will be
witnessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio River, and you
will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find. Let
there be no further delay. Hood cannot even stand a drawn
battle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores. If he
retreats and you follow, he must lose his material and much of
his army. I am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you to-day
announcing that you have moved. Delay no longer for weather or
reinforcements.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 15, 1864.

MAJ0R-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dispatch from
Van Duzer detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall go
no further. Push the enemy now and give him no rest until he is
entirely destroyed. Your army will cheerfully suffer many
privations to break up Hood’s army and render it useless for
future operations. Do not stop for trains or supplies, but take
them from the country as the enemy have done. Much is now
expected.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

(*42) See orders to Major-General Meade, Ord, and Sheridan,
March 24th, Appendix.

(*43) See Appendix.

(*44) NOTE.–The fac-simile of the terms of Lee’s surrender
inserted at this place, was copied from the original document
furnished the publishers through the courtesy of General Ely S.
Parker, Military Secretary on General Grant’s staff at the time
of the surrender.

Three pages of paper were prepared in General Grant’s manifold
order book on which he wrote the terms, and the interlineations
and erasures were added by General Parker at the suggestion of
General Grant. After such alteration it was handed to General
Lee, who put on his glasses, read it, and handed it back to
General Grant. The original was then transcribed by General
Parker upon official headed paper and a copy furnished General
Lee.

The fac-simile herewith shows the color of the paper of the
original document and all interlineations and erasures.

There is a popular error to the effect that Generals Grant and
Lee each signed the articles of surrender. The document in the
form of a letter was signed only by General Grant, in the parlor
of McLean’s house while General Lee was sitting in the room, and
General Lee immediately wrote a letter accepting the terms and
handed it to General Grant.

End of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant Volume Two

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Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Volume Two.
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